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Dialectical materialism

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Introduction

The creation of a textbook on Marxist-Leninist philosophy for Communist colleges and universities is one of the most important tasks that the party has long set for Communists working on the philosophical sector of the theoretical front. For a variety of reasons, however, this crucial task has not yet been solved in any satisfactory way.

The discussion on the philosophical front and the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) on the journal "Under the banner of Marxism" focused the attention of the workers of the philosophical front on the task of creating a party textbook on Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The task was to provide a textbook with an in-depth and at the same time fairly popular systematic exposition of the foundations of dialectical and historical materialism, containing a strong criticism of the mechanistic and Menshevik-idealist perversions of Marxism-Leninism; to provide a comprehensive exposure of the social-fascist textbooks of Kautsky, Kunov, M. Adler, and others.

Two parts of this collective work are one of the first experiments in creating such a textbook. The authors and editors set as their goal:: 1) elucidation of the main questions of dialectical materialism and its application to the history of society and the world-historical practice of the proletariat, which were elaborated and classically expressed by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin; 2) elimination of the gap created by the mechanists and Menshevik idealists between theory and practice, between philosophy and politics of the proletariat, between worldview and ideology, between materialism and dialectics; 3) highlighting the issues of dialectical and historical materialism on the basis of a critique of bourgeois philosophy and sociology, as well as contemporary social-fascist views; 4) highlighting the role of philosophy in the struggle for the general party line on two fronts - against right and "left" opportunism and counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, against mechanismism and counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. Menshevik idealism as the philosophical basis for deviations from the general line of the party; 5) identifying and highlighting the new features that Marxism-Leninism, represented by Lenin and Stalin, brings to the general treasury of Marxist philosophy.

These are the goals that determine the content of the book and the nature of the arrangement of the material presented in it.

The book is far from being free of a number of serious flaws. Only further work on this material, only the help and instructions of the entire readership, and first of all of all the workers of the philosophical front, only a detailed Bolshevik self-criticism will make it possible to make all the necessary corrections and improvements in subsequent editions of the textbook.

In the work on the first part of the textbook, tt. Bazilevsky, Bobrovnikov, Vandek, Lipendin, Maegov, Makarov, Mitin, Sitkovsky, Tashchilin, Shevkin, Shorin, Cheremnykh. General management, material processing, and text editing belong to T. Mitin.

Chapter 1. Marxism-Leninism — the worldview of the proletariat

1.1. Three sources and three components of Marxism

Marxism is a coherent and consistent system of views — the ideology of the proletariat, which was developed by Marx and Engels and further developed in relation to the new historical epoch — the epoch of imperialism and the proletarian revolution — by Lenin and Stalin. This teaching, which is distinguished by its exceptional depth and integrity, is comprehensive: it covers the whole body of knowledge, starting with the problems of the philosophical worldview and ending with the problems of strategy and tactics of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. Marxism shows the proletariat the path of liberation from the shackles of capitalist slavery, the path of revolutionary destruction of the capitalist system, the path of building a classless communist society.

The main thing In Marxism, it is the doctrine of the world-historical role of the proletariat as the creator of socialist society — the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marxism-Leninism is the only completely correct revolutionary teaching. "In Marxism, there is nothing like 'sectarianism' in the sense of some closed, ossified doctrine that has emerged *on the sidelines* from the pillar road of the development of world civilization"¹. Marxism is a brilliant continuation and completion of the three most important ideological trends of the early nineteenth century, which were developed in the three main countries of Europe. Marxism has given a profoundly scientific and revolutionary answer to all the questions that advanced human thought has already raised. The doctrine of Marxism is "the legitimate successor of the best that mankind created in the nineteenth century in the form of *German philosophy, English political economy, and French socialism* »²."

Marxism as a socio-political trend emerged and took shape at a time when the proletariat was mature enough to set itself the task of emancipation with all its acuteness. Marxism emerged at a time when the proletariat was beginning to enter the world-historical arena, when *the contradiction between the social character of production and the private-property character of appropriation*, which characterizes the capitalist mode of production and serves as the source of all the antagonistic contradictions of bourgeois society, was already sharply revealed.

In the three leading countries of Europe at that time — England, France, and Germany—which stood at different levels of capitalist development, these antagonistic contradictions of capitalism emerged with different intensity and from different sides. The three main currents of advanced human thought — classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, and French socialism in connection with French revolutionary doctrines in general—reflect the movement of these contradictions. In these contradictions of bourgeois society and in the social theories that reflect them, we must look for the historical roots of Marxism.

The worldview of Marx and Engels, which was first consistently expounded in the German Ideology, The Poverty of Philosophy, and the Communist Manifesto, has withstood the historical test of the revolutionary practice of 1848 and the revolution of 1871 in the person of the Paris Commune. Later, with increasing rapidity, it began to attract ever wider circles of followers in all countries, organizing them into the international Party of Communists. By the 1970s, Marxism was winning over all other ideologies in the labor movement. But the tendencies expressed by these ideologies began to look for other ways and "resurrected" as revisionism.

Marxism is a merciless critique of the old theoretical principles. At the beginning of the development of Marxism, this criticism mainly focuses on three sources of Marxism: *German classical philosophy, English classical political economy, and French utopian socialism* in relation to French revolutionary teachings in general. At the same time, Marxism directs the fire of its

¹ Ленин, Три источника и три составных части марксизма, Соч., т. XVI, стр. 349. Здесь, как и всюду дальше, Ленин цитируется по третьему изданию Собрания сочинений.

² Ленин, Три источника и три составных части марксизма, Соч., т. XVI, стр. 349. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

theoretical criticism at the basic contradictions of the capitalist world and mobilizes the revolutionary working-class movement to change it. This two-way process, which inextricably connects research and criticism, characterizes the content of Marxism in all its three most important components. Marxism emerged as *a continuation and development* the three main directions of theoretical thought of the XIX century. However, it also means, as Lenin repeatedly pointed out, *a critical revision* of these doctrines from the point of view of the working class, its historical tasks, from the point of view of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the construction of a classless communist society. What are the components of Marxism?

First of all, *the philosophical teaching* is the latest, completely consistent materialism. This is materialism, which did not stop at the level of the eighteenth century and at the contemplative materialism of Feuerbach, but was enriched by the dialectic of Hegel, freed from idealistic mysticism and critically revised, and extended to the knowledge of human society. This complete materialism, which is a scientific method of cognizing and changing nature and society, is *dialectical materialism*.

Secondly, *the economic doctrine* is the disclosure of the laws of the emergence, development and death of the capitalist social formation. Marxism revealed the dual character of labor, revealed commodity fetishism as the reification of social relations in commodities, and gave the key to a true understanding of the social relations of capitalist production. Marx's economic teaching revealed the secret of the existence of capitalism, which is based on the exploitation of the proletarian class by the bourgeois class, which appropriates the unpaid labor of the worker as surplus value. Historical materialism, a brilliant discovery of Marx, overcame the anti-historical and idealistic theories of the classical economists and made political economy completely scientific. *The doctrine of surplus value is the cornerstone of Marx's economic theory.*

Third, *scientific communism* is the doctrine of the class struggle that leads to the destruction of classes through the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the doctrine of the strategy and tactics of this struggle and the organization of the proletariat in the struggle for this dictatorship and the realization of its tasks. Only dialectical and historical materialism, which made it possible "to take an objective account of the totality of relations between all classes of a given society, without exception, and, consequently, to take into account the objective stage of development of this society and the relations between it and other societies"³, only the economic doctrine, which determined the nature of class exploitation in general and capitalist exploitation in particular, created scientific communism. Marxism has merged the working-class movement with scientific communism, because the political movement of the proletariat necessarily leads it to the realization that it has no other choice but communism, and communism only becomes a material force when it is the goal of the political struggle of the proletariat. Communism is not a pre-established state, as was the case with the Utopians, nor an ideal that reality must conform to, but a real movement that destroys classes. *The main thing in scientific communism is the doctrine of the world-historical revolutionary role of the proletariat as the creator of communist society.*

These three most important components of the Marxist worldview are merged into an organic unity. "The application of materialist dialectics to the reworking of the whole of political economy, from its foundation — to history, to natural science, to philosophy, to the politics and tactics of the working class — is what interests Marx and Engels most of all," says Lenin. their brilliant step forward in the history of revolutionary thought⁴."

From this unified, consistent system of Marxist views, the truth of which is confirmed and confirmed hourly by historical practice, not a single part can be removed or ignored with impunity, without falling into a bourgeois-reactionary swamp.

Thus, Marxism as a socio-political trend emerged and took shape on the basis of the class struggle of the proletariat, taking into account the revolutionary experience and revolutionary

3 Ленин, Карл Маркс, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVIII, стр. 28.

4 Ленин, Переписка Маркса с Энгельсом, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVII, стр. 30. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

thought of all countries of the world, in the conditions of the development of industrial capitalism. History itself has declared judgment on the old world, and the proletariat has made it its accuser and executor, its gravedigger. This death sentence in the economic, political, and theoretical fields is Marxism, which has merged revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice into a dialectical unity.

Only dialectical materialism has given humanity, and the proletariat in particular, a great instrument of knowledge and action, and has indicated "a way out of the spiritual slavery in which all the oppressed classes have hitherto languished⁵." Only the economic doctrine of Marxism explained the real position of the proletariat in the general system of capitalism. Only scientific communism, in its doctrine of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, showed the proletariat the way to a society in which "the free development of each will be the condition for the free development of all." History from the second half of the nineteenth century, even in the depths of capitalist society — in the person of Marx and Engels — marked the beginning of a new trend of theoretical thought — Marxism. And only "by following *the path* of Marx's theory will we approach objective truth more and more (never exhausting it); *by following any other path*," writes Lenin, the brilliant student and successor of Marxism, "we can arrive at nothing but confusion and lies⁶."

1.2. Historical roots of Marxism

Marxism emerged and took shape when the proletariat entered the world-historical arena, when the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production were revealed with great acuteness. What are these contradictions?

The first contradiction common to the advanced capitalist countries, but which at that time was particularly pronounced in England as a more developed capitalist country, was *the antagonism of wage labour and capital, the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie* .

The appropriation of unpaid labor by the proletariat is the basis of the capitalist mode of production. The freedom of competition increasingly revealed itself as the freedom to exploit the wage worker. This caused and continues to cause antagonism between the bourgeois class and the proletarian class. Within this antagonism, the bourgeoisie represents the conservative side, the proletariat the destructive and revolutionary side. From the first comes an action aimed at preserving the contradiction, from the second—an action aimed at its destruction, the destruction of the society that gave rise to this contradiction.

The Industrial Revolution, through the development of the steam engine, transformed the old manufactory into a modern large-scale industrial enterprise. It has thus given a wide scope to the development of capital, increasing capitalist exploitation, but it has also created a force capable of resisting this exploitation — the factory proletariat.

"Because in the conditions of life of the proletariat," Marx and Engels wrote in one of their earlier works, "all the living conditions of modern society have reached the height of inhumanity; because in the proletariat man has lost himself, but at the same time he has not only gained a theoretical consciousness of this loss, but is also directly forced to resent this inhumanity by the dictates of an unvarnished, implacable, absolutely imperious *need* , this practical expression of *necessity*, the proletariat can and must liberate itself. But he cannot liberate himself without abolishing his own conditions of life. He cannot abolish his own conditions of life without abolishing *all* the inhumane conditions of modern society, which are concentrated in his own position. It is not in vain that he passes through the harsh, hardening school of *work* . It's not about what you're currently *seeing*. the individual proletarians, or even the entire proletariat, have their own goal. The point is *what the* proletariat is and what it *бытию* will historically be forced to do in accordance with its existence. Its purpose and its historical effect are most clearly and indisputably indicated by its own position in life, as well as by the entire organization of modern bourgeois

5 Ленин, Три источника и три составных части марксизма, Соч., т. XVI, стр. 353.

6 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., т. XIII, стр. 117.

society. There is no need to expand on the fact that a considerable section of the English and French proletariat is already *aware of this*. He is constantly working on the further development and final clarification of his identity⁷."

Gradually, the working class develops a consciousness of the need not only to limit competition among the workers or partially destroy it, but also to destroy *the entire system* that generates competition. In 1831 and 1834, French workers revolted in Lyon in response to the increased exploitation and betrayal of the bourgeoisie in the 1830 revolution. During the uprising of 1831, the workers held the city in their hands for several days. They put up the famous slogan: "Live working or die fighting." The second uprising of 1834 was even more important. These uprisings put the workers' question at the forefront. Although the workers' demands were not yet directed against the very foundations of capitalism, they nevertheless raised the question of exploitation, the struggle against capitalism, with all its acuteness. In 1837-1840 the first *national labor movement* English Chartists, the first mass revolutionary movement of the workers reaches its apogee. In 1844, there was an uprising of Silesian weavers in Prussia. Finally, the events of 1848 "noisily and confusedly proclaimed," says Marx, "the emancipation of the proletariat — that secret of the nineteenth century and its revolutions." Thus, as large-scale industry grows and as it frees itself from the influence of the petty-bourgeois environment around it, *the proletariat develops*. It begins to resist the bourgeoisie as an independent force. He "sharply, clearly, mercilessly and imperiously declares publicly his opposition to private property society."

The second contradiction that characterizes bourgeois society and has been steadily corroding it, especially since the second quarter of the nineteenth century, is *the antagonism between the organization of production in individual enterprises and the anarchy of production in bourgeois society as a whole*.

Bourgeois society is based on the production of commodities. But "the peculiarity of every society based on the production of commodities is that in it the producers lose their power over their own social relations⁸." Production without a plan, on the market, without taking into account actual needs, entails anarchy of social production. The laws of commodity production find their expression in the external social connection between commodity producers in exchange; they are revealed as the compulsory laws of "free competition" that prevails between capitalists. Forced to introduce new machines and expand production under the blows of free competition, capitalism creates an unprecedented development of the productive forces and an unprecedented increase in social wealth. At the same time, the destruction of the urban handicraft and peasantry and the displacement of workers through improvements and the introduction of new machines create a surplus of labor, cadres of people without employment and means of subsistence. "*The anarchy of bourgeois society* It is the basis of modern *social order*, just as social order, for its part, is the guarantee of this anarchy," Marx and Engels wrote at the same time. "To the extent and to the extent that they contradict each other, to the extent and to the same extent they condition each⁹ other."

The disorderly nature of bourgeois production as a whole, which violates the proportionality between different branches of industry, creates an excess of the supply of goods over their demand. At one extreme, there are abundant means of production and wealth in general; at the other, there is want, poverty, and exhaustion. All this finds its extreme expression in crises. In them, the dominance of the product over the producer is particularly clearly manifested, material forces seem to acquire spiritual life, and the people who created them descend to the degree of stagnant, stupid material force. Crises characterize the aggravation of the contradictions of the bourgeois order. "By demanding *the denial of private property*," Marx wrote in 1844, "the proletariat is only making

7 Маркс и Энгельс, Святое семейство, Соч., т. III, стр. 56.

8 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 195. Цитируется здесь и далее по изданию 1933 г.

9 Маркс и Энгельс, Святое семейство, Соч., т. III, стр. 145.

society a principle what society has built into *its* principle, what is embodied in *it* already in addition to its assistance, as a negative result of society¹⁰."

Crises, as a material protest of the productive forces against the bourgeois property relations that hinder their development, lead to an extreme deterioration of the workers' situation, making it highly unstable and unstable. But in doing so, they revolutionize the consciousness of the proletariat to an enormous extent and make it necessary to fight not only for temporary and partial improvements within the limits of capitalism, but also against the basis of these crises, i.e., against the capitalist mode of production itself.

Thus private property, in the course of the movement and development of its internal contradictions, pushes itself to its own destruction. It comes to self-negation by giving birth to a proletariat that is "conscious of its spiritual and physical misery," that is conscious of its own rejection, and thereby abolishes itself as an outcast. The proletariat executes the sentence which private property imposes on itself by begetting the proletariat, just as it executes the sentence which wage labour imposes on itself by producing other people's wealth and their own poverty. Once victorious, the proletariat by no means becomes the absolute side of society, for it wins only by abolishing itself and its opposite. With the victory of the proletariat, both the proletariat itself and its opposite, private property, disappear¹¹."

These are the most important forms of manifestation of the basic contradiction of capitalist society — the contradiction between the social character of production and private property appropriation. But from this basic contradiction also arise other derived contradictions, which, however, are of no small importance for the characterization of capitalist reality in the first half of the nineteenth century and for understanding the historical roots and causes of the emergence of Marxism.

One such contradiction, which became increasingly apparent in the course of the unfolding class struggle in capitalist countries, especially in France, with its wealth of political upheavals, was *the contradiction between the economic essence of bourgeois society and its external manifestation in its political superstructure*— between "civil society" and the democratic state.

The more the bourgeoisie adapted the political superstructure to the needs of its economy and replaced the old feudal privileges with bourgeois law, the more glaring was the contradiction between the formal equality it proclaimed as "democracy" and *the actual inequality* that existed in its economy. Political institutions have proved to be the most evil, the most sobering caricature, Engels says, of the brilliant promises of eighteenth-century philosophers. "Eternal justice was realized in the person of bourgeois justice ... natural equality was limited to the equality of citizens before the law, and the most essential of human rights was declared the right of bourgeois property. The rational state and Rousseau's "social contract" proved to be, and could be, in practice only a bourgeois democratic republic¹²."

"The contradiction *between the democratic representative state and bourgeois society*," Marx and Engels were bound to state early on, "is a complete form of *the classical state*. contradictions *between the public and slavery*. In the modern world, everyone is *simultaneously* a member of the slave system and the human community. It is precisely *the slavery of bourgeois society that is apparently the greatest freedom*, because it seems to be the complete form of *the independence* of the individual, who accepts the unrestrained movement of his alienated vital elements, such as property, industry, religion, etc., which is not bound by any common ties and no other person, as his own freedom, while it is not bound by any common bond. on the contrary, it represents his complete slavery and human rejection. *Privilege* has been replaced by *right* »¹³."

10 Маркс и Энгельс, К критике гегелевской философии права, Соч., т. I, стр. 412.

11 Маркс и Энгельс, Святое семейство, Соч., т. III, стр. 55.

12 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 12.

13 Маркс и Энгельс, Святое семейство, Соч., т. III, стр. 144.

The development of political struggle in the 1940s increasingly revealed the class essence of bourgeois democracy. It turned out that from a political point of view, the state and social structure are not two different things. State power revealed itself as the official expression of class antagonism, as the organization of the exploiting class for the protection of "the general conditions of production, and consequently for the forcible retention of the exploited class at the level of subordination required by the given mode of production¹⁴." This showed that evil is not only in one form or another of the state, but in its essence, i.e., in the structure of society and private property.

But when the proletariat enters the historical arena, when its struggle against the bourgeoisie takes the first place, the bourgeoisie finally throws itself into the arms of reaction, and the true representative of genuine democracy is the proletariat. From the experience of his struggle, he is more and more resolutely coming to the conviction that real equality means, first of all, the abolition of classes themselves. But this equality is unattainable without the revolutionary overthrow of the existing government, without the destruction of the bourgeois state. And that is why the banners of the proletariat are increasingly bearing the slogans: "Peace to huts — war to palaces", "*Political power is our means, social welfare is our goal*".

Another, more particular contradiction, which arises from the difference in the level of the economic situation of capitalist countries, is important, since it makes it possible for a revolution to break out in certain parts of the bourgeois organism. This contradiction at the beginning of the nineteenth century found its expression in *the Anglo-Russian domination of Europe* and in the presence of a revolutionary situation in Germany.

The originality of the situation lay in the fact that in such capitalist countries, which were a kind of "extremities" of the bourgeois organism—namely, Germany at that time—the tasks of assaulting absolutism and the remnants of feudalism were just beginning to arise, while in England and partly in France the beginning of the end of this assault was already being played out, and a systematic struggle was being waged against capitalism by the revolutionary proletariat.

On the one hand, tsarist feudal Russia, the bulwark of reaction and absolutism, loomed over revolutionary Europe. On the other hand, England, then the ruler of the world market, which turned entire nations into its own wage workers, stood firmly as a rock against which the continental revolutionary waves were breaking. But at the same time, due to the difference in the level of economy of the capitalist countries, Britain, while expanding its economic ties and exerting economic pressure on the backward states of the continent, acted as one of the causes that gave rise to economic crises and revolutionary waves in the continental countries of Europe. "The continent," wrote Marx, "exports incomparably more to England than to any other country. But export to England, in turn, depends on the position of England, especially in overseas markets. Then England exports to overseas countries incomparably more than the entire continent, so that the size of continental exports to these countries always depends on England's overseas exports. If, therefore, crises primarily create revolution on the continent, they are still caused in England. Violent catastrophes must naturally occur in the extremities of the bourgeois organism rather than in its heart, where there are more opportunities for compensation¹⁵." One of these limbs was Germany in the 1940s.

Thus, if the whole of Europe felt Anglo-Russian domination, then this double oppression fell with particular force on Germany, because at that time the economic and political border separating East and West ran through it. *But it was precisely its position as one of the extremities of the bourgeois organism that thickened the revolutionary atmosphere in it and made it possible to develop the bourgeois revolution as a direct prologue to the proletarian one.*

It is necessary to point out one more contradiction in the field of theoretical consciousness, which arises from the contradictions already mentioned above. This contradiction was revealed with

14 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 201.

15 Маркс и Энгельс, Международные обзоры, Соч., т. VIII, стр. 238–239.

particular force by the time of the emergence of Marxism also in Germany. This is the most characteristic moment of bourgeois ideology, which is based on the contradictions of classes and the contradiction between mental and physical labor — *the gap between theory and practice* .

Once upon a time, bourgeois society, due to the internal needs of its development, as it freed itself from the fetters of the feudal system, necessarily pushed its representatives on the path of developing theoretical knowledge. The bourgeoisie sought, with the help of scientific knowledge, to destroy the dominance of the Roman Catholic Church as an international center that cemented the feudal system. On the other hand, through the knowledge of the properties of material bodies and the forms of manifestation of the forces of nature, it set itself the task of developing productive forces. The bourgeoisie opposed feudal society with its religion, theology, and metaphysics to the union of natural science with materialist philosophy. The eighteenth century — the century of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in England — was a practical triumph of this theory.

By the beginning of the new century, the antagonism between theory and practice begins to emerge in bourgeois ideology. This was facilitated by the growing isolation of the propertied classes from the direct process of material production and their monopolization of theoretical work. Large-scale industry separates science from the worker as an independent potency of production and forces it to serve capital. Knowledge becomes an instrument capable of separating itself from labor and opposing it in a hostile way. The antagonism between bourgeois industry and bourgeois theory, on the one hand, and the poverty and ruin created by capital, on the other, is becoming increasingly apparent.

At the beginning of its development, the bourgeoisie, expressing objectively progressive tendencies of social development, could give its science the appearance of being superclass, the form of universality, and presented it as the only reasonable and universally valid one. But as the antagonistic character of bourgeois society is revealed, the dual character of bourgeois science is also revealed. On the one hand, it aims at mastering and subjugating nature to human society, on the other hand, at subjugating society to the ruling class in order to exploit the oppressed classes. The whole exploitative character of bourgeois science and its separation of theory from practice, the gap between mental and physical labor, are revealed.

In the interests of consolidating the economic slavery of the working class, the bourgeoisie is already "anathematizing" materialism. It appeals to religion in order to "curb" the godless aspirations of exploiters directed against capitalist property. Bourgeois philosophy is becoming the mainstay of theology, and idealism is growing stronger in it. At the same time, philosophical materialism reveals in its development a different class orientation. In the form of vulgar natural science materialism, it is dissolved in natural science and thus neutralized by the bourgeoisie, which drowns in creeping empiricism the revolutionary theoretical conclusions and perspectives that follow from consistent materialism. On the other hand, in the form of socialist and communist theories, materialism begins to expose bourgeois society and its inherent antagonisms.

The theoretical struggle unfolds between classical economists as scientific representatives of the bourgeoisie and communist theorists of the working people.

Classical political economy is still engaged in the struggle against the remnants of feudalism. Its task is to show how wealth is acquired in the relations of bourgeois production and how much it exceeds the production of wealth under feudalism. This leads it to investigate the relations of bourgeois production, and here it makes its great discoveries that lay the foundation of *labor activity*. theory of value.

But it is becoming increasingly clear, especially in connection with the consequences of the industrial revolution, "that in the same relations not only wealth is produced, but also poverty, and that in the relations in which the development of the productive forces takes place, a certain *force of resistance also develops*." and that these relations create the wealth of the citizens, i.e., the wealth of the bourgeois class, only on condition that the wealth of individual members of this class is continuously destroyed and the *proletariat is constantly growing*." That is why bourgeois economists distinguish their theory from such revolutionary conclusions and gradually descend to an explicit defense and idealization of bourgeois society.

French revolutionary doctrines, especially the socialist and communist ones, which were disillusioned with the results of the Great French Revolution, critically expose the contradictions of bourgeois society, but they cannot understand their nature and find the power to resolve these contradictions practically. They are well *aware of the existence of class opposites*, as well as elements of corruption within modern society, but they do not see any historical initiative on the part of the proletariat, they "do not lead the political movement inherent in it." In the course of their struggle, they create *a utopian* theory of the organization of the future society. This leads them to break away from the practice of the present, from the class struggle.

Exposing the existing antagonisms, utopian socialists dreamed of reconciling them, developed plans for a socialist system, hoping to realize the future without a struggle; they saw no other lever for reconstructing the present than the good will and consciousness of the people. They failed to combine their theories with the social practice of the present, with the practice of the spontaneously developing working-class movement.

Bourgeois economists reject the unity of theory and practice, and oppose theory to revolutionary practice. Utopian socialists have not yet come to a unity of theory and practice.

The former are positive about the existing bourgeois world, considering it the best of all worlds; the latter are negative, considering its existence a mistake of reason. Some are apologetic about capitalism; others are critical. But both of them stand on the anti-historical point of view, and both of them carry out metaphysics and idealism in their views on the history of social development.

Classical German philosophy breaks through the metaphysical impasse of bourgeois theory under the influence of the French Revolution. But it breaks through metaphysics on *an idealistic* basis, identifying the development of being with the development of thinking.

This phenomenon is largely explained by the social practice of semi-feudal Germany, where the bourgeois revolution was still brewing.

Kant was the first to start the philosophical revolution of classical idealism. Hegel completed it in his system. "Never since men think," writes Engels, "has there been such a comprehensive system of philosophy as that of Hegel. Logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of the spirit, the philosophy of law, religion, history — everything was gathered into *one* system, everything was reduced to one basic principle¹⁶."

This principle was development, understood as a struggle of opposites, which was conceived by the idealist Hegel as the development of world consciousness, reason, and absolute spirit.

The more desolate the German semi-feudal reality was, the more strongly philosophical thought sought to rise above it. But without finding a historically valid basis for the bourgeois ideals it advanced, enjoying its own independence and "creativity," philosophical thought lost the solid ground of actual practice and fell into the deadening embrace of abstraction.

German philosophical idealism, which marks the abominable separation of theory from practice and the impotence of theory in explaining and changing practice, is an incessant flight, a "progress to infinity" from real practice, from the real world. Not "you can, because you must", but "you can't, because you must" - this is the result of German classical idealism, expressed in the words of its finalizer - the words of Hegel. But Hegel himself, on the basis of his dialectic, outlines a way out of this impasse.

"In reality, reason and law are not at all in such a sad position that they should only *должны* be,"¹⁷ Hegel states. Everything that is reasonable is at the same time necessary; everything that is necessary must be, or at least become — this is the result of his idealistic dialectic.

The Hegelian dialectic seems to return to reality. But it does not find the objective reality of nature and society, but only the empty shell of thinking — the logical shadow of reality. Having identified being and thinking, Hegel inevitably comes to identify practice with theory. Idealistic

16 Маркс и Энгельс, Статьи из «New Moral World», Соч., т. II, стр. 405–406.

17 Гегель, Наука логики, 1929 г., стр. 71.

dialectics, expressing the practical impotence of the German bourgeoisie, dissolved all the subject-practical activity of man in mental categories, and led to a conservative philosophy.

The thunders of the July Revolution of 1830 were the death knell of German classical idealism, which came closer to understanding the meaning of practical activity, but failed to master actual, material practice in order to change it.

Feuerbach's philosophy, which expresses the closeness of the bourgeois revolution, resolutely breaks with Hegel's idealism and proclaims materialism: not thinking, but the being of nature and man is the starting point of knowledge. But man and nature are considered by Feuerbach "only in the form of an object or in the form of contemplation, and not as human sensuous activity, practice»¹⁸."

When Feuerbach put forward the need for a union of philosophy with natural science and natural science with philosophy, he did not understand that the problem of developing theory rests not only on the need to overcome religion, theology, and metaphysics in general, but also on the criticism of bourgeois politics.

By the 1940s, an encyclopedic task arose to investigate and summarize the mass of accumulated material both in the field of natural history — natural science, and in the field of the history of society — the history of people. The once revolutionary bourgeois theory, having become conservative, was unable to cope with this task: by preserving bourgeois society as eternal and "natural" and feeding this conservatism to the spontaneously developing natural science, it has reached a metaphysical impasse.

In Germany, the bourgeoisie was not yet in power, because the capitalist mode of production matured only when its antagonistic character was revealed in the acute conflicts of the historical struggle that was simmering in England and France. However, this peculiarity of the historical development of Germany not only did not exclude the possibility of criticism of bourgeois theory, but it also required this criticism from the class whose historical task was to replace capitalism with a new mode of production and finally destroy the classes, i.e., the proletariat. This criticism had to be linked to politics. The political struggle was the main link by which theory could be dragged out of the swamp of feudal and bourgeois narrowness onto the road of objective and revolutionary knowledge, and thereby bridge the gap and antagonism between theory and practice.

This was the problem at the time of the emergence of Marxism. Such, in the most general terms, are the historical contradictions that prepared the birth of Marxism.

Marxism as a socio-political trend did not arise apart from the main road of international civilization. Both in its material-practical and theoretical roots, it is *a product of international development*. Its origin in Germany is also explained, as we have seen, by the international situation.

Germany at that time was an interweaving of the above-described contradictions. The still unresolved contradictions between the new bourgeois economy and feudalism were supplemented by the internal antagonisms of bourgeois society. Just as in the Roman Pantheon you could find the gods of all nations, in Germany you could find the sins of various forms of economic and state organization.

In Germany, as has already been pointed out, the capitalist mode of production matured after its antagonistic character was revealed in England and France. This circumstance determined the political and theoretical impotence of the German bourgeoisie and the great political and theoretical consciousness of the German proletariat, which was already based on the experience of the English and French working-class movements. Comparing the "gigantic children's shoes of the proletariat" with the "dwarf worn-out political boots of the German bourgeoisie," Marx saw in the German proletariat as early as 1844 the "figure of an athlete." Already "the Silesian insurrection *begins* precisely with what the French and English insurrections *end* with" - the consciousness of the essence of the proletariat." Germany, on the eve of the bourgeois revolution, under more

18 Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах, Тезисы о Фейербахе, 1933 г., стр. 59.

progressive conditions of European civilization in general, with a much more developed proletariat than in England in the seventeenth and France in the eighteenth centuries, was able to make this bourgeois revolution a direct *prologue to the proletarian revolution. The center of the revolutionary movement moved from West to East, and Germany was its vanguard.* This is why, as the Communist Manifesto points out, "the Communists pay their main attention to Germany."

Finally, only German conscious dialectics — the greatest acquisition of classical idealism, purified of its mystifying form and put on its feet by the greatest ideologist of the proletariat, made it possible to pull theory out of the metaphysical impasse of feudal and bourgeois narrowness.

All these circumstances taken together explain why Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century was *the birthplace of Marxism*, and why the leaders of the German proletariat, Marx and Engels, armed with a materialist dialectic that was critical and revolutionary in its very essence, were its creators.

Marx and Engels, having passed through the "fiery stream" of Feuerbach's materialism, through this "purgatory" of that time, which freed them from the concepts and prejudices of idealistic philosophy, for the first time brought back to light, in contrast to the "grumbling, pretentious epigonism", the forgotten dialectical method. They pointed out the connection of their method with the Hegelian dialectic, as well as the direct opposite of this latter, and showed the application of this method to the facts of empirical science and to the conditions of the revolutionary struggle.

The bourgeoisie, as we have seen above, at the time of its revolutionary character, in the person of its best representatives, "pressing nature", entered into an alliance of natural science with philosophy, and stood on a materialist and atheist position. Marx and Engels, expressing the interests of the proletariat, a class interested not only in changing nature, but also in radically changing society, demand for the ideality of philosophy not only a union with natural science, but also its connection with the history of mankind. "We know only one science, the science of history. History can be viewed from two sides and divided into the history of nature and the history of people. *But these two sides cannot be separated from each other*, Marx and Engels wrote in 1845," as long as people exist, the history of nature and *the history of people condition each other* »¹⁹." People's conscious attitude to nature determines their conscious attitude to each other, and, conversely, their conscious attitude to each other determines their conscious attitude to nature.

In a class society, people's relations to each other, their social relations, are far from conscious. In bourgeois society, on the other hand, they represent "complete slavery and human exclusion," and represent the main brake on conscious development in all respects. That is why Marx and Engels directed the main fire of their criticism at the social relations of capitalism, which received a concentrated expression in the politics of the bourgeoisie.

The critique of Hegelian philosophy, the pathetic epigones of Hegelianism represented by representatives of "German ideology" and "true socialism", and the critique of contemporary socio-economic doctrines led Marx "to the conclusion that legal relations, like the forms of the state, cannot be understood either from themselves or from the so-called universal development of the human spirit. on the contrary, they are rooted in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of the English and French of the eighteenth century, combined under the name of "civil society", and the anatomy of civil society must be sought in political economy"²⁰." "The mode of production of material life determines the social, political, and spiritual processes of life in general"²¹."

From this conclusion of Marx follow highly revolutionary conclusions that open up the prospects of the greatest revolution of all time, not only for the theory, but, what is especially

19 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 214. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

20 Маркс, К критике политической экономии, 1933 г., стр. 42.

21 Маркс, К критике политической экономии, 1933 г., стр. 42.

important, for the practice of the proletariat. At a certain stage of development, Marx's famous preface to the Critique of Political Economy goes on to point out, the relations of production change from "forms of development of the productive forces" to their fetters. "Then comes the era of social revolution. With a change in the economic basis, a revolution more or less quickly takes place in the entire vast superstructure." "Bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production, antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of an antagonism that grows out of the social conditions of individual life, while the productive forces developing in the depths of bourgeois society create at the same time the material conditions for the solution of this antagonism.

This social formation therefore completes the prehistory of human society²²."

1.3. Marxism-Leninism as a unity of theory and practice

"It is not people's consciousness that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness²³." This proposition, which is brilliant in its depth and sounds so simple and so clear, was formulated by Marx and Engels and further developed by Lenin in the merciless struggle against idealism and against metaphysical, mechanical materialism.

Idealism distracts from real existence, identifies it with consciousness. In Marx's words, he transforms "real, objective chains into *exclusively ideal*, exclusively subjective ones, exclusively *in me* existing ones, and therefore *allexternal* sensuous battles are transformed into battles of pure ideas."

Metaphysical materialism of Feuerbach's type does not go beyond the framework of simplified "natural-scientific materialism". He considers the existence of people bound by the chains of modern capitalist relations as the existence of "man in general." Therefore, He does not find in being itself the power to break these chains, and thus condemns people to continue wearing these "sober hopeless chains".

From the point of view of idealism, the development of being is determined by the development of consciousness. Therefore, idealism considers influencing people's consciousness, promoting ideas, a necessary and quite sufficient condition for the transformation of being. For metaphysical materialism, consciousness is determined by the development of being, but it understands being itself abstractly, "only in the form of *an object* or in the form of *intuition*, and not as *a human sensuous activity, practice*, not subjectively²⁴." In so far as the materialist metaphysician remains in practice an idealist, just where the communist materialist, the Marxist, sees the necessity and at the same time finds the conditions for the transformation of the world.

Consciousness is determined by social existence, and in turn it contributes to the further development of being. However, people's consciousness can play such a role only *through practice* human. "Ideas can never lead beyond the limits of the old system: they always only lead beyond the ideas of the old system. Ideas *can't accomplish anything* at all. To carry out ideas, Marxism formulates its positions, "people are required who must use practical force²⁵." Marx and Engels beat their opponents both for their idealistic disregard for the practical material activity of man, and for the metaphysical opposition of being to consciousness, ignoring the change in nature and society by man himself.

They did away with the metaphysical, Feuerbachian abstract cult of nature, but they also

22 Маркс, К критике политической экономии, 1933 г., стр. 43.

23 Маркс, К критике политической экономии, 1933 г., стр. 42.

24 Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах, Тезисы о Фейербахе, 1933 г., стр. 59.

25 Маркс и Энгельс, Святое семейство, Соч., т. III, стр. 147.

relied on natural science and its new discoveries: the discovery of the transformation of energy, which showed that the unity of all forms of motion in nature is no longer just a philosophical statement, but a natural scientific fact; the discovery of the cell, which threw off the veil of mystery that enveloped the process of growth and structure of organisms; Darwin's discovery of the law of evolution of the organic world. On the other hand, Marx and Engels, through their critique of politics, oriented philosophical thought to the study of the history of human society. Having revealed the material content of political ideas, having summed up the scientific basis for its political ideology by opening *the historical* Marx and Engels thus created the missing link for an all-encompassing, integral scientific materialist worldview, from beginning to end. Relying on stubborn facts and at the same time revealing their dialectical-materialistic connection, this worldview makes *redundant a philosophy that claims to be superior to other sciences*, a philosophy divorced from concrete knowledge, a philosophy as a "science of sciences".

Thus the greatest achievement of Marx and Engels and Lenin who continued their work is the creation and further development of *dialectical materialism* as a holistic, consistently revolutionary worldview that embraces dead nature, organic life, thinking, and human society. Marxism in its development is constructed as such a *holistic worldview* containing "consistent materialism, covering the field of social life, dialectics as the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, the theory of the class struggle and the world-historical revolutionary role of the proletariat, the creator of the new communist society"²⁶. Focusing on politics makes it possible for Marx and Engels to overcome the purely contemplative nature of previous materialism and *combine philosophical materialism with scientific communism*. The realization of communism is the ultimate goal of the activity of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and of the party of practical materialism, i.e., communism, which they created.

Marxism banishes idealism from its last refuge — the knowledge of human society; it contrasts the one-sided, half-hearted, dead materialism of the past with dialectical materialism. Marxism sets itself the task of plucking "imaginary flowers from the chains", not so that humanity, oppressed by class slavery, will wear "sober, hopeless chains"²⁷, but so that it will throw off these chains in the revolutionary struggle.

But material chains can be thrown off completely by material force. Marxism, having revealed the laws of the development of human society and its class structure, having discovered the specific law of the capitalist mode of production, the law of the production of surplus value, finds such force in the proletarian class. This force, in contrast to all the historically preceding classes, striving under the influence of "an unvarnished, inexorable, absolutely imperious need, this practical expression of necessity", to free itself from its inhumane living conditions, cannot liberate itself by abolishing its own living conditions, without abolishing "all the inhumane living conditions of modern society, which are absolutely imperious." focusing on his own situation"²⁸. Marxism reveals all the antagonisms of modern society, tracing their evolution, proving their transitory nature. While the Utopian socialists regarded the proletariat only as the most suffering class, Marxism explicitly sets itself the task of realizing the class goals of the proletariat and leading the proletariat in its struggle, since the proletariat alone is the only fully revolutionary class in modern society. Marxism is the dialectical-materialist result of a reworking of the entire history of mankind, and especially of the historical practice of the development and struggle of the proletariat itself.

Marxism, as a critical and revolutionary theory in its very essence, combines inwardly and indissolubly strict and supreme scientific character with revolutionary character. And this is because it is, first of all, the one and only worldview of the proletariat — the class called upon by history to eliminate the separation of theory from practice and practice from theory in the process of

26 Ленин, Карл Маркс, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVIII, стр. 6.

27 Маркс и Энгельс, К критике гегелевской философии права, Соч., т. I, стр. 400.

28 Маркс и Энгельс, Святое семейство, Соч., т. III, стр. 56.

revolutionizing the world. Expressing this aspiration, Marxism from the very beginning appears not only as a critique of the world and its explanation, but as *a theory and practice of its change*, which includes criticism and explanation as its subordinate moments.

"Revolution, not criticism — is the driving force of history, as well as of religion, philosophy, and every other theory²⁹."

"Philosophers have only *explained in various ways* the world, but the point is, " Marx wrote in 1845, "to *changeit*³⁰." This in no way means that a revolutionary change is possible without theoretical criticism and explanation of the world. This only means a requirement *to release* to rid the theory of its fetishistic veils, on the one hand, to rid it of the subjectivist illusions that it "can do anything, that it doesn't care about anything", on the other hand, of creeping empiricism, of "objectivism", which condemned the theory to "tail" hobbling after events and turned it into an instrument for defending the existing old the world. Thus it is "only" — a whole revolution that frees theory from illusions and gives it immeasurable power and strength.

Even at the beginning of its development, Marxism, defending the dialectical understanding of the unity of theory and practice, waged a merciless struggle against *both subjectivist and objectivist* perversions of this view. He fought against the subjectivist "critical criticism" of the idealists of the Young Hegelians, the Bauer brothers and Co., who reduced history to the imaginary activity of imaginary subjects, placing this activity of individuals above the interests and movement of the masses. He also waged a struggle against the empiricism and objectivism, etc., of the "true socialists" and historians, who regarded historical relations separately from activity, reduced history to a collection of dead facts, ignored political activity, and hovered in their party "impartiality" above all class struggle.

Against these doctrines alien to the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism advanced a theory based on "*revolutionary-practical-critical activity*." The theoretical critique of Marx and his explanation of historical reality pose problems for the solution of which there is only one means — *revolutionary practice*. "We see," wrote Marx, " that the solution of theoretical opposites is possible *only in a practical way*, only thanks to the practical energy of man, and that, therefore, the solution of them is by no means a task of knowledge alone, *but is really a matter of experience*. It was a vital task that *philosophy* could not solve precisely because it saw in it *only the problem of life*. a theoretical problem³¹." True practice — and such it is primarily as a sensuous-objective *activity* — is the basis of real and positive theory, it is its driving impulse and criterion of truth. In constant ideological battles with "friends" and open enemies, in a fierce struggle against all the remnants of "socializing" petty-bourgeois theories, Marxism developed, defending in theory and implementing in practice the dialectical unity of theory and practice on the basis of objective activity. Marxism reveals the roots of modern practice in the economic conditions of class society, and therefore mobilizes genuine theory and true revolutionary practice to overthrow bourgeois practice. In the masses, in the practice of the masses, Marxism seeks the way to eliminate this disgusting gap.

Theory, in order to become a force, must master the masses. The masses, on the other hand, in order to become capable of correct revolutionary action, must master true theory.

But not every theory can master the masses. A theory can do this *only when "it includes in its positive understanding of what exists at the same time the understanding of its negation, its necessary destruction, and considers every realized form in motion, hence also from its transitory side, since it does not bow to anything and is essentially critical and revolutionary.* " ³²that is, when it brings objective cognition to dialectical materialism, which cognizes things objectively and

29 Маркс и Энгельс, *Немецкая идеология*, Соч., т. IV, стр. 28.

30 Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах, *Тезисы о Фейербахе*, 1933 г., стр. 61.

31 Маркс и Энгельс, *Подготовительные работы для «Святого семейства»*, Соч., т. III, стр. 628.

32 Маркс, *Капитал*, т. I, 1932 г., стр. XXIII. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

essentially, in their revolutionary change and development.

The same correlation between theory and practice also leads to the conclusion that the theory of the oppressing classes, in particular bourgeois theory, cannot in essence be in unity with the practice of the oppressed masses. The reasons for this impossibility lie in the conditions of life of the bourgeoisie and its exploitative nature. By deepening the antagonism between theory and practice, the exploiting class also tries to inculcate surrogates of its theories in the oppressed masses. One of these forms of bourgeois influence is the theory of *superclassism and non-partisanship*. Marxism-Leninism, which has discovered that the class struggle permeates the whole of society, economics, politics, and theory, and has exposed the falsehood of bourgeois theory, directly and openly declares itself to be the one and only proletarian party theory.

"Marxism is distinguished from all other socialist theories," writes Lenin, "by the remarkable combination of complete scientific sobriety in analyzing the objective state of things and the objective course of evolution, with the most decisive recognition of the significance of revolutionary energy, revolutionary creativity, and revolutionary initiative of the masses — as well as, of course, of individuals, groups, organizations, and parties who are able to find and implement connection with certain classes"³³.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin pin all their hopes on the proletariat, because "the proletariat, the lowest stratum of modern society, cannot rise, cannot straighten itself without the entire superstructure of the strata that form official society being blown up"³⁴. He cannot free himself without at the same time liberating the whole of humanity. Then the old world, with its classes and class antagonisms, will be replaced by an association "in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all"³⁵. To achieve this goal, Marxism-Leninism equips the proletariat with an integral worldview and a method of changing the world. With the help of a truly proletarian party, the proletariat is organized into an independent force capable not only of throwing off its chains, but also of changing the world.

Marxism as a socio-political trend is from the very beginning inextricably linked with the Communists, because "in the struggle of the proletarians of various nations, they single out and defend the common interests of the entire proletariat, which do not depend on nationality"³⁶. At the various stages of development through which the struggle of the proletarians against the bourgeoisie passes, communists "always represent the interests of the movement as a whole"³⁷.

"The Communists, therefore, "wrote Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto," are in fact the most resolute part of the workers' parties in all countries, always encouraging them to move forward, and in theory they have an advantage over the rest of the proletariat in understanding the conditions, course, and general results of the proletarian movement"³⁸. Their task is to lead the proletariat in its actual revolutionary struggle. Under this condition, *the theoretical and practical work of the Marxist-communists merges into one work. The economic, political, and theoretical struggle represents three mutually connected fronts of the proletarian class struggle for liberation.* Against the desire to turn Marxism into a dogma, a creed, a "petrified orthodoxy," Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin repeatedly emphasized: "Our teaching is not a dogma, *but a guide to action.*" "Nothing prevents us," Marx wrote as early as 1843, "from linking our criticism with the criticism

33 Ленин, Против бойкота, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XII, стр. 32.

34 Маркс и Энгельс, Коммунистический манифест, 1933 г., стр. 26.

35 Маркс и Энгельс, Коммунистический манифест, 1933 г., стр. 38.

36 Маркс и Энгельс, Коммунистический манифест, 1933 г., стр. 28.

37 Маркс и Энгельс, Коммунистический манифест, 1933 г., стр. 28.

38 Маркс и Энгельс, Коммунистический манифест, 1933 г., стр. 28.

of politics, with the interests of a particular political party, and therefore from linking and identifying our criticism with *the actual struggle*. In this case, we will not appear before the world, like doctrinaires, with a ready-made new principle: "here is the truth, on your knees before it!" We develop new principles for the world from its own principles. We don't say to the world, 'Stop fighting, all your fighting is nothing' — we give it the true slogan of the struggle³⁹." Against dogmatism and sectarianism Marx put forward *a link with a particular party and participation in the real struggle* only under this condition can the theory give the true slogan of the struggle.

1.4. Leninism — a new and higher stage in the development of Marxism

The activity of Marx and Engels coincides with the period of preparation of the proletariat for revolution, when the proletarian revolution was not yet a direct and immediate practical task. Their activity coincides with the epoch of the development of *industrial capitalism*, its spread in the backward countries, and the colonial occupation of the agrarian backward regions by industrial capital. In the period of 1848, the center of the world revolutionary movement shifted to Germany, where, as Marx and Engels then saw it, the bourgeois revolution could most easily become the prologue to the proletarian revolution. This epoch brought forward the brilliant theoreticians and leaders of the international proletariat, Marx and Engels; it was in this epoch that Marxism developed as a revolutionary theory of the proletarian struggle. It has revealed the ways and methods of the proletarian struggle, and it has clearly put forward the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the main content of Marxist teaching.

By the end of their lives, Marx and Engels were discovering new phenomena in the economy and politics of world capitalism that could not fail to attract their attention. Thus Engels, in his *Anti-Dühring*, notes the growing importance of joint-stock companies and their future role in the creation of capitalist monopolies. The center of the revolutionary movement is shifting to the East: the attention of Marx and Engels is increasingly directed to Russia, to the eastern colonial countries, where the possibility of breaking the chain of world capitalism is becoming more and more likely.

The brilliant foresight of Marx and Engels, as well as all aspects of their teaching, were further developed by Lenin in the new epoch that replaced the period of industrial capital—the epoch of *imperialism*.

In order to fully understand the socio-historical roots of Leninism and its international significance, it is necessary to first understand the historical significance of the struggle of Leninism against the opportunism of the Second International and the whole period of its undivided rule. An impassable gulf separates the revolutionary teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin from social-democratic opportunism, which has now developed into social fascism.

The teachings of Marx and Engels developed in a merciless struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories and views that, while in reality "fundamentally hostile to Marxism", sought to exert their influence on the working-class movement: Lassallianism, Proudhonism, Bakunism, Düringianism, etc.

A distinctive feature of the teachings of Lassalle, Proudhon, and other authors of theories that were spreading among the proletariat in the era of Marx and Engels was the desire to go to *reconciliation* with bourgeois society and the state, to *reform* existing social relations for the better without a class struggle, without a revolutionary change in the economic basis. Or did these theories manifest an abstract, petty-bourgeois, "left-wing", *anarchist negation* modern social system and the state, but without understanding the actual ways and means of replacing it with another social system (Bakunin).

Gradually, Marxism defeated these apparently hostile theories and forced them out of the ideology of the working-class movement. However, as soon as the *theoretical victory* of Marxism was marked, the tendencies that found expression in these teachings began to look for new ways.

39 Маркс и Энгельс, Немецко-французские летописи, Соч., т. I, стр. 366.

The petty-bourgeois worldview began to dress up in "Marxist" garb, and began to manifest itself as socialist opportunism *within Marxism*, "on the common ground of Marxism."

Already the end of Engels' life was marked by the growth and dominance of opportunism in the social-democratic movement and the Second International. Engels had to wage an open struggle against the opportunist leadership of German Social-democracy, which, under the guise of Marxist phrases, actually dissociated itself from the true spirit of the teachings of Marx and Engels; it was necessary to pursue a line of split with opportunism.

Between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, pointed out T. Stalin, and Lenin, on the other hand, have a whole streak of undivided and actual domination of the opportunism of the Second International, despite the fact that the Second International was formally headed by such "Orthodox" people as Kautsky and others. The opportunists seek to turn Marx and Engels into harmless "icons." They distort the revolutionary essence of their teaching, substituting for it the theory of "civil peace" and the attitude towards *reform* through bourgeois democracy. Bernstein and Kautsky publish the works of Marx and Engels with abridgments and distortions, or they completely ignore and conceal their works and letters, which are of the most important importance in principle. The opportunists distort the fundamental propositions of the revolutionary doctrine of Marxism, which relate to the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the theory of the State, and to the strategy and tactics of the class struggle. The main theoretical line of opportunism was *revisionism*, i.e., the desire to revise (revise) all the most important theoretical propositions of Marx and Engels. The opportunists are launching a revisionist campaign against the foundations of revolutionary theory, the philosophical foundations of Marxism, against materialism and dialectics, striving to return to philosophical *idealism*, to the doctrine of the calm and slow "evolution" of society.

The period of imperialism leads to a further growth of opportunism: its social base expands along with the bourgeoisization of a part of the proletariat.

With the help of imperialist super-profits derived from plundering colonies, capitalism has the opportunity to bribe better-paid layers of workers, creating a *labor aristocracy*. Capitalism makes the leaders of the working-class professional movement obedient to itself by bribing the professional bureaucracy. This leads to the further development of opportunism and revisionism.

The old petty-bourgeois illusions about the possibility of "correcting" capitalism by mending its contradictions in a reformist way are increasingly giving way to the openly bourgeois current within social-democracy, which seeks to adapt the working-class movement to the interests of the capitalists and relies on the long-term existence of capitalist relations. In England, this trend was expressed in English Trade Unionism, which sought to separate the economic struggle of the working class from its political struggle, and in the policy of the English "workers'" Party. In Germany, it is expressed by the reformist elite of the trade unions, parliamentary and municipal figures of social democracy, theoretically represented by Messrs. Bernstein, Vollmar, David, Sudekum, etc.

In Russia, the same trend is represented by the so-called "legal Marxists" who were outright apologists for capitalism in the ranks of social democracy (Struve and others), and by the Mensheviks, such openly macho representatives of it as the "economists", "Rabocheye Dyelo" and "liquidators", who openly promoted liberal-bourgeois tendencies in the working-class movement. by adapting it to the interests of the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, in international social-democracy, intermediate "centrist" groups are being created, trying to occupy an intermediate, vacillating position between revolutionary Marxism and opportunism. The social roots of centrism must be sought in a peculiar division of labor among opportunists, some of whom, while continuing to sow petty-bourgeois illusions among the proletariat, clothe them in "Marxist", sometimes "leftist" and "revolutionary" phraseology. Thus, along with openly macho opportunism, there emerges centrism (Kautsky in Germany, Trotsky in Russia), which is particularly dangerous and harmful, since it conceals outright opportunism, which in its further development has fully revealed its counter-revolutionary Menshevik essence. Finally, a group of so-called "left" social-Democrats (R. Luxemburg and others), along with a more correct understanding of the revolutionary prospects, nevertheless allowed for the grossest opportunist

distortions of the theory and practice of Marxism. "Leftist", "revolutionary" phraseology, petty-bourgeois in its content, often turned out to be the worst form of revisionism.

On all decisive questions of the theory and practice of the class struggle, opportunism found itself in glaring contradiction with Marxism. The "Marxism" of the Kautskys and Hilferdings, the "Marxism" of the Russian Mensheviks, and Trotsky's "Marxism" have nothing in common with genuine revolutionary Marxism, despite the fact that, unlike Bernstein, this "Marxism" is often disguised by "Marxist" and "left-wing" phraseology. We shall see later what monstrous perversions of Marxism even such Menshevik theorists as Plekhanov, for example, admit.

The further development of Marxism required, first of all, *the restoration* of the genuine teaching of Marx and Engels and the struggle for its real theoretical foundations against all the opportunist perversions of Marxism. This task is fulfilled by Leninism, which both *revives and moves forward* the revolutionary teaching of Marx and Engels. Continuing the work of Marx and Engels in the new historical epoch, Lenin is waging a merciless struggle against all kinds of opportunism, leading the line of division against open opportunism, against opportunism disguised by "left" phrases, and against centrism.

But Leninism is not only a restoration of the teaching of Marx and Engels, but also a concretization of it and its further development in relation to the new historical conditions of the struggle, to the peculiarities of the epoch of imperialism. Imperialism as the last and highest stage of capitalism, while preserving all the basic contradictions of developed capitalism, sharpens them and brings them to their highest limits. At the same time, the era of imperialism reveals new contradictions and peculiar features in the capitalist economy. Imperialism leads to the replacement of the period of free capitalist competition by the period of capitalist monopolies, to the strengthening of the role of finance capital, to the creation of capitalist trusts and syndicates uniting individual capitalist enterprises, to the export of capital to backward countries, to the struggle of imperialist states for sources of raw materials, for colonies, for the redivision of the world already divided by capital, and to the inevitability of imperialist wars. Capitalist monopolies become fetters that hinder the further development of the productive forces of society, cause a tendency to stagnate, to decay. The age of imperialism is the age of dying, decaying capitalism.

As T. points out Stalin, imperialism pushes to the extreme limits three main and most important contradictions.

The first contradiction is the fundamental contradiction of capitalism, *the contradiction between labor and capital, proletariat and bourgeoisie*. Under industrial capitalism, long periods of relatively "peaceful" development were possible, when the working class mainly used the economic form of struggle against the exploiting bourgeoisie, when it prepared its forces for the revolution, limiting itself to the use of the parliamentary rostrum and parliamentary struggle. Workers were sometimes able to obtain certain economic concessions in the form of shorter working hours or higher wages from individual capitalists or capitalist groups through legislative reforms, trade union methods of struggle, the organization of health insurance funds and workers' cooperation. This circumstance created political inertia in certain strata of well-paid or ideologically backward workers, gave rise to opportunistic sentiments and a tendency to reconcile with capital. The scattered industrial capitalists, on the other hand, were not always so strong economically as to carry out the unlimited exploitation of the proletariat to the end, and from time to time they did not give the appearance of certain economic and political concessions.

A completely different situation is created under imperialism, when individual capitalists are united by powerful trusts and syndicates, and when they are made dependent on themselves by the all-powerful banking capital. Here the economic and political pressure of the bourgeoisie on the working class becomes unlimited. At the same time, the growing mechanization of production and the methods of capitalist rationalization lead to an increase in the cadre of low-skilled labor, increase the army of unemployed, simplify the technical functions of the worker, finally turning him into an obedient slave of the production process. Under these conditions, the working class moves on to the task of overthrowing capitalism and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"Imperialism," says T. P. Blavatsky. Stalin: there is an omnipotence of monopoly trusts and

syndicates, banks and financial oligarchies in the industrial countries. In the struggle against this omnipotence, the usual methods of the working class — trade unions and co — operatives, parliamentary parties and parliamentary struggle — proved to be completely insufficient. Either throw yourself at the mercy of capital, vegetate in the old way and go downhill, or take up a new weapon — this is how imperialism poses the question to the vast masses of the proletariat. Imperialism is leading the working class to revolution⁴⁰."

The second fundamental contradiction of imperialism is rooted in the contradictions between the interests of *various capitalist groups*, between the capitalist States that represent and protect these interests *капиталистическим государствам*. While imperialism replaces free competition with capitalist monopolies, it does not eliminate capitalist competition. Competition, as Lenin points out, persists *along* with monopolies, and this combination of competition and monopoly leads to an even greater aggravation of contradictions and conflicts. Capitalist competition between individual world trusts, syndicates, and various groups of finance capital finds its expression in their fierce struggle for markets, areas of capital export, and sources of raw materials, and for the redistribution of industrially backward regions already divided up by world capital. The struggle for colonies is further intensified by *the law of uneven capitalist development, which increases in the period of imperialism*. The uneven and abrupt nature of capitalist development leads to the fact that each time new Powers, groups of Powers and financial groups appear on the world stage as competitors of existing monopolists. The inevitable desire to seize foreign territories leads to imperialist wars.

The imperialist war weakens the economic power of the imperialists: it makes it necessary for the capitalists to arm the multitudinous masses of working people, while at the same time increasing their exploitation by the burden of military hardships. This, in turn, creates the conditions and possibilities for turning an imperialist war into a civil war. Thus, the competition of capitalist groups, in the words of T. V. It leads to the mutual weakening of the imperialists, to the weakening of the position of capitalism in general, to the approach of the moment of the proletarian revolution, *to the practical necessity of this revolution* »⁴¹."

Finally, the third contradiction of imperialism is the contradiction between the few *ruling imperialists of various countries and the masses of colonial dependent peoples*. This contradiction stems from the merciless and brazen exploitation and inhuman oppression to which imperialism subjects the working masses of the colonies and dependent countries. By exploiting the colonies as sources of raw materials, foreign imperialism oppresses the broad masses of the colonial peasantry, who are also exploited by local landlords-feudal lords. Imperialism turns local feudal lords into its agents, and this interweaving and alliance of foreign imperialism with local feudalism leads to a delay in the economic and political development of the colonies, and causes opposition in the form of peasant uprisings. But at the same time imperialism makes the colonies the object of applying imported capital, it builds roads of communication, factories and factories in them, and this circumstance contributes to the industrial and commercial development of the colonies, the formation of cadres of the national proletariat, the creation of a local commercial and then industrial bourgeoisie, the formation of a local intelligentsia and the growth of the national liberation movement. National movements are initially led by the local bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, but the role of combat cadres in them is played by the proletariat, leading the working peasantry. He leads the people's revolution in proportion as the national bourgeoisie betrays itself, which is easily satisfied with the imperialists' handouts. This is the basis of a broad revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries.

In this way, by squeezing super-profits out of the proletariat and peasantry of the colonies, imperialism creates all the conditions for a revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the working peasantry it leads. This circumstance, according to T. Stalin, *"fundamentally undermines*

40 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 7. В дальнейшем всюду будет цитироваться по 9-му изданию.

41 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 7. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

the position of capitalism, transforming the colonies and dependent countries from reserves of imperialism into reserves of the proletarian revolution »⁴²."

Such are the fundamental contradictions of imperialism, which lead the working class to revolution, which make the proletarian revolution a practical necessity, and which create its reserves for the proletarian revolution. In these conditions, new in comparison with industrial capitalism, in the conditions of rotting, dying capitalism, the revolutionary theory of the working class — Marxism—was to be further developed. Under these conditions, Leninism was born *as a further development of the teachings of Marx and Engels, as the Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions* .

However, the question arises: why exactly could the Russian revolution and should have given rise to Leninism? Why could Russia be the birthplace of Leninism, the theory and tactics of Bolshevism?

"Because," answers this question. Stalin - that Russia was the nodal point of all these contradictions of imperialism. Because Russia was more pregnant with revolution than any other country, and only it was able to resolve these contradictions in a revolutionary way⁴³."

By the end of the 90's and the beginning of the 900's, Russia was already a country of developed capitalism, moving into its imperialist stage. In tsarist Russia, however, imperialism was closely intertwined with feudal relations, with a despotic and autocratic police system that condemned the workers and peasant masses to particularly severe disenfranchisement, poverty, inhumane exploitation, and cultural backwardness. Russian imperialism was, in Lenin's phrase, "military-feudal imperialism"; it was "the concentration of the negative aspects of imperialism squared off."

At the same time, the interests of tsarism and Russian capitalism were closely intertwined with the interests of Western imperialism. Tsarist Russia was the greatest reserve and most important ally of Western imperialism. Western capitalism, along with and intertwined with Russian capitalism, carried out the economic enslavement of the Russian proletariat and held in its hands the most important branches of the Russian national economy.

It should be noted that the Russian working-class movement, for the same reasons, knew little of the working-class aristocracy; it was strong in its revolutionary traditions, and it was supported by the peasant revolution against landed proprietorship. The contradiction between labor and capital in Russia was felt with particular acuteness and had the possibility of its own revolutionary solution: *the Russian working class was closest to the revolution* . Already the revolution of 1905 was regarded by Marxist-Leninists as a step towards a world proletarian revolution.

As a springboard for the application of Western capital, its agents in relation to the millions of workers and peasants who inhabited Russia, Tsarist Russia at the same time itself pursued an imperialist colonial policy both in relation to its foreign-national suburbs and its eastern neighbors (Persia, China, etc.). *Tsarist Russia was therefore an absolutely necessary link in the imperialist policy of the Soviet Union. the chain* is a necessary component of imperialist contradictions and imperialist wars, and a link where revolution was most of all a practical necessity.

Finally, in Russia, for the same reasons, the contradiction between the dominant nationality and the peoples enslaved by tsarism (Ukraine, the Caucasus, Poland, Central Asia), deprived of basic rights and representing inexhaustible reserves of revolutionary ferment, was particularly strong. The national revolutionary movement in Russia supplied the faithful reserves of the proletarian and peasant revolution.

Back in 1902, in his work "What to Do?" Lenin pointed out that history had set before the Russian proletariat the most revolutionary task — to overthrow the bulwark of reaction in Europe and Asia and to fight for the transfer of the revolution to proletarian lines. The fulfilment of this historic task, Lenin said, would place the Russian proletariat in the vanguard of the world

42 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 8. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

43 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 8. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

proletarian struggle against imperialism.

From all that has already been said, it is clear that it is fundamentally wrong to regard Leninism only as a "practice" and Marxism as a theory (Riazanov). It is also wrong to regard Leninism as a narrowly national, specifically Russian phenomenon (as the Social-Democrats do), as an application of Marxism to the Russian situation. It is wrong to say that Leninism is the theory of a proletarian revolution that "began immediately in a country where the peasantry prevails" and to see in the question of the role of the peasantry the fundamental question of Leninism (Zinoviev).

Leninism is a profoundly international phenomenon, in which the highest development of *the theory of* Marxism is closely connected with the practice of the proletarian revolution. In the epoch of imperialism and the proletarian revolution, there is not and cannot be for us any other Marxist theory than the one and only militant theory of the proletarian struggle — Leninism. And the slightest departure from Leninism, both in theory and in practice, strikes at the very theoretical foundations of Marxism.

"Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, and the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular... Leninism is *a further development of Marxism* »⁴⁴."

These propositions determine the content of Leninism. Leninism is based entirely on the theoretical principles of Marx and Engels, and at the same time represents something new in comparison with what Marx and Engels gave. Leninism represents both the concretization and further development of Marxism in decidedly all areas of Marxist theory—the development of all three components of Marxism: its philosophy, political economy, and scientific communism. Questions directly connected with the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat were particularly thoroughly and thoroughly mastered by Lenin: the question of monopoly capitalism as a new phase of capitalism, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its state form, the question of methods of building socialism and the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, the doctrine of the party of the proletariat, its strategy and tactics, on the hegemony of the proletariat in the people's revolution and its leadership of the peasantry, the national-colonial question.

Leninism means the creation of a new type of proletarian party capable of assuming the historical tasks of the proletariat in a new historical epoch.

The method of Lenin, as formulated by T. V. Tolstoy. Stalin, "is not only a restoration, but also a concretization and further development of Marx's critical and revolutionary method, his materialist dialectic⁴⁵." Leninism represents a *new and higher stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism — the philosophy of dialectical materialism*. Just as in Marx and Engels, according to Lenin's characterization, so in Lenin himself, the central point to which the whole essence of the ideas expressed and discussed by him is reduced is materialist dialectics. Continuing and developing the teachings of Marx and Engels, and brilliantly applying materialist dialectics to political economy, history, natural science, philosophy, politics, and tactics of the working class in the new historical conditions, Lenin is a staunch follower of Marxism.

The Communist International and our Party, led by Comrade Lenin. They continue the work of Lenin, the further development of the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution. Headed by T. Stalin's world communism continues to further develop the materialist dialectic, the philosophical basis of Marxism-Leninism.

Chapter 2. Materialism and Idealism

44 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 6. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

45 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 16. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

2.1. Two lines in philosophy

Behind the verbal tinsel of numerous philosophical systems, behind the variety of colorful labels pasted on their teachings by philosophers, lies a long and fierce struggle between two main lines in philosophy: *materialism and idealism*. The history of philosophy, for all its complexity, is a history of the struggle and development of these two antagonistic philosophical trends. All philosophical trends and schools are their varieties. Every philosophical doctrine, whether it declares it openly or tries to hide it in every possible way, necessarily belongs either to the camp of idealism or to the camp of materialism. The pretensions to stand outside of both directions, "above" them, "above" them, to create some new, non-idealistic and non-materialistic philosophy—are only a maneuver used by some modern bourgeois philosophers to conceal their belonging to idealism, or a shamefaced fear of others openly declaring their materialism, or a helpless trampling between the two. philosophical confusion, *eclecticism*, confusion.

The history of philosophy does not take place in a closed world, outside the historical class struggle. Philosophical teachings arise and develop in a particular human society, they are created by people belonging to certain social classes, whose consciousness is determined by a historically defined social being. Philosophical doctrines grow up in a concrete social environment and are determined by it, expressing the needs and aspirations of certain social classes, reflecting the level of development of the productive forces of society, the historical stage of human knowledge of nature. Their fate depends on the extent to which they meet the requirements of the social classes, and how completely they serve its purposes.

The social roots of the existence of two irreconcilable lines in philosophy throughout history must be sought in the class, contradictory structure of society. Idealism arose initially as a product of the limited and ignorant ideas of the primitive savage. The development of scientific knowledge, conditioned by the entire subsequent development of the productive forces of society, seemed bound to lead to the complete triumph of materialism and to the suppression of all idealistic ideas. However, idealism not only did not die, but continued to develop. The main reason for this is *the division of society into classes, the domination of capitalist society by the bourgeoisie, which perpetuates idealistic theories and teachings for its own interests*.

In its historical development, idealism was the ideology of the exploiting classes and, as a rule, played a reactionary role. Materialism, the development of which was an expression of the worldview of the revolutionary classes, had to fight its way in class society in an incessant struggle against the philosophy of reaction — idealism. Of course, no mandatory historical scheme can be established here. We know of cases when immature social classes express their new revolutionary demands in the language of idealism (German idealism of the early nineteenth century, theories of natural law, and partly utopian socialism). On the other hand, the militant French materialism of the eighteenth century was the ideology of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie. Materialism of the seventeenth century, as Engels pointed out, was of aristocratic origin.

Similarly, materialism at the present stage of historical development, if it takes the form of vulgar or mechanical materialism, can also play a reactionary role in modern conditions. However, the very nature of idealism makes it a particularly convenient weapon in the hands of the reactionary classes.

In a class society, there is only class science. It functions in accordance with the tasks and interests of certain classes. To the extent that the consciousness of the ruling class and its interests require a true knowledge of reality in order to develop the productive forces, science contains materialistic elements; to the extent that they require concealing the truth in order to preserve and strengthen their dominance, idealism prevails in science. To the extent that science reflects in cognition the area of being under study, to the extent that it aims at the revolutionary transformation of reality and at the subjugation of the forces of nature by revealing objective laws of development of nature and society, science cannot but be a materialistic science. In so far as the condition of the exploiting classes' social existence deprives them of the possibility of a true understanding of reality, in so far as it distorts and restricts their views, in so far as true knowledge threatens their

class interests, their science is idealistic. Those who do not understand this will understand nothing of the vicissitudes of the philosophical struggle. *Anyone who disputes the class character of science and philosophy tries to hide the class identity of his philosophy.*

What is the fundamental difference between the main directions in philosophy? Which teachings are materialistic and which should be classified as idealistic?

The difference between materialism and idealism is rooted in the opposite solution of *the basic question* of philosophy — *the question of the relation of thinking to being*. "Whether to take nature, matter, the physical, the external world as primary, and consider consciousness, spirit, sensation (experience, according to *the terminology common* in our time), the psychic, and so on as secondary, is the fundamental question that *is really being asked*. he continues to divide philosophers *into two big camps* »⁴⁶." All those philosophical doctrines that recognize being, the objective world, nature, and matter as primary and independent of our consciousness, while thinking, the subject, cognition, and spirit are secondary and derived, belong to the materialist camp. Idealists are those who recognize the spirit, idea, subject, and consciousness of a person as primary, basic, and consider the external, objective world, material reality to be dependent on consciousness, secondary. From the resolution of this basic question, one way or another, there are discrepancies along the entire path of research. This issue is the core of philosophical disagreements. The place of individual doctrines in the struggle of philosophical views is mainly determined by what position they take on the question of matter and consciousness, which of them is considered primary and what is secondary, where they see the key to understanding being and knowledge.

For the idealist, the world is either the totality of our sensations or a spiritual process created by our own or universal mind, consciousness, will; the external material world is either declared to be something imaginary, an appearance, or is understood as an external shell, as a material expression of the active spiritual principle. Human cognition for an idealist is the self-activity of the subject, the self-generation of thinking, sensations, and will.

The materialist, on the contrary, sees "the unity of the world in its materiality." Consciousness, thinking is one of the properties of matter that appears only at a certain, high stage of its development. Nature, matter, and the objective world exist outside and independently of consciousness. *Cognition is the reflection by a thinking subject, i.e., a person, outside and independently of the existing objective reality.*

The solution of the question of the relation of thinking to being is the only reliable criterion (yardstick) for determining the essence of the philosophical teaching under consideration. That is why philosophers who seek to cover up the traces of the origin of their views, to drag idealism under the guise of materialism, try to divert attention from this basic question, to replace it with a different, useless, imperfect standard. Recent attempts of this kind include the claims of L. Axelrod, I. Varyash and other modern mechanists *that the fundamental difference between materialism and idealism is the relation to the principle of causality*. The mechanists substitute the question of the primacy of matter or spirit for the question of whether the philosopher adheres to a causal explanation of phenomena, reducing the explanation to mechanical causes alone; the one who explains all phenomena by their causal connection and understands the causes as mechanical movements belongs, according to the mechanists, to the materialists. Those who deny the possibility of causal explanation are idealists. There is no dispute that the materialist understanding of causality is fundamentally different from the idealist understanding of it, or from the idealists' complete denial of causality. But to understand the essence of this difference, to understand what is the basis of differences on the question of causality, it is necessary to turn first of all to the main question of philosophy: what precedes-being or thinking? — because this is also what determines the materialistic or idealistic solution of the question of causality.

Only causality, understood as a form of objective material connection between things, is

46 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 274.

causality understood in a materialistic way. Idealism, on the other hand, based on the fact that matter is generated by spirit, understands causal connection not as an objective connection of things, but as a form of thinking or as their logical connection, as a special way for the subject to connect his sensations. Other forms of idealism deny causality altogether, replacing causality with a will or other spiritual force or purpose that supposedly drives the world. By placing the question of mechanical or non-mechanical causality at the center of philosophy, the opponents of dialectical materialism try to avoid the question of an idealistic or materialistic starting point in understanding causality. The mechanists' statement of the question is an attempt to erase the real boundary between idealism and materialism with inadequate means.

Idealism is directly related to religion. Like religion, idealism is a development, an elaboration of the animistic understanding of the world, i.e. spiritualizing things, endowing them with a soul and will in the image and likeness of man. Idealism and religion have not only common origins, but also similar social goals and objectives. Idealistic philosophy performs more subtly, in a scientific form, the same ideological function that religion performs more simply and crudely. Without exception, all forms of idealistic philosophy, no matter how disguised, are justifications of religion, since on closer examination the basic position of idealism turns out to be identical with the foundations of religious ideology. The various idealistic teachings differ only in the form of justification and "justification" of religion. We find in the idealists a direct, logical proof of the correctness of religious dogmas, then the belittling of reason and the exaltation of faith, feeling, and instinct, then the delineation of the spheres of influence of science and religion for the purpose of their peaceful coexistence. *The struggle against religion, therefore, necessarily requires the unmasking of idealism, and the overcoming of idealism is the struggle against popishness in science.*

By claiming that in knowledge we are limited to the spiritual realm, which supposedly lies on the "other side" of matter, idealism asserts false criteria of truth, incorrect ways and methods of scientific research. Idealistic mathematics is also being created, which extracts its principles from pure reason, which is supposedly independent of objective reality, and which studies a special ideal realm of mathematical concepts; idealistic physics dissolves all nature in the sphere of subjective sensations; idealistic biology turns to immaterial, purposeful "life forces"; idealistic psychology deals with the "soul", free "will" and a self-sufficient, independent world of psychic experiences. Idealism penetrates all the cracks, exploits all the gaps that exist at a given level of knowledge. *Idealism parasitizes on the weaknesses of science, on its underdevelopment*, it speculates on the difficulties of its growth, on the incompleteness of the search that often takes place in the process of revolutionary breaking of obsolete ideas.

Idealism shrouds the true state of affairs in a "philosophical fog" that condemns the reactionary class to destruction; it educates the oppressed classes in a spirit of reconciliation with the hardships and miseries of the material world in the name of an ideal world, "higher" values; it educates the proletariat in the consciousness of the necessity of subordinating physical labor to the leadership of representatives of the "spirit", "reason", and "higher" values. It educates in the ruling classes themselves the ideology necessary for the consolidation of their rule.

Idealism is not something "external" to bourgeois science. It is not the case that reactionary idealistic philosophy forces pure, classless science to serve the ruling classes. This would mean assuming that only philosophy is a class science, and that the rest of exact science is in itself a classless science and can only be used in the interests of one class or another. From this understanding, which is peculiar in particular to our mechanists, follows their uncritical worship of "science", their equalization with "exact science", and their struggle for the "liberation" of science from the dialectical-materialist philosophy that supposedly leads it astray from the path of truth. In a class society, all science is a class science by its very nature: blind, uncritical adherence to "science" in general is nothing but a slide into the position of bourgeois science.

Idealism must be fought fiercely and implacably. In this struggle, it is necessary first of all to expose the class nature of all idealism, its exploitative nature. It is necessary to discover his priestly character and his defense of religious ideas. But it is also necessary to reveal what causes, hidden in

the peculiarities of human cognition itself, contribute to idealistic perversion, it is necessary to find *out the epistemological (cognitive-theoretical) roots of idealism* .

Human cognition is a process of reflecting the laws of the objective world. But this reflection is not frozen, not dead. No, the process of cognition is a movement, a division of the one. In the very process of cognition lies the possibility of departure of cognition away from the objective truth.

When thinking, a person applies general concepts. For example, the concepts of a person, class, society, formation, etc. It is impossible to think without using these concepts. But on the other hand, it reveals the possibility of flight to the side and the danger of idealism. When we say that Ivan is a human being, we can already think separately and independently of what all people have in common, regardless of whether he is Ivan, Peter, or Sidor. It is impossible to do without using the concept of "man", since in this case we will not go further than the ideas that we have about Ivan, but we need to express exactly what all people have in common, i.e., to pass in knowledge from Ivan to Peter, Sidor, etc. Thus, knowledge is divided, on the one hand, private-Ivan, on the other hand, general-man. The particular and the general are inextricably linked. To break them is to break away from the objective truth expressed in the unity of the general and the particular. The objective truth is precisely that there is no general without the particular, and the particular without the general. Ivan exists only as a person, and a person exists only as Ivan, Peter, Sidor, etc. The separation of the general from the particular, the giving it the meaning of an objectively existing reality, is the departure of knowledge to the side. When, along with really existing, living people — Ivan, Peter, etc. — they put "*man in general*", man as such, and declare Ivan, Peter, etc. to be only a form of existence of this man in general, then this is idealism, because here the starting point is taken from the thought of man (abstraction: man in general) not real people. These are the methods of all idealists. All idealists put consciousness, i.e., thought or sensation, in the place of matter, i.e., objective reality that exists independently of human consciousness.

This perversion benefits exploiters. Through idealism, they sanctify exploitation; they try to prove the eternity and inviolability of the existing order. In this way, class interest perpetuates the decline of knowledge, seeks to perpetuate it, and to establish idealism as a universal worldview.

"Human cognition is not a straight line, but a curved line, infinitely approaching a series of circles, a spiral," says Lenin. — Any fragment, fragment, or fragment of this curved line can be transformed (one-sidedly transformed) into an independent, complete, straight line, which (if you do not see the forest behind the trees) then leads into a swamp, into clerical activity (where it is *fixed* by the class interest of the ruling classes). Straightforwardness and one-sidedness, woodiness and ossification, subjectivism and subjective blindness veil & #224; epistemological roots of idealism". "Philosophical idealism is a *one-sided*, exaggerated (& #252;berschwengliches (Dietzgen)) development (inflating, swelling) of one of the features, sides, facets of knowledge into an absolute, *detached* from the mother, from nature, deified. Idealism is clerical. Right. But philosophical idealism is ("*rather*" and "*besides*") a road to clerical life through one of the shades of the infinitely complex cognition of (dialectical) man⁴⁷."

That is why the struggle against idealism, a consistent, irreconcilable struggle against the theory that has dominated a vast period of history, requires us not to simply discard the entire theoretical content of the old idealistic philosophy, but to overcome idealism critically. While we must reveal the class roots of idealism, we must not dismiss the questions raised by idealistic philosophy. By revealing the inner logic of an idealistic system and subjecting it to Marxist criticism, we reveal the idealistic one-sidedness of the solution of these questions, its subjective blindness, and the idealistic inflating of individual features and aspects of phenomena.

Idealism is false. But idealism is not just nonsense, nonsense that has no support in the peculiarities of our cognitive process. Idealism would not be able to fulfill its class purpose if it were absolutely groundless, meaningless, and without points of support in the objective process of

47 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 326.

cognition. "Popishness (=philosophical idealism), of course, has *epistemological* roots, it is not groundless, it is *an empty flower* unquestionably, but an empty flower growing on the living tree of living, fruitful, true, powerful, all-powerful, objective, absolute, human knowledge⁴⁸." It is impossible, therefore, to simply erase all the previous development of philosophy that took place under the sign of the struggle against idealism. The exploiting classes in their heyday contributed to the development of knowledge, but this development was carried out by them in a perverse, mystifying, idealistic form. By destroying idealistic philosophy, modern materialism does not undermine the living tree of knowledge, but removes the empty flower, the dead growths: it is the heir to all that is true and valuable that was achieved in the previous movement of science.

Dialectical materialism — the highest form of materialist philosophy, *is the philosophy of the proletariat*. While dialectical materialism openly proclaims itself class-based and partisan, it at the same time exposes the class essence of the hostile views that oppose it, and removes from them the veils of "classlessness," "purity," and "objectivity." Dialectical materialism is the most consistent and irreconcilable form of materialism, just as the proletariat is the most consistent and radical class in its revolutionary character. The materialism of the advanced classes of society, which preceded the proletariat, was already limited by virtue of the conventionally limited revolutionary character of these classes. The progressive bourgeoisie, while waging a struggle against feudal reaction under the materialist banner, had to look back cautiously on its "allies" — the proletarians; its revolution was the establishment of a new form of exploitation, a new kind of class oppression. Its revolutionary character was inherently flawed: it contained the germ of a new subsequent reaction. The revolutionary character of the proletariat is fundamentally different: it is directed against all exploitation and oppression, and it brings the destruction of the classes themselves to replace class rule. Hence — to the end, the consistent dialectical materialism of the proletariat, to the end, an intolerant, hostile attitude towards all and every kind of idealism and religiosity, anti-science, ideological reactionism.

The history of the development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy is the history of an irreconcilable struggle against reactionary philosophical idealism, no matter what forms it may take, no matter what clothes it may put on. "Marx and Engels were party philosophers from beginning to end, and were able to discover deviations from materialism and indulgences for idealism and fideism in all and sundry "modern" directions⁴⁹." Behind hypocritical phrases and verbal twists, they exposed an idealistic enemy. They also found him when, pretending to be a friend of the proletariat, he substituted idealism for dialectical materialism under the guise of "deepening" and "correcting" it. But they also did not give way to those materialists who were evolving from a higher form of materialism to a less consistent, pre-Marxist, vulgar mechanical materialism, long surpassed by the development of knowledge and powerless in the struggle against modern idealism. "Either consistent materialism to the end, or the falsehood and confusion of philosophical idealism — this is the formulation of the question that is given"⁵⁰ in every page of Marx and Engels.

The struggle of parties in philosophy is one of the fronts of the class struggle. And in philosophy there is class against class. The epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution that we are living through, the epoch of the deepest general crisis of capitalism, of the utmost aggravation of its contradictions, the epoch of rapid socialist construction in the U.S.S.R., of the rise of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat throughout the world, is the epoch of the most acute and bitter class struggle that history knows.

A betrayal of the philosophical line of the proletariat, a flirtation with idealism, is a betrayal in the class struggle, a surrender of positions to the enemy. Idealist philosophers are learned clerks of

48 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 326.

49 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 277.

50 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 276.

theology, idealist philosophers are certified lackeys of the bourgeoisie.

Dialectical materialists are the ideologues of the working class, which must put an end to the enslavement of man by man, a class that builds a socialist society. There can be no middle ground in the fierce class struggle; neither can there be any middle ground in philosophy. Of all the parties, therefore, "the most infamous is the party of the middle." "Conciliatory charlatans — are agents of a weakening enemy who wants to delay the struggle and gather strength.

The learned lackeys of the imperialists do not disdain anything in their desire to denigrate Marxism. "Solid" professors in "solid" philosophical works do not disdain "arguments" borrowed from the garbage pit of White emigrants, combining the struggle against communism with the struggle against materialism.

For example, the notorious herald of intervention, the ideologue of pan-Europe, Count R. Coudengove-Kalergi, in his specially written book "Away from Materialism" intimidates the petty bourgeois with the immorality and immorality of materialism: "Since (for materialists) there is nothing but matter, i.e., neither God nor ideas, then every duty is a fraud for them, every moral requirement is a fraud, every morality is a fraud... "Materialists" treat others with neither friendship nor hostility, but indifference. Other people are just a means for them to increase their enjoyment of life. They treat them no differently than good cigars, good wines and viands, or as annoying flies and venomous snakes..." This is how the most advanced ideologists of imperialism "overthrow" materialism.

The reactionary nature of bourgeois philosophy is now reaching its highest point. Hitler's "ideologues" directly proclaim the cry: "back to barbarism!" From the depths of the historical idealistic arsenal, the most vile mystical systems are extracted. Reason refuses to serve bourgeois philosophy. It turns to a superintelligent, "frank", intuitive mysticism. The vile party of the middle, the bourgeois agents among the proletariat — Social-democracy-is finally being transformed into the "left" party of the bourgeoisie, is finally closing in with its masters, and is becoming the reliable support of fascism, the last political stake of rabid imperialism. Accordingly, the philosophers of social fascism are disentangled. Philosophical revisionism-the disguised laying of an idealistic foundation under the politics of the working class in order to emasculate its revolutionary character — has today already turned into outright idealism among the official philosophers of the Second International. Dialectical materialism is openly and unceremoniously declared obsolete by them. Social — fascism takes Kant, Mach, Bergson, Freud, and anyone else as its philosophical teachers in order to "finish" Marx and direct proletarian thought into the bourgeois channel.

The Communist parties, which are confidently and inexorably leading the proletariat to victory, must be especially vigilant in preserving the inviolability of the principles of dialectical materialism, the philosophy of the Comintern, and must be merciless to the enemy and to condone him.

But our fundamental and primordial enemy, idealism, exists not only outside the borders of the Soviet Union, in countries where capitalism still prevails, where a proletarian revolution is yet to take place, but its remnants are still preserved in the pores of our Soviet country. The obscurantist idealism of reactionary philosophers like Losev, the reactionary attacks of representatives of various social and natural sciences-Platonov, Berg, Savich, and many others — the wrecking interventionist machinations of the Ramzins, Kondratievs, and Gromans — all these are different faces of the same restoration ideology.

Our struggle against the enemy cannot be victorious if it is not combined with the struggle against revisionism, which is trying to penetrate the Marxist party ranks and is hiding behind the guise of "Marxism." Vulgar mechanismism, which insists on philosophical backslides *механицизм*, which disarms dialectical materialism in the face of idealism, *Menshevik idealism*, which has replaced dialectical materialism with Hegelian idealistic dialectics — these are the two main varieties of modern revisionism in the philosophy and theory of Marxism-Leninism, both alien to the Bolshevik party and philosophy, and which provide the philosophical foundations for counter — revolutionary Trotskyism, right and "left" opportunism, playing on behalf of pests. The struggle against all these anti-Marxist doctrines is an immutable duty of dialectical materialists, since

"without an irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois theories based on Marxist-Leninist theory, it is impossible to achieve complete victory over class enemies⁵¹."

2.2. Mechanistic materialism

Materialism, as well as its opposite, idealism, does not remain stationary and unchangeable. It has its own history. Materialism passed through various *stages of development* before acquiring its highest form in Marxism-Leninism. Materialism has passed through a series of stages determined by social development, the change of the struggling classes, and the nature and level of their struggle. Materialism did not remain indifferent to the development of science and assumed a new form, transformed into *a new form* in accordance with the revolutions in natural science, with the epoch-making turning discoveries of science.

The mechanical materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which developed in England, France, and the Netherlands, has written a glorious chapter in the history of philosophy. It was the brainchild of a young, progressive, vital class that was replacing the feudal nobility. Mechanical materialism of the 17th and 18th centuries was a philosophy that expressed the aspirations for hegemony and power of a new class — the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie, which had matured in the depths of feudal society and shattered its economic, political, and ideological foundations from within, brought with it a new form of production relations and an unheard-of *powerful development of the productive forces*. It expanded the framework of the old world, drew new continents into the economic orbit of capitalism, brought new political forms, needs, ideas, and set new tasks for science. The development of the productive forces — this historical mission of the bourgeoisie — could not be carried out in the old social forms, in the close confines of feudal economics and medieval political institutions. The bourgeoisie had to overthrow feudal-noble rule, break the medieval economic forms and destroy the ideology that they generated and consolidated them.

Бурному развитию производительных сил соответствовала *The revolution in natural science corresponded to the rapid development of the productive forces*. Navigation, military science, industry, and trade brought to life a whole series of great discoveries and inventions, raised mathematics, mechanics, and physics to a level unattainable for previous centuries. Mechanical materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a philosophical expression of the demands of the development of productive forces and the level of new science. It was a teaching corresponding to the new natural science, directed against the obsolete scholastic methodology of the old natural science. The philosophy of revolutionary natural science could only be a materialist philosophy.

As the bourgeoisie grows stronger, as its needs and opportunities grow, it expresses its revolutionary aspirations more resolutely and persistently, and openly opposes the whole complex of feudal ideas and principles. Materialist philosophy has ideologically armed the revolutionary bourgeoisie. In the old materialism, the social and political ideals of the bourgeoisie, its rejection of the old, feudal culture and justification of the methodology of the new natural science, and the struggle against the philosophical stronghold of feudalism-clericism and idealism — went hand in hand.

With the strengthening of the bourgeoisie and the approach of direct revolutionary battles, the atheist battle motives in its philosophy are becoming louder and more decisive. In the eighteenth century, especially in France, where the bourgeois revolution did not have such a compromise and half-hearted character as in England, militant anti-religious propaganda and materialist teachings reached a high level of development.

From Bacon, Gassendi, and the physical teachings of Descartes, through Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke, comes the development of mechanical materialism, reaching its fullest and most

⁵¹ Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 443.

comprehensive development in the teachings of the eighteenth-century French materialists.

What, then, are the guiding principles of mechanical materialism in the form it took in the philosophical teachings of the eighteenth-century French materialists-the teachings of Holbach, Helvetius, Lamethry, and Diderot?

First of all, eighteenth-century materialism resolutely fought against religion , considering it the greatest evil and the greatest obstacle to human progress. He took up arms against the power of traditional groundless dogmas over the minds of people. Everything was *judged by reason* . All ideas, beliefs, and institutions had to justify themselves in the light of reason, to prove their reasonableness. Reason became the standard of everything, and everything that did not stand up to its criticism was rejected. Of course, this reason was the reason of a certain epoch, it was *bourgeois reason* , and that which did not correspond to the interests of the revolutionary bourgeoisie was declared inappropriate to reason. Religion, the bulwark of feudal reaction, was recognized as the ideological enemy of reason and the support of ignorance. Religion, according to the materialists of the eighteenth century, grew up on the ground of ignorance and darkness of people: god perpetuated the deception of the ignorant masses by the priests. "Religion," said the old materialists, " was born of the meeting of a fool with a priest."

From heaven, from the other world, materialism directed human interests and thoughts to this world, the earthly world, to physical reality. In the knowledge *of nature*, he saw the only goal of science. Nature, of which man himself and his senses are a part, is the only reality. There is no other world but the physical, material, and earthly world. There is a single and unique substance, that is, the only thing that exists independently, by itself, is primary and does not need anything else for its existence-material substance is the basis and carrier of all the diversity of existing things. Immaterial substance is a ridiculous fiction. "Matter in general is everything that affects our senses in any way, and the qualities we attribute to different substances are based on different impressions or different changes produced by them in us⁵²." Thus, the primacy of being, matter, and the secondary nature of thinking are affirmed.

The world, according to these materialists, is a combination of material elements, the combinations and movements of which form the entirety of reality. It does not need any supernatural, immaterial driving principles and forces. He lives according to the inviolable and eternal laws of nature inherent in matter itself, which it is the task of reason to understand. The basic and essential properties of all matter are: extension, mobility, divisibility, hardness, gravity, force and inertia. All the other derived properties arise from them. Matter is mobile by its nature, and this movement is understood mechanically, i.e. as a spatial movement of elementary parts and complex body masses, as a change of place and position in space. All the variety of qualities and events that we see in the world is nothing more than a variety of manifestations of the mechanical movement of matter. Not only dead nature in all its manifestations, but also animals and even man are only more or less complex mechanisms, the existence of which is reduced to various mechanical processes, to combinations of mechanical movements. Man differs from a machine only in the greater complexity and subtlety of his construction and can be exhaustively recognized as a perfect mechanism. The human *will is not free* , as priests and idealists claim, but is a link in the chain of natural laws and its activity is determined by material causes. The mechanism of human passions is as natural a process as any other mechanism. There is no soul as a special substance along with the body or even dominating it. The soul, or rather sensibility, is *one of the properties of the body* . Where there is no body, there is no sensitivity. With the death of an organism, its "soul" is also destroyed. The immortality of the soul, its existence independent of the body, is an absurd and harmful superstition.

The materialists emphatically rejected the idealistic doctrine that the human mind contains original ideas, innate to man, which were not acquired by him through the senses in experience. The only source of knowledge recognized by the materialists *was the experience* gained in the process

52 Гольбах, Система природы, 1924 г., стр. 31.

of nature's influence on our sense organs. A person is born with a brain like a blank board (*tabula rasa*), which experience fills with its own writing. *Materialists were sensualists*, that is, they saw in the sense organs exposed to the external world the only channel through which knowledge is acquired. There is nothing in the mind that has not come to it from sensation. The mind only processes the data of experience. Therefore, the materialists saw the main task of science in experimental knowledge, in observing nature and experimenting on it.

The sensualist theory of knowledge of these materialists determines their understanding of human development. If ideas, inclinations and beliefs are formed in a person's experience, then all people at birth are equal in their predispositions. The character and psyche of people are entirely determined by the nature of life experience, environmental conditions and upbringing. *A person is a product of the environment.* You want to change people, eliminate ignorance and vices-change the environment, create social conditions that bring up reasonable and virtuous people. At this point, the connection between the philosophical ideas of the French materialists and their revolutionary nature is revealed with particular depth.

But it also reveals the bourgeois narrowness and class nature of the revolutionary spirit of the old materialists. From this starting point, two paths follow. One way is the path to socialism. Utopian socialists proceeded from the idea of innate equality of people and the need to change the social environment in the development of their views in the future. But the French materialists themselves did not follow this path, otherwise they would have ceased to be bourgeois revolutionaries. Instead of coming to understand the material driving forces of the development of the social environment, they remained on the point of view that proclaims the "eternal", "natural" ideals of bourgeois society, law and the state. The old materialists remain with an idealistic understanding of social life. *They explain the social structure, social relations, the state of the environment, and objective laws of social development by people's opinions, their views, and the ideas that prevail in society.*

Thus, ideas are the driving force of social life. In changing ideas, in educating and eliminating ignorance, they see the key to transforming the social order. They hope that a change in social consciousness will lead to a change in the old, feudal social existence.

Such are the guiding ideas of the French materialists. They were opposed not only to direct popishness, but also to contemporary popishness clothed in philosophical garb, especially to the subjective idealism of Malebranche, Berkeley, and Hume. French materialism of the eighteenth century, as we can see, expressed the advanced aspirations of its own era and the science of its day. It should go down in the history of philosophy as a progressive step in the development of scientific thinking. But the same social relations and level of knowledge that determined the historical merits of old materialism also determined its *historical limitations*. Because of its revolutionary nature, the philosophy of Holbach, Helvetius, and their associates became a link in the chain of ideas *that ultimately led to the teachings of Marx*. Due to the bourgeois nature of this revolutionary attitude, this philosophy did not go beyond the idealistic policy of enlightenment; it failed to carry out materialism in the sphere of social phenomena. It is caught in a vicious circle: ideas are determined by the social existence of people, and at the same time their existence is determined by ideas. It could not solve the dilemmas: the social environment creates people, and at the same time people create their own social environment.

Of all the sciences of that time, only *mathematics and mechanics*, and especially the mechanics of solid bodies, reached a significant development. The rest of the sciences were in their infancy, undeveloped. This put the stamp of *mechanical limitation* on the old materialism. They applied the scale of mechanics to the whole of nature, to all supermechanical, chemical, biological, etc. areas. They simplified and discolored reality, reducing it to the simplest mechanical laws. *Their materialism was metaphysical.* They did not understand the variety of forms of movement, the principles of the emergence of new things, and the complexity of the processes of change. The concept of nature was "always an equal whole, always moving in the same limited spheres"⁵³

according to an unchanging number of eternal laws. The brilliant glimpses of thought in which individual eighteenth-century materialists rose above this concept (especially Diderot) do not alter the general metaphysical character of their materialism.

The three main features of the historical limitations of the old materialism are as follows: mechanismism, metaphysics, and the inability to extend materialism to the sphere of social life. They had to be overcome by a new form of materialism, which grew up at a different stage of social relations, connected with the development of a new revolutionary class — the proletariat — and at a new level of scientific development.

Materialistic philosophy has passed through a mechanical stage in its development. It has developed from the old form of metaphysical materialism to a modern, *dialectical materialism* corresponding to the present state of knowledge of nature and society.

However, even now there are people — and even those who imagine themselves Marxists — who strive to galvanize, to revive the already surpassed and obsolete forms of materialism, to oppose the higher form of materialism to its lower forms, which have already been overcome in the further development of materialism. Such aspirations are inevitably reactionary: they drag science and philosophy backward, hinder their development, and discredit materialist philosophy in the face of the demands of the current state of science. Advanced *для своего времени* forms of materialism for their time are becoming reactionary in our time, at a different stage of knowledge, at a new level of philosophy, in a new social environment. Here we have in mind a return to the old mechanical materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (Hobbes, Holbach, Helvetius, Lamettrie, etc.) in the representatives *of the modern world*. mechanical materialism (Bukharin, L. Axelrod, A. Timiryazev, etc.).

In modern conditions, protection *of mechanical equipment* a return to the long-surpassed philosophical ideas of the materialists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries means a rejection of the conquests of materialist philosophy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an attempt to reduce materialism to its old, passed stage. Mechanical materialism in the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution is not only a philosophical atavism. Today, in the presence of dialectical materialism, which has left far behind the historical limitations of the old materialism, mechanical materialism is reactionary. "Our" mechanical materialists (Bukharin, Timiryazev, Varyash, Axelrod) are held captive by the ideas of the old materialism. They are not able to understand the complex dialectic of material reality, the richness of its contradictions, transitions and overflows, its qualitative diversity and specificity of various areas. They reduce the highest qualitatively peculiar laws (social, biological, etc.) to purely quantitative laws borrowed from mechanics, to the principle of equilibrium and the crossing of oppositely directed forces. They try to fit all the variety of qualitatively different forms of movement into the scheme of spatial mechanical movement. Like their spiritual ancestors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they know no scale other than that of mechanics.

At the present stage of development, mechanistic materialism disorganizes the struggle of materialism against idealism, facilitates the struggle of idealism against us, and serves as a wedge driven between the discoveries of modern science and materialist philosophy. Dialectical materialism must therefore fight implacably against mechanistic materialism. This struggle is a necessary condition for its development and victory over idealism.

Whether the mechanists want it or not, they inevitably become a hindrance to the ideological struggle being waged by the proletariat, an obstacle in this struggle. In what follows, we will discuss in detail the class roots of modern mechanical materialism, its methodology, and the political role it plays in Soviet conditions, which is basically the philosophical basis of right-wing opportunism.

2.3. Subjective idealism, Machism, intuitionism

The opposite of the old materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is the contemporary *subjective idealism* of Berkeley and *the agnosticism* of Hume. Berkeley's subjective idealism (phenomenalism) signified the activation of reactionary popery, supported by the already victorious and established rule of the bourgeoisie. Hume's agnosticism is a product of the transformation of the bourgeoisie from a revolutionary class to a conservative one, of the convergence of bourgeois and renewed feudal ideologies.

The idealistic doctrines under consideration reflected the interests and sentiments of the victorious English bourgeoisie, which was ahead of its French sister and came to power a century earlier through the compromise of the English revolution, which "bourgeoisized feudalism and gave bourgeois society a feudal appearance"⁵⁴.

This peculiarity is reflected with exceptional clarity in Bishop Berkeley's philosophical teaching, which represents the adaptation of Protestantism to the level and new needs of the bourgeoisie, which has become a reactionary class.

Lenin gave an excellent analysis of Berkeley's views in his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. Berkeley proceeds from the fact that man has no other source of knowledge about the world besides sensations, that concepts, abstract ideas, as far as they are possible, are not primary and are the product of sensations. But Berkeley denies that these sensations reflect the real objective world that exists independently of these sensations. From this Berkeley comes to the inevitable logical conclusion that *the only thing known to man, the only possible object, the object of knowledge — our sensations*. Sensations are the primary elements that make up everything that exists. In his cognitive activity, a person cannot go beyond sensations, learn anything other than them, beyond them, or different from sensations. In the process of cognition, according to Berkeley, we are not dealing with things outside of us, not with the objective world reflected in our sensations, but only with our own sensations: sensations of redness, hardness, height, roundness, etc. We are unable to know anything other than our own sensations, i.e., subjective states of consciousness. Not things, but only sensations, i.e., something psychic, are given in our experience.

According to subjectivists, we have no grounds for asserting that the external world exists independently of sensations. We have no right to talk about anything reliably real that is outside of our senses. The belief that there is an objective external world outside of our consciousness, according to subjective idealists, is completely not based on experience, is a prejudice and does not stand up to scientific criticism. The biggest thing we can assume is that our psyche is inherent in the idea of the existence of the external world. But there is no reason to say that this representation actually corresponds to anything outside the subject.

From this point of view, what we call a thing is nothing more than a bundle, the totality of our sensations. A group of sensations (solid, round, blue, etc.) given together and repeated more or less constantly, we call a thing. To assume that a thing is something more, that behind our sensations lies the body that produces them, the substance, the objective world — such an assumption, according to Berkeley, is groundless.

"The being of things," Berkeley formulates his views, "is their *perceptibility*. It is impossible that they can have any existence outside of the spirit or the thinking things that perceive them. It is true that there is an astonishingly widespread opinion among people that houses, mountains, and rivers - in short, all sensible objects-have a natural or real existence, different from that which the mind perceives. But whatever confidence and general assent may be given to this principle, any one who has the courage to examine it will find, if I am not mistaken, that it contains a clear contradiction; for what are these objects but things perceived by us in our senses, and what do we perceive but our own ideas and feelings. And wouldn't it be a complete contradiction to assume that any combination of them exists without being perceived"⁵⁵?"

Thus Berkeley comes to the denial of matter, which he himself considers very important for

54 Мering, Сб. «На философские и литературные темы», Д. Локк, 1923 г., стр. 3.

55 Беркли, Трактат о началах человеческого знания, стр. 62–63.

the fight against materialism and the justification of idealism, this reliable support of religion. It dissolves matter into spirit, and reduces the object to the subject. "*To be, to exist, is to be perceived*" (esse is percipi) - and nothing more. If a thing is not felt, it does not exist. The existence of things for us, for our consciousness, is the only reality; the ability to perceive things is the only proof of their being, as being for our consciousness.

"I do not deny," Berkeley wrote, " the existence of any thing that we can *perceive* by sensation or reflex. That the things I see with my eyes or touch with my hands really exist, I have no doubt at all. The only thing we deny is what the philosophers call matter or corporeal substance⁵⁶."

This is the subjective-idealistic solution of the question of the relation of being and thinking. Based on the same sensualist teaching about sensations as the only source of knowledge, subjective idealism gives it an idealistic character, brings it to the point of absorption of the object by the subject. The subject becomes the only reality. The world dissolves into the thinking subject. An object, nature, or matter is nothing but a product of psychic activity, a product of the subject. *The object of perception is identified with the perception of the object.* Berkeley recognizes the source of our feelings as the Lord God himself, from whom our soul receives its content.

Berkeley makes no secret of the fact that his entire philosophical edifice is built for a specific purpose — *to strike down the growing godlessness and rearing head of materialism* . In his diary, he explicitly says that the desire *to strengthen faith* prompted him to invent his own system.

Hume departs from the same recognition of experience as the sole source of knowledge that Berkeley did. He shares with Berkeley the denial of the possibility of our knowing the external material world, the reduction of things to experiences.

Hume refuses to know anything other than subjective experiences; he cuts off science's path beyond the subject and restricts its introspection. His philosophy is *agnostic* , i.e. it denies the possibility of objective knowledge, the possibility of knowing the external world that exists independently of us.

Hume pays particular attention to the critique of the materialist *concept of causality* . According to Hume, causality is not given in experience. We do not perceive it in a number of qualities given to us in perception-color, shape, sound. In experience, we find only the succession of two or more sensations, the concomitance of one to the other, but not the active cause, not the force that causes the phenomena. From *the habit* of having two phenomena connected with each other in experience, a person is inclined to conclude that they are necessary and permanent dependence. But such a conclusion, according to Hume, is illegitimate. We may speak of the regularity of this sequence, we may consider its repetition probable, but we are not at liberty to assert *the necessity* of a connection between the two phenomena. In experience, there is no guarantee that a sequence of phenomena that has been observed a thousand times will be repeated a thousand times for the first time. This is Hume's way of dealing with causality and regularity. The world turns into a chaos of phenomena, from which knowledge has no way out.

Subjective idealism, when consistently pushed to its limit, must inevitably lead to *solipsism* . Solipsism is the view that only "I" exists, and everything else, including other people, is a product of my feelings. I and my causeless and groundless feelings are the only reality. *Solipsism is an extreme philosophical individualism.* From the Solipsistic point of view, the world must be destroyed with me, and it exists only insofar as I exist and feel. I am not in the world, but the world is in me. The universe is me. The solipsist is like a mad, feeling instrument who "imagines that he is the only instrument in the world and that all the world's harmony takes place in him⁵⁷." If we only consistently apply the principle of "immanence" of cognition, i.e., understanding the world as the inner content of our consciousness, then we must inevitably come to the statement that the subject can destroy the world every hour, every minute, and re-create it out of nothing. If I die — the whole world will be destroyed along with me, because it will cease to exist as the totality of my sensations,

56 Беркли, Трактат о началах человеческого знания, стр. 84–85.

57 Дидро, Избранные произведения, т. I, 1926 г., стр. 150.

but it has no other existence. True, subjective idealists themselves will not dare to make such a frank sequence. Subjective idealists try to get out of this difficulty by pointing out that the world after the death of the subject will not cease to exist in the perceptions of other people, but they inevitably fall into insoluble contradictions. In fact, other people, like all other things, are nothing but complexes of my sensations, which have no other reality than the subjective one. Therefore, if I cease to feel, then humanity, as a complex of my sensations, must be destroyed along with me. Referring to other people means admitting the existence of things outside of my consciousness, acknowledging being.

But what is "I"? Obviously not a corporeal being, since material existence is not acceptable. To be a consistent subjective idealist, it must be recognized that my body, legs, arms, head, and brain are nothing but a complex of my sensations, and exist only as a phenomenon of consciousness, as an intrapsychic reality. Thus, if you follow the subjective-idealistic current, you will not only drown in the swamp of solipsism, but, like Baron Munchausen, you will have to pull yourself out by the hair of your head. Not only does the universe dissolve into the "I", but the "I" turns out to be very ephemeral, dissolves into its own perceptions, turns into a sensation that feels itself.

The subjective idealism we have discussed here, a reactionary product of the eighteenth century, was revived and became very widespread by the beginning of our century. Modern materialists have to fight a fierce battle with subjective idealism.

The social soil on which Berkeley-Hume idealism has been revived is the imperialist phase of capitalism; its nourishing juices are in the present *crisis of natural science*. Imperialism leads not only to a crisis of the capitalist economic system, but also to a general crisis of the entire capitalist culture. "We live in an extraordinary world," exclaimed the well — known bourgeois physicist M. Planck in 1930 — "Everywhere we look, in all areas of spiritual and material culture, we are in a period of severe crises, which imprint on our entire private and public life numerous features of anxiety and instability... Just as long ago in religion and art, so now also in science, there is hardly a foundation in which anyone would not doubt, there is hardly a nonsense in which anyone would not believe..."⁵⁸

The crisis of bourgeois natural science, which is an integral element of the general agony of bourgeois culture, was already marked by the first years of the present century. The further development of knowledge on the basis of the material accumulated by natural science under capitalism can only take place in defiance of the prevailing bourgeois worldview. *Modern natural science painfully gives birth to dialectical materialism*. It comes to him spontaneously, in incessant conflicts with the original philosophical principles of the bourgeois scientists themselves, but nevertheless inevitably comes to confirm the correctness of the basic propositions of the philosophical teachings of Marx and Engels. The initial philosophical principles of bourgeois natural scientists, which are hostile to Marxism, prevent them from fully and correctly understanding the results of their research. This contradiction gives rise to a crisis of bourgeois natural science, the social roots of which must be sought in the general contradictions of the imperialist epoch.

The most significant of the attempts of bourgeois thought to use the crisis of natural science for reactionary purposes, to give an idealistic interpretation to new natural science theories and discoveries, which appeared already in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is the restoration by Mach, Avenarius, and others of Berkeley's subjective idealism under the banner of *empirio-criticism*. If natural science approaches "such homogeneous and simple elements of matter, the laws of motion of which allow for mathematical processing," modern subjective idealists say, "then matter has disappeared, only pure mathematical relations remain." The old, unchanging atom has given way to a system of moving and changing electrons; therefore, the Machists say, "matter has disappeared." Primitive physical laws are being replaced by new, more advanced physical

⁵⁸ M. Planck, *Positivismus und reale Aussenwelt*, S. 1.

principles — the Machists say: "there is no objective knowledge." Rigid metaphysical ideas about space and time give way to a dialectical understanding of the unity of time and space as a form of existence of the movement of matter — idealists cry: "space and time have disappeared." Meanwhile, the latest achievements of modern physics fully confirm the correctness of the Marxist doctrine of time and space, i.e., *that they are forms of the existence of matter, that material motion is the unity of time and space, and that our concepts of time and space are changing, being refined and developed in connection with the general development of science*. That is why modern Machists also attach the rejection of causality to the rejection of matter and substance. The latest quantum mechanics deepens the concept of causality, makes adjustments to the old mechanistic understanding of causality-empirio-critics say: "causality has disappeared." The collapse of the old mechanical-materialist principles of natural science, the triumph of the highest form of materialism, is presented by modern subjective idealists (Machists) as the end of materialism.

On this shaky ground, the Machists resurrect only the reactionary philosophical ideas of the eighteenth century, slightly disguised by new words: they solve the problem of being and thinking on the basis of subjective idealism.

Empirio-criticism acts as a philosophy of "*pure experience*". It denies the reality of everything that is not directly given in the subject's experience. The only reality for him is subjective sensations, the real reality is directly "given" in perception. Everything else is groundless, uncritical "infusions" of reason. Feelings of red, round, bitter, etc. — these are the real "elements" of reality. Matter, bodies, things are nothing more than "complexes", "bundles" of our sensations, which have no existence outside of sensations, outside of our consciousness. In the same way, space and time are nothing but a special kind of our sensations and experiences. *In this way, everything physical is dissolved in the psychic elements, in sensations.*

Machists' denial of objective reality determines their understanding of the purpose and tasks of cognition. Since there is no objective world for them, the task of approaching the full reflection of objective reality posed and solved by materialism also does not exist for them. The goal of cognition for them is only the systematic ordering of perceptions, the systematization of the diversity of our sensations. *The progress of science consists in the simplest description of the totality of sensations.* The subjective-idealistic position of empirio-critics excludes the possibility of objective cognition, for them there is no objective truth. If all reality is only the content of consciousness, then truths must be different for different consciousnesses. "Man is the measure of things," as the ancient Greek sophist Protagoras said. Cognition and truth are subjective and relative. Here the Machists open wide the gates of obscurantism and superstition.

The main principle of scientific knowledge Machists consider "*the principle of economy of thought*" or "*the principle of least effort*". According to this principle, from two systems that describe our experience, from two different theoretical constructions, we should choose the most "economical" ones that describe the experience with the greatest simplicity.

In order to "save" science, we must eliminate everything that complicates and clutters the description of sensations, and therefore we must eliminate matter, things that do not depend on consciousness, and the causal connection of phenomena.

The latest Machists "deepen" this reactionary, anti-scientific philosophy with the "doctrine of signs" and the "logic of relations." According to these "teachings," the orderly, unambiguous description of sensations or experiences is accomplished by science through "signs." The knowledge system consists of signs (Shlik). Science deals not with *the reflection* of objective things and their relations, but with *arbitrarily invented* physical and mathematical signs, symbols denoting the relations between the subject's experiences. From combinations of signs, new combinations are derived using mathematical equations, denoted by new signs, and so on. The development of science, according to the Machists, consists in improving the construction of this system of signs.

The Machists want to replace the development of a living, objective cognition of polysyllabic reality with a reactionary game of abstract, mathematical tricks. Here we see particularly clearly how their *subjective idealism is combined with mechanismism*.

To complete their philosophy, modern subjective idealists also "invented" a logic

corresponding to the "doctrine of signs". This is "mathematical logic" or "relational logic" (Ressal). The logic of relations is a new system of signs, invented to denote all possible relations between the signs of experimental sciences. Logical signs and symbols are randomly grouped into new equations in all possible ways. Philosophy has never reached a more empty, emasculated, meaningless and fruitless construction than the "logic of relations". If there is any sense in this "logic", then only one is to create another twist to deny objective reality. The basic principle of this logical nonsense is the same banishment of matter, the denial of objective reality. The old logic is bad, they say, because it allowed things and their properties. The new logic banishes things and their *properties* and deals with "pure" relations (i.e., not with relations between things, but with *pure*, meaningless relations, *without meaning*). related items).

Thus, without sparing any effort, modern idealists "purify" science... from content, from meaning, from truth.

Lenin was the first to understand the essence of the modern crisis of natural science in its full significance, to discover its roots, to reveal its true tendencies, to expose the reactionary maneuvers of empirio — criticism, and to show how to defeat Machism, how to overcome the crisis, and how to establish a union between dialectical materialism and the achievements of modern natural science *Ленин*. Verbal tricks did not hide from him the anti-scientific, popish essence of Machism. Not only did he conduct the struggle against Machism much more deeply and consistently than Plekhanov, completely saturating it with partisanship, but he made this struggle many times more fruitful in its results by establishing *a link between Machist ideas and the crisis of natural-scientific theories* and exposing the reactionary nature of the empirio-critical game played on this crisis.

Along the way, Lenin corrects the mistakes made by Plekhanov in his polemic with the Machists, including *the mistake in Plekhanov's understanding of the central concept around which the struggle is centered — the concept of experience*. Plekhanov fell for the Machian trick that they understood experience not as a "means of knowledge" but as an "object of knowledge." Plekhanov believed that if the Machists held to the understanding of experience only as an "object of knowledge", this would erase the line between Machism and materialism. But the point is not at all whether experience is understood as an object or as a means of knowledge. The essence of the matter is in the main question of philosophy: *is experience subjective or objective*, is it an immanent product of consciousness, or is experience created in the process of influencing the subject of an independent external world and the practical, transformative impact of society on the external world.

Plekhanov is slipping away from the materialist position on this question. Satisfied with defining experience as "the object of knowledge," he had to come to the agnostic position that the object of knowledge is experience, not objective reality.

Lenin's struggle against Machism was of particular importance, since these bourgeois, subjective idealistic theories also began to penetrate the ranks of pre-war social-democracy. First of all, the influence of Machism affects the views of social fascism. Not only such outspoken Machists as Fr. Adler, but also Kautsky, who from the very beginning was conciliatory towards Machism, is now, in parallel with his transformation into a social-interventionist, becoming more and more closely aligned with Machism in his philosophical convictions. In the years when Lenin was creating his "Materialism and Empirio-criticism", in the dark years of reaction after the revolutionary thunderstorm of 1905, some Bolsheviks took the position of Machism and slid to the Mensheviks. A. Bogdanov (whose departure from dialectical materialism ended later in his divergence from Bolshevism), T. Lunacharsky and others transferred the fashionable reactionary teaching to Russian literature. the soil. Lenin's work dealt a crushing blow to all these theories, and settled scores with the "philosophical headless" who followed the lead of idealistic reaction.

Bogdanov's "empiriomonism" is nothing more than a *kind of subjective idealism*, and is based on the same Machian understanding of the relation of being to thinking. Bogdanov's terminological tricks seek to cover up the idealistic nature of his teaching, but in no way eliminate his idealism. Bogdanov's "empiriomonism" is nothing more than a kind of Machism.

Bogdanov, like the rest of the Machists, does not go beyond the limits of experience. The

initial, primary for it is the chaos of elements. These elements-sensations already familiar to us, divorced from the person who feels them and from the objects that cause them-are pure sensations, sensations in general, a dead idealistic abstraction. Direct complexes, combinations of these elements form, according to Bogdanov, a psychic experience. Thus, psychic experience is recognized as immediate, existing before nature. Physical experience is the next, highest stage of development. It is *derived from* in relation to psychic experience, transformation, reflection of the latter. Being a subjective idealist, Bogdanov does not distinguish the objective, independent of experience and existing before any experience of the physical world from the physical experience of people. Instead of understanding the psychic as derived from the physical, Bogdanov does the opposite: he declares the physical world to be a field of "substitution" "in which we" substitute "the physical world for the psychic, i.e., he gives a psychological, idealistic explanation. Bogdanov's "Universal Theory of Substitution" is only a new name for the old idealistic solution of the basic question of philosophy. The last link of Bogdanov's construction, following the "elements", mental and physical experience, is our cognition that arises from it.

Such a subjective-idealistic position inevitably leads Bogdanov to *deny objective truth* and the possibility of an objective criterion of truth. In fact, if there is no reality independent of experience, then we cannot speak of truth independent of our consciousness as a reflection of objective reality. Truth is understood subjectively by empiriomonism, as what is true for us. Bogdanov thought to eliminate the endless contradictions of the previous subjectivism and avoid solipsism by making "socially organized experience" the central concept of his philosophy instead of individual experience. He hoped in this way to distinguish the true, scientific from the false, superstitious. Objectivity is transformed into a collective experience, into its universal validity for a number of people. "The objectivity of the physical world," he wrote, "is that it does not exist for me, but for everyone." "The physical world is a socially coherent, socially harmonized — in short, a socially organized experience." But in this way Bogdanov does not really overcome idealism and subjective understanding of the truth. The consciousness of humanity, which replaces the consciousness of the individual, is nevertheless consciousness: the idealistic principle remains. The existence of the physical world is made dependent on social consciousness, instead of being independent of any (also social) consciousness and preceding it. A generally valid, "socially organized" experience is not always objectively true. After all, religious beliefs have been "generally valid" and "socially organized" for a long time, but this does not make them true.

In its teaching that truth is nothing more than "an ideological form, an organizing form of human experience," empiriomonism thus opens the gates of religion and other reactionary lies.

In his later works, written by Bogdanov after Lenin exposed the idealistic nature of his "empiriomonism", Bogdanov develops a supposedly new "tectological" teaching — "*universal organizational science*". Here Bogdanov completely remains on the former subjective-idealistic, Machist position, in the realm of elements-sensations and their system of complexes. There is an old philosophical concept behind a lot of new verbal twists and turns. This, by the way, was not understood by Comrade Bukharin, whom Bogdanov managed to deceive by disguising his teaching. Tov. Bukharin, as Lenin pointed out, did not understand the idealistic identity of Bogdanov's "tectology" and his "empiriomonism."

Bogdanov, in his "General Organizational Science", while still dealing with the basic question of philosophy, develops anti-dialectical *mechanistic views on a subjectively idealistic basis*. He criticizes the materialist dialectic of Marx and Engels, replacing the principle of universal development with an "organizational process", the law of the unity of opposites with a mechanical "collision of oppositely directed forces" and "activities", and the dialectic with a mechanistic theory of equilibrium (which will be discussed later). In Tectology, we again have a vivid example of how well Machism and mechanismism get along with each other. Bogdanov tries to establish universal forms of organization of elements, regardless of the "organized content". He invents scientifically fruitless "universal laws" applied to all branches of knowledge without exception, without taking into account their originality. In fact, all these laws of selection, conjugation, ingression, etc. are empty mechanistic schemes, energy and biological labels that are pasted on supra — mechanical

and social processes.

It is not without interest to note that subjective-idealistic principles also find refuge in the teachings of "our" modern mechanists. The mechanistic worldview, which reduces nature to the movement of identical, non-qualitative particles, must naturally have as its reverse the recognition of *qualitative differences* given in experience as purely *subjective* differences. Recognizing the subjectivity of so-called secondary qualities, i.e., asserting that sounds, colors, etc. are nothing but our sensations, and not a reflection of objectively existing differences, L. Axelrod, S. Sarabyanov and their colleagues came to a more "general" conclusion about the subjectivity of quality in general. For them, quality is a product of consciousness. Without a subject, there is no object quality. The qualitative certainty of an object depends on the differences between subjects and their *points of view*. So for example T. Sarabyanov denies objective truth. In his opinion, there are as many truths as subjective attitudes and approaches.

The same elements of "shamefaced agnosticism," as Lenin put it, and subjectivism are also found in Comrade Bukharin, for whom *dialectics is only one of many "points of view."* Thus, a departure from dialectical materialism entails a link with subjective idealism. This combination of mechanism and subjective idealism, as we have seen, is by no means accidental. The history of philosophy shows that such a combination is very common and natural. The reduction of all phenomena to a mechanical, low-quality identity serves as a guiding principle for subjective idealists to systematize, organize, and bring to unity the complex variety of our sensations. Rejecting objective reality, subjectivists consider the task of science to be the systematization of experience, the "organization" of perception. The mechanism serves as the most convenient and economical principle of organization for them.

Philosophical intuitionism is very close to subjective idealism and is closely related to it in some points of its views *философский интуитивизм*— a trend that has become very widespread in bourgeois philosophy in recent decades and which has given rise to a number of fashionable philosophical schools in various capitalist countries. The most prominent representative of intuitionism is the philosopher of French imperialism Henri Bergson. The essence of his teaching, like all intuitionism, is that reason, rational logical knowledge, is belittled and limited in favor of a different, "higher" method of comprehending truth — direct intuition, instinctive insight into the essence of things.

Science, according to intuitionists, is capable of delivering only limited, empirical truths that have only practical value. Through intuition, Bergson promises a complete understanding of objects. "Either philosophy is impossible at all," he declares, "and all knowledge of things is only practical knowledge (which does not reveal their essence. - *Auth.*) ' aimed at extracting benefits from them (and not at learning the truth. - *Ed.*)' or philosophizing consists in getting into the object itself by straining the intuition.'

Bergson calls intuition "that kind of feeling or sympathy by which we penetrate into the interior of an object in order to merge with that which is unique and therefore inexpressible⁵⁹ in it." A bitter enemy of materialism, Bergson frames his call for the search for the "ineffable" through mystical "empathy" and his critique of scientific knowledge of objective reality with a multitude of supposedly scientific considerations and subtle sophisms, falsifying natural science data for his own purposes.

So Bergson proceeds from the gap between space and time. Time, the understanding of which Bergson idealistically distorts, giving it a purely psychological meaning, he contrasts space as a living principle with dead, mobile, creative, spiritual-inert, lifeless materialism. At the same time, he understands the moving, living world in such a way that "*there are changes, but there are no things that change. Changes don't need any media.*" There is motion, but there are no necessarily unchangeable objects that move: motion does not involve any moving bodies."

The relationship between intuitionism and subjective idealism is clearly evident here .

⁵⁹ Бергсон, Введение в метафизику, стр. 6.

Bergson replaces the study of the material driving forces of the universe with a belief in the "vital impulse", which, according to intuitionism, is the true basis of all vitality and development. Of course, everything ends with a mystical belief in the other world and the immortality of the soul and leads to direct clericism. "From all this," writes Bergson, "clearly follows the concept of a creative and free god, who generates both matter and life, and whose desire for creation is continued on the part of life by the development of species and the formation of human personalities."

Bergson is by no means an exception among the bourgeois philosophers of our time. The turn to mysticism is characteristic of all modern bourgeois "lords of thoughts". The same tendency, though in a different form, is found in another philosophical pillar of decaying capitalism, Edmund Husserl, who aspires to objective idealism but falls into subjectivism Эдмунда Гуссерля. Husserl proclaims a new science — *phenomenology*, which he declares to be the "basic philosophical science". Phenomenology is distracted from the whole real world, it does not deal with real phenomena occurring in time and space. It deals with "surreal phenomena", with "ideal being", with "meanings", "meanings", with the "world of eidos" (ideal essence). Being directed at consciousness, phenomenology does not mean real manifestations of human consciousness, not mental processes. It "cleanses" consciousness of all individual, psychic things, deals with the "pure", extra-individual "I", with the "absolute consciousness", with the "essence" of consciousness. Husserl's phenomenology is a purely descriptive "science". It does not rely on logic, it does not have the latter as its premise. Phenomenology precedes logic. It explains nothing, proves nothing, but only describes what is directly given in the "ideal intuition". Phenomenology, according to Husserl, should be a purely descriptive discipline that explores the realm of transcendental pure consciousness through pure intuition. Direct "seeing the essence", "pure ideal intuition" - these are the methods of this, so to speak, "science". "Philosophy," says Husserl, "in its scientific work is forced to move in an atmosphere of direct intuition, and the greatest step that our time must take is to recognize that with a philosophical intuition in the true sense of the word, with a phenomenological understanding of the essence, an infinite field of work⁶⁰ opens up." This is one of the last words of bourgeois philosophy.

2.4. Kant's Dualism and Modern Kantianism

Kantianism is another trend of bourgeois philosophy that has long been waging a struggle against materialism and has until recently been put forward in opposition to materialism.

Modern Kantian philosophy opposes Marxism not only in an open bourgeois form, but also in a "socialist" one. *Neo-Kantianism is the dominant philosophy in the social-fascist milieu.* Bernstein, Forlander, Adler, Bauer, and Kautsky combine the "Marxist" understanding of social life with neo-Kantian philosophy. As a result, neo-Kantian philosophy is still the main form of bourgeois philosophy's influence on the proletariat. Neo-Kantian perversions sometimes seep into Soviet science and philosophy. This explains the full relevance of exposing this kind of idealism, this philosophical weapon of the bourgeoisie and its agents in their struggle against the philosophical foundations of the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat.

By its social nature, the classical German idealism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was to a certain extent a kind of analog of French materialism. Like the old materialism, it was the philosophical harbinger of the bourgeois revolution. But the historical features of the preparation and development of the bourgeois revolution in Germany were different from the French conditions, and in both cases the forces and relations of classes were different. The German "enlighteners" are not yet waging, like the French, an open war with all official science, with the church, and often even with the state, "they are not breaking with religion and raising the banner of materialism. Their "revolutionism" is half-hearted, impotent, and dreamy. *This impotence and half-heartedness of the philosophy of the advanced German bourgeoisie at the beginning of the*

60 Гуссерль, *Философия как строгая наука*. «Логос», кн. 1, 1911 г., стр. 56.

nineteenth century are rooted in the backwardness of social relations in Germany at that time and the weakness of the bourgeoisie. The productive forces of Germany lagged behind the industry of the advanced countries of Europe in their development. The still insignificant and impotent German bourgeoisie, fragmented and divided by the multitude of small independent feudal provinces, did not yet dare to speak with a full voice and think with revolutionary courage. She could only dream of new social forms. It only went as far as "good will", the *idea of proper behavior*. the social system. Its philosophy is therefore idealistic and compromising. Marx did not call Kant's philosophy the "German theory of the French revolution" for nothing. It overthrows God with one hand, puts him back on the throne with the other; it tries to push away idealism, but recoils in horror from the materialism before it and sinks back into the abyss of idealistic speculation.

The founder of German classical idealism was the famous Königsberg thinker Emmanuel Kant. "The main feature of Kant's philosophy is *the reconciliation of materialism with idealism*, a compromise between both, a combination in one system of heterogeneous, opposite philosophical trends⁶¹." Any such attempt is doomed in advance, and Kant's teaching is a bifurcated, *dualistic* system torn apart by internal contradictions.

From the very beginning, literally from the very first lines of his research, Kant tries to dissociate himself from subjective idealism. "No doubt," he writes, "all our knowledge begins with experience, for what would the faculty of knowledge be aroused to activity, *if not by objects that act on our senses* and partly themselves produce representations, partly encourage the activity of our understanding to compare them, combine or separate them, and thus process the gross material sense impressions and cognition of objects, called experience⁶²." And in another place he says: "Therefore, at any rate, I admit that there are bodies outside of us, i.e., things... of which we know by the ideas aroused in us by their influence on our sensibility⁶³." By this statement, Kant's "critical" idealism tries to isolate itself from Berkeley and Hume. Our sensations presuppose the presence of an objective reality that is their source. The objective world really exists outside of our consciousness and affects our consciousness. But, having recognized, with good reason, the existence of the object outside the subject, Kant had to explain what the relations between them are, in what dependence the subject and object are on each other, and what is the role of both in the formation of knowledge. Here Kant again takes the position of idealism.

Our experience, according to Kant, is the result of the interaction of object and subject. It is a cross between these two principles. Things, acting on our sensibility, give us the content of knowledge in the form of sensations. However, it depends on the organization of the subject, on the peculiarities of the perceiving apparatus, on the structure of our sensibility and reason, what this material given by external influence will turn into in consciousness. *The subject with its inherent organization and functions opposes the object, it organizes, forms, processes sensations according to the laws inherent in it, the subject, in forms inherent in consciousness.* The influence of external things gives ideas their content, our consciousness gives them a form. This is the initial, *dualistic* formulation of the question. *The form* of consciousness is opposed to its *content*. The forms of experience, that is, the forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding by which experience is formed—space, time, causality—do not exist outside of us, but in ourselves, are the proper *forms* of the subject, its inherent original belonging. They are a priori, originally inherent in our consciousness, they are not brought into the mind from outside, but our consciousness dictates to experience its forms, the laws of its construction.

Long before Kant, the division of all the qualities we see in things into primary qualities was widespread among philosophers (which is still held by mechanists). *первичные* and *secondary* ones. Secondary qualities were called qualities that are supposedly not inherent in things

61 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 162. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

62 Кант, Критика чистого разума, 1907 г., стр. 24–25. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

63 Кант, Прологомент ко всякой будущей метафизике, 1905 г., стр. 54.

themselves, but are determined by the organization of the knowing subject itself. These qualities included color, smell, taste, and so on. The primary qualities inherent in objective things, such as extension, impenetrability, shape, and motion, were distinguished from secondary qualities. Kant focused his critique on the study of the relations underlying the primary qualities themselves. The basis of these relations, as it is easy to see, is *space and time* as forms of existence of objective reality. Kant tries to prove that we cannot get the idea of space from experience, from individual sensations, because experience already presupposes the existence of this representation and is impossible without it. According to Kant, space and time are not real forms of material existence, but primordial forms inherent in our own sensibility, *a priori*, i.e., presupposed, necessary forms of our *intuition*, conditioned by the nature of our *consciousness*.

Not because, according to Kant, all our experience is spatial, because such are things themselves, but because such is the nature of our sensibility, that it cannot but clothe the content of experience in the form of space and in the framework of time. Space, like time, is a pure form of our sensibility and has meaning only in relation to human experience, not outside of it. They are the original *subjective conditions* that determine the nature of our experience. On the basis of this understanding of space and time, Kant also transfers the so-called primary qualities from the objective world to the subjective one. Not only smells and sounds, but also extension and movement are subjective, they are not inherent in things in themselves, but are determined by the organization of the subject, since extension and movement are unthinkable without space and time. They are not the result of experience, but its subjective conditions, prerequisites.

Nature, however, is not a chaos of ideas, a disordered variety, but a certain ordered, organized unity: it is characterized by correctness, regularity. What explains its causal relationship and regularity? Kant is convinced that the content of experience itself is chaotic and disorderly, that sensations are not the source from which we derive our beliefs about the unity and order of the world. This unity of perception is acquired through participation *in a single mind*. The unity of the knowing subject (the so-called "transcendental apperception") is the basis of the unity of experience, the center that connects all our perceptions. By its unity and constancy, *the understanding brings order and connection* to the multiplicity of perceptions. Consciousness creates a certain ordered unity according to the rules, according to the so-called categories of the understanding. The rules of nature, its relations, including the causal connection of phenomena, its unity and its laws do not arise from things that are outside of our consciousness, but are the activity of the understanding itself. "Order and conformity to law are introduced *by ourselves* into the phenomena which we call *nature*, and could not be found in phenomena if they were *not originally put into them by ourselves* or by the nature of our soul⁶⁴." The understanding, as the creator of the unity of experience and its order, is the lawgiver of the world, the source of the laws of nature, understood as the totality of our experience. We have no reason to talk about regularities outside of our experience.

Thus, Kant gives the subject an increasingly decisive role in cognition. One by one, all the qualities and relations that we see in nature are transferred from the object to the subject. As a result of this research, the subject becomes everything, and the object, things-nothing. Objects that are the source of sensations, things themselves have become a disembodied shadow, elusive and unnecessary for knowledge.

True, things that exist outside of us affect our senses and cause sensations. But sensations, according to Kant, are not *at all similar* to the things that cause them. There is even less similarity between things and the phenomena they cause than there is between fire and the smoke it causes, between pain and the cry it causes. Sensations suggest things that cause them, but they do not reflect them, do not say anything about what they are-these things. Knowledge has no way out to *things; things are unknowable in themselves*. What is knowable must be subjective, determined entirely by the organization of the subject. To know that which is outside the subject, as it is in

64 Кант, Критика чистого разума, 1907 г., стр. 99, Примечание. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

itself, is to wish to reason without reason, to contemplate without contemplation, to represent without representation. *Our knowledge can only deal with phenomena, and not with things in themselves; it finds in "nature" only what it puts into it.* Things are cut off by themselves. We do not learn the very things that arouse our senses to action, but only the ways in which they affect us. This is Kant's final *agnostic* conclusion. The phenomena are supposed to be "things in themselves", the world outside of our consciousness exists, but it is completely unknowable and absolutely inaccessible to the subject. The subject of knowledge can and should be the world of phenomena. The laws of nature are laws of the understanding and are valid only within the limits of our subjective understanding. Nature as an object of knowledge loses its materiality. "Bodies and motions," says Kant, "do not exist as something that is outside of us, but only as representations in us, and therefore the motions of matter do not produce representations in us, but are themselves (just as matter, which is known by means of motions) only representations"⁶⁵.

Kant's answer to the basic question of philosophy is dualistic. Objective reality confronts the subject as an independent "thing-in-itself". For its part, the subject with its "a priori" remains independent of the external world and creates a special world out of itself. The subject breaks away from the object of perception — from their cause, the "thing — in — itself" — from the phenomenon, cognition — from the real world, the form of cognition — from its content, the experienced world — from the "superexperienced". *Sensation and reason do not bind the subject to the object, but break them apart.* Kant's agnosticism closes the path from object to subject. The contradiction between the recognition of objective reality and the doctrine of its unknowability is a fundamental organic flaw of Kant's philosophical system.

Since, according to Kant, only the content of consciousness, the forms of sensibility, and the categories of the understanding are cognizable, science is completely enclosed in the sphere of the subjective. *Kant's agnostic dualism actually turns out to be an inconsistent subjective idealism* that does not go beyond idealistically understood experience.

Kant's theory of knowledge is metaphysical. It is based on a *non-historical* approach to the subject and its relation to the object. Kant takes the ready-made, frozen, once-for-all given thinking of a modern man, a contemporary bourgeois. He doesn't care that thinking has become what it is only in the process of development. Kant does not consider cognition in its origin, movement and change. He metaphysically breaks up the forms of knowledge and their content and explores completely isolated, meaningless, "pure" logical forms. Instead of the inseparable unity of the content and form of cognition, Kant operates with dead, immobile, empty, ready-made forms of cognition that are separated from the object and content.

Plekhanov and even more so A. Deborin reveal their lack of understanding of the essence of Kantian agnosticism when they *identify it with the French materialist doctrine of knowledge*. French materialists, according to Deborin, contrasting *the essence* of a thing with its *properties*, expressed propositions that were supposedly identical with Kant's teaching about the "thing in itself" and the phenomenon. In reality, the French materialist doctrine of knowability *is the opposite* of Kant's. Kant asserts the absolute, fundamental *unknowability* of "things in themselves"; old materialism speaks only of the actual *"unknowability"* of the essence of things in their epoch. Kant rejects all possibility of entering the world of "things-in-themselves"; the old materialism believes that *we have come to know the objective properties of things themselves*, that through the manifestation of properties we are approaching an understanding of their essence. For them, things in themselves are material, extended, and objectively regular; Kant transforms experience, the materiality of things, their objective regularity, etc., into subjective forms. The Plekhanov-Deborin position on this question smooths out the fundamental contrast between materialist and idealist views. It brings materialism and idealism closer together, instead of exposing their opposites in all their acuteness.

Kant's teaching, like all non-materialistic teaching, opens the way for religion. By limiting

⁶⁵ Кант, Критика чистого разума, 1907 г., стр. 244, Примечание.

knowledge to phenomena, by cutting off the path of reason to things in themselves, by shutting it up in the subjective world, and by rejecting its claims to judge objective reality, Kant's philosophy leaves room for faith. Cognition embraces only phenomena, "things in themselves" are inaccessible to it, they are accessible only to faith. Thus the cohabitation of faith and knowledge is established. Kant's philosophy justifies the ideological compromise between science and religion, between the theoretical tasks of the progressive bourgeoisie and reactionary ideology. Kantian dualism is a classical philosophy of reconciliation, social compromise, liberalism, and reformism. This characterizes the social essence of Kantianism and determines its further role in the class struggle.

The revolution of 1848, the entry of the proletariat into the historical arena as an independent force with special class interests, the consolidation of capitalism, and the formation of the German Empire deprived the bourgeoisie of any remnants of its previously very relative "revolutionism" and directed its ideology *along the path of reaction*. Since the 60s of the last century, the "revival" of Kantian idealism in bourgeois philosophy begins. Neo-Kantianism, in contrast to Kant's philosophy itself, represents a turn away from all half-heartedness, ambiguity, and flirtation with vulgar materialism to the most reactionary aspects of idealistic philosophy. The "restoration" of Kantianism is directed in a certain direction — it must "put an end" to materialism (Liebmann, Lange, Cohen, Rickert, etc.).

Neo-Kantianism is as different from the teachings of Kant himself as the interests of the bourgeoisie are different in different epochs of its development. Neo-Kantianism is not a restoration of the true dualistic teaching of historical Kant, but a reactionary edition of it, an attempted "correction", a consistent development of Kant's teaching. In the face of the unfolding class struggle, the bourgeoisie could not be satisfied with the petty-bourgeois materialism of natural science that prevailed at that time. It appeals to the idealistic reactionary side of Kant's teaching, "deepening" it and adapting it to its new tasks.

The main difference between neo-Kantianism and historical Kant is the *transformation of the inconsistent subjective idealism of Kant's dualistic philosophy into subjective idealism*. Despite the fact that various neo-Kantian representatives retain significant elements of dualism in their views (between being and ought, nature and history, end and means, etc.), they mostly "correct" Kant "from the right", trying to root out any materialistic elements from him. The "thing-in-itself" is discarded by neo-Kantians. The "thing-in-itself" as a materialistic element in Kant, which evokes our feelings, is rejected and declared an unnecessary appendage, which should be removed from philosophy (G. Cohen, P. Natorp, the social fascist M. Adler, etc.). "Thinking can have no origin other than itself." "There are no things except in and because of thinking" (H. Cohen). The only true "thing-in-itself" is consciousness itself. Moreover, not the consciousness of concrete real people, but a mystical "consciousness in general", independent of the brain (Adler). Both form and content in cognition, all "experience" and "nature" are represented as *a product*, by thinking about oneself and its objects (Natorp). Thinking is given nothing but what it has produced itself.

Neo-Kantianism, in bringing idealism to its conclusion, rejects Kant's distinction between "sensibility," sensations and reason, between "view" and thinking. Visual representations and sensations are reduced by neo-Kantians to thinking, to the products of the logical "I". If in Kant the content of experience is given to consciousness through the action of "things-in-themselves" on it, then in the neo-Kantians nothing is given to consciousness, *but everything is produced by thinking*. The "creative sovereignty" of "pure" thinking (Natorp) is proclaimed. For the Neo-Kantians, being is only thinking. "The world rests on the basis of the laws of thought" (Cohen). It exists only insofar and only as long as it is thought (M. Adler). Thus, neo-Kantianism, in its essence, and in its solution of the basic question of philosophy, comes very close to being a priest. At the same time, the philosophers of the Second International are not far behind their masters.

The main scientific method, in the image and likeness of which neo-Kantians develop logic, they consider the method of mathematical natural science, which they idealistically pervert. Cohen tries to rely on his distorted method of calculating infinitesimals, which he declares to be the universal method of genuine scientific thought. Natorp declares "pure number" to be the alpha and omega of logic. For him, number is "the purest and simplest way of thinking that has established

science as exact." From the "pure number" he proceeds to the concepts of dimension and direction, from which he "deduces" space and time as pure acts posited by thought, and from space and time he "deduces" the "concept" of matter. It is necessary to pay attention to this connection between neo-Kantian idealism and the principles of mathematical sciences that it disfigures, since in this way, with the help of the concepts of number, quantity, etc., *neo-Kantian idealism is combined with mechanicism*.

Neo-Kantianism "corrects" the Kantian dualism of the form and content of experience by rejecting the real content of experience, remaining in the realm of "pure" forms and relations. All reality dissolves into "pure" logical-mathematical relations and empty forms of thinking. According to neo-Kantianism, correlating elements, "members of a relation" are "determined" and "posited" by a logical relation.

We have focused on one of the main trends of neo-Kantianism, the so-called *Marburg* school. Another, no less reactionary trend is associated with the names of Windelband and Rickert. The main task of their philosophy is to break up the social and natural sciences and "justify" the impossibility of studying social laws. This trend, *which denies the regularity in the development of social life and the possibility of its scientific investigation*, will be further discussed when considering historical materialism.

Fighting relapses of Kantianism, especially in its reactionary neo-Kantian form, and being irreconcilable with it, is a self-evident duty of modern materialists. However, even in Plekhanov, who mainly followed the philosophical line of dialectical materialism and fought against the Kantianism of his Menshevik friends, we find not only connivance with Kantianism, but also direct Kantian errors. *Plekhanov's theory of knowledge, as Lenin showed with unmistakable conviction, suffers from elements of agnosticism*.

We have seen that according to Kant, our representations do not give a correct picture of things. The representations called "things-in-themselves" do not reflect them. There is no similarity between things and phenomena. Plekhanov, agreeing with the "theory of hieroglyphs", takes the indicated agnostic position of Kant. According to this theory, our sensations relate to the things that cause them, just as symbols or hieroglyphs refer to the objects they represent. Symbols *do not resemble* the things they represent, do not reflect or reproduce them. So the "v" symbol is by no means a *reflection of the speed it denotes*, or the hook on the musical ruler is not at all similar to the sound it denotes. Similarly, the theory of hieroglyphs represents the relationship of things and their perception. In our experience, signs and symbols of things are given, but not their reflections. The world of experience is a realm of symbols that is not at all similar to the objective world that causes it. In this realm of signs, which does not reflect the actual world, human cognition is closed. Plekhanov was deeply imbued with this dualistic concept, and although he later admitted that he had made a mistake in agreeing with the theory of hieroglyphs, he still did not understand the essence of his mistake, did not overcome it. Plekhanov believed that this was only a terminological error, whereas in reality he was deviating from the materialist solution of the basic question of philosophy. Having abandoned the word "hieroglyphs", he continued to hold the view that there is a simple connection between things and ideas *связь*, not a *reflection* with the consciousness of things, i.e. remained in the same agnostic position. Each symbol, Plekhanov points out, corresponds to the object he designates, but the whole point is that, according to Plekhanov, the object is not *reflected* in consciousness.

It is very characteristic that both forms of perversion of Marxism — Mechanicism and Menshevik idealism — adhere to Plekhanov's agnostic errors. The mechanists (Sarabyanov, Axelrod) explicitly declare their disagreement with Lenin on this most important question; they insist on the Kantian hieroglyphic theory, deepening Plekhanov's error. The Menshevik idealists are in an idyllic alliance with the Mechanists on this question. Deborin and Luppol, recognizing Plekhanov's mistake as "purely terminological," cover up the fundamental difference on the fundamental question of philosophy and become advocates of Kantian agnosticism.

If Plekhanov shamefacedly extended his finger to Kantianism, then the ideologists of modern *social fascism* they gave him their hands and heart. *Kantianism is the main form of carrying out*

bourgeois influence on the proletariat along the line of philosophy; it has become the official philosophy of the Second International.

The very attitude of the social-fascists towards theory in general and philosophy in particular, and their understanding of their role in the class struggle, are directly opposed to Marxism-Leninism. The social-fascists detach theory from social practice, and do not see the necessary correlation between the two. They consider philosophical views, as well as religious beliefs, to be a private matter, indifferent to the party and political activity. What theoretical basis a social-democrat provides for his political program is his own business. This doctrine, which fundamentally contradicts the Marxist doctrine of class ideology, is necessary for the social traitors to directly replace Marxism with bourgeois ideology. By breaking the link between their own practice and Marxist theory, they make room for the connection of this renegade practice with anti-Marxist idealist trends, which are more suitable as the philosophical basis of renegade and lackeyism.

At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the founder of modern social betrayal, E. Bernstein, adopted the slogan of bourgeois philosophical reaction: "Back to Kant." Since then, attempts to "supplement" Marx with Kant, "correct" him with neo-Kantianism, and "deepen" him with idealistic a prioriism have become the leitmotif of social-traitorous philosophy. M. Adler tries to interpret Marxism idealistically, throwing a bridge between Marx and Kant in the form of "social a priori", i.e., a priori categories of the understanding diluted with sociological phraseology. Forlander provides a Kantian ethical justification for socialism. He is echoed by Bauer, who "enriches" Marxism with Kantian morality and "national apperception", i.e. applies the principle of the primacy of the subject to the national question. The dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels is declared by the social-fascist philosophers to be a hundred-year-old doctrine, which must be rejuvenated by the ever-youthful teaching of Kant.

The infamous social-interventionist Kautsky, who for decades played the role of "guardian of Marxist orthodoxy" in the Second International, who is crumbling with decrepitude, is not far behind the "spirit of the times". Kant's "criticism", in his opinion, is capable of raising materialism to a higher level. He agrees with the dualism of thing and phenomenon and basically accepts Kant's teaching about the unknowability of the "thing-in-itself". Individual things and their nature, according to Kautsky, are unknowable. Only *relationships are knowable* between things, the identity and difference of things among themselves. The identity or difference of symbols "expresses" the identity or difference of the objects signified by them, but, according to Kautsky, it says nothing about what the objects hidden from us behind the symbols are. The differences we study, according to Kautsky, are the differences of ideas among themselves, i.e. they are subjective and do not *lead out of the realm of phenomena*. If Kautsky criticizes Kant and does not agree with him on certain points, it is only in order to "correct" Kant's teaching with Mach's, to "improve" one kind of idealism with another. Kautsky's eclectic philosophy is positivism, a doctrine that confines itself to experience in the subjectively idealistic sense of the latter. If Kautsky continues to use the term "materialism," he also considers Kant a materialist, since this term is for him only a synonym for the philosophical method, which remains within the limits of "pure experience."

In terms of social interventionists, the social wreckers in Soviet conditions are also equal. The *wrecking methodology of the Menshevik Rubin*, which is nothing more than a counter-revolutionary neo-Kantian doctrine adapted to the use of Soviet "legal opportunities", echoes Kautsky and Bauer in unison. Rubin's scientific activity was an integral part of all his counter-revolutionary work. Its wrecking role was to divert Soviet economic thought from the pressing issues of socialist construction in the midst of scholastic disputes. To prevent economic theory from serving the construction of a socialist economy is Rubin's goal. In order to distract from the Soviet reality, Rubin followed a purely formalistic neo-Kantian methodology, "studying ""pure" non-material economic forms, social relations abstracted from the class content. The historical was absorbed by the logical, the social became formal, and the class was repressed. In short: Marxism was replaced by neo-Kantianism, and revolutionary methodology was replaced by counter — revolutionary methodology.

2.5. Hegel's Absolute, Objective idealism and modern neo-Hegelianism

German classical idealism reached its culmination in the philosophy of Hegel, whose teaching represents the highest peak of philosophical thought *that bourgeois idealistic thinking was capable of reaching*.

Hegel's teaching is a philosophical reflection of the further development of ideas inspired by the French Revolution in German conditions, in the conditions of backward development of the bourgeoisie and the indissolubility of the class struggle. The further it was from the Prussian reality of that time to the broadcast ideas of the French Revolution, the more tempting were the ideals, the more they inspired the philosophical thought of the German idealists. In the transcendental heights of philosophy, they performed great feats that they were powerless to perform in earthly reality. If in Kant the realm of reason still appears only as the realm of what is due, in Hegel it is already becoming *necessary*. He is deeply convinced of the reasonableness of reality, of the inescapable triumph of reason. But while in the French materialists reason was hostile to faith and incompatible with religion, in Hegel religion is the highest stage of the development of the spirit, reason only purifies and raises religion to a philosophical height.

Hegel's philosophy is a product of the era of bourgeois revolutions. It is reflected in the ideological sphere of the class struggle of the late eighteenth and first quarter of the nineteenth centuries. Hegel's philosophy is a product of the Great French Revolution. Marx, describing Kant's philosophy, pointed out that it was "*German the theory of the French Revolution*". This characteristic can be attributed with some justification to Hegel's philosophy. Undoubtedly a product of the entire epoch of the bourgeois revolution at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was at the same time a product of German conditions and of the class relations of Germany in that period. It is precisely these circumstances that explain the contradictions of Hegel's philosophy, the contradictions between the reactionary and revolutionary sides of his philosophy, between method and system.

Hegel was a brilliant critic of Kant's philosophy. With all the insight available for idealistic positions, he revealed the imperfection of Kantian dualism and subjectivism. But this critique, which deeply strikes Kantianism, is carried out by Hegel in the name of a more consistent and profound idealism, in the name of *objective*, dialectical idealism.

Kant's break between being and thinking Hegel contrasts their *identity*. Kant separates being from thinking. Hegel transforms the objective world, the universe *частью* of which man and his consciousness are only a part, into a spiritual process, a realization of *universal reason*. For Hegel, the initial principle, the primary essence of the world, is the objectively existing spirit, the universal mind, universal thinking.

The development of the universe is a rational development that takes place according to the laws of reason, according to logical laws. The evolution of the universe is the logical development of the universal mind. In the logic of the world mind, we should look for an explanation of everything that happens, the beginning and cause of everything that happens are rooted in it. The history of nature and society is in essence nothing but the otherness of self-development, the self-movement of the eternal, absolute spirit according to its inherent logical principles. Everything that happens in the world is nothing but a manifestation of the universal mind. The history of the world — universal logic, various stages, stages of development of *the absolute idea*. The latter does not depend on our cognition or sensation. We can imagine such a stage of the existence of the world mind, when there were no people and no cognizing beings at all. On the contrary, the emergence of cognizing people characterizes a high stage in the development of the world spirit. The world is not our creation, but, on the contrary, we, like everything that exists, are the embodiment of the world spirit, the stage of its self-development.

Only the spiritual is the real. Nature, things, and the material world are nothing but a manifestation of the realization of the universal mind, one of the embodiments of the absolute idea. In this realization, the spirit is transformed into something contrary to its own nature, it is realized in the form of unintelligent matter, in the form of a multitude of things. Nature is, in Hegel's phrase,

the otherness of the spirit, its *other being* "in the form of an indifferent external objectivity... The becoming of nature is the becoming of its spirit." "Nature should be considered as a system of steps, each of which necessarily follows from the others, but this does not mean that each of them is naturally produced by the other. Such a sequence of them exists only in the inner idea underlying nature⁶⁶." These words clearly express Hegel's recognition of the objective reality of the absolute idea. In this way, Hegel asserts the primacy of the spirit, of thinking, which is the basis, the essence of objectivity itself. The subjective spirit, the "I", is understood by him as a derivative, secondary, but derived from the world spirit-the absolute, universal spirit. Subjectivism is denied by Hegel on the basis of *objective idealism*. In nature, as we have seen, the alienation of the spirit from itself took place, the spirit was realized in things.

The next stage of its movement is the reverse transformation of nature into spirit, the return of the spirit to itself in the form of *the subjective* spirit, self-awareness.

From this point of view, what is science? Cognition is an activity, a manifestation of the spirit. And the object of knowledge is the same spirit in all its various manifestations, including nature. Thus, in science, *the spirit's knowledge of itself*, self-consciousness, is accomplished. The cognizing subject, as one of the manifestations of the spirit, cognizes its essence in its various manifestations. Here the spirit is aware of itself, its principles, laws, and history. "The spirit that knows itself in development as a spirit is science. It is his activity and the kingdom that he builds for himself in his own sphere⁶⁷." Science differs from art or religion in that here the comprehension of the spirit is accomplished not in images or feelings, but in concepts. "Science is," in Hegel's words, "the cognition of the absolute spirit comprehending in concepts⁶⁸." And since scientific knowledge is a logical process, and the knowable, i.e., reality, the history of the universe, is also a logical process, "knowledge is a concept that has itself as an object and comprehends itself *самого себя*." In this identity of knowledge with its object, in the fact that in science the mind remains in its own sphere, Hegel sees the guarantee of our correct knowledge of reality. The spirit does not know something alien, inaccessible to it, but knows itself, its own laws as they really are. To understand the history of nature and society, to understand its driving forces, is to understand the logical process of self-development of the absolute idea that underlies it. Logic is the science of sciences. *History* the world must be understood as *logic* the world mind. In the person of Hegel's philosophical teaching, the spirit has come to know itself, to understand its development and its principles.

This completes the self-development of the absolute idea.

Hegel's world-mind bears an unmistakable resemblance to the Lord God, a refined, highly idealized, dematerialized god. Hegel's idealistic solution of the problem of being and thinking is essentially a scientific theology. Hegel himself does not hide the fact that his philosophy is the highest stage of the spirit, immediately following religion, raising it to a perfecting stage.

In reality, the assumption of an absolute spirit, a universal mind, and the attribution of subject properties to the objective world is nothing more than the humanization of nature. Objective idealism is nothing but a projection, a transference of human consciousness *to the outside*. The property of man — thinking-is transformed here into an independent world being and receives an independent existence outside of man.

Objective idealism puts *на голову* the actual relationship between being and thinking on its head. The mind, which has emerged as a result of the long development of living beings, breaks away from its base and is depicted as the primordial. Objective idealism seeks to penetrate nature into the spiritual world that is supposedly hidden behind its appearance. For him, the material world is a veil through which knowledge must make its way to the world of true reality, to the realm of the

66 Гегель, *Философская пропедевтика*, 1927 г., стр. 163–164.

67 Гегель, *Феноменология духа*, 1913 г., стр. 11.

68 Гегель, *Философская пропедевтика*, 1927 г., стр. 11.

spirit. In reality, objective idealism finds on the other side of things what it has placed there - human consciousness transformed into the absolute. Hegel's idealism shrouds the real world in a spiritual shell and, as a result, perceives nature through a misty mystical veil. Marx and Engels needed to tear this mystical veil from the world in order to see it as it really is.

In fact, the problem of being and thinking is not at all solved by Hegel. If Kant "eliminates" the problem by placing being and thinking in two different mutually impenetrable worlds, then Hegel, with his objective-idealistic identity of being and thinking, discards one of the general principles and leaves only thinking, which he inflates into the absolute.

Nevertheless, when evaluating Hegel's philosophy, its historical significance cannot be belittled. In its reactionary, mystical form, Hegel's philosophy "for the first time presented the entire natural, historical, and spiritual world as a process, i.e., it explored it in continuous movement, change, transformation, and development, and tried to reveal the mutual inner connection of this movement and development⁶⁹." Hegel's teaching is *dialectical* idealism. Developing the dialectical tendencies already contained in the previous representatives of German classical philosophy, Hegel reflected in *a mystified form* Its dialectical logical teaching is the contradictory development of nature, society, and human thought. In an ugly idealistic form, he overcame the metaphysics that dominated the thinking of philosophers and natural scientists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

But idealism in Hegel's teaching is not something that is indifferent to the dialectical method and does not affect it. In *идеалистической* Hegel's idealistic system, his most dialectical *method* is it stands on its head, limited and blunted, and represents an *idealistic* dialectic.

Hegel's dialectic is *an idealistic* dialectic. Self-development and the contradictions that drive it are not material, but spiritual in nature; the categories and forms of movement are connected by ideal-logical, very often fictitious, artificial connections. In Hegel, the historical is dependent on *the logical*. History is shredded for the sake of logic, it becomes nothing more than *applied logic*.

While materialist dialectics, which asserts universal variability and therefore the necessity of destroying the existing system, is a revolutionary methodology, *the absolute system and idealistic dialectics led Hegel to justify the Prussian monarchy*.

Hegel's dialectical idealism marked not only the end of classical German idealism, but of all bourgeois philosophy. The current revival of Hegelianism is only a "re-course", a resurrection of the dead idealism of Hegel, *a repetition of idealistic tasks*. At the same time, everything that was progressive in the revived teaching is emasculated, and everything that was reactionary in it is aggravated.

Modern representatives of fascist neo-Hegelianism pay special attention to the issues *of the state and the nation*. Hegel's "Philosophy of History" and especially the "Philosophy of Law" are used by these "theorists" to lay the theoretical foundation for the fascist state. Hegel becomes the father of modern fascist theories of the authoritarian, corporate state, etc.

Bourgeois philosophical thought has twice moved from Kant to Hegel. But the first time it was a triumphant march of developing idealism, the second-its final degeneration. The fruitless thought of decaying capitalism cannot move even idealistic philosophy any further. Imperialist philosophy feeds on everything that was stillborn among the great idealists of the bourgeois Revolution, the products of the decomposition of their idealism. The ideologues of imperialism, which is near the last line, are no longer satisfied with neo-Kantianism. The last years, the years of the fascization of capitalist states, are characterized by the transition from neo-Kantianism to neo-Hegelianism, which is the philosophy of the worst reaction, the philosophical expression of fascism.

The epoch of imperialism, when the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie reaches an extreme stage, is accompanied in the field of philosophy by a decisive *turn of bourgeois ideologists towards completely metaphysical and mystical systems*. Half-hearted, compromise doctrines do not satisfy the ideologues of imperialist reaction.

69 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1932 г., стр. 16.

Bourgeois philosophy revives the most extreme forms of obscurantism, revives everything that was most reactionary in the history of idealism.

In recent years, during the years when the general crisis of capitalist society has become all-round acute and deepened, and the elements of the revolutionary crisis have been growing, bourgeois philosophy has turned especially intensively to the philosophy of Hegel. Slandered and forgotten by the bourgeoisie, Hegel has once again become a fashionable philosopher. Neo-Hegelianism has taken a prominent position in modern bourgeois philosophy. Neo-Kantians, philosophers of "life" and "culture," Husserlians, etc., are increasingly drawn to neo-Hegelianism, which is becoming the focus of the reactionary aspirations of modern bourgeois philosophy.

It would be a mistake to think that neo-Hegelianism is a complete and direct reproduction of the philosophical teaching of historical Hegel. Not at all. Neo-Hegelianism is alien and hostile to the revolutionary tendencies of Hegel's dialectic, and it rejects the rational core of his teaching, those truly valuable elements that are contained in a mystified form in Hegel's idealistic dialectic. *Neo-Hegelianism clings only to what is dead, reactionary, and mystical in Hegel, to the husk and rubbish of his idealistic system, to the absolute idea of God.* The modern bourgeoisie is seduced by absolute idealism. Neo-Hegelianism exaggerates the reactionary elements of Hegel's teaching, inflates them, and pushes to the limit the popishness contained in Hegel's system.

The views of the leader of neo-Hegelianism, the chairman of the International Hegelian Union, R. Kroner, are very characteristic in this respect. Kroner does his best to prove *the irrationalist* character of Hegelianism, i.e., Hegel's denial of rational knowledge. In Hegel's dialectic, he finds the highest form of irrationalism. "Before Hegel," he writes, "there was never an irrationalist who was so philosophical, so thinking, so scientific in his way... Hegel is undoubtedly the greatest irrationalist that the history of philosophy knows. No thinker before him has been able to so irrationalize the concept, to so enlighten the most irrational through the concept, as he ...""Hegel is an irrationalist, for he is a dialectician, for dialectics is irrationalism transformed into a method, *made rational*" - for dialectical thinking is rational-irrational thinking. Hegel's philosophy has been called "rational mysticism," which indeed marks its dual character⁷⁰." Mysticism, unreasonableness, and irrationalism are what fascinates the neo-Hegelians.

It is quite clear that Marxism cannot pass over this turn to Hegel. Neo-Hegelianism appears as the worst reactionary antithesis of the revolutionary materialist dialectic. We must reveal the true face of neo-Hegelian philosophy, expose its class nature, its arch-reactionary popish essence, and strip the phraseological veil from the enemy's ideology. We must *expose the role and significance of neo-Hegelianism in the modern class struggle, and its hostility to the interests of the proletariat*. We must do this all the more because the main support of the bourgeoisie — the social-fascists — does not lag behind their masters and hastens to rebuild their philosophical lyres in a neo-Hegelian way. Z. Mark, G. Marcuse, K. Korsch and others like them try to keep up with the philosophical evolution of the bourgeoisie. They are trying to spread the poisonous philosophical "ideas" of neo-Hegelianism in the ranks of the working class.

It is not by chance that the modern bourgeoisie, in search of a complete idealistic prototype for its philosophy, has turned to *dialectical* idealism. It is attracted to Hegel, preferably over other idealists, by his idealistic dialectic, which the modern reactionaries completely distort and emasculate, and thus use as an ideological weapon of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary materialist dialectic of Marxism-Leninism.

The reason for the fascination of ideologists of the modern bourgeoisie with idealistic dialectic is rooted in the nature of the stage experienced by modern capitalism. The most severe crisis, the deepest class contradictions, the extreme instability of capitalism, the collapse of all bourgeois culture, the crisis of bourgeois science, "the most painful dissonances and almost insoluble antinomies that tear apart reality" — this is what forms the root of the appeal to Hegel. "Whether we look," complains the Hegelian Husserlian T. Lit, "at the external conditions that limit

70 R. Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*, Bd. II, S. 271–272.

the existence of our people for an unforeseen time, or whether we turn to the internal division of tribes, estates, and classes, whether we ask about the political, moral, and religious beliefs that lurk in their depths, there is a heavy struggle and tension everywhere restrictions, everywhere the confusion and ferment of irreconcilable elements, everywhere clashes, whether in the coarser forms of a simple struggle for existence or in the higher, but not so much milder forms of conflicts of worldviews-in short, at first glance the confusion of a multi-thousand-sided movement in which everyone seems to stand against everyone... For the sake of faith in the harmony of the idea of humanity there is no place in this cruel world⁷¹."

The mystical dialectic of neo-Hegelianism is growing out of the rotting capitalism, the most severe crisis of the capitalist system, which is reflected in the collapse of bourgeois culture. Bourgeois philosophy, which has lost its stability in a hopeless crisis and "tragic and gigantic contradictions" (A. Liebert), tries to achieve self-consciousness in idealistic, mystical teachings about the movement and contradictions of logical categories and spiritual entities.

At the same time, we observe two most important varieties of neo-Hegelianism, which are idealistic representations of two different aspects of the same process of decay and crisis of capitalism: *the philosophy of hopeless despair and the philosophy of frenzied fascist "efficiency"* . The first of these trends is nothing more than variations on the theme most pronounced in Spengler, the singer of the decline of capitalist Europe and the death of bourgeois culture, and at the same time the singer of fascism and "fascist culture", a critic of bourgeois democracy, liberalism, pacifism and other "values" that have lost their meaning for the fascizing bourgeoisie.

The sentiments expressed by Spengler are widespread among the modern bourgeois intelligentsia.

The connection between the hopelessness of the modern bourgeoisie and the turn to Hegelianism in A. Liebert's idealistic "tragic dialectic" is very clearly expressed. He, like I. Cohn, understands dialectical contradictions as antinomies, i.e. as *insoluble contradictions*, absolute, eternal, insurmountable opposites and discontinuities. Here "dialectic" clearly expresses a sense of hopelessness out of chaos, a sense of hopelessness.

However symptomatic this trend may be, it is not the dominant one in neo-Hegelianism. While the "tragic dialectic" in modern neo-Hegelianism reflects in itself mainly the moment of the decay and disintegration of capitalism, the dominant form of neo-Hegelianism, to which we will now turn, puts in the first place the offensive tendencies of the losing ground of the bourgeoisie. This is *militant* the neo-Hegelianism of the fascist thugs, the philosophy of the most fierce struggle of the reactionary bourgeoisie for the suppression of the revolutionary proletariat, for the preservation of its rule at any price and by any means, the philosophy of mortal combat with the enemy.

The essence of the fascization of bourgeois democracy is "the process of transition of the bourgeois dictatorship *to open forms of suppression of the working* »⁷²people." "The main thing in fascism is *its open attack on the working class by all methods of coercion and violence, it is a civil war against the working* »⁷³people ."

For a correct understanding of the essence of fascism as a dictatorship of monopolistic capital, it is necessary to understand the interpenetration of *two* sides in it. First, you need to understand fascism (and, consequently, its ideology) as a product of *rotting, hopeless-crisis imperialism* . "The emergence of the fascist movement in the current historical conditions indicates that *capitalism has outlived its usefulness, all the prerequisites for the social transformation of society have matured.*"

71 Th. Litt, Die Philosophie der Gegenwart, II Aufl., S. 74–75.

72 Мануильский, Доклад на XI пленуме ИККИ. — «Компартия и кризис капитализма», Партиздат, 1932 г., стр. 35. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

73 Мануильский, Доклад на XI пленуме ИККИ. — «Компартия и кризис капитализма», Партиздат, 1932 г., стр. 37.

Fascism is "one of the symptoms of the disorientation of the ruling classes and their desire to find a way out of the situation by suppressing the working class." "The ugliness of its ideological forms is influenced by the fact that it is a political superstructure *of decaying capitalism* »⁷⁴."

Anyone who does not understand this aspect of fascism — that it arises on the shaky ground of decaying capitalism, who regards fascism as a mere offensive of the bourgeoisie, who sees in it signs *of the strength* of capitalism — inevitably slips into a right-wing opportunist position, falls into pessimism, disbelief in the strength of the working class and the imminent victory of the socialist revolution.

But it is just as wrong to see fascism *only as a state*. One side characterized is decay, decadence, and degeneration. This would lead to a "left" mistake (in form the opposite, but in essence identical to the right), to a belief in the automatic fall of capitalism, in its *very* disintegration, *in its very* disintegration, to an opportunist underestimation of the importance of active revolutionary struggle as a necessary condition for the destruction of capitalism. "Fascism is not *just about* an expression of the crisis of capitalism and the beginning disintegration of the ruling classes. To say only this is not to say everything. Fascism is one of the forms *of the offensive of capitalism*, which contains elements of overcoming this crisis by methods of getting out of it on capitalist paths. Fascism is both an offensive and a defense of capital... the fascist movement is in fact one of the forms *of the offensive of capital in the context of the general crisis of capitalism* and the beginning disintegration of the ruling classes. And this makes fascism a special, unusual *form of capital's offensive*"⁷⁵."

Thus, for a correct understanding of fascism, it is necessary to understand the dual nature of the offensive activity of reactionary big capital and the convulsive, groundless nature of this activity.

The most typical example of fascist philosophy is the "teaching" of the life philosopher Mussolini, his "spiritual maestro" and former Minister of Education Giuseppe Gentile.

The philosophy of Gentile, the "spiritual ancestor of fascism", is a vivid expression of the "ugliness of the ideological forms" of fascism. This is the clear and unambiguous philosophy of fascism, which has "established itself at the helm of state power" and has completely "revealed itself as a terrorist dictatorship of big capital." Gentile's neo-Hegelianism is a clear philosophical reflection of the above-mentioned reactionary offensive of capital in the context of the deepest universal death crisis of capitalism.

The starting point of Gentile's philosophy is the Popish *subjective idealism* of Berkeley, which Gentile wants to combine with idealistic dialectics, free from inconsistencies and contradictions, and bring to its logical conclusion. Gentile makes no secret of the fact that his "actualism" — idealism taken to the extreme — is a kind of mysticism and clericism.

The basic principle of Gentile's philosophy is the unrestrained pursuit of idealism to the end, the denial of objective reality independent of consciousness. "If the world is a world of higher experience, if the world of experience is a product of the Ego, and therefore an expression of both the creative energy and the cognitive abilities of the same Ego..., then it is necessary to throw away from oneself every idea, every belief, every way of thinking that gives rise to a search for reality outside the Ego ... It is necessary with all determination, submissively courageously and with the passion of a person who is aware of his responsibility, to affirm this truth, which contains all the others: that the true world is we; being is knowledge, knowledge that is being"⁷⁶." Reality, for the subjective idealist Gentile, is an eternal, primal, pure subjectivity. The object dissolves into the

74 Мануильский, Доклад на XI пленуме ИККИ. — «Компартия и кризис капитализма», Партиздат, 1932 г., стр. 37. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

75 Мануильский, Доклад на XI пленуме ИККИ. — «Компартия и кризис капитализма», Партиздат, 1932 г., стр. 606–608. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

76 G. Gentile, *Sistema di Logica*, v. II, p. 144.

subject. Nothing exists outside of the spirit. Thinking absolutely and independently. It does not need any carrier, any thinking being. Not only things, but also people do not exist outside of thinking. "Because we have known the other... our neighbor ceases to exist outside of us." This thinking without a real thinking being, which does not need a brain and absorbs its neighbor "we", according to Gentile, "is not in space and time, on the contrary, space and time, everything that is located spatially and gradually follows in time, is in us"⁷⁷."

But even this does not satisfy Gentile, nor is it sufficient for him. To be completely consistent, idealism must go one step further. And this step Gentile considers the most important feature of his "teaching", the "new" that he introduced. This "new" is that not only material things, but also thoughts are dissolved in thinking. Thoughts conceived as too "objective", "objective", "must give way to thinking as a *pure act*", "pure subjectivity". This act is the basis of dialectics.

Dialectic, according to Gentile, is inherent only *in the spirit*. Nature, on the other hand, things are not dialectical, they are dead, stagnant *products of the dialectic of the spirit*, the result of the cessation of the process. For Gentile, Hegel's idealistic dialectic is imperfect because it is a dialectic of the thought, not of the actual thinking spirit; it is too "objective," too "objective," too "substantial." For the fascist philosopher, dialectics is pure *subjectivity*; reality is a never-realized realization. I, dialectic is *the freedom* of the Self.

Here we come to the principle that makes up the core of the Blackshirts' philosophy, the principle of "freedom". No matter how wild and absurd this phrase (freedom and fascism) may be, the principle of "freedom of the spirit" is a favorite philosophical hobby of the ideologists of fascist executioners and jailers. But what kind of "freedom" are we talking about? Clearly, it is not about freedom from class oppression. It is not a question of a curt bourgeois "freedom" - the formal democratic "freedom" of speech, the press, and assembly that the bourgeoisie so boasted of; the ghostly remnants of such freedom are now being brutally dealt with by the fascists. The fascist "philosophy of freedom" is a philosophy of frantic *opposition to historical necessity*, a desperate, convulsive attempt by the bourgeoisie, which has lost its footing, to delay the wheel of history at all costs, to hold on, to resist the fateful inevitability for it. Fascist actualism is a philosophy of *reactionary activity*, of the offensive of a doomed class that is losing ground.

The reactionary class, the bourgeoisie, which has been condemned to destruction by history, cannot rely on objective necessity. This necessity is incompatible with its "freedom," that is, with its class interests, and completely contradicts it. That is why the philosophy of the modern bourgeoisie declares objective necessity to be a ghost from which the bourgeoisie wants (but cannot) free itself. And since this apparition makes itself felt in a very real way, bourgeois philosophy has no choice but to declare a holy crusade of all the forces of black reaction against historical necessity. It creates "doctrines" that spur the bourgeoisie to struggle, to become active, to use all means, all forces, to hold out, to resist, in spite of and against historical necessity. This *актуализм* is Gentile's actualism. This actualism of pure subjectivity is the philosophy of militant fascism, the philosophy of the last frenzied struggle of the doomed bourgeoisie to maintain and maintain its dominance.

"Actualism" is the philosophical foundation of fascist "efficiency": the economic suffocation of the working class, the fascization of the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie, the intensification of repression and ferocious white terror, mass arrests of workers, the closure of revolutionary organizations, the shooting of workers' demonstrations, strikers, the murder of revolutionaries on trial and without trial, and long-term hard labor sentences (see resolution X of the ECCI Plenum).

By its *logical form* Gentile's philosophy is closest to Fichte's subjective-idealistic dialectic, but it differs in its reactionary nature from the bourgeois-revolutionary philosophy of the German classical idealist Fichte. In both cases, there is a position of effectiveness, activity on an idealistic basis. But Fichte's idealistic doctrine of efficiency was an expression of the revolutionary anti-feudal aspirations of the young German bourgeoisie, and at the same time of its weakness, narrowness, and backwardness. Therefore, revolutionary activity was transferred by him to the

⁷⁷ G. Gentile, *L'esprit acte pur*, p. 144.

sphere of pure spirit in the intelligible world, becoming a disembodied dream of effectiveness. In Gentile, however, "actualism" expresses a reactionary offensive against the proletariat, and moreover an offensive of capitalism that is losing ground, and whose aspirations are increasingly losing their foundation in the dialectic of the development of objective historical reality.

Gentile's theory seeks to "liberate the spirit from every boundary of space and time, as well as from all external conditions..."⁷⁸ "Our only support is the creative, creative activity of the spirit itself, which is agitated in us..."⁷⁹ History is proclaimed to be the product of the free creativity of the miraculous spirit. Such is the meaning of "actual idealism" — the philosophy of the frenzied big bourgeoisie of the era of decaying imperialism and the victorious socialist revolution, such is the meaning of fascist "dialectics".

Gentile does not hide the connection of his philosophy with politics. "To philosophize concretely means to include your actual personality in the system of your country's politics." He celebrates the cult of the fascist state, which, in his opinion, embodies an absolute and concrete universality, to which every individual must surrender, identify with. This cult of the fascist state, of "integrity" (O. Shpan), which supposedly "erases" class contradictions, runs through all the writings of fascist "theorists" who recommend "concrete cooperation of citizens" instead of "abstract class struggle" and call for sacrifice on the altar of the absolute value of the state of the rabid bourgeois dictatorship.

Neo-Hegelianism is now spreading with great force in bourgeois philosophy, winning back primacy from the idealistic trends that previously prevailed, and attracting to itself from all sides and in various ways all the forces of philosophical reaction.

As has already been pointed out above, the social-fascists, in the general process of fascization of the bourgeoisie and the turn of its philosophers towards Hegel, are in a hurry to make their "contribution", to keep up with bourgeois philosophy. *Especially in recent years, the "interest" in Hegel has increased on the part of ideologists and philosophers of social fascism.* The elements of Hegelianism are increasingly pronounced in Max Adler, in Kunov, who speaks directly of Marx's "Hegelianism", and in Kautsky. There are a number of social-fascist philosophers who openly take neo-Hegelian positions (for example, G. Geller) or combine Kant with Hegel (for example, Siegfried Mark).

Such are the tendencies in the development of modern bourgeois, social-fascist philosophy.

In the face of reactionary mysticism appealing to Hegel, the damage done on the ideological front in our country, in the Soviet Union, by a group of philosophers led by A. Deborin, who drew Soviet philosophical thought *from Marx and Lenin to Hegel, is particularly aggravated*. Despite the well-known achievements of this group of philosophers in the struggle against mechanismism, this struggle cannot be considered satisfactory, since it was conducted from the wrong positions. The Menshevik idealists quite falsely solved the problem of studying Hegel's dialectic without being "materialist" friends of Hegel's dialectic.

If Western European neo-Hegelianism is a most reactionary perversion of Hegel's teaching, *then Menshevik idealism is a Hegelian revision of Marxism*. The first is the fruit of fascist ideology, the second is a form of petty — bourgeois influence on proletarian ideology. The former calls for the defeat of the working-class movement; the latter objectively promotes the ideological disarmament of the proletariat.

Menshevik idealism, behind the screen of developing dialectics, renews *idealistic* dialectics, assimilates Hegel's teaching uncritically, and tries to transplant his ideas one by one onto socialist soil. The Deborin group, under the guise of deepening and developing Marxism, revised it, substituted Hegel's philosophy for it, and put Marxism on the head. Instead of purging Hegel's logic of the mysticism of ideas, melting it down in the materialist crucible, "they took it as *given*." Instead of "reading Hegel in a materialistic way" and reworking it in the light of the teachings of Marx and

78 G. Gentile, *L'esprit acte pur*, p. 217.

79 G. Gentile, *Sistema di Logica*, v. II, p. 188.

Lenin, they read Marx in the Hegelian way, combing it "under Hegel". Instead of developing dialectical categories based on the work of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of party congresses, studying the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the discoveries of modern natural science, the Deborin group closed itself in the sphere of "pure" self-moving logical categories, divorced from the material reality and practice of the class struggle. From the height of Hegelian logic, concrete reality ceased to be discernible. Matter disappeared, turning into "an infinite ... aggregate of mediation, i.e. relations and connections" (Deborin), into an immaterial "synthesis of space and time" (Hesse), moving matter was replaced by "moving motion" (Tymyansky). In short: dialectical materialism, Marxism, has degenerated into a Hegelianism tinged with Marxist phraseology.

On closer examination, Hegelian revisionism is closely related spiritually to Menshevik neo-Kantianism; the philosophy of the Second International shows where Menshevik idealism is growing. We observe in the Menshevik idealists the same *separation of theory from practice* that is typical of the Second International, the same departure from the reality of the class struggle, from its theoretical understanding, the same separation of logical forms from concrete, material content, the same inability to preserve harmony between the historical and the logical, the same autocracy of the abstract-logical. The undermining of the materialist foundations of Marxism, the introduction of bourgeois idealist philosophy into the proletarian worldview, the distraction from revolutionary practice, from defending the general line of the party — such is the role objectively performed by Menshevik idealism.

*The Menshevik idealism of the Deborin group returns the philosophy of Marxism to Hegel, while the mechanists draw us back to pre-Marxian materialism. We don't want to go back — neither Hegel nor mechanical materialism, and we are fighting both kinds of revisionism equally. Like the mechanists, we do not reject all dialectics, but only idealistic dialectics. We "must organize a systematic study of Hegel's dialectic from a materialist point of view ... based on the way Marx applied the dialectic understood by materialists. According to Hegel, we can and must develop this dialectic from all sides"*⁸⁰.

By developing a materialist dialectic, we are moving philosophy forward along the path laid out by Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

2.6. The Materialistic philosophy of L. Feuerbach

The development of post-Hegelian philosophy went in two ways. The first path is reactionary, idealistic epigonism, back to Kant, and again from Kant to Hegel. The second way is a materialistic critique and reworking of the Hegelian dialectic. Feuerbach, the immediate forerunner of Marx's materialist philosophy, was the true successor of eighteenth-century French materialism — In the struggle against classical German idealism, he continues the materialist line in philosophy. During the revolution of 1848, the advanced bourgeois democracy, the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, found in Feuerbach's philosophy the expression of its radical sentiments and ideals.

Feuerbach's teaching is materialism. Its guiding principle is the recognition that it is not thinking that determines being, but rather being that determines thinking. Nature exists independently of thinking, by itself. It is the primary, the independent, the infinite. The concrete sensory world, which exists independently of consciousness and is perceived through our five senses, is the only real world. The task of science is to know this material sense world as it is in itself. Man himself is a part of nature, flesh of its flesh. Our sensations are caused by the impact of things on the senses. Thinking, according to Feuerbach, is nothing more than a property of a living bodily person and his brain. The fact that the brain with which we think is itself a part of the material world, that the work of the brain is connected with our practical activities, guarantees that the knowledge of this world is fully accessible to our thinking.

⁸⁰ Ленин, О значении воинствующего материализма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVII, стр. 187. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

From this materialistic standpoint, Feuerbach leads an indefatigable struggle against idealism and religion. Idealism and religion, according to Feuerbach, are not two different enemies; idealistic philosophy is the last refuge of religion, a logically expressed theology. Therefore, the struggle against religion requires the defeat of idealism. Idealism separates thinking from the whole material being of which it is a property, and ascribes to it an independent objective being. The human quality-thinking-is alienated from the person. This is the secret of idealism. This is also the secret of religion. Religion is a belief in ghosts. *God is nothing but a mystified idea of human power and intelligence.* By creating and worshipping him, man exalts *his own essence*, alienated from man. "Objective being as *subjective* a being of nature, as *distinct from nature*, as a *human being*-that is what a divine being is, *what a being of religion is, what a mystery of mysticism and speculation*⁸¹is." Man creates God in *his own image and likeness*. "God is the mirror of man," says Feuerbach. Feuerbach pays a great deal of attention to elucidating the psychological foundations of religion, thereby exposing its falsity, although he is not able to find out its social and class roots. The idea of God arises, but in his opinion, from a sense of lack, from a person's experience of need and imperfection. The feeling of lack of something is connected with a desire, with a need. These unfulfilled desires, which a person is unable to satisfy, give rise to religious faith. What is not feasible in reality, a person transfers to a fictional, fantastic world. In religion, a person dreams in reality. The other world is nothing but the unrealizable desires of this world.

Thus, according to Feuerbach, the origin of religion is not rational, rational, but emotional-religion is generated by feelings, desires and fantasies.

Feuerbach emphasizes the importance of *human dependence on nature*. By creating the concept of God, a person expresses to them not only the dream of his own power, independence, and immortality, but also his powerlessness before nature, which is infinite, powerful, and indifferent to human joys and sorrows. These, according to Feuerbach, are the roots of religious illusions.

The central concept of Feuerbach's philosophy is *man*. Not the abstract "I" of idealism, not the meagre abstraction of the "I" as pure thought, pure sensation, or pure will, but man as *a corporeal being* in the flesh and blood, as *part of nature*, and not the "I" should be the starting point of the theory of knowledge, but "I" and "you" in their unity. This formulation of the question follows from the fact that there is no "I" that is not also "you" and vice versa. In other words, object and subject are not two separate, independent entities, *but a unity*. The subject is necessarily also an *object*. There is no subject without an object. "What is for me, or subjectively, a purely spiritual activity," says Feuerbach, "is in itself, objectively, a material sensuous act."

Feuerbach's teaching was of great historical significance for the struggle of materialism against idealism and for overcoming the "omnipotent" Hegelian philosophy.

Despite all the positive significance of Feuerbach's restoration of materialism in the heyday of idealist systems, despite all the indisputable historical value of his struggle against religion in general and Christianity in particular, and his opposition to the sober philosophy of materialism and the drunken speculation of idealism, both his positive teaching and his criticism of his opponents bear the stamp of historical significance. limitations. Feuerbach's critique of idealism, especially his critique of Hegel, does not give a materialistic reworking of the dialectic mystified by idealism and does not preserve it in a reworked form, but rejects it "from the threshold". *Feuerbach, in his struggle against Hegel's idealism, underestimated the significance of dialectics* and failed to make it materialistic. As a result, his materialism did not take on the higher form that the discoveries of the natural sciences of the nineteenth century already required. His materialism, which represents a certain step forward in comparison with the materialism of the French thinkers of the eighteenth century, still did not rise, despite some brilliant dialectical moments, to the height of dialectical materialism. Matter and history, nature and development are separated in his philosophy.

Feuerbach's materialism is abstract. The man who stands in the center of his attention,

81 Фейербах, Лекции о сущности религии, Соч., т. III, стр. 353.

however much Feuerbach emphasizes his concreteness, is nevertheless not a concrete *historical* person. This is a person "in general", an abstract representative of a biological species, and not a real person of a certain historical epoch, social formation, class. That is why Feuerbach "is forced, for example, to see instead of healthy people a crowd of scrofulous, overworked, and consumptive poor people, to resort to 'higher contemplation' and to ideal 'equalization of the species', i.e., to fall back into idealism just where the communist materialist sees the necessity and at the same time the condition for the transformation of both industry and consumption." and the social order⁸²."

The naturalism and anti-historicism of Feuerbach's teaching also determines the limitations of his criticism of religion. Religion, according to Feuerbach, is generated by the essence of man. He did not understand that religion is a product of *the concrete*. It is *обусловлено* determined in each case by specific *social relations*, in which the solution of religious systems should be sought. Therefore, he limits his task to destroying religion, but does not come to the necessity of destroying its earthly basis.

Feuerbach, however, while trying to make practice the basis of the theory of knowledge, understands this practice naturalistically, only as a struggle between man and nature, without seeing the true social practice of the social man, without revealing the historical, class-based foundations of his social practice. Therefore, Feuerbach's materialism, like all the materialism that preceded it, remains *passive-contemplative* materialism. The world is not perceived by Feuerbach as an object of human *activity*, as an object of *social practice*. Reality is only understood by contemplative materialism *только* as a source of sensation, and not as something *transformed* in the process of human activity, industry, exchange, or class struggle. Feuerbach's theory of knowledge is based on a contemplative-materialistic experience. The unity of subject and object, of human thought and nature, is realized only in sensuality, in the process of passive reception of influences, in contemplation. Pre-Marxian materialism has not yet reached the understanding that it is only in social practice, in the activity and change of the world by man that the true unity of nature and man, of object and subject, is achieved.

Another important feature of Feuerbach's philosophy, which is closely related to the abstractness of materialism, and which caused its insufficiency, is the limitation of materialism to the limits of nature. Feuerbach lacks a materialistic understanding of social life. *Like the French materialists, he remains a materialist "from below" in natural science, and an idealist "from above", i.e. in the social sphere.* He does not understand the material driving forces of social development. The change of social forms is defined by him as a change of religious views. He sees no other relations between people than moral relations, love and friendship. Morality — the doctrine of morality — is at the center of his social views. The love of a person for a person, the union of "I" and "you" — he does not go further than this. However, he is not satisfied with mere morality, but considers it necessary to sanctify it. "Man is God to man," he declares, and declares morality to be the true religion.

Thus, an idealistic understanding of history leads to the vulgarization of morality by a religious label, which inevitably blunts Feuerbach's atheistic struggle.

All the shortcomings of Feuerbach's philosophy were early revealed by Marx and Engels, who, overcoming them in the development of their teaching, raised materialism to a new level, created a new, higher form of materialism. However, even in some of the post-Marxist works, we find remnants and relapses of Feuerbachianism, a misunderstanding of the full depth of the processing that Marxism subjected to the previous materialist philosophy. Plekhanov also shows an inability to rise above the contemplative materialism of Feuerbach's type. *Plekhanov did not understand the full significance of Marx's criticism of Feuerbach, of the turn from contemplative materialism to dialectical materialism.* Remaining on this most important question in Feuerbach's position, he cannot understand Marx's criticism, it seems unfair to Plekhanov, he smooths out the

82 Маркс и Энгельс, Немецкая идеология, Соч., т. IV, стр. 35.

difference between Feuerbach and Marx. According to Plekhanov, "Marx was wrong when he reproached Feuerbach for not understanding 'practical-critical activity'. It was clear to Feuerbach"⁸³. Plekhanov did not understand that Feuerbach's ideas about the meaning of practice were only scattered conjectures that had negligible influence on his general worldview. By identifying Feuerbach's assertion that the world is not only an object of reasoning, but also an "object of desire" with Marx's doctrine of a revolutionary and effective attitude to the world, Plekhanov himself reveals an inability to completely overcome the passive materialism of Feuerbach's type.

Another Feuerbachian feature of Plekhanov's philosophical works is his lack of deep understanding of *dialectics*. Rather, Plekhanov formally recognizes the significance of materialist dialectics, uses it only for individual purposes, and does not grasp the core, the essence of dialectics. Accordingly, Plekhanov's critique of idealism bears the stamp of Feuerbachianism. He does not correct idealistic arguments by deepening them, but only "from the threshold" rejects these arguments. Plekhanov criticizes idealism from the point of view of materialism "in general", i.e., in reality vulgar materialism, and not dialectical materialism.

It is not difficult to reveal the Feuerbachian limitations of the modern *mechanists*. They, like their spiritual ancestors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are much closer to Feuerbach's materialism than to Marx's. Of course, they are not orthodox students of Feuerbach, and we will not find a religion of "love" in them, but the type *and form* of their materialism are similar to Feuerbach's abstract, contemplative materialism.

As for the attitude of Menshevik *idealism* towards Feuerbachianism, here we find the reproduction, deepening and transformation into a system of Plekhanov's errors, or rather Plekhanov's, semi — Feuerbachian materialism. Representing mainly an idealistic, Hegelian revision of Marxism, the eclectic philosophy of the Deborin group does not formally break with materialism either. Materialistic aspects are interspersed in its Hegelian teaching, covering up its true nature. But even this materialistic cover-up is a reproduction of Feuerbach's principles. materialism.

The evolution of Deborin's philosophical views can be described as a movement from Feuerbachianism to Hegelianism. Therefore, if only traces of materialism remain in later works *следы*, then Feuerbach's materialism prevails in the early ones. This is clearly expressed in Deborin's slogan: "Feuerbach's time is ahead." What does this slogan mean after Marx and Lenin, if not a retrograde call to return to the past stages of materialist philosophy? How else can we define the opposition to modern idealism not of Marxism, but of Feuerbachianism?

Deborin fully adheres to Plekhanov's revision of Feuerbach's Marxian critique. According to Deborin, Feuerbach's entire literary activity is a relentless struggle against the theoretical and contemplative point of view of the previous philosophy and the defense of the practical point of view. Here Deborin finally breaks with the Marxist assessment of Feuerbach's materialism. According to Deborin, the historical and philosophical turning point in the development of materialism is accomplished not by Marx, but by Feuerbach, whose ideas Marx sees as a mere successor. In this way the lines between effective and contemplative materialism are blurred, so that it is more convenient to return to the petty-bourgeois point of view of feeling and contemplation.

The fundamental flaw of Menshevik idealism is *the separation of theory from revolutionary activity*, the alienation of theory from the actual tasks and interests of the proletariat. Menshevik idealism separates theory from practice. He does not understand the full significance of revolutionary practice for the development of theory and is unable to make theory worthy and valuable for revolutionary practice. When Menshevik idealism ventures into a field of socialist practice that is alien to it, it is capable only of Feuerbachian babble "about the collectivization of feelings."

And this restoration of Feuerbach's passive-contemplative philosophy is being accomplished by Menshevik idealism in the years of the agony of imperialism and the powerful advance of

83 Плеханов. От идеализма к материализму, Соч., т. XVIII, стр. 176.

socialism, in the years when the roots of capitalism were being uprooted and the foundation of socialism was being built in the Soviet Union, and the elements of the revolutionary crisis were growing uncontrollably in the capitalist countries. To develop a theory outside of practical revolutionary activity, apart from it, is to present the working class with the cardboard sword of scholasticism instead of the steel blade of revolutionary theory.

2.7. The development of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels and the transition to dialectical materialism

The first chapter has already shown the socio-political conditions of the emergence of Marxism and its theoretical sources. Let us dwell in more detail on the development of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels.

In 1841, Marx was working on his dissertation on the philosophy of Epicurus. As Lenin points out, in this dissertation Marx still *maintains a completely idealistic Hegelian* point of view.

The greatness of Hegelian philosophy was that it was the first time that the idea of development was most fully formulated. This was her progressive side. Hegel's idea of universal development reflected the emancipatory aspirations of the German bourgeoisie and was essentially directed against the moribund feudal system. But it is already known that Hegel was a consistent idealist, that Hegel's idealistic dialectic reflected the economic connection of the German bourgeoisie with serfdom, the weakness of its socio-economic positions. Marx, who since 1841 still held the position of Hegel's idealistic dialectic, continues to hold it in his dissertation, giving Epicurus preference over Democritus in the question of the atomistic theory. In 1842, Marx's articles appeared in the *Rheinische Zeitung*, which already outlined Marx's transition from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary democracy to communism. Marx's attempts to interpret the Hegelian doctrine of the state in such a way that it can be used in favor of protecting the rights of the exploited masses, freeing politics from theology, etc., are already evident here. In Berlin, he joined a circle of "*left-wing Hegelians*" (Bruno Bauer and others) who sought to draw practical and revolutionary conclusions from Hegel's philosophy.

In the Hegelian philosophy of law, Hegel's efforts to reconcile the needs of capitalist development with the feudal state structure of Germany at that time found a vivid expression. In his *Philosophy of Law*, Hegel treats the state as an expression of the development of an objective idea, which appears in the form of the moral spirit of the people. The state, according to Hegel, is a political organism that represents the unity of the universal spirit of the people with its special manifestations in the form of the interests of individual citizens. According to Hegel, the government is the "soul", the "expression of the will" of the popular spirit, and therefore its activity should be experienced by citizens not as something external, compulsory, but as a manifestation of their freedom, their own rational moral essence. Hence, Hegel dogmatically asserts the necessity of unconditional, voluntary obedience of all citizens to their government. In fact, Hegel is philosophically serving the feudal dictatorship here. It is not surprising that Marx and Engels should have felt all the negative aspects of the Hegelian philosophy of law early on and begun their revolutionary critique as early as 1842.

Marx and Engels, from the very beginning of their theoretical activity, while starting from the Hegelian idea of development and still holding idealistic positions, were nevertheless *the most revolutionary thinkers of all the left Hegelians*. This point must be especially emphasized in contrast to those perverts of dialectical materialism who claim that Marx in the early period of his activity was an ordinary Young Hegelian and bourgeois radical. Riazanov, the well-known Menshevik historiographer of Marxism, especially "worked hard" in this direction, and in the end he descended to a direct betrayal of the interests of the working class.

The left-wing followers of Hegel, the so-called Young Hegelians, showed a negative attitude towards the right-wing Hegelianism, which tried to justify the nationalist ideal of a Christian-German state with Hegel's philosophy. But in their polemics against right-wing Hegelianism, the Young Hegelians generally did not go beyond the entire German bourgeois enlightenment that

preceded them, and in particular beyond the limits of Hegel's philosophy. Following the example of their old enlighteners, they limited their theoretical activities to only half-hearted criticism of religion, declaring it the main cause of all social evils, completely failing to understand that religion, as well as all the old forms of consciousness, can be destroyed not just by theoretical criticism, but by a revolutionary and practical revolution in socio-economic conditions. life. "All German philosophical criticism," Marx described their position a little later, "from Strauss to Stirner is limited to the criticism of religious ideas, which claims to be the absolute redeemer of the world from all evil"⁸⁴."

This criticism of religion by the Young Hegelians was extremely half-hearted and inconsistent. We find in them a strong criticism of religious dogmas and at the same time a philistine worship of religion, attempts to prove that religion, "namely Christianity, is identical with the highest philosophical truth" (Strauss), an idealistic deification of human thought, turning it into a mystical "self-consciousness", which in the form of "criticism creates history" (Bruno Bauer).. We find the revelation of the earthly roots of the heavenly deity, the deification of man, the statement that "man is god to man" (Feuerbach). On the one hand, the most consistent denial of all that is divine, the statement that "for the egoist there are no objects so exalted and independent that they can make him adore them, live exclusively for them, and sacrifice himself for them"; on the other hand, the absolutization, deification of egoism, the thoroughly religious statement that the "I" is not a God. just like God, above everything else, because "I", mine is "everything", because I am the only one. "I" is nothing in the sense of emptiness, a creative nothing, that from which I myself, as the creator, will create everything"⁸⁵." All the young Hegelians were more or less in thrall to the Hegelian system, for, says Marx, "not one of these newest critics has even attempted to undertake a thorough critique of the Hegelian system"⁸⁶." Their polemics with Hegel and with each other were limited to the fact that each of them pulled out some side of the Hegelian system and turned it against the whole system. "The only result of this philosophical critique is some-and even that is one-sided-research on the history of the emergence of Christianity"⁸⁷." The rest of the critical activity of the left Hegelians was limited to the struggle "only against phrases", while they completely failed to understand that "while they are fighting against the phrases of the given, real world, they are not fighting this world"⁸⁸at all."

In the words of Marx, these "sheep who considered themselves wolves, all the hype of their theoretical activities only clothed the ideas of the German burghers in philosophical jargon."

Marx's early theoretical activity, in its class character and tendencies of development, has a number of features that sharply differ from the theoretical activity of other left-wing Hegelians. Marx's political and theoretical views were formed in great dependence on the revolutionary mindset of the era of the Great French Revolution and the mass revolutionary movements of the late 30s and early 40s of the last century.

As Lenin points out, Marx and Engels became socialists from democrats, and the democratic feeling of hatred for political arbitrariness was extremely strong in them. Since 1842, they have been acting as consistent defenders of the broad mass of working people, the urban and rural poor. During this period, materialistic tendencies made their way in their works.

На опыте политической борьбы Marx and Engels are convinced from the experience of a short period of political struggle that it is not "the contradictions of the Hegelian idea embodied in

84 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 213.

85 М. Штирнер, Единственный и его собственность, 1907 г., стр. 203.

86 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 213.

87 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 214.

88 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 214.

law and the state" but the irreconcilable struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie that is the driving force of social reconstruction, and that consequently it is not law and the state, as Hegel taught, that determine the forms of so-called civil society, but On the contrary, the dominant mode of production determines the forms of state institutions, legal and religious beliefs, and all sorts of other ideas of people. This process of Marx and Engels ' transition from the position of a revolutionary democrat to that of a proletarian revolutionary, their critical rejection of the Hegelian dialectic, and their creation of dialectical materialism as the worldview and method of the proletariat can be traced in a number of their works.

As early as in one of his first articles in the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx expressed such propositions as clearly reveal in him a consistent revolutionary-democrat, who was gradually passing over to communist positions. Marx contrasts the revolutionary argument with the feudal-reactionary statement that "only religion is the basis of the state" and that therefore "newspapers should not discuss politics from the point of view of philosophy in the so — called Christian state". Philosophy, according to Marx, must declare itself a "newspaper employee" and discuss all political questions quite openly "not in church, not in salons, not in the family circle," but in the press, because " newspaper questions have become the militant questions of the day." Philosophy must "exchange the ascetic priestly habit for the light fashionable clothes of newspapers", for " philosophers do not grow like mushrooms out of the ground, they are the product of their time, their people, whose most subtle, precious and invisible juices ferment in philosophical ideas. The same spirit that builds railways with the hands of artisans builds philosophical systems in the brains of philosophers⁸⁹." Philosophy does not hover outside the modern world, on the contrary, it "invades the hearts of contemporaries", as well as in the "editorial offices of newspapers".

Starting from Hegel's idealistic position of the state as a "moral organism," Marx seeks to use this position to defend the freedom of the democratic press against feudal censorship. "The state should be built not on the basis of religion, but on the basis of reason and freedom." "Modern philosophy ... considers the state as a great organism in which legal, moral and political freedom must be realized, and the individual citizen, obeying the laws of the state, obeys only the natural laws of his own reason, the human mind⁹⁰." In such an ideal state, the press should be free, because it is "the open eye of the popular spirit, the epitome of the people's confidence in themselves, the most eloquent link connecting the individual with the state and with the whole world."... It is a merciless confession of the people to themselves... It is a spiritual mirror in which the people see themselves... She is the light of the state mind, which can penetrate every hut... It is an ideal world, which, growing out of reality, in turn enriches and spiritualizes this reality⁹¹." Marx resolutely protests against the representatives of those estates who " in order to save the special liberties of their privileges... condemn the universal freedom of human nature." Marx argues that the argument against freedom of the press developed by the representative of the nobility in the Landtag, as well as the argument of the representative of the princely estate, cannot be of any substance, since it contrasts the special spirit of privileges with the universal "historical spirit of the people." But Marx not only stigmatizes the orators of princes and nobles, he also sharply criticizes the representative of the bourgeoisie, who demanded freedom of the press as "commercial freedom", i.e., as an expression of freedom of property. "But," says Marx, " is *свободна* the press free when it descends to the level of a craftsman?"⁹² "Let's expose the speaker's thought. To the question: what is freedom? he answers: *commercial freedom* . It is as if a student answers the question: what is freedom? I

89 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 200–201.

90 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 206–207.

91 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 171.

92 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 181.

would answer: "*Free night* "»⁹³.

The idea of violence against the "freedom of the universal popular spirit" by the privileged classes is expressed by Marx, however, in a slightly different form, in another article written on the issue of the law against the theft of firewood, in defense of the ordinary right of the poor. While still firmly convinced that the state should embody "the freedom of the universal popular spirit," Marx demands that legislation should take care of protecting the interests not only of the forest owner, but also of the violator of forest regulations, "for the state must also see in the woodcutter a person... a citizen. The State cannot lightly cut off one of its members from all these functions, for the State cripples itself when it turns a citizen into a criminal"⁹⁴.

This is what Hegel's idealistic theory of State law teaches. But Marx already understands perfectly well that the forest owner is guided not by ideal principles, but by practical interests. "The practical forest owner thinks this way: this decree of the law is good, because it is useful for me..."⁹⁵

What is important, however, is that Marx no longer confines himself to criticizing the forest owners. In contrast to the serf-bourgeois estates, Marx declares the poor to be the legitimate bearer of their "ordinary rights." Marx argues that the gathering of dead wood in privately owned forests is a legitimate manifestation of the "right of conquest" of the poor, who "in their very activities... find justification for their right"⁹⁶. Thus Marx, as a revolutionary democrat, used certain propositions of the Hegelian philosophy of law. This meant that *Marx was following the path of rejecting the Hegelian "idea" of the state*, because instead of expressing the freedom of the "universal popular spirit", Marx forces it to express *the special, private, class spirit* of the poor.

If at the beginning of his activity Marx is deeply convinced that the ideal state as the embodiment of the universal popular spirit determines the forms of existence of the so-called civil society, then during his work in the "Rheinische Zeitung", in the process of practical political struggle, Marx comes to the conclusion that the state only "implies reason realized", in fact "it is a real state." it runs into a contradiction between its ideal purpose and its real data⁹⁷.

The further development of Marx and Engels, namely their work in the German-French Yearbooks and their Critique of the Holy Family (1843-1844), is aimed at exposing the Hegelian understanding of the state and law. The appearance of the works of L. Feuerbach (1841-1843) helped Marx and Engels to realize and formalize the materialist propositions that had already made their way in earlier times. As Engels notes, "we (i.e., Marx and Engels) immediately became Feuerbachians." *This period marks the final transition of Marx and Engels from idealism to materialism, from revolutionary democracy to communism.*

It would be wrong to deny the well-known influence of Feuerbach's materialism on the formation of the materialist theory of knowledge of Marx and Engels. However, it would be no less a mistake to see Marx and Engels as orthodox Feuerbachians, in the sense that they shared the limitations of Feuerbach's views even at this early period of their activity. To the extent that Feuerbach's critique of religion helped Marx to expose the ideal Hegelian state, he was a Feuerbachian, to the extent that he adhered to Feuerbach's philosophical views and was a strong defender of Feuerbach against the attacks of vociferous idealistic criticism from the Young Hegelians. Marx placed Feuerbach immeasurably above the Young Hegelian "Critical Criticism." But Marx was never an unqualified follower of Feuerbach, for from the very beginning of his philosophical development, Marx's activity was directed against the fundamental vice of

93 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 180.

94 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 233.

95 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 236.

96 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 231.

97 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 365.

Feuerbach's philosophy — its contemplation, against the lack of understanding that religion can be destroyed not by theoretical criticism, but by a revolutionary and practical revolution in the socio-economic conditions of social life. That is why Marx, in connection with the appearance of Feuerbach's Theses on the Reform of Philosophy, says in one of his letters: "Feuerbach's aphorisms suffer, in my opinion, from the fact *that* he puts too much emphasis on nature and *too little on politics* . Meanwhile, this is the only union that can make the present philosophy an ideological⁹⁸one."

In contrast to Feuerbach's inconsistent abstract-theoretical critique of religion, Marx advocated *a practically effective philosophy from the very beginning* . From the experience of the political struggle, Marx is quite independently convinced that the Hegelian ideal state is an abstraction and as such cannot be the cause of social development. During this period of its development, Marx asserts that the "German philosophy of law and the state "is an" ideal continuation of German history " and that it is not, as Hegel believed, the cause of social development, but is only a "philosophical reflection" of the social life of modern advanced peoples. Therefore, Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy of law was not only a critique of the German feudal system, but also leads him to a critique of English and French capitalism, which was already developed at that time.

In this critique of Hegel's philosophy of law, which was based on the point of view of bourgeois political economy, in the process of studying economic theory and criticizing utopian socialism and communism, *Marx leaves the revolutionary-democratic positions and takes the position of the proletariat* . In his famous article "Towards a Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law", Marx already appears as a proletarian revolutionary, and therefore he now understands much more deeply the dependence of theoretical criticism on the practical revolutionary struggle. Marx writes that he is "a resolute opponent of the former form of the German state." the critique of the speculative philosophy of law proceeds not in itself, but in *tasks* for the solution of which there is only one means — *practice* ." "The weapon of criticism,"he goes on to say," cannot of course replace the criticism of weapons; material force must be overthrown by material force itself; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it takes possession of the masses⁹⁹."

The following passages confirm our idea: "Just as philosophy finds its material weapon in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its *spiritual weapon in philosophy* weapons, and as soon as the lightning of thought thoroughly strikes this naive national soil, the emancipation of the Germans into people »¹⁰⁰will also take place." Trying to find out more concretely the ways of "emancipating Germans into people", Marx poses the question: "What is the *positive* possibility of German emancipation? Answer: in the formation of a class bound by *radical chains* , a class of civil society that does not represent any class of civil society; a class that is the decomposition of all classes; a sphere that has a universal character due to its universal sufferings and does not claim *any special right*, because it is not being subjected to any *special action. injustice, and injustice in general*; which can no longer refer to the *historical*, but still only to *human law*; which is not in any one-sided contradiction with the results of the German state system, but in a comprehensive contradiction with the foundations of this system, and finally a sphere that cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all others It represents, in a word, the *total loss of man* and, consequently, can only find itself through a *complete new rebirth of man* . This decayed society, as a special class, is *the proletariat* »¹⁰¹."

Marx here definitively rejects Hegel's idea that the ideal state determines the forms of social

98 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 532.

99 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 406.

100 Маркс и Энгельс, Соч., т. I, стр. 412.

101 Маркс и Энгельс, К критике гегелевской философии права, Соч., т. I, стр. 411.

life. In contrast to Hegel, Marx begins to look for the dependence of the forms of state institutions on the regularity of social life, although at first he can only give the most general definition of this regularity. "Hegel forgets," says Marx, "that a particular individuality is a human individuality, and that state functions and realms of reality are human functions; he forgets that the essence of a particular personality is not its blood or its beard, but its *social quality*, and that state functions, etc., are nothing but forms of life and forms of manifestation of social qualities of people. It is clear, therefore, that since individuals are the bearers of the state function and State power, they are considered not from the point of view of their private, but from the point of view of their public qualities."

The next decisive step in their development is taken by Marx and Engels in the Critique of the Holy Family, where, while castigating and exposing the followers of Hegelian idealism, they finally strengthen themselves as proletarian revolutionaries on the positions of *dialectical materialism*. Marx shows here that the state, law, religion, and morality are determined by the irreconcilable struggle of classes. In the Critique of the Holy Family, Marx gives a class characterization of the antithesis between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Here Marx outlined more clearly the historical role of the proletariat, the necessity of its struggle against the capitalist system, against the outrageous conditions of its existence. In the Critique of the Holy Family, Marx and Engels finally found the main springs of social development — the material process of production and the associated law of class struggle - and thus laid the foundations of dialectical materialism.

"German Ideology" (1846) — a further step in the development of dialectical materialism. The starting point of "*German Ideology*" is fundamentally opposed to the entire preceding pre-Marxist philosophy in general and in particular to German philosophy. Marx and Engels proceed "from really active people, trying to deduce from their real life process also the development of ideological reflexes and reflections of this life process"¹⁰². The point of departure for the study of social life should not be a fantastic representation of people, not an abstraction from real reality, but "real people, their actions and the material conditions of their existence, both present and created by the activities of people themselves."

"So we are faced with this fact: certain individuals who produce in a certain way enter into certain social and political relations"¹⁰³. "The ideas which these individuals form for themselves are representations either of their relation to nature, or of their relation to one another... It is clear that in all these cases these representations are a real or illusory conscious expression of their real relations and activities, their production, their relations, their social and political practice"¹⁰⁴. "People's material existence is the actual process of their life: 'consciousness can never be anything other than conscious existence'¹⁰⁵." And here Marx gives his classical formulation of *the dependence of consciousness on being*. "It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness,"¹⁰⁶ he says.

Having thus formulated *the basic principle of materialism*, Marx gives a merciless critique of the philosophy that preceded him. Marx and Engels are especially merciless in their crackdown on German philosophy, which, instead of studying a concrete acting person, studied an abstract, fictional, imaginary, in a word, fantastically represented person. "The thought of German ideologues," according to Marx, "revolves in the sphere of the 'pure spirit,' seeing in religious illusion the driving force of history." German philosophy operates only in the sky, never descends to

102 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 216.

103 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 215.

104 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 215.

105 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 216.

106 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 216.

earth. But truly scientific knowledge must begin its research path with the study of the real, with the study of the production process, with the person living on earth, who is specifically acting. It is necessary to start from a certain historical person in order to understand that the social conditions of production determine their ideological reflection. Consequently, philosophy, like any ideology, does not have a special independent history of its development, because people, developing the methods of their material production, thereby change the way they represent themselves.

Thus, " phrases about consciousness disappear, and real knowledge must take their place." At best, philosophy can be replaced by "summing up the most general results" abstracted from the consideration of the historical development of people. Therefore, the real and only science is history, which should fully depict the process of changing social forms of production, as well as the various forms of consciousness that depend on them.

In order to show that the development of material production is the basic all-determining law of social life, Marx and Engels repeatedly refer to the empirical fact that people, in order to live, must produce "the means necessary for their life" and thereby produce their material life "indirectly", because "this activity is not a direct one." this incessant sensuous work and creativity, this production, is so much the basis of the whole sensuous world as it now exists that if it were to cease even for a single year, Feuerbach would not only find colossal changes in the physical world, but very soon he would not find the whole human world, his own capacity for thinking and thinking. not even your own existence¹⁰⁷."

But if production is the all-determining law of the development of society, then it is also a boundary that establishes the distinction between man and animal, for "people can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, religion, or anything else in general. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin *to produce* the means necessary for their lives¹⁰⁸." Even at the lowest and most primitive stage of social development, production is the basis of human life.

Consciousness at the first stages of social development is directly dependent on practical human activity, being "primarily the consciousness of the immediate sensory environment¹⁰⁹." Consciousness and language arose in primitive man in the process of labor out of the need for practical and active relations with each other, and only when there was a separation of material and spiritual labor did consciousness imagine "that it is something other than the consciousness of existing practice¹¹⁰." "From this point on, it is able to free itself from the world and pass on to the formation of a 'pure theory'"¹¹¹, thus acquiring the form of the illusion of domination over man.

This division of labor is conditioned by the historically developing process of *material division of labor* . The division of labor makes human development one-sided, disfigures it, dominates man in the form of assigning him certain social functions. "According to the division of labor that is taking place, everyone has a certain exclusive circle of activity that is imposed on him and from which he cannot escape: he turns out to be a hunter, a fisherman, or a shepherd... or a critical critic¹¹²." Marx and Engels consider the division of labor between town and country to have a particularly negative effect on human development *городом и деревней*, since it "is the crudest expression of the fact that the individual is subordinated to the division of labor and a certain

107 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 218.

108 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 215.

109 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 220.

110 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 221.

111 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 221.

112 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 223.

activity is forcibly imposed on him, a subordination that turns one person into a limited urban animal, the other into a limited rural animal¹¹³."

Thus, Marx and Engels show us how the law of the division of labor causes the appearance of the illusion of independent development of ideology, how the division of labor disfigures the development of a person, attaching him to separate professions. In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels clearly formulate the law of the division of labor as the basis for the formation of *classes*, because, they say, "division of labor and private property are identical expressions: in one case the same thing is said in relation to activity as in the other case it is said in relation to the product of activity¹¹⁴." Therefore, "the various forms of ownership at each stage of the division of labor determine the relationship of individuals with respect to the material, tool, and product of labor." Thus, in the German Ideology, Marx and Engels fully reveal the reasons for the division of society into classes.

There they also give a very concrete definition of society as socio-economic formations, establish the dependence of their structures on the dominant form of ownership, and study the concrete class struggle developing in them.

The struggle between feudal aristocracy and bourgeois democracy, the struggle for universal suffrage, for equality and freedom of citizens, etc. — all these are deceptive forms that are the ideal expression of the economic interests of the bourgeoisie.

Using the example of the analysis of the class struggle in the era of bourgeois revolutions, Marx and Engels conclude that the class that *dominates materially* is always *dominant spiritually*. The class that owns the material means of production also owns the means of spiritual production. The thoughts that prevail in a given epoch are the ideal expression of the class relations that prevail in that epoch. Therefore, Marx again and again emphasizes that the old forms of consciousness can be destroyed not by spiritual criticism, but by a practical revolution in real social relations... "It is not criticism, but revolution, that is the driving force of history."

Thus, in the German Ideology, Marx and Engels, along with the discovery of the basic laws of social development, clearly reveal the historical inevitability of revolution. Revolution is the inevitable result of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production; "the contradiction between the productive forces and the forms of relations... had to break out every time in the form of a revolution¹¹⁵." Marx and Engels repeatedly explain the fact that all previous revolutions were limited only to the redistribution of property, without affecting the very foundations of the rule of private property. This is one of the fundamental differences between all previous revolutions and the future proletarian-communist revolution. Only the communist revolution will finally destroy all class rule, because it will be created and led by the proletariat, a class that has the same interests in all nations, a class that cannot bear not only its relations with the capitalist, but also the division of labor itself, a class that "bears the whole burden of society without taking advantage of its benefits the class "from which the consciousness of the necessity of a communist revolution emanates". The proletariat must make a revolution "not only because it is impossible to overthrow the ruling class in any other way, but also because the overthrowing class can only be cleansed of all the filth of the old society in a revolution and become capable of creating a new society »¹¹⁶." Therefore, "communism for us is not a state that must be established, not an ideal that reality must conform to. We call communism a real movement that destroys the present state of affairs »¹¹⁷.

113 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 224.

114 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 222.

115 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 241.

116 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 227. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

117 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 223. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

Thus, the "German Ideology" represents a significant step forward in the development of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels. Here they extend materialism to the knowledge of society, complete materialism to the top, reveal the basic laws of social development, and thereby *finally* formulate dialectical materialism as the worldview and method of the proletariat.

Before proceeding to a more detailed consideration of dialectical materialism, we will focus on those views that distort the actual course of development of Marx's philosophical views.

Plekhanov's point of view is widespread and yet fundamentally perverting the actual process of forming the philosophical views of Marx and Engels *точка зрения Плеханова*. In his article "The Philosophical Evolution of Marx", Plekhanov states that "their (Marx's and Engels') entire path consists of three stages: the first stage — abstract Hegelian self — consciousness, the second stage—the concrete — abstract man of Feuerbach, and the last stage—a real man living in a real class society, in a certain socio-economic situation". From Hegelianism through anti-Hegelianism to the synthesis of Feuerbach's materialism and Hegelianism on a new basis - to Marxism in the proper sense.

The fundamental flaw of this point of view is that Marx's philosophical development is considered purely logically, as a simple development of ideas, regardless of the class struggle, regardless of the level of development of science. We have also shown that Marx and Engels created dialectical materialism in the struggle against Hegel and Feuerbachianism. Plekhanov does not understand that Marx's philosophical development was always subordinated to the tasks of the revolutionary struggle, and that in the revolutionary struggle Marx quickly understood the shortcomings of the Hegelian and Feuerbachian weapons.

Both the mechanists and the Menshevik idealists adhere to Plekhanov's scheme of Marx's philosophical development *механисты и меньшевистствующие идеалисты*, though they significantly worsen it and lead it to the point of absurdity. Thus, in his book "Marx as a Philosopher" L. Axelrod writes: "Idealism in general and Hegel's idealism in particular were opposed by Hegel's disciple Feuerbach, who passed through the system of his teacher and adopted the dialectical method of thinking. Feuerbach, with remarkable skill, used the dialectical weapon with which he destroyed idealistic constructions. And where Feuerbach ended, Marx just started. Marx fully shares Feuerbach's critique of idealism... In short, Marx created a higher synthesis, which was expressed in the combination of Hegel's dialectical method with Feuerbach's materialistic basis of knowledge." In fact, Axelrod here only repeats Plekhanov more vulgarly, passing off as dialectical materialism a combination of Feuerbachianism and Hegelianism.

The Menshevik idealists completely agree with the mechanists on the question of the origin of dialectical materialism. They regard Marx's dialectic as the dialectic of Hegel, corrected by Feuerbach's materialism, as a synthesis of Hegel's dialectic and Feuerbach's materialism (Deborin).

What is the *social meaning* of these perversions of the history of dialectical materialism? All these perversions converge on one common statement: dialectical materialism is a union of Feuerbach's materialism and Hegel's dialectic. But to assert this is to try *to dissolve the philosophy of the proletariat in the bourgeois worldview*. Dialectical materialism is both the continuation and the complete *opposite* of all forms of bourgeois philosophy. The path of its development is a struggle against *all* the philosophical theories of the bourgeoisie, including, first of all, the idealistic dialectic of Hegel and the contemplative materialism of Feuerbach.

One cannot be a dialectician "in general", but only *either* idealistic, *or* a materialist dialectician. The Menshevik idealists are among the former, while the Marxist-Leninists are among the latter. Mechanists do not belong to either of them, not being *at all* dialectics.

We are "*materialistic* friends of the Hegelian dialectic." We do not reject this dialectic, but rework it and develop it as a materialist dialectic. Although "there is a lot of mysticism and empty pedantry in Hegel... but the main idea is brilliant: a universal, comprehensive, *living* connection of everything with everything and the reflection of this connection-materialistically placed on its head by Hegel — in the concepts of man, which must also be hewn, broken off, flexible, mobile,

relativistic, interconnected, united in opposites, to embrace the world¹¹⁸." Marxism turned Hegel's dialectic from its "head to its feet"; it extracted "the rational core from under its mystical shell." We are the dialectical-materialist enemies of Hegelian *idealism*. We overcome the false, idealistic, mystical, theological dialectic of Hegel. By freeing dialectics from its idealistic captivity, materialism finds in it a natural ally and accomplice. Dialectics is by no means an accidental companion of materialism. Consistent materialism is *necessary*. It is dialectical, just as the *only consistent dialectic is materialistic*.

Chapter 3. Dialectical Materialism

3.1. Materialistic dialectics as a philosophical science

Dialectical materialism is the worldview of a new social class, on which history has assigned the great task of destroying classes. In dialectical materialism, the working class finds the spiritual weapon of its struggle and liberation, the philosophical basis of its views, which attests to its transformation from a class "in itself" to a class "for itself". Dialectical materialism is a worldview that can be properly and completely mastered only if one approaches the world from the class standpoint of the proletariat and its party. It is precisely these positions that make it possible to know reality in a truly objective way. For only the philosophy of Marxism is a system of views in which the highest and strictest scientific knowledge is combined with consistent and irreconcilable proletarian revolutionism. Dialectical materialism is the only philosophical doctrine that openly and consistently opposes the ideology of the exploiting classes, growing and developing along with the strengthening of the power of the proletariat.

The philosophy of Marxism is *the historical outcome*, the conclusion, the result of all the previous development of science and philosophy. But Marxism did not simply and mechanically combine the previous doctrines; it is by no means (as the Menshevik idealists believe) a mere mechanical *synthesis* of the previous theories, but *a critical revision* of them. It is a *newholistic* philosophical teaching based on the conclusions of the study of the nature, history and practice of class struggle.

Modern materialism is not a mere heir to previous philosophical teachings; it was born and grew up in *the struggle* against the previously dominant philosophy, in the struggle for the liberation of science from the idealism and mysticism that corrode it. Marxism not only inherited what was fruitful in Hegel's teaching — the highest product of idealism—but also overcame the idealism of this teaching and reworked its dialectic in a materialistic way. It is not only a continuation of the entire preceding development of materialism and its completion, but it is also becoming an opponent of its limitations, an opponent of mechanical, contemplative materialism. The philosophy of the proletariat inherits the scientific results of the previous civilization and subjects them to a revolutionary revision.

Dialectical materialism as the philosophy of Marxism is also *a method of cognition* — the surrounding world and revolutionary action. Dialectical materialism is a unity of worldview and method. It is precisely on this question that one often meets with incorrect views that distort Marxism. The representatives of the idealist revision of Marxism saw the whole essence of dialectical materialism in the fact that it is a "method". By posing the question in this way, they *separated method from the general philosophical worldview*, separated dialectics from materialism. Nor is the mechanistic point of view incorrect, which sees in the philosophy of Marxism *only the following*: a general philosophical worldview, and one that is identical with the conclusions of mechanical natural science, without understanding that our philosophy is not just materialism, but *dialectical materialism*.

118 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 139.

Marx and Engels developed very deep thoughts on the question of the philosophy of Marxism and its subject matter, in contrast to all previous philosophy, in their early works. So in the German Ideology they wrote on the question of philosophy: "Thus, where speculation stops, that is, at the threshold of real life, real positive science begins, the image of practical activity, the practical process of human development. Phrases about consciousness disappear, and real knowledge must take their place. When they begin to portray reality, independent philosophy loses its *raison d'être* (meaning) *самостоятельная*. In its place, at best, can be a summation of the most general results abstracted from the consideration of historical development of people"¹¹⁹.

By directing the sharp edge of their teaching against the separation of philosophy from real reality and its transformation into a kind of independent entity, Marx and Engels emphasize with particular force the need for a philosophy that grows on the basis of an analysis of real life, real relations. They emphasize that with *such* an understanding of philosophy, *independent* philosophy, i.e., philosophy that has only logical ideas and their self-generation as its subject, loses all meaning. Thus, a positive definition of the role and tasks of philosophy is given here, which is developed in detail in the subsequent works of Marx and Engels and in the works of Lenin. We mean to indicate that the task of philosophy should be *to summarize general results* that are abstracted from the consideration and study of the historical development of people. The vulgarizers and perverts of Marxism in general and Marxist philosophy in particular, who deny the right of philosophical science to exist, try to refer to Engels' statements on this subject in Anti-Dühring. Engels says there: modern "materialism is essentially dialectical and makes redundant any philosophy that claims to be superior to other sciences. When the requirement is applied to each individual science to find out its place in the general system of things and knowledge, any special science about this general connection between them becomes superfluous"¹²⁰.

First of all, Engels emphasizes here that the philosophy of Marxism is not just materialism, but dialectical materialism. Secondly, since, from the point of view of dialectical materialism, every science requires an explanation of its place in the general process of our knowledge of the objective world, there is no need for philosophy, which stands above the other sciences, is like a "science of sciences" and invents general connections without analyzing the real material of science. *Such* a "philosophy" in its old form disappears. However, there is still a need for a philosophical science that has a real content in philosophy as a science about the laws of the development of human thinking, reflecting the laws of the development of nature and human society. That is why, speaking of dialectical materialism, Engels wrote: "Philosophy is thus 'removed', i.e., 'buried', 'simultaneously destroyed and preserved'. Destroyed formally, preserved in its actual content"¹²¹.

Thus we see that all sorts of opportunists and revisionists who reject Marxist philosophy distort Marx's views' Engels' Lenin. What did the founders of Marxism-Leninism understand by materialist dialectics as a philosophical science?

Marx, Engels, and Lenin understand materialist dialectics *as the doctrine of development*. In his writings, Engels calls dialectics the doctrine of "the universal laws of the movement and development of nature, human society, and thought"¹²². Lenin, like Marx and Engels, sees dialectics as "the most comprehensive, rich in content, and profound doctrine of development"¹²³. For Lenin, as for the founders of Marxism, a different formulation of the principle of development is limited,

119 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 216. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

120 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 17.

121 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 98.

122 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 100. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

123 Ленин, Карл Маркс, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVIII, стр. 10.

meaningless, and "cripples the actual course of development... in nature and in society"¹²⁴. Dialectics is the most profound and comprehensive study of development because it most fully and comprehensively reflects the abrupt and contradictory nature of the processes of change in nature and society.

According to Engels, " what remains of philosophy is the doctrine of the laws of thought, logic and dialectics." But the laws of our thinking reflect the laws of the development of nature and society.

"All our theoretical thinking," says Engels, " is absolutely dominated by the fact that our subjective thinking and the objective world are subject *to the same laws*, and that therefore they cannot contradict each other in their final results, but must agree with each other. This fact is an unconscious and unconditional prerequisite for our theoretical thinking"¹²⁵. The very laws of thought by which our knowledge develops reflect the development of nature and the history of human society. Therefore, outside of nature and history, the laws of dialectics have no meaning. The very laws of thought are correct only because they reflect the development of nature and history. "The so-called *objective* dialectic, Engels wrote, reigns supreme in all nature, and the so-called *subjective dialectic, dialectical thinking*, is only *a reflection* the movement that prevails in all nature by means of opposites, which determine the life of nature by their constant contradictions and their final transition into each other, or higher forms"¹²⁶.

Subjective dialectics, being a reflection in the consciousness of the development of the objective world, is a method of thinking, as well as a method of practical activity of people aimed at both nature and society. It is, as Engels puts it, the most correct form of thinking, "for it alone represents an analog and, consequently, a method of explanation for the processes of development taking place in nature, for the universal connections of nature, for the transitions from one field of research to another"¹²⁷.

3.2. Materiality of the world and forms of existence of matter

Continuing and developing the materialist line in philosophy, Marxism solves the basic question of philosophy about the relationship between being and thinking, consistently and materialistically emphasizing the materiality of the world and the dependence of consciousness on being. "The unity of the world lies in its materiality, and it is proved... by the long and slow development of philosophy and natural science"¹²⁸.

The recognition of *the primacy* of being, of the nature of an object, presupposes its *independent existence*. Indeed, the first condition for belonging to materialism is the recognition of the existence of the external world, objective reality, *outside and independently of anyone's consciousness*. The object is not something secondary to the subject, it is independent, primary. We have already seen, in our study of subjective idealism, what an abyss of absurdity the rejection of this principle leads to.

The proof of the existence of an objective world is the social practice of a person carried out in the historical development of human society. Human activity and our very existence irrefutably and irrefutably prove the reality of the external world and its independence from the subject. The fact that man must face the external world every day, every hour, every minute, which he perceives

124 Ленин, Карл Маркс, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVIII, стр. 10.

125 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 75. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

126 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 35. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

127 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 70.

128 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 30.

through the medium of his senses; the fact that the world confronts man as an unruly, often hostile force, with which a severe, cruel struggle is required; the fact that man *must not only* overcome external obstacles, but also overcome them. and *to be able* to overcome them is the best proof of the existence of an external world independent of consciousness.

Recognition of the material world, the dependence of consciousness on being, and the primacy of matter is the cornerstone of Marxist philosophy. But what is *matter* ? To understand this question, it is necessary to clearly distinguish *between the philosophical and natural-scientific concepts of matter* . This is not two contradictory concepts, but a definition of matter in two different ways. *The philosophical* concept of matter characterizes it in relation to cognition, to thinking, to the subject. Under the philosophical concept of matter is meant that " which, acting on our sense organs, produces sensation; matter is *an objective reality given to us in sensation* »¹²⁹." Matter is something that exists outside and independently of our consciousness, causes our sensations and is reflected in them. The natural-scientific concept of matter refers to the question of *what* this objective world is like from the point of view of the current level of physical knowledge. If the philosophical concept of matter is inextricably linked with the solution of the question of *the relationship between being and cognition, subject and object*, then the natural-scientific concept of matter refers to the *structure of matter* , the characteristic of this physical structure, and this characteristic changes with the development of our knowledge in different historical epochs.

Matter is the entire world that exists independently of us. The concept of matter is the most general concept. All that *is* is different kinds of matter, and matter itself cannot be defined as a special case of any kind. For the same reason, it is impossible to specify the specific differences of matter. We distinguish matter from consciousness, we contrast them with one another, but *this opposition is conditional and makes sense only within the "epistemological" formulation of the question* , since we find in matter itself a special property of it as a property of highly organized matter — consciousness. The opposition of knowledge to being is the opposition *of the knower* matter *of knowable* matter, but no more. A completely legitimate and correct opposition of subject to object loses its meaning outside the theory of knowledge. If we were to oppose matter to spirit from a natural-scientific point of view, it would mean a betrayal of materialistic monism, a transition to a dualistic position. There is only matter and its manifestations. The subject is also material. The knowing man himself is one of the manifestations of matter.

In view of the universality and uniqueness of matter, to give its full definition means to enumerate all its properties and manifestations, i.e., everything that exists in nature. That is why *the natural-scientific concept of matter* it can always be only *a relative truth* , since its exhaustive definition presupposes the completion of absolute knowledge of nature, the exhaustion of science's tasks. With the progress of physics and chemistry, the natural-scientific concept of matter is being refined. It is absurd to demand from philosophy that which is the aim and task of the whole development of the natural sciences.

Classical mechanics, physics, and other sciences, when talking about matter, had in mind such properties of it as: mass, inertia, impenetrability, gravity, and so on. These properties of matter were considered to be its absolute, unchangeable and original properties. This understanding was partly due *to the level of development* of natural science itself.

Until the twentieth century, scientists were dominated by the view that the atom is the last degree of divisibility of matter: the atom is then indecomposable. But at the beginning of this century, in connection with the progress of physics, together with the discovery of the fact that the atom is also decomposable, that electrons are a further step in the divisibility of matter, it became clear that the old atomistic theory of the structure of matter is no longer sufficient, that it must be supplemented and developed by the electron theory. When the further development of physics at the end of the XIX century radically changed the views of physicists and matter lost those properties that were previously considered the main features of matter, a crisis broke out in physics: some

129 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 119. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

physicists took the position of idealism.

For bourgeois philosophers and natural scientists, the discovery of the electronic structure of matter gave rise to the conclusion that "matter has disappeared." Lenin, whose philosophical views were invariably connected with the recognition that matter does not arise and does not disappear, that matter *is an objective reality that exists independently of our consciousness*, came to a different conclusion. "Matter is disappearing," writes Lenin, *that means the limit to which we have hitherto known matter disappears, our knowledge goes deeper*; such properties of matter as formerly seemed absolute, unchangeable, and original (impenetrability, inertia, mass, etc.) disappear, and which are now being revealed *as if they were not real.* "relative, inherent only in certain states of matter»¹³⁰."

Philosophical materialism believes that "the only" property "of matter, which philosophical materialism is associated with, is the property *of being an objective reality*, of existing outside of our consciousness,"¹³¹ whereas physics and the natural sciences in general connect, as we have already written, the recognition of matter with the recognition of a number of its physical and other properties. Metaphysical materialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (the French materialists, Buchner, Focht, Mollehot, etc.) also had a limited understanding of matter, linking its recognition to a number of mechanical properties. Our mechanists (A. Timiryazev et al.) did not get rid of this metaphysical understanding of matter either.

This, of course, does not mean that dialectical materialism rejects certain physical properties of matter. He recognizes them. But he does not connect the recognition of matter with the recognition that it must necessarily be weighty, have a mechanical mass, etc., etc. He considers these properties inherent only in certain states of matter, only in certain forms of material motion, and defines matter itself as an objective reality that exists outside of our consciousness.

The difference between the philosophical and natural-scientific concepts of matter is thus that the former is immutable, inextricably linked with "philosophical materialism", with dialectical materialism. Natural-scientific views on matter have repeatedly changed, are changing and will continue to change in the process of developing specific knowledge about the structure of matter, etc.

This position is confirmed by the entire history of the development of philosophy and natural science. As Lenin correctly emphasizes, philosophical materialism *has always been* associated with the recognition of matter as an objective reality existing outside of our consciousness, while the ideas about the structure of matter, about the concrete forms and types in which matter can exist, have repeatedly changed depending on the level of development of the productive forces and directly on the level of development of natural science and equipment.

With the progress of knowledge, *materialism changes its form*, deepens and improves its understanding of matter, getting closer and closer to its comprehensive knowledge. The philosophical formula that speaks about the materiality of the world, its objective reality and its primacy in relation to consciousness, however, remains unchanged. No matter how much our views on the qualities and structure of objective reality change, the recognition of the existence of objective reality does not depend on this.

Another such basic principle of dialectical materialism is Engels' statement that "matter without motion is just as unthinkable as motion without matter"¹³², that "motion is a form of existence of matter"¹³³, "a mode of existence of matter", "an attribute inherent in matter". Lenin expressed the same thing, but in a new way, in connection with his special formulation of the

130 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 213. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

131 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 213.

132 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 41. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

133 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 41.

question of matter and the further development of natural science: "Whether we say: the world is moving matter or: the world is material motion, the matter does not change¹³⁴." Thus, Lenin believes that by defining the world around us in a materialistic way, we can say that it is the movement of objective reality, moving matter or material movement. Each of these definitions expresses the same thing.

These propositions of Marxism-Leninism are directed against: 1) the assumption of absolutely immobile matter or any absolute rest, at least for a part of objective reality, 2) attempts to think of motion without matter, 3) a simplified view of the motion of matter.

Matter is *moving* matter. There is no matter without motion, just as there is no motion without matter. Matter has not acquired this movement from outside, from any external force. It is initially mobile and has always been a moving matter. Movement is a universal, integral *form of its existence*. The question of what "caused" matter to move is an absurd one. In the first place, this question presupposes that there is, or has been, something supernatural, something other than matter, which moves the latter; that is, it denies the material unity of the world, the universality of matter, the uniqueness of material reality. Second, it assumes that matter was at absolute rest until the moment of impact. Third, matter is understood in this question as a dead, lifeless abstraction, and not as concrete, self-active, self-moving matter, as it really is. Finally, motion itself is understood purely mechanically, as the result of an external push acting on the body, and not as an internally necessary self-movement of matter. Modern physics, which has penetrated deeply into the bowels of the atom and discovered in it the complex, infinite motion of electrons and protons, has left such views far behind and confirmed the dialectical-materialistic doctrine of the self-motion of matter.

The assumption of *absolute rest* as the state in which matter originally existed, or can exist at all, is characteristic of metaphysical systems in philosophy and of the so-called metaphysical period in natural science. In the new philosophy, for example, Descartes saw matter as a dense, solid, and absolutely stationary body, "which could have taken place before God set it in motion." Spinoza considered rest to be just as necessary a mode as movement. Newton began his mechanics with laws that considered rest as the most normal state of matter, and motion as a consequence of certain external "forces". He recognized on this basis the necessity of a "first push" on the part of the deity. The need for a first push is shared by almost all metaphysicians. Recognition of the primary push is the logical end and beginning of all mechanical systems.

During the XVI–XVII centuries, the integral worldview characteristic of natural science of this period developed. According to the views of this worldview, "nature remains always unchanged." The stars are at rest, forever motionless in their places. There is no development at all in nature. The French materialism of the eighteenth century displayed all the main features of this metaphysical view.

Dialectical materialism does not recognize absolute rest. But it recognizes, of course, *relative rest*, relative equilibrium, as *one of the moments of motion*, as a special case of motion. Dialectical materialism recognizes that "the possibility of relative rest of bodies, the possibility of temporary states of equilibrium, is an essential condition for the differentiation of matter, and therefore of life¹³⁵."

Attempts to think of *motion without matter*, force without its underlying substance, are the beginning and main essence of philosophical idealism and clericism. Movement breaks away from matter, from nature, becomes thought, and is deified. Lenin writes: "The attempt to think of motion without matter drags *through a thought* divorced from matter, and this is philosophical idealism¹³⁶."

The attempt to think of motion without matter is characteristic of idealist and positivist physicists, and of natural scientists in general, who hold idealistic positions, which Dietzgen still

134 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 221.

135 Энгельс, Диалектика природы, стр. 13.

136 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 220.

called "certified lackeys of the priests." Lenin devoted much attention to the struggle against these attempts, speaking out against the idealists Pearson, Mach, Avenarius, against the Russian Machists — Bogdanov and others who pushed the same trend in philosophy, against similar mistakes made by the energeticist Ostwald, etc.

Among some modern physicists, we observe the continuation of the same idealistic tendencies. Many people, in connection with the data of Einstein's theory of relativity, tend to depict motion without matter (for example, Frenkel). We also find peculiar attempts to separate motion from matter among the Menshevik idealists. Tymyansky, for example, writes that movement is "subordinate to itself, embraces itself, *moves itself*" (our italics) and that "this concept: movement of movement... is not alien to us." As we can see, here the separation of motion from matter is presented in a very subtle form: instead of material motion, it is a moving motion. What is the difference between the Menshevik idealists and those idealist physicists about whom Lenin wrote that they reject the question of what "moves" as absurd and consider it "moving" and basta¹³⁷. Essentially none.

Dialectical materialism holds *that there can be no motion without matter, just as there can be no matter without motion*.

Dialectical materialism also does not allow for a simplified view of motion, i.e., the reduction of all motion to a single form, such as mechanical motion. Such a simplified view is characteristic of any mechanical worldview in general and in particular for modern Soviet mechanics (A. Timiryazev, Tseitlin, etc.). A simplified view of motion, understanding motion as only displacement, necessarily leads to the recognition of *equilibrium* as the only possible way of existence of matter, and *rest* as the predominant state. It leads in the end as a necessary logical conclusion to the "first push"...

*Dialectical materialism holds that "the motion of matter is not reduced to mere gross mechanical motion, to mere displacement; the motion of matter is also heat and light, electric and magnetic tension, chemical combination and decomposition, life, and finally consciousness"*¹³⁸. Failure to recognize this, says Engels, leads to the denial of the law of conservation of energy. The view of motion as the movement of immutable bodies, the refusal to study the qualitative differences in the forms of motion, is incompatible with Lenin's thesis that the whole world is material motion in qualitatively different forms.

When we speak of material movement, we must always keep in mind its concrete forms. Motion "in general", matter as such ("in general") — there is no such motion, such matter, and cannot be. We only know the various forms of matter and its movements. "Words like matter and motion are simply *abbreviations* in which we encompass, according to their general properties, various sensible things"¹³⁹.

But moving matter exists in *space and time*; the movement of matter already presupposes these forms of the existence of matter. Space and time are inseparable from the motion of matter. Space and time are not something different from matter, independent of it. The expression "matter exists in space" does not mean that there is some immaterial, empty space filled with matter, something in which matter is placed. It means that matter itself is spatial and extended, that the material world is a world in which extension is inherent. Space, like time, is neither something independent, immaterial, nor a subjective form of our sensibility. They are forms of material existence, *forms of the existence of matter itself*. They are objective and do not exist outside of matter, just as matter does not exist outside of them.

Lenin, along with Marx and Engels, defines space and time as forms of being of matter, forms of its existence, independent of our consciousness. He writes:

137 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 219.

138 Энгельс, Диалектика природы, стр. 97. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

139 Энгельс, Диалектика природы, стр. 85. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

"While recognizing the existence of objective reality, i.e., moving matter, independently of our consciousness, materialism must inevitably also recognize the objective reality of time and space¹⁴⁰." Engels says the same thing in *Anti-Duhring*:

"The basic forms of all being are space and time; and being outside of time is as meaningless as being outside of space¹⁴¹."

The view of time and space as forms of being is a consistent view of philosophical materialism. Dialectical materialism's understanding of time and space is fundamentally the opposite: 1) the understanding of time and space by Kant and Kantianism, who, standing on the point of view of subjective idealism, consider "time and space not as objective reality, but as *forms of human intuition*"¹⁴²; 2) the understanding of time and space by the Hegelians, who believe that "the developing concepts of time and space approach the absolute idea of both"¹⁴³. 3) it is also opposed to the understanding of time and space by Machism, which considers them "a kind of sensation", means of "harmonizing experience", etc., etc. All these trends do not recognize that the concepts of space and time reflect in their development the forms of existence of matter.

Kantianism transforms space and time into properties of the perceiving subject. Machism interprets space and time as purely auxiliary logical constructs by which we get a biologically expedient orientation, organize the chaos of our sensations, and which can be eliminated in order to describe experience more economically. Hegelian idealism asserts that space appears only at a certain stage *of the development of an idea in the phase of its otherness, in the form of nature*. Time is included in the Hegelian system even later — at the stage of development of the spirit.

All these idealistic quirks are rejected and refuted by dialectical materialism.

Regarding the Machist interpretation of space and time, Lenin wrote:

"If the sensations of time and space can give a person a biologically expedient orientation, then only under the condition that these sensations reflect *objective reality* outside of a person: a person could not biologically adapt to the environment if his sensations did not give him an objectively correct idea of it¹⁴⁴."

The denial of the objective reality of time and space inevitably leads to clericism and religion.

But it is not only idealistic perversions that Marxism has to contend with in this matter. We also have to overcome the outdated mechanistic understanding, which was refuted in the course of the development of natural science *механистическое понимание* the question. As the natural-scientific concept of matter improved, the unacceptability *of the metaphysical became clear*. understanding of space as an absolutely homogeneous container of matter. In particular, Newton considered space as independent of time, as a kind of fixed frame that only contains matter.

In contrast to metaphysical materialism and the mechanists, dialectical materialism emphasizes the development of our ideas about time and space.

"There is nothing in the world but moving matter, and moving matter cannot move except in space and time," says Lenin. - Human *conceptions of space and time are relative*, but from these relative conceptions absolute truth is formed, these relative conceptions, developing, *follow the line of absolute truth*, approach it. *The variability* of human ideas about space and time just as little refutes *the objective reality* of both, as the variability of scientific knowledge about the structure and forms of motion of matter does not refute the objective reality of the external world¹⁴⁵."

140 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 143.

141 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 36.

142 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 143. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

143 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 145.

144 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 146.

145 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 144. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

To believe that our ideas about time and space should remain unchanged, as our mechanists believe, to slide in the question of time and space to the metaphysical ideas of Descartes¹⁴⁶ or to the mechanistic ideas of physicists of the Faraday school, as A. Timiryazev does: to confuse the ether as one of the forms of material motion with space, i.e. objectively real. This means taking the position of metaphysical materialism—the position of negation of movement and development.

Dialectical materialism also fights against Menshevik idealism, which considers "matter as a synthesis of space and time"¹⁴⁷, which thus reduces the objective reality of matter to the forms of its being, essentially taking the position of Hegelianism.

Modern natural science has brilliantly confirmed the dialectical-materialistic understanding of space and time. The modern scientific concept of space associated with Einstein's name immutably establishes its materiality, the unity of space and time, and the relativity of our ideas about space and time. In this question, as in many others, the progress of natural science confirms dialectical-materialist concepts.

3.3. Matter and consciousness. Dialectical-materialistic theory of reflection

According to the views of dialectical materialism, consciousness, psyche, and thinking are not some independent, second principle that is in external interaction with matter or exists parallel to it. Consciousness is dependent on matter and is derived from it. Consciousness is inherent only in a certain way organized matter. Consciousness is possessed only by those higher representatives of the organic world who are endowed with a nervous system of greater or lesser complexity. The nervous system is a necessary condition for conscious activity. *Consciousness is a property of physical beings organized in a certain way.* The social man in all his materiality, in all his physical and social concreteness, is the bearer of higher forms of consciousness that develop as a result of human labor and social activity. Consciousness is one of the manifestations of the life of matter at a certain stage of its development.

According to the materialist teaching, and in full accordance with the irrefutable data of modern science, there is no and cannot be consciousness where there is no matter, moreover, matter organized in a special, definite way. Consciousness is nothing more than a *special property of a certain type of matter*, very complex in its structure, which arose at a high level of the evolution of nature.

The stone can be moved, its position can be changed, but the stone, like the rest of the inorganic world, as well as the plant world and the lower forms of animals, has no inherent ability to perceive the processes that occur to them; they are devoid of consciousness. Only the matter — matter of the higher nervous system of animals, which is organized in a certain way, has the ability to perceive, internally reflect, *and be aware* of the processes occurring in it and outside it, i.e., to express these processes that are subject to objective study, which occur in the nervous system *in a special way*, as they occur for the feeling and thinking being itself. Objective physiological processes in our nerve centers are accompanied by their internal subjective expression in the form of consciousness. What is objective in itself, what is a material process, is at the same time a subjective, psychic act for a being endowed with a brain. *Consciousness itself also has a long history of development.* If the lower stages of animal consciousness (instincts) are associated with the development of the nervous system in higher animals, then the further development of consciousness is associated with the transition from animal to human, with the development of social labor, in which conditions are created for the development of the human brain.

Vulgar materialism holds that thoughts or desires are something tangible that is secreted by the brain, just as bile is secreted by the liver. This view completely distorts our understanding of the

146 См. например работы Цейтлина.

147 Гессен, Основные идеи теории относительности, стр. 64.

matter. Thoughts, feelings, or acts of will are not something that can be measured, weighed, or shifted. Just as roundness is not heavy, but both are different properties of the same body, so extension and consciousness are different properties of matter. The views of the ancient materialists, which were based on the fact that man has a soul consisting of the finest matter, of round, smooth and mobile fire-like atoms, belong to the infancy of science. We are very far from such an understanding of the psyche. Sensation and consciousness are *internal states* — moving matter has a *special property* — to reflect the physiological process taking place in it is inseparable from the objective nervous process, but also not *identical* — to him. But we are no less far from recognizing thinking as a special spiritual substance, as idealists want it to be.

There is no spirit, no special thinking substance, but there is *thinking matter*, the brain. Conscious, thinking matter is specific, *qualitatively peculiar* — matter that receives its highest development along with the development of language in human social life. We do not identify higher and lower types of material organization, nor do we deny the consciousness and specificity of thinking beings. But we explain them as forms and historical products of *the development of matter*. Emphasizing the dependence of consciousness on the development of material production and the connection of consciousness with the development of human speech, Marx and Engels wrote in their earlier work: consciousness "does not exist in advance, as 'pure' consciousness. The" spirit "is pre-burdened with the curse of "burdening" it with matter, which appears here... in the form of language... Language, like consciousness, arises from the need to communicate with other people. *My attitude to my environment is my consciousness*. Where there is a relationship, it exists for me¹⁴⁸." Consciousness is a historical product that is inextricably linked with the development of social production.

The dialectical-materialist solution of the problem of consciousness (the so-called psychophysical problem) is fundamentally different from the pseudo-Marxist theories of the mechanists and Menshevik idealists. *The mechanists*, joining forces with certain left-bourgeois trends in psychology — the reflexological school and the American school of biovichism (the doctrine of behavior), essentially *eliminate consciousness altogether*. They reduce consciousness to a physical-chemical, physiological process. The study of the behavior of higher beings for them is completely and completely exhausted by its objective-physiological and biological study. Mechanists do not understand the qualitative distinctiveness of thinking, conscious beings, and do not see consciousness as a product of human social practice. They replace the concrete historical unity of object and subject with their identity, a one-sided, mechanistic objectivism. This mechanistic position is particularly pronounced in the so-called "parmenism". In his book *Theory of New Biology*, Youngman identified consciousness with the physiological process, thereby eliminating the basic question of philosophy — the relationship between thinking and being.

The position of the Menshevik idealists on this question is also incorrect. Deborin and others are trying to replace the Marxist doctrine of consciousness with a conciliatory theory, trying to *reconcile* materialism with idealism. They are supporters of "synthesis", a combination of objectivism and subjectivism. Menshevik idealism opposes the dialectical principle (neither mechanistic objectivism nor idealistic subjectivism) *to the bloc* — objectivism with subjectivism, the mutual assistance of both methods — one that studies only the physiological process, and the other that studies consciousness as an independent entity.

We should note Plekhanov's mistakes in the problem under consideration. Without seeing that the consciousness inherent in matter develops only at a certain historical stage, Plekhanov arrives at "*hylozoism*", the doctrine of the universal animateness of matter, and that all matter possesses consciousness to varying degrees *всякая*. This is clearly expressed in his aphorism: "*And the stone thinks*." For Plekhanov, consciousness did not *arise* in the development of matter, but is originally inherent *in all* matter. The difference between the consciousness of a human, a lower organism, and a stone is *only in degree*. This understanding of Plekhanov is affected by the insufficiently deep

148 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 220. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

assimilation and implementation of the materialist dialectic, the lack of understanding of the qualitative originality of thinking matter.

In order to be a consistent materialist, it is not enough to recognize *the primacy* of matter; it is necessary to recognize its *knowability*. Materialistic dialectics makes it possible to correctly solve the complex problem of cognizability, over which the previous philosophy struggled powerlessly. On the question of the possibility of knowing the objective world, dialectical materialism takes a position that differs from both agnosticism and the naive realism of the Machists. We have already seen the agnostic views of Hume and Kant, which separate the knowing subject from the object, consider it impossible to go beyond the subject, and see an impassable chasm between "things-in-themselves" and representations. The naive realism of the Machians, as we know, identifies objects with sensations. He is convinced that the world is identical with our direct perceptions. The truth, in his opinion, is given in a ready-made form already in sensations. At the same time, the Machists not only do not see in our sensations the products of the influence of the external world, but they do not understand the activity of the subject in the process of cognition, the processing that is carried out in his senses and in his thinking brain by the effects of the external world in the form of concepts and representations.

In the question of the cognizability of the external world, dialectical materialism is based on the consistently developed materialistic-dialectical *theory of reflection*. Consistently carried out by Marx and Engels and further elaborated and developed by Lenin, the theory of reflection is the "soul", the core of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. It gives an affirmative answer to the question of the cognizability of objective reality. According to this teaching, our ideas and concepts are not only *caused* by objective things, but also *reflect* them. Representations and concepts are not the product of the subject's self-development (as idealists claim), nor hieroglyphs (as agnostics think), but *their reflection, snapshots, copies*. Objective truth exists independently of the subject, although it is not reflected in our feelings and concepts immediately, in a ready-made form. But human consciousness is able to reflect, to know this truth in the process of *cognition*. The process of cognition is a complex process in which yet unknown "things in themselves", reflected in our sensations, ideas, concepts, thereby become "things for us". Sensation and thinking do not separate us from the external world, as Kant believed, but connect us with it, representing a reflection of the objective external world. The ideal — our ideas and concepts — is nothing more than "translated and processed in the human mind material"¹⁴⁹. The material world in the movement of cognition is being reflected more and more closely, more precisely, more comprehensively and more deeply in our cognition.

There are no limits to our ability to know the world, but there are always historically given limits to our approach to the absolute truth. The attainment of truth takes place in the historical movement of human knowledge. "From the point of view of modern materialism, that is, Marxism, *the limits* of our knowledge's approach to objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but *it is absolutely certain* the existence of this truth is certainly that we are approaching it. Historically, the contours of the painting are conditional, but what is certain is that this painting depicts an objectively existing model"¹⁵⁰.

The theory of reflection, which was greatly developed in Lenin's works, is not, however, a new principle in the philosophy of Marxism introduced or established by Lenin. *Marx and Engels were entirely on the point of view of the dialectical-materialist theory of reflection.*

It is expressed in the following way: Lenin considers *cognition as a reflection*, but he understands this reflection *as a contradictory dialectical process*. "Reflection" nature in human thought, "he wrote," must be understood not "dead", not "abstract", *not without movement, not without contradictions*, but in the eternal process of movement, the emergence of contradictions and

149 Маркс, Капитал, т. I, 1932 г., стр. XXIII.

150 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 111.

their resolution¹⁵¹."

Lenin pointed out that the process of reflection should not be understood in the narrowly empirical sense of the word, but in the sense of direct reflection in our feelings, as many tried to interpret Lenin, as representatives of mechanismism and Menshevik idealism also wrote about it. The process of reflection is not limited to sensations, representations. The reflection of the objective world in our cognitive process is also given in thoughts, in abstract concepts. In this connection, Lenin says: "Knowledge is man's reflection of nature. But this is not a simple, *direct*, or integral reflection, but a process of a series of abstractions, formulation, formation of concepts, laws, and so on¹⁵²."

At the same time, Lenin pointed out — and in this point they give an extremely clear description of the dialectical-materialist understanding of the relation between the empirical and rational moment in cognition — that the process of cognition and its movement from sensation to thought take place in leaps and bounds. Many philosophers do not understand the leap that occurs in the movement of knowledge from sensation to thought, from representation to concept. The understanding of this transition as an abrupt transition, as a transition resulting from contradictions, the understanding of *the unity of sensations and thinking* as a dialectical unity — this is an extremely important point that characterizes the essence of Lenin's theory of reflection.

Indeed, what is the limitation of sensualist empiricism? The fact that they have dug *a chasm between sensation and concept*. What is the limitation of rationalistic trends in philosophy up to Hegel? In the fact that they have separated the concept from the sensation. Only dialectical materialism, which considers cognition as a process, provides a genuine solution to these problems. Lenin's interpretation of this question provides us with a powerful weapon for defeating all idealistic theories.

The naive realist *не исторически* does not approach cognition historically, does not understand how the cognitive act is performed, what are the relations between the object, representation and concept. Lenin, developing the Marxist theory of knowledge, revealed the dialectical nature of the transition not only from matter to consciousness, but also from *sensation to thought*. Sensation, perception, and representation give *immediate results*. reflection of a perceived object. The concept, idea, and thought are not immediate: they are connected with the object *through the medium of* feelings. Making the transition from a visual representation to a concept, consciousness seems to recede, *recedes* from the item. The feeling, the idea, seems to be closer to reality than thinking. But thinking grasps the object as a *whole*, in its movement and connection. It *глубже* penetrates deeper into the subject, reflects its essence. Thus, although it is not direct, it nevertheless reflects the subject more fully and profoundly. Thinking takes us further away from the subject, but only to bring us closer to it. *This is the dialectical unity of sensation and thinking in the process of cognition.*

The next point, which is extremely important for understanding the theory of reflection and its development, which Lenin gave, is the understanding of reflection itself. A reflection is an image, a copy, or a snapshot that gives the correct representation of reality. However, this correct representation of reality is obtained *in the process of development, in the process of social practice*. At the same time, Lenin, emphasizing this circumstance, directed this point and sharpened it against agnosticism, in whatever form it might manifest itself. Lenin says: if we had more sense organs, would we be able to know more? And indicates that it doesn't. Responding in this way, Lenin believed that we have sufficient means at our disposal for a correct understanding of the objective world, and that any agnostic theories that give rise to doubt or skepticism in relation to our knowledge should be categorically rejected and exposed. However, knowledge does not give us any complete, absolute picture; the progress of knowledge goes through relative truths to absolute ones.

Finally, we need to pay attention to another important point that characterizes Lenin's theory

151 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 227.

152 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 203. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

of reflection: the question of how Lenin understands *sensation itself*. It was precisely around this point that a great struggle was being waged against Lenin even when his work "Materialism and Empirio-criticism" was published, from the side of Axelrod the Orthodox. Both the mechanists and the Menshevik idealists also distorted the essence of the Marxist-Leninist approach to the question of sensation.

Sensation, according to Lenin — is primarily the result of the action of matter on our sense organs. *Sensation is the transformation of the energy of an external stimulus into a fact of consciousness, a subjective image of the objective world.* In this connection, an extremely important question arises: how does sensation as an image, sensation as a snapshot, as a display relate to what is displayed? In what sense can we talk about the similarity of the display with the displayed one, the copy with the original? In order to understand this point, we will analyze Lenin's extremely interesting statements on the question of the relationship between color and light.

Color is the result of the action of a physical object, i.e. a light wave, on our retina. Color, however, is not a hieroglyph, but a symbol in relation to light — an objective process that affects our retina. Nor is color something purely subjective, as some of the mechanists, in particular Sarabyanov, Axelrod, and others, have tried to imagine. In the subjective form, in the form of sensation, the objective quality of the light wave is reflected here. Color is similar to the light effect that causes it, as an objective process, but *relatively*.

Lenin wrote on this subject in Materialism and Empirio-criticism, criticizing the Mechanists and Bogdanovites: "And if you allow such physical objects independent of my nerves, of my sensations, which generate sensation only by affecting my retina, then you shamefully abandon your 'one-sided' idealism and pass over to the point of view of 'one-sided' materialism. If color is *a sensation only depending on the retina* (as natural science makes you admit), then *light rays* falling on the retina produce *a sensation of color*. This means that outside of us, independently of us and from our consciousness, there is a movement of matter, say, waves of ether of a certain length and a certain speed, which, acting on the retina, produce in a person a sensation of this or that color. This is exactly how natural science looks at it. It explains the different sensations of a particular color by the different lengths of light waves that exist *outside the body*. the human retina, outside of and independent of humans. This is materialism: matter, acting on our senses, produces sensation. Sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc., i.e., on the matter organized in a certain way. The existence of matter does not depend on sensation. Matter is the primary. Sensation, thought, and consciousness are the highest products of specially organized matter¹⁵³."

In another passage, Lenin says: "Color is the result of the action of a physical object on the retina ; sensation is the result of the action of matter on our sense organs¹⁵⁴."

Thus we see that Lenin *does not identify* the sensation of color and the ray of light that causes this sensation. But without identifying color and light (and this can also be said in relation to our other senses and other types of sensations), Lenin at the same time gives a truly materialistic interpretation of this question, which excludes all elements of agnosticism.

The slightest deviation from the theory of reflection inevitably leads to idealism and agnosticism. To the extent that the philosopher departs from the theory of reflection, he becomes a Kantian, a Machist, a Hegelian, and ceases to be a dialectical materialist. Plekhanov, and after him both the mechanists and the Menshevik idealists, also made a number of essential deviations from the theory of reflection towards the anti-Marxist theory of hieroglyphs.

In this most important question of materialist dialectics, Plekhanov allowed himself to "deviate from the formulation of materialism given by Engels" by adopting the *hieroglyphic point of view* in questions of the theory of knowledge. The hieroglyphic point of view was formulated by Plekhanov in 1892 in the notes to the " L. Feuerbach " by Engels. Agreeing with the idea of the Russian physiologist I. Sechenov that " whatever external objects are in themselves, regardless of

153 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 44–45. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

154 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 46.

our consciousness-let our impressions of them be only conditional signs, in any case, the similarity and difference of signs that we feel corresponds to the similarity and real difference¹⁵⁵." Plekhanov wrote : " Our sensations are a kind of hieroglyphics that bring to our attention what is happening in reality. Hieroglyphs are not like the events they convey¹⁵⁶." Later, namely, at the beginning of 1899, Plekhanov, developing his view, argued that "it would be very strange if the sensation and the idea that grew up on its basis *were similar to* on the thing that caused it, and which itself is, of course, *neither a sensation nor a representation* »¹⁵⁷." "The forms and relations of things — in — themselves," wrote Plekhanov, "cannot be what they *appear to us*, i.e. , what they appear to us when 'translated' in our head. Our ideas about the forms and relations of things are nothing more than *hieroglyphs* , but these hieroglyphs accurately denote these forms and relations, and this is enough for us to study the actions of things-in-themselves on us and in turn influence them¹⁵⁸." In 1905. Plekhanov, essentially continuing to share Sechenov's views on the question of the relation of consciousness to reality, spoke out against his terminology, arguing that " if a thing-in-itself has color only when it is looked at, smell-only when it is smelled, etc., then, calling conventional signs our idea of it, we give rise to the idea that, in our opinion, its color, smell, etc., existing in our sensations, corresponds to some color in itself, some smell in itself, etc. — in short, some *sensations in themselves* that cannot become the subject of our feelings." Having abandoned the term "hieroglyph", Plekhanov *essentially continued to believe that our sensations and representations are not similar to the objects that they are caused by* . The Menshevik idealists took Plekhanov's mistakes under their protection, which shows that their views are closely related to Plekhanov's views in the theory of knowledge. And modern mechanists have also taken Plekhanov's hieroglyphic theory under their protection, contrasting it with the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of questions of the theory of knowledge. As early as 1909, L. I. Axelrod, in her review of Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, categorically rejected the theory of reflection. "By rejecting the theory of symbols and regarding sensation as images or 'inaccurate' copies of things, "she slandered Lenin in this review," Plekhanov's critic is setting himself on 'dualistic' ground, preaching Platonism from the inside out, and not a materialist philosophy based on a single principle. If the sensations were *images or copies of things* then why the devil would we need things that would actually be things-in-themselves in the absolute sense of the word? To recognize sensations as images or copies of objects is to re-create the impassable dualistic chasm between object and subject¹⁵⁹." Axelrod cannot understand that the dualistic gap is not created by the theory of reflection, but precisely by the theory of hieroglyphs, because this theory recognizes the existence of things-in-themselves and different symbols, signs in the representation of man. Vividly spoke out in defense of the theory of symbols against the theory of reflection Sarabyanov. "The process of cognition," he writes, " is not the process of making a copy of an object, but is the process of finding *a correspondence* between objective and subjective phenomena"¹⁶⁰. Sarabyanov has repeatedly stated directly: "In my books, however, I clearly develop Plekhanov's point of view... I have resolutely stood up and stand by Plekhanov's point of view."

In *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, Lenin pointed out that Plekhanov had "made a clear

155 Плеханов, Примечания к 1-му изд. «Л. Фейербаха», 1931 г., стр. 117.

156 Плеханов, Примечания к 1-му изд. «Л. Фейербаха», 1931 г., стр. 118.

157 Плеханов, Ещё раз материализм, т. XI, стр. 141.

158 Плеханов, Ещё раз материализм, т. XI, стр. 142.

159 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, Приложения, стр. 330. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

160 Сарабянов, статья в «Под знаменем марксизма» № 6 за 1926 г., стр. 64.

mistake in his exposition of materialism"on questions of the theory of knowledge.

What, according to Lenin, is Plekhanov's mistake, and why is the theory of hieroglyphs untenable? Plekhanov's mistake is *that he slips into the position of agnosticism*, i.e., distrust of the testimony of our senses, and consequently distrust of the knowledge of the objective world. In fact, if our sensations and representations do not resemble the objects they represent, but are hieroglyphs, symbols, then we cannot be sure that our knowledge really corresponds to the objective world to which it relates. We cannot be sure of the truth of the information that scientific knowledge gives us about the objective world. In short, the hieroglyphic theory of knowledge leads to the denial of the existence of the external world, since signs or symbols are also possible in relation to imaginary objects. In this sense, the theory of hieroglyphs is close to Hume's skepticism and Kant's agnosticism. This is the failure of the theory of hieroglyphs or the theory of symbols. This is the fundamental difference between it and the materialist theory of reflection.

Lenin, in connection with the analysis of Plekhanov's error, gave an exhaustive critique of the theory of symbols. "It is indisputable that an image can never fully compare with a model," he wrote, " but an image is one thing, a symbol, *a conventional sign*, is another . The image is necessary and inevitably presupposes the objective reality of what is "displayed". A "conditional sign", a symbol, a hieroglyph are concepts that introduce a completely unnecessary element of agnosticism¹⁶¹." The theory of symbols, which Lenin opposed, was proclaimed before Plekhanov in one of the works of the famous naturalist Helmholtz. Helmholtz deduced from the limitations of our vision that the eye gives us false information about the properties of objects we see. Lenin therefore recognized A.'s statement as correct. Rau (German philosopher, follower of L. Feuerbach), that Helmholtz's theory of symbols pays tribute to Kantianism. It is remarkable that Lenin's critique of Helmholtz's theory of symbols literally coincided with the critique first given by Engels in *Dialectics of Nature*, published only in 1925.

3.4. Objective, absolute, and relative truth

Lenin, while developing materialist dialectics as a theory of knowledge, and clarifying the essence of reflection as a process, gave a brilliant description of the relationship between *relative, objective, and absolute truth* . Refuting relativism (Bogdanova et al.), according to which the relativity of our knowledge makes objective absolute knowledge impossible, Lenin revealed the dialectical interpenetration of absolute and relative truth. Lenin found out that relative cognition is not the metaphysical opposite of absolute cognition, but *a step* on the road to absolute cognition, that it does not exclude absolute cognition, but in its progress is increasingly approaching absolute cognition. Hence *the objectivity of our knowledge* .

But what is the proof of the objectivity of our knowledge, where is the guarantee of the correct reflection of being by thinking? "The question," Marx replies, " whether objective truth is inherent in human thought is not at all a question of theory, *but of practice*. *In practice, a person must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, of the worldliness of his thinking*. The dispute about the validity and invalidity of thinking isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question¹⁶²."

The question of the possibilities and limits of cognition can be resolved only in the *process* of cognition itself, which is determined by social practice. Just as the best and only possible proof that a person is capable of swimming will be the result itself — the practice of swimming will clarify the question of the powers and capabilities of the swimmer — so the question must also be solved in relation to cognition. The application of knowledge, the history and practice of science prove its possibility and define its historical boundaries. With its practical achievements, science solves the problem of the reliability of scientific knowledge.

161 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 193.

162 Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах, Тезисы о Фейербахе, 1933 г., стр. 59.

The history of mankind, the history of science and technology is the best proof of the knowability of the external world.

The theory of reflection, as we know, is the most important foundation of the materialistic and at the same time dialectical *theory of knowledge*. The recognition of the primacy of matter and the secondary nature of consciousness are inextricably combined with the understanding of the contradictory, dialectical nature of reflection. Cognition is considered as a historical process. This opens up a broad perspective for studying cognition in its dependence on social development.

By objective truth materialistic dialectics understands that objective *content* — our ideas, which does not depend on consciousness — neither on the person, nor on humanity. Objective truth is revealed to us by the historically developing knowledge of the social man. Truth is not something fixed, but a *process*. "Truth," says Lenin, "is a process. From a subjective idea, a person goes to an objective truth *through* 'practice' (and technique)"¹⁶³.

The doctrine of objective truth is of great scientific and practical importance. This teaching is the best weapon in the fight against all kinds of idealistic and relativistic theories. For if there is no objective truth, that is, independent of the subject, of man or of humanity, then there can be no certainty that there is an objective reality independent of people's awareness, which is the only content of our knowledge. If our knowledge does not have such a content that does not depend on people, then we cannot be sure that practical activity aimed at changing the world around us, guided by theoretical foresight, corresponds to the objective regularity that is reflected in these theoretical predictions. The knowledge of objective truth, the recognition that scientific knowledge, reflecting the real world, alone can give objective truth, eliminates any uncertainty about the reality of the external world.

Consequently, the denial of objective truth leads to the denial or is the denial of existence independently of the knowledge of material reality, and, conversely, the recognition of objective truth is equivalent to the recognition of objective reality that exists outside and independently of consciousness.

At one time, Bogdanov opposed the Marxist doctrine of truth. Being a proponent of subjective idealism, which, as is well known, rejected the materialist position that the existence of the real world is independent of consciousness, Bogdanov wrote: "For me, Marxism implies the denial of the absolute objectivity of any truth... truth is *an ideological form, an organizing form of human experience*." According to Bogdanov, truth is an ideological form of organizing experience. If so, then the truth depends on people's consciousness, i.e. there is no objective truth. In essence, Bogdanov admits inconsistency when he uses the term "objective" truth; from his point of view, one can only speak of subjective truth, even if the subject is taken not as an individual, but as the whole of humanity. The concept of "objective", according to Bogdanov, does not mean independent of consciousness, but *generally valid*, i.e. having the same meaning for many people, for all mankind.

According to Bogdanov, the objective truth is a representation that is established "on the basis of mutual verification and coordination of statements of various people." It is not difficult to see the absolute failure of Bogdanov's idealistic point of view. Bogdanov gives such a definition of objectivity, which includes as truth religion and various prejudices that, despite the fact that they are a delusion, are more generally valid, more widespread among people than, say, for example, scientific discoveries that express objective truth and remain unknown to most people. By rejecting the existence of objective truth, Bogdanov opens the door to clericism and "clears the way for 'organizing forms' of religious experience."

Bogdanov's denial of objective truth is closely and consistently connected with his *subjective idealism*. A point of view similar to Bogdanov's view of truth was developed by relativists and agnostics of various stripes, ranging from Hume and Kant to the empirio-critics-Mach and Avenarius. All of them, who directly reject or doubt the existence of an objective reality given to a person, in his feelings, are characterized by the denial of objective truth.

163 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 37.

At present, the teaching of materialist dialectics about objective truth is being reviewed by some representatives of *mechanismism*. T. Sarabyanov, for example, promoted the point of view that "there is no objective truth at all, every truth is subjective." "Why," Sarabyanov asks, "do I call all truth subjective? Yes, because truth is not objective being, because truth is our *representation* about the world, things, and processes¹⁶⁴." Sarabyanov, like the subjective idealist, considers people's ideas to be only subjective, i.e., they have no objective content. Where does the content of our ideas come from? We must not at all understand or consciously revise the position of dialectical materialism in order to seek the content of our ideas not in the world around us, but in consciousness itself. For anyone who is not confused by the reactionary ideas of Solipsism, it is clear that the content of our ideas is nature and history. The content of our ideas, of our knowledge, independent of man and of humanity, is the objective truth. Our knowledge belongs to us, people, but what is contained in our knowledge is not ours, but is *independent* from us. That's what T. can't or won't understand. Sarabyanov.

If the content of knowledge belongs to the subject, depends on him, as T. thinks. If the theory of Marxism-Leninism about the historically inevitable revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into communist society, etc. cannot be considered objective truth, then the statement of science about the existence of the earth before humanity cannot be considered objective truth. In short, none of the scientific propositions can be considered true, except perhaps those proclaimed by Sarabyanov.

So, according to the materialist dialectic, the representation, knowledge of people expresses *objective* truth. Now, the question is, can our knowledge, which expresses objective truth, give it at once in its entirety, unconditionally, absolutely, or does it express it approximately, not at once? This question is the question of the relation between absolute and relative truth. First of all, let us note that materialist dialectics does not reject absolute truth. On the contrary, by recognizing objective truth, it recognizes in one way or another absolute truth. "To be a materialist," says Lenin, "is to recognize the objective truth revealed to us by the senses. To recognize *an objective* truth, that is, *a truth independent of man and humanity*, is to recognize *an absolute truth in one way or another* истину»¹⁶⁵." In fact, when we say that the content of our knowledge is the objective world, it means that our knowledge belongs to the eternal, absolute nature, that the content of our ideas is the eternal, absolute world. "Every true knowledge of nature is a knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and therefore it is essentially absolute¹⁶⁶." In this sense, Lenin writes that "one can deny the element of the relative in certain human conceptions without denying objective truth, but one cannot deny *absolute* truth without denying the existence of *objectivetruth*¹⁶⁷." However, objective, absolute truth is given to our knowledge not immediately, not entirely, but in an infinite process of development of knowledge itself, given through the medium of relative truths, the totality of which expresses absolute truth.

"Cognition," says Lenin, "is man's reflection of nature. But this is not a simple, direct, or integral reflection, but a process of a series of abstractions, formulation, formation of concepts, laws, etc., which concepts, laws, etc.... and cover conditionally, approximately, the universal regularity of an eternally moving and developing nature. There *are really*, objectively, *three* members: 1) nature, 2) human cognition = *мозг* the human brain (as the highest product of the same nature), and 3) the form of reflection of nature in human cognition, this form is concepts, laws, categories, etc. *всё* It can only *last forever* approach this by creating abstractions, concepts, laws,

164 Сарабянов, статья в «Под знаменем марксизма» № 6 за 1926 г., стр. 66.

165 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 108. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

166 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 84.

167 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 100. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

a scientific picture of the world, etc., etc.¹⁶⁸."

According to the materialist dialectic, "human thinking is inherently capable of giving and gives us *absolute truth*, which consists of the sum of *relative truths*. Each step in the development of science adds new seeds to this sum of absolute truth, but the limits of truth of each scientific statement are relative, being sometimes extended, sometimes narrowed by the further growth of knowledge¹⁶⁹." Absolute truth finds its expression in *relative truths*, and it is only through relative truths that the absolute cannot be known. And in every scientific truth that humanity arrives at, despite its relative nature, there are seeds of absolute truth. Materialist dialectics does not deny the relativity of all our knowledge, but only in the sense of *the historical conventionality of the limits of the approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth*. "We can learn only under the conditions given by our epoch and as *much as these conditions allow* »¹⁷⁰."

Historically, any scientific discovery is conditional, limited, and relative, but it is certain that scientific knowledge, unlike delusions, reveals and reflects *objectivetruth*, absolute nature.

This dialectical understanding of the relation between absolute and relative truth is radically different from the views of the proponents of metaphysical materialism and the views of the proponents of relativism. Representatives of metaphysical materialism *recognize absolute truth*. They proceed, as we know, from the proposition that the existing world is in an unchangeable state, that it is an unchangeable material substance. Further asserting the immutability of human thinking, materialistic metaphysicians believe that in the minds of people this unchanging objective world is displayed immediately, completely. For example, Duhring recognized "eternal truths in the final instance." The main defect of the metaphysical materialists' view, as can be seen from what has been said, is not that they accept absolute truth, as dialectical materialism also agrees with them, but that they take both the objective world and the knowledge of people outside of their historical development. Therefore, metaphysical materialists also look at truth as something immobile, dead, not developing; truth, according to their view, has only an absolute character. In reality, the absolute truth is revealed in *the process of development of human cognition*, and each step of cognition forward, expressing absolute content, has a relative meaning, i.e. it does not exhaust this content to the end.

Proponents of relativism limit themselves to recognizing the relative value of knowledge. Relativists reject absolute truth. From their point of view, no scientific discoveries contain absolute, and therefore objective truth. From this point of view, every error and nonsense can be sophistically justified. This extreme relativist view of truth stems from the denial of the existing world independently of people.

At *релятивизм* the present time, certain representatives of the modern mechanistic worldview and Menshevik idealism have fallen into the position of relativism on the question of truth. Tov. Sarabyanov explicitly stated in almost all of his works that knowledge is only relative. T. Sarabyanov turns the very relativity of knowledge into an absolute. In fact, the same view is expressed by the Menshevik idealists. One of Deborin's students wrote that "knowledge is always relative, it always only approaches the object¹⁷¹." Note: "*Always only moves closer to the object*." There is nothing to say, the "Marxist" theory is good, according to which our knowledge always only approaches the object. If our knowledge only approaches the object and never *reaches it*, then it is impossible to be sure of the existence of an objective world outside of people's ideas...

According to Deborin himself, "every given truth is not an absolute truth, but a relative one... but we *never possess absolute truth* itself. We are only approaching it in our knowledge and

168 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 203.

169 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 110. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

170 Энгельс, Диалектика природы, стр. 7.

171 Гониман, Ленин как философ, изд. 2-е, стр. 40.

activity¹⁷²." We only approach the absolute truth and never grasp it. This position of Deborin directly contradicts Lenin's view, which we have discussed above.

But if the Menshevik idealists do not draw their own conclusions from their philosophy, on the contrary, Sarabyanov spoke with a full voice. "How can a materialist claim," he wrote, " that there are ideas that do not correspond to the objective state of things? Of course it can't. Consciousness *is always determined by being*. You won't find any exceptions. The representation of God corresponds to objective processes¹⁷³." From the fact that religious ideas are rooted in the social conditions of a class society, Sarabyanov draws an incorrect conclusion about the truth of such ideas. A clear confusion of two different things: objective truth and the exploiters' class interest, which, although it exists objectively, does not contain objective truth. Thus, the theory of relativistic understanding of truth justifies all illusions and delusions, and opens wide the door to the most Black-hundred priests and mystics.

Thus, neither metaphysical materialism nor idealistic relativism can correctly solve the problem of the relationship between absolute and relative truth. Only materialist dialectics, while providing the most profound solution to the question of the relation of thought to being and the most comprehensive justification of the objective nature of scientific knowledge, also provides a correct understanding of the relationship between absolute and relative truths.

3.5. Social practice as a criterion of cognition. Partisanship of philosophy

The connection between practice and the process of cognition is by no means limited to the fact that practice verifies the truth of cognition. This connection is deep and multifaceted. *Knowledge and theories arise from practice*. A social person not only perceives the objective world, is not only affected by it, but also acts in relation to the external world as an object of his activity, *changes it*, and converts it. In practical *activity*, our feelings are accumulated and formed, in the same activity, the ideas and theories that have emerged from them must prove their truth, and here are the forces that correct and improve them. Knowledge grows out of practice, is accomplished in unity with it, and serves practice by organizing and perfecting it. In practical activity, the unity of object and subject, nature and man is realized: by influencing nature and transforming it, a person changes his own nature.

Why is it that practice gives evidence of the reality of our knowledge, and why is there no criterion for the truth of this knowledge outside of practice? The fact is that people's consciousness is only one of the sides of *social life*. a life that has no meaning outside of it. The activity of human consciousness would cease as soon as the production of the material means necessary for human existence ceased. At the heart of all aspects of social life is material production, in the words of Marx, *the sensuously practical, objective activity of people*.

Consequently, people's knowledge will be valid only if, in the process of social practice, primarily in the process of material production, they achieve the result that was assumed in their thinking. If human cognition did not reflect the processes in the external world as they exist, then in their practical activities people would not be able to achieve the results of this activity that were supposed in their consciousness. And practical activity, without which even the existence of human society is impossible, will force people to change their perception of the world around them if it is false. Therefore, in the practice of a social person, in his objective activity, there is *an indicator of the truth* of our ideas about the external world. In the process of development of social, material production arise and develop *correctly*. Society practically influences nature, changes the forms that it presupposes, and thereby changes itself and its perception of the external world. As a result of the objective activity of people, material objects are created, which are integral parts of material reality. According to Lenin, "*practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge*, because it has not only

172 Деборин, Ленин как мыслитель, изд. 3-е, 1929 г., стр. 27.

173 Сарабянов, статья в «Под знаменем марксизма» № 6 за 1926 г., стр. 67.

the dignity of universality, but also of immediate reality¹⁷⁴." The theoretical knowledge of people about the external world and the processes taking place in it reveals the regularity and trends of historical development; but only public practice gives the theory a final confirmation, covers the subject in its historical concreteness.

"Theoretical knowledge," says Lenin, " must give the object in its necessity, in its all-round relations, in its contradictory movement in-and-for-itself. But the human concept "finally" grasps this objective truth of knowledge, captures it, and masters it only when the concept becomes "being for itself" in the sense of practice. That is, the practice of man and humanity is a test, a criterion of the objectivity of knowledge¹⁷⁵." We must not forget that the objective material productive activity of people is the main type of *practical* activity that determines all others. But this type of activity does not exhaust public practice yet, it is much more versatile. The social man participates in the class struggle, lives a political life, creates scientifically-in short, participates in all areas of the practical life of society. Therefore, the criterion of the truth of our knowledge is *the totality* of social practice. "All human practice must enter into a complete" definition " of the subject, both as *a criterion of truth and as a practical determinant of the connection of the subject with what a person needs* »¹⁷⁶."

Lenin repeatedly notes in his works the need to see this dialectical correlation between theory and practice. Thus, for example, in his notes on Bukharin's book "Economics of the Transition Period" concerning Bukharin's statement: "Once the disintegration of the capitalist relations of production is given in reality, and once the impossibility of their restoration is proved theoretically," Lenin remarks: "*the impossibility is provable only* in practice. The author does not put *dialectically* the relation of theory to practice¹⁷⁷."

But the knowledge of people, being one of the sides, one of the moments of social life, if it is correct, is of the greatest importance for the practical activity of people. Correct knowledge illuminates the path of practical activity of people. "A theory, if it is really a theory, gives practitioners the power of orientation, clarity of perspective, confidence in their work, and faith in the victory of our cause¹⁷⁸." But in order for theoretical knowledge to be correct, it must be based on practice, must be inextricably linked with it.

The very practice of a social person does not remain unchanged and every step of its *development* it requires more and more new comprehension and awareness. That is why science, which at present does not meet the demands of the practice of socialist construction, ceases to play a positive role for it and turns into a theoretical weapon of class forces hostile to the proletariat.

Material reality is known not by an individual isolated from society, but by a social person connected with it and dependent on it. Human nature has a social character. The life of each individual is entirely determined by the life of society, by the contradictions of the class struggle going on in it; it is connected with the life of this or that social *class* . The individual person is a social being, so any manifestation of his life, starting from practical activity and ending with theoretical knowledge of the surrounding world, is a special manifestation and expression of social life in the final analysis. "Even when I'm doing *research*, etc. By an activity-an activity that I can perform myself, without direct communication with others - I still act *in a social way*, because I act as *a human being* . I am not only given, as a social product, the material for my activity, and in the same way the language with which the thinker's activity takes place, but also my *own* being *is a*

174 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 261.

175 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 257. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

176 Ленин, Ещё раз о профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 134–135. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

177 «Ленинский сборник» XI, стр. 362.

178 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 442.

social activity; therefore, what I make of myself, I make of myself for society, being aware of myself as a social being¹⁷⁹."

The ability not only to feel, but also to think is a property of highly organized matter. Only the brain of a social person has this property. A person develops the activity of the senses and the activity of thinking only in society. Therefore, a person's feelings and thoughts are not some once-for-all data, unchangeable properties. They, being a product of social life, undergo changes depending on the development of society itself. And society is a part of nature, changing which it also changes itself. The basis of multi-faceted life, including knowledge, is the practical activity of people, the production of material resources necessary for the existence of people. All the knowledge about the surrounding world that human society has achieved has been achieved thanks to the entire previous history of the development of material *production*, as a result of the class struggle that drives this development within class society.

The metaphysical point of view on questions of knowledge was developed by Feuerbach. According to his view, the essence of a person lies in his body, an organism capable of feeling and thinking. Feuerbach was alien to the idea that man, with his senses and thinking, is a product of the historical development of society. He took a person out of touch with society and therefore never got to real-existing active people, but remained with the abstraction of a person. Because Feuerbach excluded man's social nature, he did not understand the dependence of knowledge on social practice. Knowledge, according to Feuerbach, was an unchangeable reflection of an equally unchangeable, once-for-all given nature. However, the consideration of the question of knowledge outside of the practical activity of people and outside of its historical development was the main drawback not only of Feuerbach's materialism, but of all pre-Marxian materialism.

Thus, according to the materialist dialectic, the knowledge of man must be taken in relation to the development of social material production and the class struggle that drives it, in relation to social practice. That is why "the point of view of life and practice should be *the first and main point of view of the theory of knowledge* »¹⁸⁰."

Human cognition of material reality begins with sensory *sensations* caused by the impact of objects of the surrounding world on the senses, begins with the testimony of our senses. However, sensory cognition gives us only an accidental, empirical knowledge of the immediate sensory environment and external limited connections. It does not yet represent the objective world in its many-sided relations, internal connections, and wholeness. The real task of cognition is to understand the laws of reality. This awareness is achieved on the basis of *generalization* those sensory sensations that we receive in the process of interacting with this reality. The result of generalization and processing in consciousness of the material of direct contemplation are *concepts*. This is already a moment of logical cognition. Of course, the sensory and logical aspects of cognition are not separated. They always manifest together, starting with the primary sensations. Moreover, thinking *occurs* one of the ideas that it doesn't exist and can't develop without its connection with it. The content of our knowledge is the objective world. Our sensations connect us directly with this objective world. Therefore, logical cognition of an object, i.e., thinking, is possible only on the basis of sensory representations.

However, you can not identify with each other *the sensual* and *mental* moments of cognition. Sensory cognition does not go beyond the display of individual things and the external relations between them, while cognition mediated by thinking grasps the internal connections of objects, displaying them in their objective unity.

"Representation," Lenin observes, "cannot grasp movements *as a whole*, for example, it does not grasp movements with a speed of 300,000 km in 1 second, but *thinking does* it grasps and must grasp¹⁸¹." In his notes "Synopsis", "Sciences of Logic" of Hegel, Lenin, revealing the

179 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. III, стр. 253.

180 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 116. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

181 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 289.

dependence of thinking on the sensory moment in cognition, pays special attention to the difference between direct intuition and thinking.

"Thinking, going up from the concrete to the abstract," he says, " does not depart — if it is *correct... from the truth*, but approaches it. The abstraction of *matter*, the law of nature, the abstraction of *value*, etc. — in a word, *all* scientific (correct, serious, unsound) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, more accurately, *more fully* . From living contemplation to abstract thinking *and from it to practice*-this is the dialectical path of cognition of *truth*, of cognition of objective reality¹⁸²." Thus, the sensory and mental moments are different moments of a single process of cognition that reflects objective reality in our thinking. This is the dialectical understanding of the relationship between the empirical and rational aspects of the cognitive process.

A Marxist theory that emphasizes *the crucial importance of practice* for theoretical knowledge, it is the direct opposite of pragmatism — the modern idealistic trend of bourgeois philosophy, especially popular in the United States. Pragmatism, which was founded by William James, is based on the subjective-idealistic concept of truth. For him, what is true is not what reflects objective reality as it is, but what is useful and expedient for our practical activity. What is practically useful is true. Utility is a measure of truth. Hence pragmatism comes to the relativistic doctrine of *the multiplicity of truths* . Different views can be equally true because they best serve the interests of a particular era, people, social group, or individual. This philosophy serves as a justification for all lies and obscurantism, since they are useful for the practice of the ruling classes. In the end, pragmatism leads to open clericism. "If it turns out," says James, " that religious ideas have a value for life, then from the point of view of pragmatism they will be true, since they are suitable for this purpose."

The position of Marxism is diametrically opposed to pragmatism. Proceeding from objective truth and rejecting relativism, Marxism considers not what is useful to be true, but what *is true to be useful* . In the material revolutionary-critical practice, an objective knowledge of the world is born and tempered, contributing to its further transformation.

Marxist theory is unthinkable in isolation from revolutionary practice. At the same time, Marxism is profoundly alien to the neglect of theory, vulgar practicality, and "headless division". Growing up in the midst of practice, revolutionary theory serves as a guide to practice. "*Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement* »¹⁸³." Only when illuminated by Marxist-Leninist theory does revolutionary practice acquire confidence, foresight, accuracy and depth of forecast, and maneuverable flexibility. Communist strategy and tactics cannot be based on a small-scale empiricism; they are guided by the most perfect of theories — dialectical materialism. It is only thanks to the leading role of theory that "a combination of Russian revolutionary scope and American efficiency" is achieved, in which "the style of Leninism in party and state work" (*Stalin*) .

The greatest victory achieved by Marx and Engels is the extension of materialistic knowledge to *human society* . Even the most consistent materialists before Marx did not extend their materialism to the knowledge of the processes of social development, limiting themselves to philosophical and natural-scientific materialism. This was not a historical accident, but was conditioned by the class essence of the old materialism. To discover the truth of social life, to discover the underlying contradictions and driving forces — this was beyond the ideologues of the exploiting class, no matter how revolutionary it might be. This task-to transform the history of human society into a science, an object of materialistic knowledge — could only be accomplished by the creators of the philosophy of the proletariat.

The sensualism of the French materialists led close to the materialist understanding of society, to the understanding that the social environment, the social existence of people determines their

182 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 183–185.

183 Ленин, Что делать, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. IV, стр. 380. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

thinking, desires, and interests. But the French materialists were slipping into historical idealism, since they explained social existence by the opinions and beliefs of people.

Feuerbach, despite having some insightful remarks, remained an idealist "from above", did not go beyond the ethical understanding of society. Calling his philosophy anthropologism, i.e. making man the center of philosophy, he did not understand the social man. Like the materialists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Feuerbach believed that there is a certain eternal and universal "nature of man", a special essence of man "in general".

Some representatives of the old materialism considered man to be good by nature, others-evil, gave him one or another characteristic, but all of them operated with the concept of an abstract, unhistorical human essence. Specific historical conditions of human existence could be "unreasonable", diverge from "human nature", then they "mutilated" human nature, "spoiled" people. It was necessary to bring social relations in line with the "nature of man", to make them "reasonable". It is not difficult to discover that the man of whom the old materialists spoke was conceived by them in the image and likeness of the bourgeois, that their human essence was the capitalist essence, that the "ideal nature of man" was only the embodiment of the bourgeois ideal.

Dialectical materialism did away with Feuerbach's anthropological metaphysics. The person to whom Feuerbach addressed himself was understood by Marxism not as an abstract person, but as a concrete historical person, as a set of definite *social relations*. Historical materialism has given an understanding of social development that consistently follows the principle of the primacy of social existence and the secondary nature of social consciousness. The creation of historical materialism, the extension of materialistic knowledge to social existence and social consciousness, transformed materialism into the foundation of *all* human knowledge. The "spirit" is banished from the last refuge. Materialism has drawn all spheres of reality into its orbit.

The materialistic understanding of history has raised the struggle against religion to a higher level. Reconciliation with religion in any form or measure, directly or indirectly, flirting with clericism or tolerating it is absolutely alien to Marxism and incompatible with it. Whether it is Christianity or Judaism, the "living" or "inanimate" church, sectarianism, Tolstoyism, Feuerbachian "religion of love" or "religious atheism" by T. Lunacharsky in 1908 — dialectical materialism is waging an inexorable, crushing struggle against all these forms of reconciliation and flirting with religion. "Every god is a cadaverous position — whether it is the purest, most perfect, not the sought-after, but the built-up god, it doesn't matter¹⁸⁴."

Whereas for the French materialists religion was a product of the deception of the ignorant by evil people, and for Feuerbach it was a ghostly expression of the essence of man "in general" — Marxism exposes the class essence of religion, finds its roots in social existence and exposes its exploitative function. Militant atheism of the Marxist-Leninist worldview considers the struggle against religion as one of the forms of the great liberation struggle of the proletariat. For us, religion is not only stupidity or meanness, it is a means to preserve class oppression, a weapon of enemies. Marxist militant atheism combines a keen understanding of the essence of religion and a deep active hatred of it, as well as of its scientific undertones — idealistic philosophical systems.

These are the basic guiding principles of modern materialist philosophy. It has nothing to do with a passive worldview. "Philosophers have only *explained in various ways* the world, but the point is to *change it*,"¹⁸⁵ Marx said of the previous philosophy. As the philosophy of the revolutionary proletariat that transforms the world, dialectical materialism is *an effective philosophy*. Philosophy for us is not a quiet abode, but a front, one of the fronts of the class struggle that drives the development of society. Knowledge of reality is not done out of curiosity, but for the transformation of reality. Transformation of reality requires awareness of its regularities. Practice guided by a true theory is the most perfect practice, and the most perfect theory that correctly reflects objective reality is the most practically fruitful theory.

184 «Ленинский сборник» I, стр. 145.

185 Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах, Тезисы о Фейербахе, 1933 г., стр. 61.

Marxism-Leninism is equally alien to unprincipled division and contemplative theorizing divorced from the practice of the class struggle. Theory and practice develop in it in the closest unity, mutually reinforcing each other. However, primacy in this unity belongs *to practice* ; the unity of theory and practice is realized on the basis of revolutionary practice. "*A theory becomes pointless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice becomes blind if it is not illuminated by revolutionary theory* »¹⁸⁶."

The only theory that can be called Marxist is one that goes hand in hand with the practice of the proletarian struggle, which in the capitalist countries strengthens the will of the working class to storm capitalism and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, equips it with the knowledge of the enemy and points out the paths to victory, which in the country of the victorious proletariat organizes the working class to uproot the roots of capitalism, socialism, overcoming the resistance of the class enemy and its opportunist agents on the right and "left". The unity of the practice of class struggle and Marxist-Leninist theory at every stage of history finds its most perfect expression in *the general line of the Communist Party* , in the decisions of the party congresses and conferences of the Central Committee of the Party and of the Communist International.

The teachings of Marx and Engels are not dead *dogmas* . It does not end the history of knowledge, but opens up gigantic prospects for it. The works of Lenin and Stalin are the advancement of dialectical materialism and its further development. Lenin developed " Marxism further in the new conditions of capitalism and the class struggle of the proletariat ... Leninism is the Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and the proletarian revolution¹⁸⁷." This is dialectical materialism, which has reached a new and higher stage of its development on the basis of the experience of the class struggle in the era of imperialism and the socialist revolution and the generalization of the conclusions of modern natural science.

Dialectical materialism grew and developed in the tireless defense of the cause of the working class, in the relentless struggle against its opponents, with various anti-materialist and anti-dialectical doctrines. In the battles for the general line of the Communist Party and the Comintern, in the relentless struggle against its opponents, with all the popish, idealistic and revisionist theories, dialectical materialism will follow the path of new victories. Marx's teaching is "*omnipotent because it is true* . It is complete and harmonious, giving people a complete worldview, irreconcilable with any superstition, any reaction, or any defense of bourgeois oppression¹⁸⁸."

3.6. Dialectics as logic and theory of knowledge

In bourgeois philosophy, especially in Kantian philosophy, it is customary to distinguish several separate, unrelated philosophical "problems" that form several independent philosophical sciences. There is a distinction *between epistemology* or the theory of knowledge — the science of the limits and abilities of human knowledge, about the sources and forms of knowledge. Then they distinguish *logic* — an independent science about the laws by which human thought develops, about concepts, judgments, and conclusions. Further, there is *an ontology*—the doctrine of being, of the nature of the objective world. The Kantians thus divide philosophical science into several opposing sciences.

In contrast to the Kantians, dialectical materialism establishes the unity and indissoluble integrity of philosophical science. Dialectical materialism as a science is an indissoluble whole, which is at the same time logic, theory of knowledge, and the doctrine of the objectively real existence of matter... "In Capital," says Lenin — " the logic, dialectic, and theory of knowledge of

186 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 16–17. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

187 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 6.

188 Ленин, Три источника и три составные части марксизма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVI, стр. 349. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

materialism are applied to one thing in science (three words are not necessary: it's the same thing)¹⁸⁹. "Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism: this is the "side" of the matter (this is not the "side" of the matter, but *the essence* of the matter) that Plekhanov, let alone other Marxists, did not pay attention¹⁹⁰ to."

As we can see, Lenin attaches great importance to the fact that *совпадение* logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge coincide in dialectical materialism. Indeed, these Leninist propositions contain not only Lenin's reference to dialectical materialism as a science, but also an indication of Lenin's understanding of the essence of the tasks of philosophy. Lenin's thesis on the coincidence of dialectics and the theory of knowledge is a special expression of the general position of dialectical materialism on the unity of theory and practice. Such a view of dialectics as a theory of knowledge obliges, if only it is understood in the Leninist way, and not distorted in the Hegelian way, as the Menshevik idealists did, to link the development of dialectics with the practice of socialist construction and world revolution, as indicated in the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on the magazine "Under the Banner of marxism".

The reason for the break between logic and the theory of knowledge among the Kantians is that they approach both logic and the theory of knowledge formally, take them out of practice, not historically. Logic The Kantians have a science about the forms of thought as such, regardless of their content. Formal logic is concerned only with the form and not with the content of thought, and therefore it is idealistic logic. The Kantian theory of knowledge must explore the " capacities and limits " of cognition before any cognition, isolating itself from the process of cognition. Before we can know, we must investigate what knowledge is capable of and what it is not capable of-that is the Kantian formulation of the question.

Hegel, who for the first time, albeit in an *idealistic* manner, realized that logic and the theory of knowledge coincide, if we take them not *formally, but historically* , criticized Kant's formulation of the question. "One cannot learn to swim without entering the water", one cannot determine the abilities of human cognition without looking at how cognition *works in practice*, without examining the actual *history of human cognition* . The basis of the theory of knowledge is the history of knowledge, the practice of knowledge. On the other hand, if we take logic, it is just as completely unreasonable to study the forms of human cognition, its concepts, judgments, and conclusions in isolation from how these forms were applied in practice, in the real historical process of cognition, and how they crystallized in human cognition, became more complex, and developed as knowledge developed. In short, the basis for logic must also be found in the history of knowledge. In this *historical* approach of Hegel and philosophy lies the reason that in Hegel, as in Marxism, dialectics and epistemology coincide. "Dialectics, as understood by Marx and also according to Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, epistemology, which must treat its subject equally historically, studying and generalizing the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from *non-knowledge* to knowledge¹⁹¹."

To understand why Hegel coincides with dialectics (logic) and the theory of knowledge, this is not enough. Both theory of knowledge and logic should be studied on the basis of the *history of knowledge* . However, they *are not* simply limited to the history of knowledge. In the theory of knowledge and logic, the history of knowledge should be taken as a whole, in a generalized form, from the point of view of the result, the results of knowledge. In such cases, it is said that *the historical* must be taken from a *logical* point of view, i.e. from the point of view of general results. The resulting logic will be the same story, the same process, but *generally* without any complicating details, leaving out any random deviations that don't matter. This is how Marx's Capital is constructed, which is logic, i.e., a general *theoretical analysis of capitalism* . But at the same time,

189 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 292.

190 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 325.

191 Ленин, Карл Маркс, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVIII, стр. 11.

Marx's *Das Kapital* also provides a generalized, summarized *history of development* capitalist relations of production. For example Marx himself points out: "*The commodity* as the most elementary form of bourgeois wealth was our starting point, the prerequisite for the emergence of capital. On the other hand, *products* now they act as a *product of capital*. This cycle of our exposition also corresponds to the *historical development of capital*¹⁹²." Summing up Marx's methodology in *Capital*, Engels also emphasizes the unity of the historical and the logical in *Capital*, which did not prevent Rubin, the Menshevik interventionist, from proving that Marx's analysis of commodities is not historical, but only logical¹⁹³. Engels says: "The logical method was the only appropriate one. But in essence it is the same historical method, only freed from its historical form and from disturbing accidents"¹⁹⁴."

When applied to the theory of knowledge and logic, this means that logic is a generalized and summarized history of knowledge, it is "the result, sum, conclusion of the history of knowledge of the world". On the other hand, the theory of knowledge is also a history of knowledge summed up and generalized, taken as a result of development. This is the most general result of the history of knowledge, and logic and theory of knowledge. Categories of logic are a reflection of the laws of the material world in the human mind. Logic and the theory of knowledge coincide.

We have one philosophical science — dialectics, which is both logic and theory of knowledge. Each category of logic should show: 1) what kind of objective relation this category reflects, and 2) how this objective relation is known by a person. Engels makes this distinction already in the definition of matter, in the question of the relation of thought and being. Engels first points out that materialism considers nature to be the basic principle. Matter is an objective reality that exists independently of cognition. "But the question of the relation of thinking to being," says Engels, " *has another side* : how do our thoughts about the world around us relate to that world itself? Can our thinking comprehend the real world? Are we able to give a correct reflection of reality in our ideas and concepts about the real world?"¹⁹⁵ Thus, as we can see, Engels distinguishes between two aspects — the existence of the objective world and its cognizability.

Here it is necessary to point out the fundamental difference that exists between Hegel's idealistic understanding of the coincidence of dialectics and the theory of knowledge and the materialist one. In both Hegel and Marxism, dialectics and the theory of knowledge coincide as a result of the history of knowledge. However, the idealist Hegel takes the history of knowledge as an independent process of spontaneous development of the spirit, a certain world thought. For Hegel, as an idealist, the history of knowledge is divorced from the history of the development of the material world and the material practice of mankind — its productive activity and class struggle. For dialectical materialism, on the contrary, the history of knowledge is only the history of the development of the objective material world itself, which is known in the material practice of man, which changes and transforms the world. "The most essential and first basis of human thinking is precisely *the change in nature by man*, and not nature alone, as such, and the human mind developed proportionally how he learned to change nature"¹⁹⁶ - this is a materialist statement, radically different from Hegel's, of the question of the history of knowledge, of the basis on which logic and theory of knowledge coincide in Marxism.

192 Маркс, Непубликованные рукописи, «Большевик» № 6, 1932 г., стр. 80.

193 Рубин, Очерки по теории стоимости, изд. 4-е., стр. 217.

194 Маркс, К критике политической экономии, 1933 г., стр. 208.

195 Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах, 1931 г., стр. 18. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

196 Энгельс, Диалектика природы, стр. 14–15.

Chapter 4. The Laws of Materialistic Dialectics

4.1. The Law of Unity of opposites

In the *Dialectic of Nature*, Engels wrote: "(To develop the general character of dialectics as a science of connections, as opposed to metaphysics).

Thus the laws of dialectics were abstracted from the history of nature and human society. But they are nothing more than the most general laws of both these phases of historical development, as well as of thought itself. In essence, they are reduced to the following three laws:

The law of the transition of quantity to quality, and vice versa.

The law of mutual penetration of opposites.

The law of Negation of negation¹⁹⁷."

Engels further points out that all these laws were already developed by Hegel, but *in an idealistic manner*, i.e., they were not derived from nature and history, but imposed on the latter as necessary laws to which history and nature must obey. From this, inevitably, Hegel got a "forced and often terrible construction".

Meanwhile, one has only to approach these laws in a materialistic way, and everything becomes, as Engels puts it, simple and clear. These basic laws of dialectics are the real laws of the development of the objective world, as well as the laws of cognition of the world, since they are a reflection in our consciousness of this objective world itself.

Let us now proceed to consider the fundamental law of materialist dialectics — the law of the unity of opposites.

The history of human thought knows *two basic concepts of development*. According to one of them, development is understood as *a decrease* and *increase*, like quantitative growth and *repetition* the same as before. Things, no matter how they may have appeared from the very beginning, as well as their mental representations in the human head, according to this concept, always remain equal to themselves. Once created, the thing, while remaining unchanged in its nature, makes a monotonous path of movement in the same unchanging circle. The development of any thing, the development of a plant, animal, or human being, is essentially reduced to growth, an increase in various aspects and properties that it has in advance, but in a "small", embryonic form. In this conception, which is devoid of any hint of the actual historical character of the development of things, lies the meaning of the metaphysical concept of development, which is ultimately based on the doctrine of the absolute immutability of nature, which reigned supreme in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and which was revived in bourgeois vulgar evolutionary theories in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

With such a concept, first of all, the reasons for the variety of objects that appear to our eyes, the reasons for the emergence of the other, *the new*, and the replacement of the old by it, remain inexplicable. Second, and most importantly, the source assumes an inexplicable character *источник* movement and development. Not being able to explain the internal causes that give an impulse, an impetus to development, the metaphysical concept is forced to transfer this source to the outside, either under the guise of material metaphysical "essences" and "forces", or under the guise of a supramundane spirit!

Lenin points out that by the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, "everyone agrees" with the principle of development, but that this is an external, superficial "agreement" that trivializes and obscures the true understanding of this development. "If everything develops," says Lenin, "then everything passes from one thing to another, for development is obviously not a simple, *universal*, and eternal *growth*, an *increase* (or, consequently, a decrease), etc.... understand evolution as the emergence and destruction of everything, mutual¹⁹⁸ transitions." Without

197 Энгельс, *Диалектика природы*, стр. 125.

198 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 185.

understanding this basic development, vulgar-evolutionary theories do not see ways to develop our thinking, reflecting the development of being, do not understand *the objective meaning and role of the dialectic of knowledge*, do not know how to connect the principle of development with the materialistic principle of *unity* of the world.

Not understanding that the development of any thing (and phenomenon) is its own, and that the internal characteristics of the thing itself determine the transition from one to the *other*, the vulgar-bourgeois concept of development does not see in the development of the thing's own movement, its self-movement, as Hegel put it. The development of plants, animals, humans, and human society appears to bourgeois evolutionists as a repetition in an enlarged form, as a simple growth, the unfolding of certain eternal, unchangeable properties and features that were originally inherent in this plant, organism, and society and were only previously in a hidden, less clearly expressed state, in the embryo. This growth, according to these theorists, is carried out under the influence of *external environment conditions*. environment due to the "pumping of energy", due to the receipt of nutrition by the plant, animal, and human body from the outside. They portray the development of human society as a repetition and unfolding of certain unchanging, eternal features characteristic of *bourgeois society*. society with its capitalist exploitation, competition, individualism, etc., which bourgeois scientists manage to find in ancient slave-owning society and even among primitive savages. Bourgeois science, therefore, either does not think at all about the causes, sources, and driving forces of the development of society, or explains it by the intellectual progress of humanity, which, as a result of repeated repetition, begins to become more aware of the eternal and natural features of every human community, or tries to explain the development by the various external geographical and climatic conditions of life in different societies, society and the external environment!

In contrast to the evolutionary concept, dialectics requires the study of *the "thing in itself"* (Lenin), *its relations to other things*; it considers the development of a thing as its spontaneous development, i.e., as an internally necessary independent, *proper one* the movement of a thing as its *self-movement*.

Regarding Hegel's doctrine of development as self-movement, Lenin wrote:: "Movement and"self-movement " (this is NB! spontaneous (independent) spontaneous, *internally necessary* movement), "change", "movement and vitality", "the principle of all self-movement", "the impulse" to "movement" and to "activity" - the opposite of "*dead being*" - who will believe that this is the essence of" Hegelism", abstract and abstrusen (heavy, absurd?) Hegelianism?? This essence had to be discovered, understood, saved, hatched, and purified, which is exactly what Marx and Engels did¹⁹⁹." In Hegel's idealistic doctrine of *self-movement* Marxism revealed the rational core, purged it of mystical ideas about purely logical development, and understood it as the law of development of the objective world.

External causes alone, taken by themselves, can only cause a mechanical change in a given thing, an increase or decrease in its volume, size, etc. But the mere growth of a plant or animal organism is not only a quantitative increase: it also implies a qualitative change in the organism, its transition from one state to another. Approximately the same geographical and climatic conditions have been operating in Europe for many centuries and obviously they do not explain the development of society. On the contrary, the same geographical conditions would most likely lead to monotony in social relations, repetition of the same methods of labor, etc., as the example of many African and Asian tribes shows. Meanwhile, in Europe, for example, with approximately the same geographical environment, we have a huge variety and unevenness in the historical development of individual countries. It is obvious that the influence of external conditions is refracted through *internal ones* features of this social formation. Only by identifying the internal, own driving forces of development, only by identifying the impulses, pushes from within, given to

199 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 127–129.

the development of an object's own life, can we understand the real essence of development as the self-movement of natural phenomena, society, and human thought.

What is self-movement at last? Won't the idea of the self-movement of things have a certain flavor of mysticism and Hegelian idealism, as Comrade Bukharin believes, for example? In no case, unless one approaches movement and development purely mechanically, sees in it a simple displacement or quantitative increase, if, on the other hand, one does not approach self-movement idealistically, does not see in it a purely logical development, a self-generation of concepts, if one understands that self-movement is the self-movement of the objective world. Self-movement is *its own* the movement of a thing caused by both internal and external circumstances, but taking place according to internal laws peculiar to the thing itself, its transition due to internal impulses, its transformation into another thing. The study of any object in self-motion frees us from idealistic ideas about higher external forces (God, the world spirit) or about higher inner spiritual entities. At the same time, it does not in the least relieve us from the necessity of studying the role that external conditions play in this development, along with the internal causes. It is the view of development as a self-movement of things that forces our attention to the knowledge of the actual internal, own *source* development. Materialist dialectics finds this source, this driving force, in *the internal contradiction* of all that exists, in the movement and development of internal contradictions. Inconsistency in the thing itself, internal contradictory forces and *tendencies*, aspects in any phenomenon of nature and society, are the basic principles from which materialist dialectics proceeds in its understanding of development.

For metaphysics, for formal logic, contradictions are possible only in *our thinking*, and not in objective reality. But these logical contradictions, according to formal logic, are precisely the evil that must be avoided; contradictions, according to formal logic, indicate *inconsistency* of thoughts, the wrong course of thinking, they *interfere* with the correct development of thought. If the bourgeois believes that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is directed against democracy," then it would be a logical contradiction for him to admit at the same time that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the highest form of democracy.": these two thoughts are incongruous for him. For dialectical logic, the contradictions of thinking are a reflection of *the contradictions of real objective existence* : it is not content with external definitions, with the apparent inconsistency of two contradictory propositions. Materialistic dialectics penetrates into the inner essence of the subject under study and finds in the subject itself an *internal connection* of contradictory forces, tendencies, aspects, and definitions. In the most objective reality, Marxism reveals the contradictions that characterize it and drive it. The rejection of the old bourgeois democracy and the creation of a new proletarian democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat is a real *two-way* contradictory process. "In the proper sense, dialectics, "Lenin pointed out," is the study of contradiction *in the very essence of objects* »²⁰⁰."

Признание *противоречивости* It seems impossible for a metaphysician to recognize the inconsistency of things, because he considers things and phenomena outside of their connection, outside of their continuous interaction.

"But it is quite different," Engels points out, "when we begin to consider things in their movement, in their change, in their life, in their mutual influence on each other. Here we immediately encounter *contradictions* . *Motion itself is a contradiction* ; even simple mechanical movement can only occur in such a way that *the body is at the same time in one place and at the same time in another place, is in the same place and not in it* . And the constant positing and at the same time resolution of this contradiction is precisely movement"²⁰¹."

The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the reality of contradictions, revealing these objective contradictions also in the social and historical life of people, becomes the most important theoretical basis for the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat. It is not surprising that this doctrine is

200 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 183.

201 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 85. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

fiercely attacked by bourgeois theorists. Numerous "critics" of Marxism have repeatedly tried to refute Engels' statement about the movement as a contradiction. They referred to the fact that in reality a moving object passes through supposedly different points in space at different points in time. If, as the "critics" (Struve, V. Chernov, etc.) argued, the spatial line continuously traversed by the object is divided into a series of small segments, points, "breaks" in space, then at each individual moment of time the object assumes any *one position* in space, it occupies one point corresponding to *one* segment of this space.

Lenin showed the absurdity of this "criticism," which in fact reduces continuous movement to a series of *interruptions* this movement in space and time, to a number of states of *rest*, stationary states of objects. In fact, each new position of an object is possible only as the result of a certain movement from one point of space to another; critics do not understand that to move is to be at a given point and at the same time *not to be* in it, that without this contradiction, without this unity of continuity and discontinuity, movement itself would be impossible, what can contradiction means simply glossing over it. "This objection is *incorrect*," Lenin wrote, " (1) it describes *the result* movement, and not *самомovement* itself; 2) it does not show, does not contain the *possibility* of movement; 3) it represents movement as the sum, the connection of states of *rest*, i.e. , the (dialectical) contradiction between them is not eliminated, but only covered, pushed back, obscured, curtailed²⁰². " "Motion is *the unity of continuity* (time and space) and discontinuity (time and space). Movement is *a contradiction* , a unity of contradictions²⁰³."

But the contradiction lies not only in the simplest and most general forms of movement. Dialectical contradictions manifest themselves in special forms of movement and development of individual objects and processes.

It is not difficult to notice these contradictions that drive development in any field: in nature, in society, in thinking.

The process of life, Engels pointed out, is inextricably linked with the opposite process of death: the constant dying and renewal of cells is-and this is the contradiction! - a condition of life and development of the whole organism. In mechanics, any action is internally contradictory, it causes opposition and is inexplicable without the latter. Any quantity in mathematics is internally contradictory, it can be either positive or negative. Every phenomenon in the social life of this society is permeated by contradictions and class struggles that permeate all aspects of the life of class society, whether it is the purchase and sale of labor power or an exalted philosophical teaching. Vulgar bourgeois thinking sees only *a difference* *противоположность* It is limited to what indicates the diversity of our ideas, but does not penetrate into *the very essence of things*. Meanwhile, in every difference, in the diversity of our ideas, we must be able to see *the essential difference, the opposite* of the sides, forces, and tendencies of the objective world. "The opposite of the forces, sides, tendencies contained in any thing is their *negative* the relation (negativity) to each other is their living contradiction, which gives internal impulses to the self-movement of things."

So, what is this internal contradiction of any thing (and phenomenon)? In that it *is a single* object (process, phenomenon, etc.), in which at the same time opposites both *mutually exclude* and *mutually penetrate* one after the other. Opposites *are internally connected* in their development, one is a condition for the existence of another opposite, and at the same time they are hostile to each other, they are fighting among themselves *борьбу*.

"The thinking mind (mind)," Lenin observes, " sharpens the blunted distinction of the various, the simple diversity of ideas, to *the essential difference, to the opposite* . It is only to rise to the top of contradiction that varieties become mobile and alive in relation to one another-they acquire that negativity that is *the inner pulsation of self-movement and vitality* »²⁰⁴."

202 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 193.

203 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 191. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

204 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 133.

This *bifurcation of the one* , the internal inconsistency observed in any phenomenon of nature, history, and spiritual life, which has been noticed by thinkers since the time of the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus, Lenin described as *the essence* of dialectics, as its main feature. The materialist dialectic of Marx — Engels — Lenin sees in *unity (interpenetration)* opposites are the basic law of dialectical development. It finds its specific expression in the contradictions inherent in all special forms of movement.

The variety of things is explained by the specificity of the forms of movement, each of which characterizes a special quality of the thing. We observe in nature a number of forms of motion, such as mechanical motion, light, heat, electricity, chemical combination and decomposition, etc. All these forms of movement mutually condition each other, pass into each other. Man's knowledge of matter is limited to the knowledge *of the forms of motion of matter* , for there is nothing in nature but moving matter. Each form of movement should be taken in its originality, qualitative difference from others. Materialist dialectics makes it clear *that every form of movement has its own particular contradiction*, its own unity , and *the struggle of opposites* . The cognition of each given unity of opposites, which is specific to a given domain of phenomena, is the subject of separate sciences. Thus, for mathematics, the main opposites are positive and negative quantities, differential and integral; for mechanics, action and reaction; in physics, positive and negative electricity, etc.; in chemistry, the combination and dissociation of elements; in human society and social science, the struggle of classes.

The dialectical concept of development understands development as "*bifurcation* look at mutually exclusive opposites and *relationships* between them²⁰⁵." This "relationship" of opposites is *the internal source* of movement. With this concept of development, "the main attention is directed precisely to the knowledge *of the source* of "self-movement"²⁰⁶. A characteristic feature of this concept is the recognition, due to the internal struggle of opposites, *of the emergence of the new* in place of the old. While all bourgeois evolutionary theories, without denying the possibility of the emergence of the new, focus on what *объе* the old and the new have in common , and tend to regard the new as an extension and repetition of the old in one way or another, the dialectical doctrine of development, on the contrary, emphasizes the peculiarity *and originality of the new* . The limitation of any bourgeois-evolutionary theory, which is fundamentally opposed to the dialectical theory of development, ultimately consists in *reducing the new to the old* , and consequently in identifying the former with the latter. Meanwhile, it is precisely the qualitative *features* that actually give the basis for the new, which has emerged in place of the old, to be called new. For the dialectical concept, development involves the transformation of things, the transition from one quality to another.

The law of unity of opposites , according to Lenin's definition, is "the recognition (discovery) of contradictory, *mutually exclusive* , opposite tendencies in *all* phenomena and processes of nature (including the spirit and society *мом числе*)"²⁰⁷."

The relationship — the interpenetration and struggle — of the opposing, contradictory sides contained in an object determines its life, gives it impulses for self-movement, for development. That is why the law of unity, of the interpenetration of opposites, is the main, most important, and decisive one in dialectics. "The division of the one and the recognition of its contradictory parts," says Lenin, " is *the essence* of dialectics"²⁰⁸." In his notes, he calls the unity of opposites *the core* dialectics.

205 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 321. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

206 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 321.

207 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 323.

208 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 323.

The law of unity of opposites is the most general law of the objective world and cognition. "The condition for knowing all the processes of the world in their 'self — movement', in their spontaneous development, in their living life, "says Lenin," is to know them as a unity of opposites²⁰⁹."

Thus, the law of unity of opposites is *the basic* law of dialectics. The law of unity of opposites, being the most general law, is applicable to *all* phenomena of the objective world and to the process of cognition. Plekhanov's mistake, which Lenin points out in his fragment On the Question of Dialectics, was that he did not understand the decisive and universal significance of this law as the law of knowledge and the law of the objective world, and that he reduced it to a "*sum of examples*".

If Engels in the "Anti-Duhring" cited in the interests of *the popular* After presenting a number of examples of this law, while at the same time considering the interpenetration of opposites as the most general law of development²¹⁰, Plekhanov reduces this universal law to *its particular* cases and manifestations. Plekhanov dwells only on the law of the transformation of quantity into quality, on the contradiction between content and form. Often, accusing Lenin of not understanding dialectics, Plekhanov in his numerous works failed to provide a justification for this core, the essence of dialectics, and even failed to understand the theoretical significance of Hegel's "Logic", in which this law was developed on an idealistic basis. Plekhanov often discovers an *eclectic* understanding of this law as a "combination of opposites."

Dialectics is fundamentally hostile to all eclecticism: Marxism-Leninism would not be a guide to *action* if it did not provide precise and definite answers that characterize the essence of the subject or process, no matter how "complex" it may seem. Therefore, in materialistic dialectics, it is extremely important to correctly understand what *the relationship consists of* between opposites. The unity of opposites is at once their mutual penetration, their *identity* and their mutual exclusion, their negation, *their struggle*.

Defining: "a thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum and *unity of opposites*,"²¹¹ Lenin wrote: "Not only the unity of opposites, but *the transitions of each* definitions, qualities, traits, sides, properties in *each other* (in its opposite)"²¹². "The ordinary conception," Lenin said elsewhere, " grasps the difference and contradiction, but not *the transition* from one to the other, *and that's the most important* »²¹³ thing." "*Dialectics*," Lenin formulated for this reason, " is the doctrine of how opposites can be and how they are (how they become) *identical*, under what conditions they are identical when they turn into each other — and why the human mind should not take these opposites for dead, frozen ones, but for living, conditional ones. mobile, turning into one another²¹⁴."

Lenin considers the identity of opposites, their interpenetration, their mutual transition from one to the other *to be the most important* thing for understanding the essence of dialectics. At the same time, he emphasizes *the conditional* nature of this identity of opposites, its possibility only under certain conditions, the fact that the unity of opposites is relative, and their struggle is absolute. The process of life and the process of death, as mentioned above, continue each other in a certain respect: the death of the cells of an organism is a necessary condition for their renewal, a

209 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 323–324.

210 Наиболее полно этот взгляд сформулирован Энгельсом в «Диалектике природы».

211 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 275.

212 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 277.

213 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 131.

214 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 69.

necessary moment in the life process; the opposites — life and death — become identical with each other, as it were, mutually pass into each other. But the conditional nature of this identification is clear: life is still life, not death; in this process, the elements of life overcome and dominate the moments of death. Production and consumption, Marx pointed out, are not only opposites, but also mutually permeate each other in a number of ways. "Each is directly its opposite. However, at the same time, there is a mediating movement between both²¹⁵ of them." Production makes consumption possible, creates the object of consumption, gives consumption its definiteness and character. Consumption completes the process of production of products, causes the need for production, is a component moment of production. However, this does not mean that we can identify production and consumption. Their immediate unity, says Marx, does not destroy their immediate duality.

The bourgeoisie and the proletariat in capitalist society are external, hostile opposites. However, these classes are inextricably linked in the economic structure of capitalism, and the existence of one class is a condition for the existence of another. Without the bourgeoisie, there can be no more capitalism than without the proletariat. The creation by the working class, deprived of the means of production, of surplus value for the bourgeoisie that buys its labour-power, and the exploitation of labour-power by the bourgeoisie, the owner of the means of production, is *a single* process that determines the very existence of capitalist society. At the same time, the conditional nature of this unity, "interpenetration", is obvious: there is no unity *of interests*. It is not necessary to speak of both classes; not the coincidence of class interests, but, on the contrary, their struggle is the basis of social development. Strengthening of the proletarian state, points out vol. Stalin *is preparing the conditions for its withering* away in the future. The strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the future withering away of the State are thus not external opposites: the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat *is identical* preparing the conditions for its future extinction. However, it would be the greatest mistake to forget about the opposite of these stages and simply identify both processes, to assume that along with the strengthening of the proletarian state, its immediate death occurs...

Modern mechanismism, Menshevik and Menshevik idealism fundamentally distort Lenin's correct understanding of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. The mechanists, beginning with Duehring and ending with Comrade Bukharin, regard all kinds of opposites that are in unity as *external* each other, *opposite forces directed against each other*. Mechanists identify every unity of opposites, every contradiction, *with an external* contradiction, *with the antagonism* of hostile forces, and they explain the coexistence of these forces and the preservation of the contradiction *by the balance* of opposites. Engels ridiculed Duhring's flat understanding of contradictions as oppositely directed forces. Lenin pointed out to Comrade Bukharin, reading his Economics of the Transition Period, that it was wrong to identify contradiction with antagonism, that under socialism, for example, class antagonisms would disappear, and contradictions between nature and society, the productive forces and the relations of production would take place.

Antagonism is a special kind of contradiction in which the parties treat each other as irreconcilable extremes.

The best example of social antagonisms is *class antagonisms*. contradictions between exploitable and exploitable classes. But in the dialectical understanding of contradictions, we must also look for and find a possible internal connection *even* between antagonistic opposites, otherwise it would be unthinkable for these extremes to co-exist for any length of time in one object, phenomenon, society, etc. (see the example of the bourgeoisie and the working class above). The entire transition period is permeated by the antagonism of dying capitalism and socialism born of the revolution. Nevertheless, at the early stage of NEP during the reconstruction period, Lenin considered it possible to use the methods of state capitalism controlled by the dictatorship of the proletariat, to use the NEP bourgeoisie for the rise and development of the productive forces, provided that it was completely subordinated to proletarian laws and simultaneously restricted and

215 Маркс, К критике политическое экономии, стр. 16.

ousted it. The period of socialist reconstruction and the advance of socialism on the entire front sets forth the task of eliminating the kulaks as a class, destroying the remnants of capitalism in the economy and in the minds of people: the antagonism of the capitalist elements and the socialist system makes it impossible for them to continue to co-exist, and the class struggle becomes more acute. The right-wing opportunists, who identify antagonisms and contradictions and portray contradictory development as a balance of antagonistic forces, preached *reconciliation*, a balance of the struggling forces, the capitalist and socialist sectors, and the theory of the class struggle in the Soviet economy fading away in the process of this "balancing" of sectors.

Menshevism and Menshevik idealism also distort the correct understanding of the unity of opposites. Menshevik idealists understand it as "flexibility applied subjectively," as *sophistry* and eclecticism. They see the unity of opposites as their eclectic combination. The Menshevik idealists, departing from Lenin's formulation of the law of the unity of opposites, draw a completely mechanistic scheme, according to which we first have a simple difference, then an opposite, and then a contradiction. They do not understand that every difference is already a contradiction; they *limit*, like Plekhanov, the universal character of the law of contradictory development. Lenin, on the contrary, emphasizes *the conditional, temporary, relative* nature of the unity, identity, and interpenetration of opposites, and *the absolute* nature of their mutual negation, the mutual exclusion of opposites, and their *struggle*, which is *the source of development*.

A certain unity of opposing sides and tendencies in the subject is not always absolute, but has a relative meaning. But if there is a temporary, relatively transitory *unity* of opposites, which also do not remain unchanged, like the object itself, then *борьба* their struggle is absolute. Everything that exists on earth changes because of the struggle of opposites, whatever the latter may be in nature.

"The unity (coincidence, identity, co-action) of opposites," Lenin emphasizes, "is *conditional*, temporary, transitory, and relative. *The struggle* of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and movement²¹⁶ are absolute."

And in the relativistic, the relative, there is the absolute, says Lenin in another place. And in the interpenetration of opposites we must see *their struggle*: we must regard the very identity, the interpenetration of opposites, *as a manifestation of their struggle* — and this is the deepest meaning of Lenin's words about the transition from one to the other as "the most important thing."

The appearance of a new object provides a solution to the contradiction, in which the old unity is eliminated along with its constituent opposites. Instead of the old phenomenon, a new one begins its history, which from this moment on also includes its own new contradiction, which moves it along the path of further development.

The task of scientific research in any field is to be guided by this *general* law of materialistic dialectics, which is the conclusion, the result of the entire history of the development of human knowledge, to study each time on factual material *the specific* nature of the contradictory development inherent in this phenomenon of nature or society under study. No principle of materialist dialectics can be transformed into an abstract scheme from which *что логическим* answers to concrete questions can be deduced in a purely logical way. For materialist dialectics requires a relentless concrete study of the processes that take place in nature, society, and human thought.

It teaches us to grasp not only the general features inherent in all subjects and at all stages of their development, but also the special features of contradictory development that characterize a given subject under study at a given stage of its development. There cannot and does not exist an example of resolving a contradiction that is suitable for all times and for all cases. One cannot, for example, look for explanations of the ways of transition from capitalism to socialism in the particular character of the resolution of social contradictions that took place during the transformation of the feudal socio-economic formation into a capitalist one.

Hegel, who first gave expression to the law of the unity of opposites, understood it, however,

216 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 324. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

in an idealistically perverse way. As objects of knowledge, Hegel considered the stages of development of thought - not real objects, as they exist in the real world, but only mental, abstract objects, created in thinking as abstract as the objects themselves. For this reason, Hegel's law of the unity of opposites also meant a law of thought that had the most general character, but was divorced from the actual, concrete development of nature and history.

According to Hegel, the interpenetration of opposites expresses the interpenetration of opposites not in reality, but in thought. And if Hegel turns to the phenomena of the surrounding world for examples, it is in order to confirm his logical construction, and not at all in order to explain, on the basis of studying the specific conditions of their real movement, under what *conditions* the resolution of contradictions occurs and *in what* special way the transition of the phenomenon to its opposite takes place. That is why in Hegel's dialectic the transitions of concepts from one to the other are arbitrary. In Hegel, the solution of a contradiction is arbitrary, illusory, brought into reality from abstract thinking: it is only *mental* the solution of a contradiction is therefore abstract, detached from the development of the real world.

Thus, the recognition of the law of the unity of opposites as the essence of dialectics, as well as other laws of dialectics, while giving us the key to dialectical knowledge, at the same time not only does not save us from a thorough study of the phenomena of nature and social life, but, on the contrary, it necessarily requires a concrete study of them. A concrete analysis of the actual development of phenomena should serve as an accurate justification and confirmation of this law, which is applied in its general form to any subject. The reverse understanding of it is a vulgarization of materialist dialectics, a perversion of it. The law of the unity of opposites, like the whole materialist dialectic, is a guide to *action* and to scientific research.

Marx and Engels put Hegel's idealistic doctrine of the unity of opposites "on its feet", reworked it in a materialistic way, and made it the universal law of the development of the material world and of the thinking that reflects it. Applying this law to the knowledge of the historical process, they saw the main causes of social development in the contradiction between the development of the productive forces and the relations of production, in the contradictions of the class struggle, and in the contradiction derived from them between the economic foundation and the political and ideological superstructure. Applying the materialist dialectic to the economic structure of capitalist society, Marx revealed its basic contradiction — the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of appropriation, which finds its manifestation in the contradiction between the organization of production in a particular enterprise and anarchy in the whole society, and its class expression in the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working class.

As an illustration, here are some examples from the dialectic of Marx's Capital. Only by understanding *the general idea* of "Capital", understanding "Capital" as a whole as logic, dialectics and theory of knowledge, can we trace the dialectic of individual economic categories of "Capital". Without this, we would be in danger of losing the "sum of examples" from the dialectic of "Capital," which is so common for mechanists and Menshevik idealism.

The dialectic of individual economic categories of "Capital " can be seen from the economic movement of capitalist society as a whole. The transition from simple commodity production and circulation to capitalist production, and then the demise of capitalism and the prerequisites for the emergence of a new, socialist system , are due *to the duality* and contradiction underlying commodity-capitalist production. This duality and contradiction determine the nature of *all individual economic phenomena and categories*: commodity, money, capital, value, etc.

Let's start with the product. The product has a dual, i.e. contradictory nature. As a thing, it has useful properties, called in economic language use value. On the other hand, as a commodity, it has a value, can be exchanged for another commodity. If the use value reveals the qualitative side of the commodity, then the exchange value expresses the quantitative side of the commodity. Due to the cost, goods can be equated to each other.

A commodity is a product of labor. Like a commodity, labor also has two sides, two natures: concrete (qualitative), which has significance for use value, and abstract (quantitative), which

creates the value of commodities. "If only quality matters in relation to the use value of a commodity *качество* If the quantity of labor contained in it is only the quantity of labor that matters in relation to the value of value *количество труда*»²¹⁷."

Other contradictions follow from this. Each commodity measures its value *by another* commodity that has *other*, incommensurable useful properties (the doctrine of relative and equivalent value), the value of goods *is inversely proportional* the mass of goods produced at a given socially necessary time, etc.

Whatever the productive power may be, it can only change the shape of the useful properties of various substances. Productive power cannot change the properties of the canvas, it can only give the canvas the shape of a garment. Changing the shape of different things and depends on the specific type of work. But in the society of commodity producers, labor has another side — the quantity of labor, which appears as labor in general, as abstract labor that creates value in general. "Labor is the father of wealth, land is its mother."

The further dialectical movement of the commodity consists in the transformation of the commodity into money, as Marx points out.

"The historical process of expanding and deepening exchange develops the dormant contradiction between use value and value in the nature of commodities. The need to give an external expression to this contradiction for circulation forces us to look for an independent form for the embodiment of commodity value and does not give rest until this problem is finally solved by dividing the commodity into commodity and money²¹⁸."

So *quantitative* the development of the exchange of goods leads to a new *quality*—the monetary form. The source of this movement lies in *contradiction* commodity form, i.e. ultimately in *contradiction* between the social form of production and the private form of appropriation.

Money is also a commodity, but it is a commodity in a "withdrawn" form. Money is both a commodity and a *negation* the product. Money is an absolute commodity by which the values of all other commodities are measured. As such, money is transformed into a means of circulation of goods. Here a new *contradiction emerges*. Being a product of historically defined social relations, money expresses the totality of contradictions of a given society. Money is the unity of opposites. If we take money as an identity in relation to itself, it immediately turns out that this identity is the source of a new division, a new contradiction of money — as a means of circulation and as the independent existence of the exchange value of an absolute commodity.

"The function of money as a means of payment involves a direct contradiction. Since payments are equalized, money functions only perfectly, as money of account, or a measure of value. In so far as it is really necessary to make payments, money appears not as a medium of circulation, not as a mere passing intermediary in the exchange of substances, but as an individual embodiment of social labor, as an independent existence of exchange value, or as an absolute commodity. This contradiction is revealed with particular force at that moment of industrial and commercial crises, which is called the monetary crisis²¹⁹."

Every movement is dialectical. This is why the movement, or, as Marx puts it, metamorphosis, becomes of particular interest from the dialectical point of view *метаморфоз* products. Marx begins this chapter with the following words, which are particularly important for understanding the dialectical method of "Capital": "We have seen that the process of exchange of commodities involves *contradictory and exclusive conditions of exchange*. each other's relationship. The development of this process, which reveals *a dual character* the division of the commodity world into simple commodities and money commodities does not eliminate these contradictions, but creates a form for their movement.

217 Маркс, Капитал, т. I, 1932 г., стр. 9. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

218 Маркс, Капитал, т. I, 1932 г., стр. 43–44.

219 Маркс, Капитал, т. I, 1932 г., стр. 85.

This is the general method by which real contradictions are resolved²²⁰."

So *the contradiction is* product form determines the form of movement of goods. The commodity as value is exchanged by means of money for use-value: C-M-T. This product cycle has two opposite phases of movement. In the beginning, the commodity form turns into a monetary one. Then back again: the monetary form turns into a commodity form. There is a kind of *negation of negation*. On the one hand, the commodity form is negated by money, and the latter is again negated by the commodity. On the other hand, at the beginning of the cycle, the commodity is not a use value; at the end point, it is a use value.

If we take the *circulation of commodities* as a whole further, it is negated in its turn *by the circulation of capital*. In the first case, we have the movement of commodities; in the second, the movement of money converted into capital. In the first case, money was a medium of circulation; in the second, it is a goal. In the M — C — M cycle, the commodity appears only as a necessary phase in the transformation of one value (M) into another, a greater value (M').

"Value thus becomes self-moving value, self-moving money, and as such it is capital. It goes out of the sphere of circulation, re-enters it, preserves and multiplies itself in it, returns back in an enlarged form, and again and again begins the same cycle²²¹."

The circulation of capital is only a further development of the movement of commodities, and consequently a further development of the contradictions of social relations. As its historical prerequisites, capital has: 1) the accumulation of money and 2) the emergence of a new commodity-*labor*. Labour-power is the only commodity of all other commodities that is capable, in the process of consumption, in the process of labour, of creating surplus-value beyond its value. The money spent on its purchase is returned to the capitalist at a profit.

But only a certain amount of surplus-value obtained makes the owner of money a capitalist, and consequently only a certain amount of money can become capital. What is needed is just such a sum of money as can secure the purchase of labour-power capable of producing surplus-value in the amount necessary for the maintenance of the capitalist and the increase of both constant and variable capital. Thus, capital *as a new quality* is associated with a certain *quantity*.

Surplus-value (quantity) has that particular form or *quality* that it expresses the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist. Commodity production generates the circulation of goods on the basis of an equivalent exchange. The owner of the goods exchanges it for goods of the same value of another owner. The picture changes "qualitatively" under capitalist production and circulation. Here the capitalist, the owner of capital, appropriates the unpaid labor of the worker. This new *quality* is expressed by a new form of value (quantity) — surplus value.

In a letter to Engels (August 24, 1867), Marx wrote:

"The best in my book (Capital): 1) in *the first* In the same chapter, the peculiarity of *the dual character of labor is emphasized*, depending on whether it is expressed in use or exchange value (this theory of the dual character of labor is the basis of *all* understanding of the facts); 2) *surplus value* is considered *independently of its special forms* as profit, interest, land rent, etc²²²."

It is quite understandable why Marx distinguishes these two points. They are crucial in understanding the essence of the capitalist economy. The duality and inconsistency of labor in the conditions of capitalist production reflects *the main contradiction* capitalist society is a contradiction between *the social* character of production and *the private* form of appropriation. Tracing the development of this contradiction in economics, Marx finds in capitalist society itself both the material possibility, the method, and the power to *overcome* this contradiction. This method is the socialization of the means of production; this possibility is the concentration of production; this force is the proletariat, trained and disciplined by capitalist production itself, hardened and

220 Маркс, Капитал, т. I, 1932 г., стр. 57. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

221 Маркс, Капитал, т. I, 1932 г., стр. 100.

222 Маркс и Энгельс, Письма, стр. 198.

politically matured in class battles with the bourgeoisie.

The doctrine of surplus value, considered independently of its particular forms, formed the basis for a clear and sharp contrast between the antagonistic positions of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This made it possible to emphasize the class contradictions between the proletariat and *all* the oppressed, on the one hand, and between all groups of exploiters, on the other.

In these two points, Marx's dialectical method also had the greatest impact. Based on these two points, the entire exposition of Capital unfolds in a spiral, revealing the fetishistic character of capitalist relations, revealing more and more the internal contradictions of capitalist society, tracing the economic basis and various forms of capitalist exploitation and the growing antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, tracing further and further the historical trend of the demise of capitalism and the development of the prerequisites for a new communist society. Anyone who understands the dialectic of the theory of commodities and surplus-value, which is based on the law of the unity of opposites, can easily understand the dialectic of "Capital" as a whole.

Lenin and Stalin raise the Marxist understanding of the law of the unity of opposites to the highest level. Lenin pays special attention to revealing the full significance of this law as the essence, as the core of dialectics. "In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This will capture the core of the dialectic, but it requires explanation and development²²³." Lenin explains and develops this essence of dialectics on the basis of the indissoluble unity of theory and revolutionary practice, applied to the analysis of the most important stages of the proletarian struggle. The knowledge of the internal contradictions of development was of great importance for Lenin's analysis of the development of the Russian revolution, for his teaching on the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. The Bolsheviks regarded the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions "as two links in the same chain, as a single and integral picture of the scope of the Russian revolution²²⁴." Lenin and Stalin emphasize the whole peculiarity of Russian "military-feudal imperialism", which made it possible to combine the historical development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution directed against tsardom and held under the leadership and hegemony of the proletariat, with the proletarian revolution striking at capitalism. "From the democratic revolution," Lenin wrote, "we will at once begin to pass over, and just to the extent of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organized proletariat, we will begin to pass over to the socialist revolution. We stand for continuous revolution. We won't stop halfway²²⁵."

Emphasizing as opposed to right-wing alarmists (Kamenev, Zinoviev) *this is unity* At the same time, Lenin struggles with the Trotskyist misunderstanding of the stages and transitional stages in the development of the revolution and the relation of the proletariat to the peasantry at various stages of the revolution. "Having completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution together with the peasantry in general, the proletariat of Russia finally passed over to the socialist revolution' when it succeeded in splitting the countryside, uniting its proletarians and semi-proletarians, and uniting them against the kulaks and the bourgeoisie, including the peasant bourgeoisie... '²²⁶If the revolutionary proletariat failed to take into account the class stratification of the countryside,' then that would be a Blanquist distortion of Marxism, then it would be an attempt by the minority to impose its will on the majority, then it would be theoretical absurdity, a failure to understand that the general peasant revolution is *still* a bourgeois revolution, and that *without a series of transitions*,

223 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 227.

224 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 23.

225 Ленин, Отношение социал-демократии к крестьянскому движению, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. VIII, стр. 186.

226 Ленин, Пролетарская революция и ренегат Каутский, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXIII, стр. 394.

transitional stages , it cannot be made socialist in a backward country²²⁷."

Lenin laid down the law of the unity of opposites as the basis for the analysis of imperialism as a special and new stage in the development of capitalism. Lenin here reveals the unity *of the general* and *what is special* , the general laws and contradictions of capitalism and those features that are introduced by the imperialist stage. Lenin shows that these special features of imperialism not only do not cancel out, but also *strengthen* the manifestation of the general capitalist contradictions, that the unity and intertwining of monopoly and competition not only do not reduce the severity of capitalist contradictions, but *they sharpen* them even more, and contribute to the deepening and sharpening of capitalist competition. Lenin and Stalin establish that *the dictatorship of the proletariat is the fundamental law of the period of struggle between established communism and moribund capitalism* . Lenin and Stalin reveal the dual nature of NEP as a policy that allows for the struggle of socialist and capitalist elements and is designed for the victory of socialism, "as a two-way process of the development of capitalism and the development of socialism, a contradictory *process of the struggle* of socialist elements with capitalist elements, the process of *overcoming* capitalist elements by socialist²²⁸ elements."

Comrade Stalin shows how the aggravation of capitalist contradictions in the new epoch is accompanied by the emergence of a new contradiction, no longer of an intra-capitalist order, but of a contradiction between capitalism as a whole and the country of socialism under construction, and how this latter contradiction "*opens up to the roots all the contradictions of capitalism and gathers them into one knot*, turning them orders of magnitude".

4.2. The law of quantity-to-quality transition and vice versa

Another law of materialistic dialectics is the law of the transition of quantity to quality and vice versa. For understanding the process of development, this law is of the most important importance, because in this law of dialectics the revolutionary leap-like transition from one quality to another finds its expression.

Quality should be understood as the *definiteness of phenomena* , due to which they are distinguished from each other and which makes them what they are. Scientific research is successful if it studies a particular object and takes it in its qualitative originality in comparison with other subjects. The definiteness that characterizes an object is a quality. The qualitative diversity of objects of objective reality is explained by the presence *of various forms of matter movement in the surrounding world* . Everything that exists is in the form of a certain form of motion of matter. However, individual things are characterized not by one form of movement, but by a number of them. For example, the human body contains forms of movement of matter, ranging from mechanical to thinking. But each specific, definite thing is characterized by one of the forms of movement that plays a decisive, defining role for it. Therefore, when we speak of quality, we do not mean the existence of qualities independent of the objective world, but the very objects and phenomena that have this or that quality. Quality is objective; the qualitative certainty of things in nature exists independently of consciousness. Human thinking only reflects this qualitative certainty of objective processes.

Because of their quality, things are different and separate from each other. This boundary, however, is not absolute, for absolutely individual, absolutely singular objects do not exist in nature. Each object has something in common with all other objects, with which it is always inextricably linked. The qualitative definiteness of things is not something permanent, unchangeable, as representatives of medieval scholasticism thought. The qualitative certainty of the phenomena of reality is constantly evolving, changing, and becoming more complex.

In order to properly understand the quality category, it is necessary to consider the question of

227 Ленин, Пролетарская революция и ренегат Каутский, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXIII, стр. 394.

228 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 234. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

quality and property. This question is dealt with by Hegel in his *Science of Logic*. He's writing: "Quality is a *property* primarily and primarily in the sense that it manifests itself in an *external relation* as an *immanent determination* »²²⁹." Hegel's point here is that while quality expresses an immanent, i.e., intrinsic determinateness of a given phenomenon, process, or object, property expresses this determinateness in relation to other objects. For example, the rose as a flower has certain qualities as a plant species, and this quality is its determinateness, which distinguishes it from all other plants. This definiteness is expressed in a whole *series of properties*— in the smell of the rose, in color, etc.

Quality is inextricably linked to the very being of a thing. Without this or that property, the thing does not lose its definiteness, but when it loses its quality, the thing ceases to be what it is, it becomes something else. The qualitative certainty of a thing is expressed in a specific pattern that determines the nature of its development. A scientific definition of a thing becomes meaningful only when it captures its qualitative definiteness.

Cognition of a thing, however, does not stop at one qualitative characteristic; it also captures the quantitative definiteness inherent in the object under study. What is the quantity? Let us first turn to how Hegel defines quantity.

He's writing: "*Quality* there is in general an immediate determinateness identical with being, in contrast to the quantity considered after its *количества*, which is also a determinateness of being, but no longer directly identical with the latter, but a determinateness indifferent to being, external to it"²³⁰."

Thus, Hegel defines quantity as an external determinateness that is indifferent to being. In this definition, the kernel of truth is that changes in quantity for the time being are really external to quality. Despite changes in quantity, the quality remains the same. However, this is only up to a certain point, when a further change in quantity leads to a change in quality. In this case, the given certainty does not just increase or decrease, but, on the contrary, radically changes. Quantitative certainty of phenomena, as well as qualitative, is objective in nature. The concept of quantity is a reflection in the consciousness of those quantitative relations that are inherent in the phenomena themselves. Therefore, scientific knowledge should grasp and reflect the real reality not only in its qualitative, but also in its quantitative diversity. The quantitative definiteness of an object does not exist outside of its qualitative definiteness; it is always closely related to the latter. Similarly, a certain quality is characterized by a certain specific measure of quantitative measurements.

So in nature there is not just quality and quantity, there are things that have both qualitative and quantitative certainty. The quantitative and qualitative definiteness of the subject is an indissoluble *unity*. But this unity is the unity of various determinations, the unity of opposites. Therefore, the transition of quantity to quality and vice versa is, in Lenin's words, an example of the mutual transition of opposites. A certain unity of quantity and quality inherent in certain things of the surrounding world is a *measure*. The measure expresses a specific qualitative definiteness of the subject, which is also characterized by a specific quantitative characteristic. However, quantitative changes in items occur on the basis of a certain quality that corresponds to them. Quality also limits, for the time being, the limits of quantitative changes in the subject. For example, the feudal mode of production extremely limited the possibilities for the growth of productive forces, material wealth, and the entire level of development of society. These feudal relations were eliminated as a result of the bourgeois revolution, which established the capitalist mode of production. In its turn, capitalism, having played a progressive role in history, has turned at the imperialist stage of its development into an extreme obstacle to the further movement of society forward. On the other hand, what unprecedented rates of development in all aspects of social life we have under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and precisely because the U.S.S.R. represents a new quality in terms of production relations *новое качество*!

229 Гегель, Наука логики, 1929 г., стр. 54.

230 Гегель, Соч., т. I, 1930 г., стр. 157.

In a word, quantitative change finds its basis and limitation in the qualitative definiteness of the object. In turn, a quantitative change in the subject affects the qualitative side of it. A certain object remains what it is only up to a certain point. The quantitative process of change, having reached the limit for a certain quality and under certain conditions, requires a change in quality, causes *the transition of one quality to another*. At the same time, this transition is also *the transition of quality into quantity*, since through the destruction of the old quality, the possibility of a new quantitative movement forward is now achieved. Under any possible conditions of quantitative growth in capitalist society, it is impossible to implement the socialist type of production relations. On the other hand, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, a new socialist form of production relations is being created, and even the simple addition of the means of production in collectivized agriculture gives an incomparably greater quantitative increase in production.

The law of the transformation of quantity into quality, as well as other laws of dialectics, was formulated by Hegel in his Science of Logic. But in Hegel this law received *an idealistic expression, as the law of self-movement of categories, and not the law of the objective world*. It goes without saying that Hegel's idealistic understanding of the law of the transformation of quantity into quality is absolutely unacceptable to us. The founders of Marxism, having proved the failure of Hegel's understanding of the law of the transition from quantity to quality, revealed the rational grain in it, gave it a deeply materialistic interpretation, as formulated by Engels. "We can express this law for our own purposes in such a way that qualitative changes can occur in nature — in a way that is precisely determined for each individual case — only by quantitative addition or quantitative reduction of matter or motion (so-called energy).

All qualitative differences in nature are based either on different chemical compositions, or on different amounts or forms of motion (energy), or—as is almost always the case—on both. Thus, it is impossible to change the quality of any body without adding or subtracting matter or motion, i.e., without a quantitative change in this body²³¹."

In support of this idea, Engels, both in Anti-Duhring and Dialectics of Nature, gives a whole series of examples showing how a purely quantitative decrease or increase in the same chemical elements turns into a qualitative difference.

Engels, referring to the law of the transition of quantity to quality and vice versa, points out that "the law of nature discovered by Hegel celebrates its greatest triumphs in the field of chemistry. Chemistry can be called the science of qualitative changes in bodies that occur under the influence of changes in the quantitative composition²³²." Engels then gives the following examples: oxygen and ozone. Two atoms are combined into an oxygen molecule, and three atoms are combined into an ozone molecule, and a new body is obtained that differs in its properties from oxygen. "But what can we say," Engels goes on to write, "about the various proportions in which oxygen combines with nitrogen or sulfur, and each of which gives a body qualitatively different from all other bodies? How different is laughing gas (nitrous oxide N_2O) from nitric anhydride (two-five nitrogen oxides N_2O_5)! The first is a gas, the second at ordinary temperature is a solid crystalline body! Meanwhile, the only difference between them in composition is that the second body has five times more oxygen than the first, and both contain other nitrogen oxides (NO , $_2O_3$, N_2O_7 , N_2O_3 , N_2O_7), which all differ qualitatively from both of them and from each other"²³³.

These are the examples from chemistry that Engels cites as illustrations of the law of the transition of quantity to quality. Engels believes that this law is of great importance for the chemical elements themselves. The periodic table of elements discovered and developed by Mendeleev shows that the quality of elements and their place in the system is determined by the amount of their

231 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 125.

232 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 127.

233 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 127.

atomic weight.

Thus, quantitative changes in phenomena have, to a certain extent, the character of continuous growth of the same object in its quality. The object, changing quantitatively *within the same measure*, does not cease to be what it is. Only at a certain stage of its development, under certain historical conditions, the object loses its quality, ceases to exist. The transformation of one quality into another, in contrast to the continuous quantitative process of change, does not occur gradually, but by leaps and bounds. An object that has become a new quality shows only its many different properties, sides, and remains the same object in its quality until the struggle of opposite sides leads it to a change in quality. *A jump, a break in a continuous process*, is the moment of transition from one quality to another.

The continuous quantitative change of phenomena never leads to the emergence of new qualities. The recognition of only continuous change entails the denial of the possibility of the emergence of qualitatively new things. And this would mean standing on the point of view of the immutability of things, which, once appearing, move in an eternally unchangeable circle. Similarly, it would be untenable to accept only the qualitative development of phenomena. Only qualitative transitions without a corresponding quantitative change would mean that there is no historical connection between the various phases of change in phenomena.

The dialectical concept of development, in contrast to the vulgar theory of evolution, recognizes the abrupt, intermittent nature of changes in the phenomena of the world around us. The leap, the transition from one quality to another, is not prepared immediately, but in *a gradual process*. changes to the item. And in this gradual change lies from the very beginning the possibility of a break, a leap that will occur immediately, as soon as the quantitative changes necessary for each case are sufficiently ripe.

The law of the transition of quantity to quality and vice versa is particularly hateful on the part of the enemies of Marxism, reformists and opportunists of all kinds, because this law, when applied to the phenomena of social life, means the recognition of the need for a revolutionary change in society, the recognition of the need *for a leap forward* when moving from one social formation to another. Reformists and social-fascists, while emasculating the revolutionary content of Marxism, hold the view that the transition to socialism is by no means necessary through revolution, through the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that the mere quantitative development of democracy will naturally lead society to socialism. Hitlerite fascism showed firsthand where the development of bourgeois democracy leads, and the full value of social-fascist "theoretical" inventions on the question of "gradual reform" of capitalist society.

Under Soviet conditions, the teaching of materialist dialectics about quality and quantity is being *revised by mechanists and by Menshevik idealists* .

Proponents of the mechanistic worldview explain "all changes from changes in place, all qualitative differences from quantitative ones, and do not notice that the relationship between quality and quantity is mutual, that quality also passes into quantity, as quantity into quality, that there is an interaction²³⁴here."

Giving a brilliant refutation of the mechanistic worldview, Engels shows that if we "reduce all differences and changes in quality to quantitative differences and changes, to mechanical displacements, then we necessarily arrive at the position that all matter consists of *identical elements*." and that all qualitative differences in the chemical elements of matter are caused by quantitative differences in the number and spatial grouping of these smallest particles when they are combined into atoms²³⁵." But in this case, the question arises, where is the reason for the diversity, the multi-quality that we observe in nature? This is a question that mechanists cannot answer without falling into the swamp of dreary metaphysics. For example, modern mechanists deny the qualitative distinctiveness of all forms of motion, reducing them to mechanical motion and

234 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 81.

235 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 81.

explaining positively all phenomena of the surrounding reality.

The denial by mechanists of the objective character of qualities entails, as its inevitable consequence, the denial of the abrupt development of phenomena. In fact, if the objects of the surrounding world are determined only from the quantitative side, then their development can consist exclusively in quantitative *increase or decrease*, but not in the transformation of one quality into another, as the dialectical concept of development teaches. That is why the mechanists are the restorers of a long-obsolete, and therefore reactionary, now vulgar theory of evolution, which reduces development to an increase or decrease and denies leaps.

The vulgar theory of evolution, which denies the abrupt nature of development and the transformation of one quality into another, is the theoretical basis of revisionism. The father of revisionism, Bernstein, in his time, based on this theory, preached the blunting of class contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, denied the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and the necessity of a proletarian revolution. Modern social-fascists argue their tactics with a vulgar theory of evolution, putting it forward against the doctrine of the proletarian revolution. In the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the vulgar concept of evolution is *a methodological prerequisite* for the right-opportunist theory of the decline of the class struggle and the growth of the kulak into socialism. The reactionary views of modern mechanists provide a philosophical basis for the right-wing opportunist conclusions.

In contrast to the mechanists, the Menshevik idealists pay lip service to the unity of quality and quantity and the objective character of quality. However, these categories, like all others, they turn into abstract formulas and purely logical categories that are divorced from the real world. The idealistic understanding of the law of the transition of quantity to quality and vice versa lies in the isolation of the general categories of quality and quantity from their concrete, material content. Giving the concepts of quality and quantity a self-sufficient meaning, the Menshevik idealists deduce in a purely logical way the transitions of quantity to quality and back, considering it possible to consider any specific cases of transition, *regardless of the conditions, time and place*.

4.3. The Law of Negation of Negation

The law of negation of negation is one of the very general and widely valid laws of dialectics and at the same time a concretization of its basic law — the unity of opposites. In Hegel, the negation of negation appears as the basic law in the construction of his entire philosophical system. In materialist dialectics, the negation of negation has such an important and general significance in the development of nature, human society, and thought that Engels classifies it — together with the law of the unity of opposites and the law of the transition of quantity to quality and vice versa — as the *most general laws* of dialectics.

Further development of the Marxist understanding of the law of negation of negation and its significance for materialist dialectics is provided by Lenin in his vivid description of the dialectical doctrine of development: "Development," he says, "is kind of *repetitive* steps already passed, but *repeated otherwise, on a higher basis* ("negation of negation"), their development is, so to speak, *in a spiral, and not in a straight line* »²³⁶." In another passage, while enumerating the elements of dialectics, Lenin also points out: "*the repetition in the highest stage of certain* features, properties, etc. of the lowest, and *a return, supposedly, to the old*(negation of negation)²³⁷."

The unity of opposites, their interpenetration and their struggle reveal the source of self-movement, development, its internal driving forces, internal impulses to development given by contradiction. The law of the transition of quantity to quality reveals the very process of development, its qualitatively peculiar stages, the abrupt, revolutionary course of this development-with interruptions of gradualness and the indissoluble interdependence of quality and quantity.

236 Ленин, Карл Маркс, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVIII, стр. 11. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

237 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 277. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

"Negation of negation" further deepens our understanding of the developmental process. Speaking about the negation of negation in development, materialistic dialectics emphasizes that in development there is a certain sequence, a movement through various *stages*, stages, and stages. The course of development is not *rectilinear*, but zigzag, contradictory, and in the transition from one stage to another sharp *turns are inevitable*, so that the development of internal contradictions of an object or phenomenon leads at each subsequent stage to their transition to their opposite.

In this contradictory development, each lower stage of development itself prepares the condition of its *own self* — *negation*, its transition to the opposite, new, *higher* stage; this negation — the overcoming of each subsequent stage of the previous one — creates an internal *connection* between both stages, signifies *the preservation of life*. at a new stage of positive results of the previous development.

When moving to a new opposite, to the next, third stage, development *seems to repeat* certain features and properties of the lower, first stage, supposedly *returns* to the starting point of the process, but at the same time enriches it with the results of subsequent development, reproduces these repeated features on a higher basis, and the whole process of development as a whole proceeds in converging and diverging ways. circles — *in a spiral*. Since every second stage of development is a negation of the first stage, and the new, third, stage in turn "negates" the second stage, the whole development appears as a negation of negation. Such, in short, is the rich content that Marxism-Leninism puts into the concept of negation of negation.

It is not uncommon to encounter a misconception when the negation of negation is seen as a rare case of development and it is difficult to find examples of it. Meanwhile, as Engels points out, the negation of negation is a very general and widely valid law of the development of nature, society, and human thinking, a law inherent *in every* process of development. Grain, Engels cites the well — known example, thrown into the ground, under normal conditions of its development turns into its negation — into an ear, which, reproducing grains again, in larger quantities and sometimes qualitatively improved, means, as it were, a return to the starting point. But in the same way the development of a tree, of any plant, of any insect, of any vegetable or animal organism takes place. The growth of man and his puberty, the pregnancy of a woman, new births and the development of a new man, subject to certain laws of heredity — is it not possible to see in all these phenomena the manifestation of the same great and universal law of negation *of the old*, and the emergence from this old *of a new one*, then of a new negation, reproducing in one on a qualitatively higher basis? Engels rightly pointed out that the negation of negation also takes place in inorganic nature, for example, in the processes of development of the Earth's crust, etc.

The law of negation of negation is also expressed in the development of human society. Marx and Engels view the historical preparation of socialist society from this angle, seeing it as a product of the entire past — a "negated" and "overcome" historical development. Such is the historical development of property — the transition from primitive communal ownership of land to private land ownership — and — a new negation of this latter — social ownership of land under socialism; such is the transition from generic ownership by combining genera to the ancient "collective private ownership", and then to individual ownership, after which the concentration of private ownership begins again.

In *Capital*, Marx summed up the main historical "tendency of capitalist accumulation" in development through the negation of negation. Marx shows how small-scale production and private property, based on their own labor, themselves prepare the conditions for their negation, their destruction. The expropriation of direct producers is "the transformation of individual and fragmented instruments of production into socially concentrated ones" that belong to the capitalist. Together with the victory of the capitalist mode of production, the further socialization of labor and the means of production takes a different form. The very immanent laws of the capitalist mode of production — through the concentration of capital, the development of a cooperative form of the labor process, and the transformation of the means of production into those that can only be used socially, causing the growth of poverty, exploitation, and indignation of the ever-growing working class, trained, united, and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of production —

are preparing a new negation: the expropriation of the expropriators the destruction of capitalism. Under socialism, public ownership of the means of production is harmoniously combined with individual ownership of the means of consumption.

Finally *in the sphere of human thinking* it is not difficult to notice the same stages of development. Lenin depicted the course of development of philosophical thought in the form of "circles", and pointed out that the point here is not in a strictly chronological sequence, but in identifying the main lines of development of thinking: Holbach's materialism, the denial of the possibility of knowledge in Hume-Kant, the denial of this denial in Hegel's idealistic dialectic: Hegel's idealistic dialectic, the return to metaphysical materialism in The negation of negation in Marx's materialist dialectic, which "repeats" Hegel's dialectic, but also refines and enriches it with materialist content. The same kind of development is shown by Engels in Anti-Duhring. The ancient Greek naive dialectic is, as it were, the first stage, which is then denied by the metaphysical materialism that has spread in the subsequent period. But metaphysical materialism is also denied. Modern materialist dialectics is a form of materialism that holds back all that is positive' what was in the previous development, but in an improved form. And here the same rhythm of development — the previous stage somehow prepares the transition to the opposite side and then to a new negation, as if returning to the starting point, but on a higher basis.

Совершенно очевидно *The connection of this law of dialectics with the law of the unity of opposites is quite obvious*. In each case of the unity of opposites, among the contradictory tendencies that characterize a phenomenon, we can distinguish *a positive moment* that confirms this phenomenon, contributes to the preservation of the temporary, conditional unity of its opposites, and another *negative moment*, the development of which leads to the struggle of opposites, to overcoming this form, to resolving the contradiction. In addition to the nutrient substance that forms it, the grain contains the embryo of the future plant, which assimilates this nutrient as it grows; in the private property of the small commodity producer, the beginning of future capitalist property — its negation-is already laid. The negative moment of development is in an internal *connection* with the positive moment. The old positive content of the developing object is not rejected in vain, is not completely destroyed in the process of its negation: it serves both *as a prerequisite* and as the material that needs to be reworked and *assimilated* by a new stage of development, using everything that is valuable and viable in it, moving forward.

Negation in dialectics, as we have already seen, is by no means a bare, empty negation. Dialectical negation is also *not the skeptical* negation that is characteristic of subjectivism, relativism, sophistry, and eclecticism, which casts doubt on everything and is based on nothing concrete. Negation is *overcoming* or, as Hegel puts it, *the removal of* the former, old stage of development, i.e., its negation with the retention of all the positive things created by the previous development. Negation is the driving force of development; it is the "evil" that, in Marx's words, "leads forward." But in this way the positive content of a given phenomenon, which is negated in further development, not only prepares itself for its negation, but in a certain sense it *is preserved* in the negative, overcome, processed by it, and passes in its negation to a higher level.

There is not a grain of subjectivism or bare skepticism in denial in this way. Denial is a certain moment, a stage of objective development that requires certain answers and certain actions.

Emphasizing the unity, connection of the negative with the positive, and the finding of this positive in the negative, Lenin wrote : " Not bare negation, not vain negation, *not skeptical* negation, hesitation, doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics, which undoubtedly contains an element of negation and moreover as its most important element — no, but *negation as a moment connections, as a moment of development, with the retention of the positive*, that is, without any fluctuations, without any eclecticism²³⁸."

Development through *denial* there is only another expression of development through the interpenetration and struggle of opposites; *the negation of negation* there is a further specification

238 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 285. Последнее подчеркнуто нами. — Авт.

of the same law in a number of stages of this development.

If the transformation of quantity into quality explains the emergence of new qualities, then the negation of negation shows how *new it is*. quality by self-negation arises from *the old* quality, reveals the inner connection between *the new and the old* as successive stages of development. Only the conscious application of all the laws of dialectics fully reveals to us the problem of the new, the problem of development, the problem of revolution.

Summing up the process of development in the formula "negation of negation", materialist dialectics distinguishes *three types of development*: the most important stages, the starting point, the negation stage, and the third, higher stage of returning to the starting point-negation of negation. However, it would be a mistake to assume that this stage of negation *ends* the process of development: development knows no boundaries, the negation of negation not only completes the course of the previous development, but in turn serves as a starting point for *further development* development, for the emergence of new contradictions, for new "negations".

This external form of the three stages of development, with a return to the starting point, has long been noticed by a number of thinkers. The idea of development in three successive stages was reflected in the ancient mystical-religious philosophy, the so-called Neo-Platonists. Later, the brilliant J. R. R. Tolkien taught about the development of "circles". Vico. As Lenin notes, " both astronomical and mechanical movement (on earth), and the life of plants, animals, and humans — all this drove into the minds of mankind not only the idea of movement , but precisely *movement with returns to the starting points*, i.e., dialectical movement²³⁹." Hegel gave it expression in his famous "*triad* — - thesis (proposition), antithesis (opposition), synthesis (unity) — simultaneously negating and preserving both propositions. In the form of a "triad" according to Hegel, the self-development of the spirit, the self-development of each logical category, takes place. In accordance with this triadic scheme, Hegel overcomes and "removes" the contradictions of concepts in a purely intellectual way, but without achieving a genuine solution of the real contradictions of the objective world. The logical stages of the " triad", which" negate " one another, are connected in Hegel by artificial logical transitions that do not reflect the actual material, natural-historical and socio-historical connection.

Revisionists of all persuasions have long accused Marxist dialectics of subordinating real development to the far-fetched scheme of Hegel's "triad": critics claim that in this purely scholastic way, without any other evidence, Marxism allegedly seeks to justify the contradictory course of historical development and the inevitability of revolution. Such an accusation was made against Marx's Capital, his famous chapter on the law of capitalist accumulation, by the mechanist Duhring; this slander of Marxism was later repeated by Russian narodniks like N. Mikhailovsky and others.

In his critique of Duhring, Engels gave a brilliant answer to all such accusations. Engels emphasized that Marx does *not prove* anything by the negation of negation, but only summarizes and sums up in this general dialectical formulation his long and careful study of the real, concrete, historical process of the development of capitalism and its historical tendencies, which are reflected in the entire vast material of Capital. It is only as a result of a concrete historical study, supported by vast factual material, that Marx further characterizes this process as taking place according to a certain dialectical law. By embracing the most diverse phenomena in one universal formula of negation of negation, Engels pointed out, we are not yet saying anything about *the peculiarities* of each individual process of development. Meanwhile, it is necessary to deny not in vain, but in such a way that both the first and second "negations" express the process of real *development* : "the method of negation is determined... first, *by the general* , and secondly, *by the special* nature of this process²⁴⁰." Only *a concrete*, comprehensive study of each individual case of development based on factual material can give such a deep understanding of all *the features and contradictory* stages of this process that it becomes possible to characterize this development in one particular respect or

239 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 301. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

240 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 100. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

another as occurring according to the general law of negation of negation.

Lenin also resolutely rejects the Narodniks 'accusation of Marxists in reducing evidence to Hegelian' triads "and an" unquestionable " dialectical scheme. Lenin explains to Mikhailovsky that the very term "negation of negation" in Marx and Engels is only a "mode of expression" indicating a historical *origin* materialist dialectic, which had as one of its sources the dialectic of Hegel. In Lenin's words, Marx "recognized as the only criterion of a theory *its fidelity to reality*." If ... it sometimes turned out that the development of some social phenomenon fell under the Hegelian scheme: position, negation-negation of negation, then nothing is surprising, because in *nature this is not uncommon* »²⁴¹at all." Only with Hegel's *idealistic* understanding of development, in which the development of reality is subordinated to the development of the idea, can we interpret the meaning of "triads", of the "indisputability" of the dialectical process. In Marxist dialectics, however, " there is no other place for triads than the role of the lid and the husk"²⁴². The essence of the law of negation of negation is not in the external form of "triads", but in the concrete study of the internal features of the process, which inevitably lead development to sharp turns, preparing its " self-negation", in the study of successive stages of development of the new from the old, in the assimilation and processing of the old at a new, higher level.

And much later Lenin proved to Comrade Bukharin, who misused *the word* "dialectical negation", that "it is impossible to use it without *first* proving it carefully"²⁴³by facts." At the same time, Lenin raises the Marxist understanding of the negation of negation to a new level, formulating its connection with the law of the unity of opposites, emphasizing as a characteristic feature of dialectical development the sequence of inevitable *stages* of development, the course of development in "circles", in *a spiral*, with inevitable turns, with returns, as it were, to the starting point, revealing the contradictory path of development of the new old and *new connection* with the old one in this development.

Studying the process of development of our Party and the party struggle, in particular by analyzing the materials of the Second Party Congress, Lenin showed that *the development of the party struggle is subject to the same law of negation of negation* and it proceeds along the path of contradictions: the minority at the congress becomes the majority, the majority becomes the minority; the starting point of the ideological struggle over paragraph 1 of the charter is denied, giving way to unprincipled questions, and then the *negation of the negation* begins, a return to the starting point of the ideological struggle; but the "thesis" has already been enriched with all the results of the "antithesis" and has The highest "synthesis" is when two different systems of views are already linked to the correct or incorrect position on point 1, and the revolutionary and opportunist wings of the party are revealed. "In a word," Lenin wrote, "not only is the oats growing according to Hegel, but the Russian social-Democrats are also fighting among themselves according to Hegel"²⁴⁴."

However, this recognition of the contradictory development of the party struggle should by no means justify sophistry, eclecticism, zigzags and personal mistakes of political figures: "True dialectics does not justify personal mistakes, but studies *the inevitable turns* , proving their inevitability on the basis of *a detailed study of development in all its concreteness*"²⁴⁵."

241 Ленин, Что такое «друзья народа» и как они воюют против социал-демократов?, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. I, стр. 80. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

242 Ленин, Что такое «друзья народа» и как они воюют против социал-демократов?, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. I, стр. 84.

243 «Ленинский сборник» XI, стр. 378.

244 Ленин, Шаг вперёд, два шага назад, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. VI, стр. 326.

245 Ленин, Шаг вперёд, два шага назад, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. VI, стр. 326. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

The ways of developing the party struggle through contradictions were particularly clearly outlined during the transition period. The struggle against the anti-Bolshevik, Menshevik, position of Kamenev and Zinoviev on the eve and during the October period, the struggle against the "left" communists after the victory of the proletarian Revolution in the Brest period, the concentration of fire "to the left" against Trotskyism in the reconstruction period, then the transformation of right opportunism into the main danger in the era of socialist reconstruction, then the "synthesis" of right and left in the "right-left" block, etc. Com. Stalin further develops Lenin's teaching on the contradictory nature of the process of development and the sequence of stages traversed, on the contradictory paths of development of the Soviet state, national forms and international content of culture, and so on.

Mechanists purely *outwardly* they understood the negation of negation, taking it as a Hegelian "triad", filling it with a different, mechanistic content: Thus Comrade Bukharin reduced the negation of negation to a "disturbance of equilibrium" and then to a new "restoration" of this equilibrium, depending on the conditions of the external environment.

The Menshevik idealists have substituted an eclectic synthesis for the negation of negation, a combination of pieces *of the old* : dialectical materialism, according to Deborin, is a synthesis of Hegel's dialectic and Feuerbach's materialism. From the point of view of right-wing opportunism, the entire transitional epoch is the restoration of the equilibrium disturbed by the October Revolution; it is not surprising that, according to Bukharin, all development takes place in the order of smooth evolution, without class contradictions, without the need to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotskyists and "left" opportunists made logical "leaps" through the necessary *stages* of development.

Neither the right nor the "left" understood what was new in the system of socialist relations of production, the contradictory ways of its development, and the role of the old in relation to the new in the development of the proletarian revolution.

4.4. Essence, phenomenon, content, form

In the previous chapters, we found out *the main features of* laws of materialistic dialectics. However, materialistic dialectics as a science is by no means limited to them. It is necessary to find out why scientific knowledge of the objective world consists in knowing the laws of its development; it is necessary to show how the laws of special forms of movement and development of this objective world reveal the essence of phenomena and processes occurring in it. In this connection, we must focus on such important categories of dialectics as phenomenon and essence.

The practice of a social person, which transforms the world, is the basis on which our knowledge of the internal connections of phenomena develops, not limited to their external appearance.

The task of scientific knowledge is to penetrate into the depths of things, to reveal their inner connections hidden by their external, immediate visibility, to deepen our knowledge of the quality of things, to reveal their identity and difference behind the phenomena of reality, to discover the most common and important things in them — their basis, their *essence*, the necessary natural connection of phenomena. The historical practice of social man, the practice of material production and class struggle generates and fixes the main categories of scientific knowledge—essence, regularity, causality, etc.

The most general and basic concept of scientific knowledge, which indicates the penetration of knowledge into the depths of things — is the concept of their inner connection, their *essence*, which is opposed to direct phenomena.

The concept of the inner connection, the regularity of phenomena, their essence hidden behind direct phenomena, appears already at the early stages of the history of human thinking, but only gradually receives its materialistic content. Even animals, as Engels points out, are characterized by the germs of abstraction (representation of the genus) and analysis (breaking nuts). The process of labor, which distinguishes human society from nature, leads man to the mastery of nature, to the

ability to "comprehend and correctly apply its laws", develops in him the ability to "foresee... and regulate ... the consequences... of ordinary productive processes"²⁴⁶. Using the example of the theory of heat, Engels shows how slowly the knowledge of internal connections and laws develops, covering many centuries and millennia. Already the ancient Greek philosophers (Eleatics) sought to find the essence of all things. The concept of essence acquired a metaphysical character in the Middle Ages (the doctrine of the unchangeable "essences" of things, "elements" , etc.). Only with the success of physics and chemical analysis did the materialistic view of the essence of things strengthen. Kant, as we have already seen, turned the essence of things into a world of unknowable "things-in-themselves", which for him is divorced from the world of phenomena. This metaphysical gap between the essence and appearance of things, drawn by Kant's philosophy, was most severely criticized by Hegel. Hegel overcomes the old, metaphysical view of essence as something otherworldly, unchangeable, immobile, and fundamentally isolated from the world of visible phenomena. Hegel establishes *the relative* character of the concept of "essence", its close interdependence with the world of phenomena, with the externally opposite "appearance": the inner essence of things, Hegel points out, reveals itself only in phenomena. Hence the importance of studying phenomena for understanding the very essence of things.

But the concept of "essence" was developed in Hegel in a purely idealistic way: through logical development, essence, as it were, *constructs* its "reality". The concept of essence receives a truly deep, materialistic meaning *сущности* only in materialist dialectics, on the basis of Marx and Engels' study of the essence of social life, in the process of developing the class struggle of the proletariat. Marx does not ignore "essences" as some vulgar materialists and creeping empiricists tend to do. "If," he says, "the form of manifestation and the essence of things coincided directly, then all science would be superfluous"²⁴⁷. "Dialectics," Lenin observes, "requires a comprehensive study of a given social phenomenon in its development and the reduction of *the external, apparent , to the fundamental driving forces*, to the development of the productive forces and to the class struggle"²⁴⁸." At the same time, Lenin emphasizes the unity of essence and phenomenon, their transition from one to the other. "We see," Lenin gives a materialist description, "a transition, an overflow of one into the other: the essence *appears* . The phenomenon *is significant* . Man's thought goes infinitely deeper from phenomenon to essence, from the essence of the first, so to speak, to the essence of the second order, and so on *without end* »"²⁴⁹."

In Marx, Engels, and Lenin we have the opposition of the inner connection of things to their immediate "appearance", and at the same time the recognition of the unity of essence and phenomenon, internal and external. The essence is not *outside* phenomena, it *is in them* , although this essence of things does not always appear in phenomena entirely and *directly* . The essence of phenomena is their *relation* , their *inner connection*, it is a pattern that penetrates phenomena, a *holistic unity* a given set of phenomena. "Human nature," Marx criticizes Feuerbach's abstract view, "is not an abstract inherent in the individual. In its reality, it is *the totality of social relations* »"²⁵⁰."

Marx's *Das Kapital* reveals to us the enormous scientific significance of the category of "essence." In exploring the essence of capitalist production, Marx begins his research with immediate existence, with the commodity. The analysis of the commodity as a social relation, a logical and historical analysis verified by facts and practice, reveals in the commodity the unity of

246 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 57–58.

247 Маркс, Капитал, т. III, 1932 г., стр. 589.

248 Ленин, Крах II Интернационала, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVIII, стр. 347–348. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

249 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 183. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

250 Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах, Тезисы о Фейербахе, 1933 г., стр. 60. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

use — value and value, the unity of immediate *phenomenon and essence* ; the analysis reveals in different commodities that common unity which makes different commodities appear qualitatively identical-value, the measure of which is socially necessary labor. "Labor," says Marx, " is that in which different commodities are identical, their *unity* , their *essence* , the inner basis of their value²⁵¹." Different things, he points out, "must be considered as corresponding embodiments , expressions of *the same general unity*, an element that is completely different from their natural existence or appearance²⁵²." Marx traces this unity of essence and phenomenon to such economic categories as price and value, price, supply and demand, wages and the price of labor power, and so on.

The same important role is played by Marx's category of essence in the analysis of surplus value. Analyzing surplus-value and its division into parts, Marx points out that it takes special forms, independent of each other and regulated by different laws. Therefore, " their common unity — surplus value — and therefore the nature of this common unity-becomes more and more unrecognizable, it does not appear in *the phenomenon* , but only has to be revealed as a hidden mystery²⁵³."

Considering the transformation of the rate of surplus-value into the rate of profit, Marx notes that "historically, the starting point was the rate of profit. Surplus-value and the rate of surplus-value represent, relatively speaking, something invisible that requires essential disclosure, while the rate of profit, and therefore such a form of surplus-value as profit, are revealed on the surface of the phenomenon²⁵⁴." "Profit is a form of manifestation of surplus value, and the latter can only be extracted from the former by analysis²⁵⁵."

The concept of essence is equally important in the Marxist analysis of class relations of production. For example, referring to the fact that in the last unfinished chapter of Capital Marx speaks of "three great social classes"²⁵⁶ — landowners, capitalists, and workers — who receive rent, profit, and wages respectively, some authors consider all these three classes *to be the main* classes of bourgeois society, inextricably linked with the capitalist mode of production. Of course landowners play a very important role in the development of capitalism: As Marx points out, large landowners are the personification of one of the most essential conditions of production, land; moreover, the formation of large-scale land ownership is a historical prerequisite for capitalism, which requires the expropriation of working conditions from small landowners and the formation of a class of wage workers. Nevertheless, we must consider the class of large landowners as a derivative phenomenon that does not follow from *the essence* of the capitalist mode of production. "The capitalist and the wage-worker are the only agents and factors of production whose relation and opposition to each other results from *the essence* of the capitalist mode of production²⁵⁷." Capitalism is also possible if the land belongs to, say, the capitalist state, as long as it does not belong to the working class. Therefore, Marx considers "the reduction of the classes directly involved in production, based on the essence of the capitalist mode of production — and in contrast to the feudal, ancient, etc. — to capitalists and wage-workers, with the exception of the landowner,

251 Маркс, Теории прибавочной стоимости, т. III, 1932 г., стр. 107. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

252 Маркс, Теории прибавочной стоимости, т. III, 1932 г., стр. 98–99.

253 Маркс, Теории прибавочной стоимости, т. III, 1932 г., стр. 356.

254 Маркс, Капитал, т. III, 1932 г., стр. 15.

255 Маркс, Капитал, т. III, 1932 г., стр. 18.

256 Маркс, Капитал, т. III, 1932 г., стр. 638–639.

257 Маркс, Теории прибавочной стоимости, т. II, 1932 г., стр. 198–199. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

which comes only post factum thanks to the relations of ownership of the forces of nature, *which did not grow* out of the capitalist mode of production, *but inherited* "...an adequate theoretical expression of the capitalist mode of production"²⁵⁸. Starting from this essence of capitalism, however, we must also begin to consider the important role that the landowner class, as the third major class of bourgeois society, plays in the concrete historical conditions of the development of capitalism, in capitalist reality.

The concept of "essence" is further developed in the works of Lenin and Stalin. In the struggle with Trotsky and Bukharin on the question of trade unions, where Lenin gives a brief description of dialectical logic, he demands that we "*study*: first, the essence of disagreements, and, secondly, the development of the party struggle. Both are necessary, "Lenin said," for the essence of disagreements is developed, clarified, concretized (and often modified) *in the course of the struggle*»²⁵⁹."

Lenin further develops the Marxist doctrine of the essence, paying special attention *to the development of* the essence and its *concretization*, finding out the relationship of the essence with *concrete phenomena*, with the apparent, with the insignificant — their relationship, their *unity*. Kant not only separated the world of phenomena from the world of "things-in-themselves", but at the same time turned the appearance of the phenomena of reality into something purely subjective. Having sharply criticized Kant's subjectivism, Hegel emphasized the objective significance of the appearance of a given world of phenomena. He showed that the appearance of a thing is a manifestation of the thing itself, of its essence in one of the moments of its movement, that the appearance of things is a special expression, *a manifestation of their very essence*. Hegel showed that the inner essence of things is not something immobile, detached from the world of phenomena, that the appearance of things is not "nothing" in the sense of objectively non-existent, as the Kantians think. The apparent and visible are the nonessential aspects of the thing, the "nothing", but these nonessential moments also simultaneously reflect a certain *moment* in the movement of the *objective* essence of the thing itself. But the idealist Hegel sees in the movement from essence to appearance a purely logical movement- "from nothing to nothing." Lenin here corrects the idealist Hegel by pointing out that the movement even towards the vanishing "non-essential" is always a movement "away from something", while emphasizing the materialistic nature of the concept of essence and its connection with the concrete world of phenomena, with the "non-essential". "The non — essential, the apparent, the superficial more often disappears," Lenin comments and corrects Hegel, "it does not hold on so" tightly", does not" sit firmly "as"essence". For example: river movement — foam at the top and deep currents at the bottom. *But foam* is also an expression of essence²⁶⁰."

Not only essence, but also everything that is not essential has an objective meaning: essence expresses the general unity, the necessary inner connection of things, and everything that is not essential, which we discard in the analysis of essence, is separate facts, a single, accidental, external *existence* things. But the external existence of each individual object also has its basis in the internal essence, in the internal connections, laws of the given object. On the other hand, the general exists only in the separate, in the singular, and the essence of things cannot be conceived outside of the things themselves, outside of the unity of the essence and its manifestations, outside *of the mediation* of this essence, that is, outside *of the realization* its in real life. The essence of a given phenomenon must be studied in all *the connections* of the subject, in its *development*, at *specific* stages of this development, in the process *of the struggle* that is being waged for the course of its development.

In a whole series of Lenin's speeches in connection with the development of the 1917

258 Маркс, Теории прибавочной стоимости, т. II, 1932 г., стр. 200.

259 Ленин, Кризис партии, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 87.

260 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 107.

revolution, one can trace this only correct approach to the study of the class essence of historical phenomena. Thus, in his "Letters on Tactics", criticizing Kamenev's position, Lenin notes that the old Bolshevik formulas about the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry are *generally* confirmed by history, but their concrete *implementation* in fact, it turned out to be more complex. The February Revolution meant the transfer of power to the bourgeoisie. At the same time, however, a secondary government was established and existed in the form of soviets of workers 'and soldiers' deputies, who voluntarily surrendered their power to the bourgeoisie. As early as April 1917, the indignation of the masses of the people deceived by defencism began, and this is "the essence of the crisis, which must be strictly distinguished from the opinions and assumptions of individuals and parties." Lenin goes on to analyze *the essence* of the bourgeoisie's maneuver to turn the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries into appendages to the bourgeois government. In this connection, he reveals the class essence of the struggle of the Cadets and Mensheviks against the Bolshevik Party. Lenin elucidates the essence of the class position of the petty bourgeoisie, which strives to take the "middle line" in the class struggle. Whatever the external forms, the essence lies in *the relationship of classes*.

In the course of the July events, Lenin elucidates *the modification of the essence* of the slogan "all power to the Soviets", as well as the essence of the conditions that in the preceding period made possible the peaceful development of the revolution. "The essence of the matter is that power cannot be taken peacefully right now"²⁶¹; in fact, power has passed into the hands of a military gang; one cannot mistake the deceptive *appearance* of the Kerensky government for *its essence* and not see its Bonapartist essence. Lenin proves to Kautsky and Co. that "the economic *essence* of capitalist exploitation is not in the least affected by the substitution *форм* of republican-democratic forms of government for monarchical ones"... etc., etc.

Lenin explains with equal clarity the class essence of Marx's teaching on the state and the fundamental difference between the proletarian state and the bourgeois one: "The essence of Marx's teaching on the state has been assimilated only by those who have understood that the dictatorship *of one class* is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for the *proletariat* that overthrew the bourgeoisie, but also for *the period* that separates capitalism from a" society without classes", from communism. The forms of bourgeois states are extremely diverse, but their essence is the same: all these states are in one way or another, but in the final analysis necessarily *the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*. The transition from capitalism to communism, of course, cannot fail to produce an enormous abundance and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: *the dictatorship of the proletariat* »²⁶²." Lenin also clearly describes the main essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat: "Its main essence lies in the organization and discipline of the advanced detachment of workers, its vanguard, its sole leader, the proletariat"²⁶³."

An in-depth analysis of the essence of the October Revolution and the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat can be found in vol. Of Stalin. The essence of the October Revolution vol. Stalin sees in two of its peculiarities: first, that the dictatorship of the proletariat was born in our country out of the power that emerged on the basis of the union of the proletarian and working masses of the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat; second, that the dictatorship of the proletariat was established in our country as the result of the victory of socialism in one country, capitalistically it is poorly developed, while maintaining capitalism in capitalistically more developed countries. There is *an essential* and fundamental difference between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, i.e., the dictatorship of the exploiting minority over the exploited majority, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the dictatorship of the majority over the exploiting minority. "The essence of Soviet power lies in the fact that the most mass and most revolutionary organizations of

261 Ленин, К лозунгам, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXI, стр. 35.

262 Ленин, Государство и революция, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXI, стр. 393.

263 Ленин, Привет венгерским рабочим, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXIV, стр. 314.

the very classes that were oppressed by the capitalists and landlords are now' *permanent and unique* the basis of all state power, the entire state apparatus"²⁶⁴.

In this connection, the critique of vol. Stalin's attempts at vol. Zinoviev identified the concept of the dictatorship *of the proletariat* with the concept of the dictatorship *of the party*. As T. points out Stalin, Lenin only *in a certain sense* what is meant by the dictatorship of the proletariat *in essence?* the dictatorship of its organized and conscious minority, i.e., of the party—precisely in the sense *of the leading role* of the party. "To say - "in essence", - explains T. Stalin Lenin's thought does not mean to say " in its entirety." We often say that the national question is essentially a peasant question. And this is absolutely correct. But this does not mean that the national question is covered by the peasant question... the dictatorship of the proletariat is broader and richer in scope than the leading role of the party"²⁶⁵.

The Party *exercises* its leadership *through* tips, *via* through the medium of the masses, listening sensitively to their voice. Zinoviev did not see these intermediary links through which the party leadership finds its fulfillment. According to Zinoviev, the dictatorship of the proletariat is directly exercised by the party. Zinoviev, therefore, identified the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in a certain sense ("leadership") with the concrete form of its implementation.

According to all these instructions of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, the essence of an object or question, its "core", must not only be revealed, "plucked" out of "non-essential", i.e., random, isolated facts: we must simultaneously consider the movement of this essence, its formation, its transition into the form of its manifestation, its realization. The essence of any thing is not a dead immobile abstraction, a certain "self-identical" "essence, not a" thing-in-itself", but an internal natural connection of phenomena, their basis for the correct understanding of which various specific moments of its manifestation are needed. Therefore, we must see in the very essence *the unity of opposites*, the living unity of identity and difference between positive (positive) and negative (negative), movement, *transition* from one to the other.

In the process of historical practice of a social person, along with the concept of essence, another, more specific one-order category develops, showing *how* essence is related to the form of its manifestation and development. This is the concept *of the foundation*, the basis. "Smaller philosophers," Lenin explains, " argue about whether to take the essence *or* the immediate given as a basis (Kant, Hume, all the Machists). Hegel *unputs and instead of or*, explaining the concrete content of this "and"²⁶⁶.

"Essence" and " basis — are concepts of the same order. The basis—the same essence, taken in the inner necessity of its transition into its mediation, expresses not only the interpenetration of opposites, but also their struggle. The basis expresses the actual connection of these opposites. Identity and difference, necessity and chance, cause and effect—these two contradictory moments, *considered separately, become one another*. "And then, "notes Engels, "the' foundations ' must come to the rescue *основания*."²⁶⁷.

In historical development, the various becomes identical, and in the identical differences are revealed, necessity manifests itself in the form of various accidents, and so on. In order not to get lost in this eternal and continuous *interaction* of phenomena, in order not to fall into eclecticism and sophistry, we must reveal *the basis*, the decisive principle *in this contradictory process*, we must reveal on what *basis* this interpenetration of opposites takes place.

Mechanists usually separated the basis from the justified, did not see *the transition* of the basis into their consequence. For idealistic philosophers like Leibniz, "reason" was a purely logical

264 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 34.

265 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 206.

266 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 115.

267 Энгельс, Диалектика природы, стр. 112. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

concept, through which they tried *рационалистическото* to rationalize the regularity of phenomena. The law of "sufficient reason" as a more flexible and subjectivist formulation was put forward by them against the supposedly "mechanistic" study of the causal relationship of phenomena. Everything that exists has its own "sufficient foundation", this empty and vague formula said. Hegel already distinguishes from the purely logical "formal ground" the "real ground" that actually generates a given consequence, but understands it as a certain stage of development of the spirit.

The practice of the proletarian struggle raises for Marx and Engels the most difficult question — the foundations of social life. Overcoming and generalizing the achievements of contemporary knowledge, Marx overcomes Hegelian idealism, putting a new, materialistic content into the concept of a real basis. In the field of social life, we are dealing with the economic *basis* as the real basis on which political forms and ideological superstructures grow. The historical practice of the proletariat gives further development to the concept of the basis in the works of Lenin and Stalin. Large-scale industry, we say, is the material basis of a socialist economy. It was impossible to continue to develop on two different economic bases, on the basis of large-scale socialist industry and on the basis of small-scale agriculture, pointed out T. V. Lenin. Stalin, justifying the slogan of collectivization of agriculture. We highlight the main thing in the special and new things that Lenin brought to the treasury of Marxism when he spoke about *the foundations* of Leninism.

In any thing and any process, we find *an internal connection* of various *external properties*, "mediations", manifestations taken in unity with their inner essence, with the regularity that manifests itself in them. The concept of external and internal — therefore, both are necessary to characterize the development process. To understand the nature of the development of any process, we must proceed from its essence, that is, from its internal connections and relations. This is the true *basis of development*, and this is not understood by mechanists who seek to reduce development to a series of *external factors*. or look for its basis in an external push. But it would be wrong to forget the role that external conditions play for development, in which the internal properties of a thing receive their concrete development; it would be wrong, as the Menshevik idealists do, to limit development to deducing it from *the internal* properties of the object, without taking into account the role of *external* conditions for development. We proceed from the unity of the internal and external in the development of nature and society, and the leading role is played by internal regularity, say, the internal regularity of the development of a certain formation.

The essence is not *on the other side* of phenomena. *Phenomena*, manifestations of essence, are by no means something lower than the very *essence* of phenomena, as Kantian philosophy believed. On the contrary, the world of phenomena is a richer, more definite, more concrete being than the essence taken *by itself*, separated from its manifestations, because the concrete manifestations of the essence *presuppose* the existence of an internal connection in them. Development reveals the objective opposition of essence and phenomena, since each individual phenomenon *does not fully* reveal the essence. But the very development of matter makes this opposition — essence and phenomena, external and internal, ground and grounded — *relative*; it gives *a solution* according to their contradiction, development is carried out only with the active role of both internal and external conditions. *The unity of the inner and the outer, the unity of the essence and the form of manifestation*—this is the most important position that runs like a red thread through the entire Marxist dialectic.

This unity is clearly expressed in *the content*. The content of every phenomenon is simultaneously *juxtaposed with its form* and at the same time presupposes a certain form: the content both generates the form and includes this form.

Value is the economic content in which its essence, social labor, is crystallized and which simultaneously finds its "definiteness of form" in exchange value. The material relations of production are a social content that always assumes one or another "historically social definiteness", i.e., the form of *certain* production relations, a certain economy: capitalist, socialist, etc.

Content and form are in dialectical unity: *they pass into one another, manifest themselves in one another, and condition the development of one into the other*. "Form," says Hegel, "is content

passing into form ; content is form passing into content²⁶⁸." The form is therefore not passive in the development process: as *an essential point of content* form back *active* influences the course of content development and changes in it. In contrast to all idealism, Marxism, when speaking of the unity of content and form, emphasizes *the leading role of content* — in contradictions and in *the struggle* of content and form. Content generates, conditions, and determines its form. But at the same time, it always presupposes the presence of one form or another. There is no unformulated content, just as there is no empty form. Form is the law of the structure of content, its definite structure, which represents its essential moment, but is determined by the essence of this phenomenon. "Form is essential," Lenin points out. "The entity is formed in one way or another depending on the entity"²⁶⁹."

The form is thus not alien to the essence, content, and at the same time opposes it as a special, defining moment of the essence, content. They mutually penetrate each other in the unity of the subject and the process of development. Nevertheless *основу*, we must always look for the objective basis (essence) of this unity in the content, without identifying it with the form.

Historical development leads to the fact that the inner turns into the outer and vice versa. This leads to the fact that *the form* seems to *be separated from the content* . It gets its *own* relatively independent development. The form is opposed to the content as something external that hinders its development; it sometimes lags behind the development of the content and contradicts its further development. In the process of development, therefore, there is a "struggle" of content with form and vice versa. Resetting the form, reworking the content"²⁷⁰. The old form, which has become external to the content, is discarded in its further development by overcoming the resistance of the form. Finally, a new form that has matured along with the content is approved and begins to actively contribute to its further alteration. This is precisely the case with the productive forces and relations of production, with the political and legal forms and economic content of modern capitalist society.

Historical materialism focuses on the contradictions and conflicts between the material *foundations* of production and its social *form* . The contradiction of content and form occupies an important place in Marx's analysis of capitalist society. Having revealed the contradictory nature of commodity production, Marx further concretizes it as a contradiction between the socially necessary content of value and the form of value (exchange value). On the other hand, by analyzing the external manifestations of capitalist reality, Marx teaches us to distinguish between the economic content of commodity transactions and their legal forms.

The dialectical movement of the economic categories of commodity, value, money, capital, surplus value, rent, etc., analyzed by Marx in *Capital*, reflects the class relations of people. A thing, a product of labor, takes the form of a commodity with its inherent contradiction, not because of the natural properties of this product, but because of a certain attitude of people in the process of production and distribution. This is the case with all other economic phenomena. In his review of the *Critique of Political Economy*, Engels says: "Political economy does not deal with things, but with relations between people and, ultimately, between classes, but these relations are always *connected with things and manifest themselves as things* »²⁷¹."

Marx expressed the same idea as follows:

"Goods cannot be sent to the market and exchanged among themselves... In order for these things to relate to each other as commodities, the owners of goods must relate to each other as

268 Гегель, Наука логики, т. II, 1929 г., ч. 1.

269 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 135.

270 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 277.

271 Маркс, К критике политической экономии, 1933 г., стр. 209.

persons whose will dwells in these things²⁷²."

Idealists like Rubin and mechanists like Bukharin, Bessonov, A. Cohn, and others distort this basic dialectical-materialist position. In the former, the Kantian *separation of form from content*, the emasculation of all content, is obtained. The mechanists, on the other hand, completely fail to understand *the role and significance of the social form*, do not see the peculiar laws of various social formations, and thus also do not understand the actual processes of social development and class struggle. Consequently, wherever Marx exposes the dialectic of commodities, money, capital, value, surplus value, etc., we are essentially dealing with social relations that have taken on a material form. The economic law of movement of capitalist society, up to its last stage — imperialism — is an expression and reflection of the development and growth of class contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Here lies the point that fundamentally distinguishes Marxism from bourgeois theories. It seems to the bourgeois consciousness that commodities, money, value, and capital have natural properties that determine the attitude of people towards them and the attitude of people towards each other. "In the eyes of the latter," says Marx, "their own social movement takes the form of the movement of things under whose control they are, instead of controlling²⁷³ it." Marx's critique of commodity fetishism, which forms one of the most brilliant, if not the most brilliant, chapters in *Capital*, for the first time tears the misty veil from bourgeois economic relations. Marx's dialectical method has shown itself here to its full extent, with all its sharpness and clarity. Marx's dialectic behind the material form of the commodity revealed the social *content*. Marx's critique of *naturalism*, a mechanistic approach to social phenomena, showed *the specificity of quality* public relations. This gives the answer to the mystery of ideology, and in particular bourgeois ideology, which consists in the fact that every ideology reflects the social relations of people.

The problem of form and content is also given a detailed account in Marx's analysis of the question of productive forces and relations of production. In the introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx wrote: "*A dialectic of concepts, productive forces (means of production) and relations of production*, a dialectic whose boundaries are subject to definition and which does not eliminate the real distinction²⁷⁴." The dialectic of productive forces and relations of production is a dialectic of content and form. In *Capital*, Marx does not ignore the real difference between the productive forces and the relations of production, but establishes their unity. In fact, the relations of small commodity producers, which are reflected in the internally contradictory nature of labor and commodities, are determined by the scattered and limited means of production of small-scale agriculture and handicrafts. Capitalist relations are based on the separation of the means of production from the direct producer. Finally, the socialist socialization of the means of production is inevitably accompanied by the socialization of production and distribution, the establishment of planning, etc. This mutual penetration of the productive forces (content) and the relations of production (form) is consistently shown in *Capital* on such economic phenomena as value, wages, crises, etc. The role of the productive forces in the formation of value (the problem of the average socially necessary time); the role of the productive forces in the enrichment of capital and the impoverishment of the worker the development of a "reserve" army of labor, the fall of the worker's wages below the value of labor — power, etc., due to the growth of the organic composition of capital; finally, crises — a clear indicator that the relations of production have already become fetters for the productive forces—all this Marx masterfully revealed the dialectical significance of the social class (the exploitation of women's and child labor), the creation of a "reserve" army of labor, the fall of the worker's wages below the value of labor-power, etc., due to the growth of the organic composition of capital. unity and difference of productive forces and relations of production.

272 Маркс, Капитал, т. I, 1932 г., стр. 41.

273 Маркс, Капитал, т. I, 1932 г., стр. 33–34.

274 Маркс, К критике политической экономии, 1933 г., стр. 35.

Marx established not only this relationship between the productive forces and the relations of production. He accurately indicated the basis of this connection. *Content* defines *the form*. In turn, the form as *a content form* does not remain external to the content, but represents *the form of content development*. The level of productive forces determines the relations of production, although the latter are forms of development of the productive forces. This, for example, was not understood by Proudhon, who believed that it is not the development of the means of production that determines the corresponding division of labor, but, on the contrary, the division of labor causes the need for a certain kind of means of labor:

"For Proudhon, who, if he sees things, sees them upside down, the division of labor, in the sense of A. Smith, is born before the workshop, while it is by it that its existence²⁷⁵ is conditioned."

The concepts of form and content are also particularly important for the scientific class analysis of imperialism. Thus, criticizing the absurd opinion of the opportunists that the internationalization of capital is a means of peace between peoples, and pointing out that international trusts and cartels are the clearest expression of the internal struggle between capitalists, Lenin says: "*the form* of the struggle can and does constantly change, depending on various, comparatively particular and temporary causes, but *the essence* of the struggle, its content, and its content, are class *content* downright *can't* change as long as classes exist... To substitute the question of *the content* of the struggle and deals between the capitalist unions for the question of the form of the struggle and deals (peaceful today, non-peaceful tomorrow, non-peaceful again the day after) is to stoop to the role of a sophist." Thus,²⁷⁶ using Trotsky's slogan of a united states of Europe as an example, Lenin shows how the slogan of a united states of the world is identical in its economic *content* with socialism after the victory of the proletarian revolution, and how under the conditions of capitalism this Trotskyist slogan is identical with the defense of imperialism and leads to misconceptions about the impossibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

In another case, in the Infantile Disease of "Leftism," drawing a line of struggle on two fronts — against right-wing and "left-wing" doctrinarianism in the understanding of the methods of struggle of international communism, Lenin points out that the new and powerful *content of the "left-wing" movement is based on the following principles*: the work of the Communist Party (the struggle for Soviet power, for the dictatorship of the proletariat) "can and *must* manifest itself in any form, both new and old, can and must regenerate, conquer, and subjugate all forms, not only new, but also old" ...²⁷⁷

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the main *content* the proletarian revolution. This fundamental position of Lenin and Stalin finds its concrete manifestation in the consideration of a number of more specific questions. This is for example the question about *the new form* proletarian democracy. "The forms of democracy inevitably changed over the course of thousands of years,"²⁷⁸ Lenin observes. It is absurd to assume that the deepest revolution in the world will take place within the framework of the old parliamentary, bourgeois democracy, "without creating *new forms* of democracy²⁷⁹." "The Soviet government," says T. V. Tolstoy. Stalin is *a new form* of state organization, fundamentally different from the old, bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary form, *a new type* of state²⁸⁰. "Real *content* In this new form of proletarian democracy, the real content of the

275 Маркс, Ницета философии, 1930 г., стр. 128.

276 Ленин, Империализм как высшая стадия капитализма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIX, стр. 130–131.

277 Ленин, Детская болезнь «левизны» в коммунизме, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXV, стр. 238.

278 Ленин, I конгресс Коммунистического интернационала, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXIV, стр. 12.

279 Ленин, I конгресс Коммунистического интернационала, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXIV, стр. 12. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

280 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 35.

tactics of the proletariat is the destruction of classes and the building of a socialist society. "The proletariat needs the abolition of classes—that is the real content of proletarian democracy, proletarian freedom..., proletarian equality... Anyone who has not understood this content of the dictatorship of the proletariat (or, what is the same thing, Soviet power or proletarian democracy) takes this word in vain²⁸¹."

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the basic content of the proletarian revolution and at the same time a new form of State in which the struggle for the complete abolition of classes is taking place. But the new powerful content can also use the old forms for its development, subjecting them to a radical change. These are the national forms of culture in which a new, international, proletarian content develops under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Sometimes a certain content can also appear in an outwardly opposite form. Such, for example, are the capitulatory, counter-revolutionary content and the "left" form of Trotskyist phraseology. "Capitulationism in practice as content," left-wing "phrases, and "revolutionary" adventurist tendencies as a form that conceals and advertises capitulationist content—such is the essence of Trotskyism²⁸²."

4.5. Law, reason, purpose

Materialistic knowledge of the phenomena of nature, society and thought in their *universal connection*, knowledge of the essence of each individual thing in its unity with the manifestations of this essence leads us to consider the laws prevailing in nature and society *законов*, to clarify the laws of development.

The concept of law reflects *the essential relation*, i.e., the relation of essence; the law acts in relation to phenomena, is realized in them not as an external force, but as an objective, immanent, internal tendency of their development inherent in the phenomena themselves. The law acts as a universal form of their internal connection.

"The concept of law," Lenin observes, "is one of the stages in man's cognition of the unity and connection, the interdependence and wholeness of the world process²⁸³."

Engels shows how historically our knowledge of the laws of nature gradually develops — how we gradually move from more particular generalizations over the course of thousands of years to the "judgment of universality". The practice and technique of material production play a decisive, definite role here. Even in prehistoric times, it was practically known that friction generates heat, but millennia passed before the judgment was made: friction *in general* there is a source of heat. Only in the era of industrial capitalism, in connection with the study of thermal energy sources, do Mayer and Joule propose a generalization: all mechanical motion is converted into heat by friction. *Further generalization* it leads to a more universal law: any form of movement under certain conditions turns into another form of movement. This is how knowledge of the general laws of nature develops historically.

Man cannot at once embrace, reflect, and display *the whole* of nature in its entirety; in Lenin's words, "he can only go on forever." approach this by creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world, etc²⁸⁴."

"The law is," Lenin emphasizes Hegel's thought, "the reflection of the essential in the

281 Ленин, О задачах III Интернационала, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXIV, стр. 398–399.

282 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 559.

283 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 145.

284 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 203.

movement of the universe²⁸⁵." But the concept of law is a dialectically contradictory concept that reflects the development of objective laws in their internal contradictions. In the law, we have something repetitive, *identical*, "solid", *remaining*, something unchangeable and "calm" in comparison with changing phenomena. The law takes *the essence* of the movement and development of phenomena in its abstract, "pure" form: the law is the "form of the universal" (*Engels*). "The law takes the calm," Lenin continues, "and therefore the law, every law, is narrow, incomplete, approximate"; in this sense ... "the phenomenon *is richer* than the law²⁸⁶."

However, the law should not be considered only as an abstraction from a set of *repetitive* phenomena. The law also has a *qualitative* side: it is fixed to us every time as a special necessary *trend of development*, in which the law seems to seek to *cover its* infinite manifestations and *needs to be realized* in them. In this respect, the abstraction of the law *злубже* reflects reality more deeply, or rather more fully, than each individual phenomenon. The law of value, Lenin pointed out, is much truer than every single manifestation of it, than every act of exchange, than the law of supply and demand. The law embraces and expresses each individual phenomenon approximately, relatively, at one stage of knowledge, on the one hand, in one relation; it does not give all the concrete completeness, all the integrity of the phenomenon, which can be fully known only through the knowledge of its infinite number of sides. In this sense, the law *is poorer* a single concrete, integral phenomenon. And at the same time, covering groups of homogeneous phenomena, the law is deeper, more accurate, more permanent than each of its individual manifestations. This is the peculiarity of the law, of every scientific abstraction that reflects the inner *inconsistency* of every development.

This internal inconsistency of the law is constantly emphasized by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. They are fighting for the only scientific, *natural* knowledge of reality-with every kind of idealistic denial or idealistic perversion of the meaning of the general laws of nature and society. At the same time, they struggle with the fetishistic, simplistic, vulgar understanding of the law as a certain unchangeable "absolute", which is directly and completely, in its "pure form", manifested in each individual concrete phenomenon. They emphasize the relative, historical nature of laws, and the variability of the laws themselves.

"The ultimate goal of this work," Marx says of *Capital*, "is to reveal the law of economic development of modern society²⁸⁷." At the same time, Marx strongly emphasizes the relative, historical, and transitory nature of the laws of capitalist society. He sharply criticizes the views of bourgeois economy, which sees in the laws of capitalism eternal "natural" laws. In the words of an early reviewer of *Das Kapital*, whose essay Marx himself recognized as successful, "for Marx, only one thing is important: to find the law of the phenomena that he is studying. And it is not only the law that governs them that is important to him, as long as they have a certain form and as long as they are in the relationship that is observed at a given time. For him, moreover, the law of *their mutability*, their development, i.e., the transition from one form to another, from one order of relations to another, is still important²⁸⁸." There are no general economic laws suitable for all times for Marx. "In his opinion, on the contrary, each historical period has *its own laws* »²⁸⁹." Its scientific goal is "to elucidate those *particular laws* that govern the emergence, existence, development, and

285 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 149. Ср. У Маркса: «Постоянная тенденция и закон развития капиталистического способа производства».

286 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 147–149.

287 Маркс, *Капитал*, т. I, 1932 г., Предисловие к 1-му изд., стр. XV.

288 Маркс, *Капитал*, т. I, 1932 г., Послесловие, стр. XXI. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

289 Маркс, *Капитал*, т. I, 1932 г., Послесловие, стр. XXII. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

death of a given social organism and its replacement by another, higher²⁹⁰ one."

Marx sharply contrasts the blind laws of the capitalist element with the laws of socialist society, understood by the collective intelligence of people and directed by them to their benefit.

Engels emphasizes the historical, relative nature of the laws of nature—seemingly universal, eternal, and unchangeable laws. He shows that physical laws — for example, the liquid state of water from 0 to 100° C - that these laws are ultimately determined by the conditions of the earth's planet and could be modified on the sun or on the moon. The most general formulation of the theory of energy transformation, according to Engels, in its application to the world system turns into a history of the domination of various laws at different stages of its development.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin are fighting against the abstract-fetishistic understanding of laws that is characteristic of both mechanism and idealism. They show that, while expressing the essence of phenomena "in its pure form" *сущность*, the laws cover only *approximately* a universal law of nature. Laws are implemented in concrete capitalist reality only in the midst of constant deviations, only as a dominant tendency that overcomes constant violations of laws, i.e., as a certain average of constant fluctuations and deviations from the law. The law of value, the universal law of capitalist accumulation, the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, etc. — Marx treats all phenomena of capitalist reality in this natural form. At the same time, Marx emphasizes not only *the historical* character of the laws of capitalist production, but also the fact that they are only roughly implemented in capitalist reality as dominant *tendencies* that seek to eliminate and overcome fluctuations and deviations. "In general," says Marx, "in capitalist production, every *general law is realized only as a dominant tendency*, in a very confused and approximate way, as a certain *average of constant fluctuations*, which can never be sufficiently established²⁹¹."

Elsewhere, noting that the prices of commodities deviate from their value, and that commodities are sold in capitalist society in accordance with their market value only in those rare cases when supply and demand cease to function and cover each other, Marx explains: "The actual internal laws of capitalist production obviously cannot be explained from the theory of production. the interaction of supply and demand..., since these laws are implemented in *their purest form* only when supply and demand cease to operate, i.e. cover each other. Supply and demand never really cover each other, or if they do, it is only *by chance*, and therefore, from a scientific point of view, this case should be equated to zero, should be considered as nonexistent. However, in political economy, they are assumed to cover each other. Why? This is done in order to *consider phenomena in their natural form, corresponding to their concept*, that is, to consider them regardless of what they *seem* due to fluctuations in supply and demand. On the other hand, in order to find *the actual trend* of their movement, so to speak, to fix it²⁹²." Marx shows that only when we consider the result of the movement over a more or less prolonged period do we obtain a complete equilibrium between supply and demand, that this result is obtained only as an average of completed fluctuations, only "*as a constant movement of their contradiction*." We also have here "*deviations* of market prices from market values and, on the other hand, *a tendency* to eliminate these deviations..."²⁹³

In the concrete reality of capitalism, laws are never implemented in their pure form. Each particular phenomenon also represents a certain *deviation* from the law that manifests itself in it and *confirmation* law, since the prevailing trend in the development of a given set of phenomena tends to eliminate this deviation that occurs in *individual* phenomena. The law is always carried out only as a trend of development, often intertwined with other trends. And only in this way do we

290 Маркс, Капитал, т. I, 1932 г., Послесловие, стр. XXII. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

291 Маркс, Капитал, т. III, 1932 г., ч. 1, стр. 105. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

292 Маркс, Капитал, т. III, 1932 г., ч. 1, стр. 126. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

293 Маркс, Капитал, т. III, 1932 г., ч. 1, стр. 127.

correctly know *the concrete content* reality.

This is exactly how Lenin approaches the question of the regularity of phenomena, when he covers the question of the relation between *general phenomena and their laws*. laws and laws of *special* stages of development of capitalist society. The creation of a monopoly by the concentration of production, Lenin points out, is in general a *general and fundamental law* of the present stage of development of capitalism: "in its economic essence, imperialism is monopolistic capitalism"²⁹⁴." But imperialism, for all that, remains a special stage in the development of capitalism and is subject, along with this special law, to the general laws and contradictions of capitalism — the contradiction between social production and private appropriation, between the organization of production in individual enterprises and anarchy in society as a whole. Therefore, the fairy tales of bourgeois economists about the possibility of eliminating crises under monopoly capitalism are incorrect. No, the capitalist contradictions become even more acute in the period of imperialism. "On the contrary," says Lenin, "the monopoly created in *certain* branches of industry *increases and sharpens* the chaotic character of capitalist production as a whole."

Monopolies tend to stagnate and decay. However, "it would be a mistake to think that this tendency to decay precludes the rapid growth of capitalism."... In general, capitalism is growing immeasurably *faster than before*, but this growth is not only becoming *more uneven* in general, but the unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in *the decay of the economy*. the most capital-rich countries²⁹⁵."

Lenin and Stalin proceeded from this dialectical understanding of the law, justifying the law of uneven development under imperialism and the possibility of building socialism in one country. Social-opportunists of Kautsky's type, quite *abstractly* approaching the laws of the imperialist stage, they argued, from a purely "economic" point of view, that the contradictions and unevenness of capitalism *are weakened* under the rule of finance capital, because development "goes" to monopolies, hence to one world monopoly, to one world trust.

Trotsky and Zinoviev also argued that the unevenness in the development of imperialism has become less. A point of view close to the theory of "ultra-imperialism" was developed by Comrade Bukharin, who proved that the laws of capitalist competition cease to apply at least within individual states.

Development goes to monopolies. "This is indisputable," Lenin replied to arguments about such pure "abstractions" of development, "but it is also completely meaningless... The best answer to the dead abstractions of" ultra-imperialism " ... is to contrast them *with the concrete economic reality* of the modern world economy"²⁹⁶." Kautsky pushes through the idea that "the domination of finance capital *weakens the economy*." unevenness and contradictions within the world economy, while in reality it *increases the level of inequality and contradictions in the world economy*. them²⁹⁷."

The same dialectical understanding of the historical regularity of development is also given by Lenin in his famous rebuke to Sukhanov on the question of the "regularity" of the October Revolution. Lenin shows that "with *the general regularity of development*, in the entire history of the world, individual events are not excluded, but, on the contrary, *assumed*. development lanes that represent *unique features* either the form or order of this development"²⁹⁸." October not only

294 Ленин, Империализм как высшая стадия капитализма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIX, стр. 170.

295 Ленин, Империализм как высшая стадия капитализма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIX, стр. 172. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

296 Ленин, Империализм как высшая стадия капитализма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIX, стр. 147.

297 Ленин, Империализм как высшая стадия капитализма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIX, стр. 147.

298 Ленин, О нашей революции, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVII, стр. 399. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

did not break the general line of development of world history, which passes from capitalism to socialism, but it confirmed these general laws, and yet in the October Proletarian Revolution we had *a unique character* – a separate development lane, the peculiarity of the transition.

Developing Lenin's idea further, Comrade Stalin elucidates *the following features*: First, that the dictatorship of the proletariat was born in our country as a power formed on the basis of the union of the proletariat and the working masses of the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat, and second, that the dictatorship of the proletariat was established in our country as the result of the victory of socialism in one country, while preserving capitalism in others in capitalist countries.

At the same time, T. Stalin proves that the October Revolution is of an international nature, that it is *a classic* example of the implementation of Lenin's theory, which is obligatory for all countries, and that it is *a unique phenomenon*. October, in Lenin's words, also followed "the general line of development of world history." The breaking of the chain of imperialism by the proletarian revolution in those parts of it where imperialism is *weaker* becomes *the general law* of the proletarian revolution in the epoch of imperialism.

In these propositions of Lenin, etc. According to Stalin, we have an indissoluble connection between the natural knowledge of reality and revolutionary *practice*. The practice of the proletarian revolution provides us with a genuine criterion for testing the significance of the general laws of capitalist development and for combating their opportunistic fetishization. The practice of socialist construction introduces a number of new aspects to our understanding of the law. It introduces a conscious, *rational, planned* beginning into the laws of the transition period (this conscious beginning is carried out by the dictatorship of the proletariat). In contrast to the "law of initial socialist accumulation" and the "law of labor expenditure" that Trotskyists and rightists put forward to understand the new economy by analogy with the spontaneous laws of capitalism, we see all the peculiarities of the laws of history after the victory of the proletariat, we emphasize the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which suppresses exploiters, guides the masses of working people and the construction of socialism.

One of the most important steps to the knowledge of the universal, universal connection and regularity of nature is our knowledge *of causal* relationships, causes and effects, the so-called *causality*.

The development of the causal, causal point of view is an absolutely necessary step in the development and strengthening of the materialist understanding of nature. Early materialists put forward the concept of causality in contrast to idealists who deny the existence of causal relationships in nature and society. But early materialists tended to understand the causal relationship of phenomena primarily as *mechanical* causality. Modern mechanists, such as L. Axelrod, are even inclined to see mechanical causality as the main difference between materialism and idealism.

Kantian philosophy pays a lot of attention and space to the category of causality, trying to turn causality into *the subjective* – a concept, a category of our *mind* that we bring from ourselves to the outside world.

Hegel, from the standpoint of idealistic dialectics, criticized the old mechanism and Kantianism on the question of causality, he showed that causality is only a small particle, only a moment in the knowledge of the universal world connection, which Hegel understood as the development of absolute spirit.

Engels and Lenin give a deep dialectical-materialist interpretation of the concept *of causality*. They simultaneously find out the full significance of this concept for materialism, its *objective significance*. At the same time, they emphasize its relativity, one-sidedness and incompleteness in the process of cognition of universal regularity.

Even in Materialism and Empirio-criticism, while sharply criticizing the Machists 'and Kantians' rejection of causality and noting the enormous importance of causality for materialism, Lenin also pointed out that in the concepts of cause and effect we have a certain simplification of the objective connection of phenomena. Lenin emphasized in his synopsis "the comprehensive and

all-embracing nature of the world connection, which is only *one-sided, fragmentary, and incompletely* expressed by causality²⁹⁹." "The formation of (abstract) concepts and their operations," says Lenin, " *already involve* representation, belief, and *consciousness* regularities of the objective connection of the world. It is absurd to distinguish causality from this connection³⁰⁰." "Cause and effect, & #233;rgo, are only moments of universal interdependence, connection (universal), interconnection of events, only links in the chain of development of matter³⁰¹."

For Hegel, according to Lenin, "causality is only *one of* the definitions of a universal connection, which he has already covered much more deeply and comprehensively³⁰²." Hegel " fails *completely* history is called causality, and causality is understood a thousand times more profoundly and richly than the darkness of "scientists" today³⁰³." "Causality, as we usually understand it, is *only a small part of the universal* connection," but it is here *that the materialistic addition and correction follows* Lenin of Hegel — "a piece of not subjective, but objectively real connection³⁰⁴."

The relation of cause and effect, understood by mechanists as the relation of certain "substances" external to each other, we must study more deeply, starting from the movement of matter, from the movement of history and their universal connection. The starting point of the Marxist-Leninist view of the causal relationship between phenomena, Engels notes, is the recognition of their mutual conditionality, their *interaction* . "The first thing that strikes us," says Engels, " when we consider moving matter is the mutual connection of individual motions, individual bodies with each other, and their *conditionality* with each other³⁰⁵."

Our knowledge, however, is not satisfied with one such initial general point of view. We therefore distinguish the conditions under which each *individual event occurs*. a phenomenon or set of these phenomena, individual links of a process considered separately from other links. In the general flow of motion of matter, we distinguish between the impacting movements that are transferred to other bodies or phenomena, and those that arise as a result of this action or transfer of motion. In order to understand individual phenomena, Engels says, "we must remove them from their natural or historical connection and, considering each separately, examine its properties, its particular causes of action, and so on³⁰⁶." "If any movement... is transferred from one body to another, then, *in so far as this movement is transferred* from one body to another, it is necessary to take into account the fact that it is actively, it can be considered the cause of the movement, *since it is transferred* passively-the result³⁰⁷."

This dialectical view of the causal relationship of phenomena finds its justification and confirmation in *practice* a public person. The reason, as our practical work proves, *is that it is necessary to* it passes into its "actions"; it manifests itself in them as a movement that is active in relation to its effect, as a movement that reproduces the object in a certain way. Practice reveals this

299 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 161. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

300 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 197.

301 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 161.

302 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 167.

303 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 163.

304 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 163. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

305 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 14.

306 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 14.

307 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 10–11.

objective causal relationship of phenomena, creates an idea of causality.

Hegel also pointed out that in order for the *necessary connection to arise between phenomena*, not only the conditions and not only the object that follows from all these conditions are necessary, but also the activity that "translates the condition into an object and the object into a condition" is necessary. It is a different matter, Engels observes, when "we also find that we are able to reproduce a certain movement by creating the conditions under which it occurs... and that we can give this movement a definite meaning." advance the direction and dimensions.

Thanks to this, thanks to human activity, the idea of causality is created, the idea that one movement is the cause of another" and "human activity makes it possible to prove causality"³⁰⁸. Each time we light a match on the box, we confirm that it is friction that generates heat and fire. However, even here there may be a deviation from the rule, the expected action may not follow, and the match may not suddenly light up. "But," adds Engels, "this is precisely what proves causality, and does not refute it, for with every such deviation from the rule, it is possible to find out the cause of it (for example, the dampness of matches, etc. — *Auth.*), so that here, in fact, a doublecheck of causality³⁰⁹ is made."

In this way, the causal point of view is not introduced into the cognitive process from our consciousness, as skeptical philosophers and Kantians believe. It inevitably follows from the most objective connection of things, it is inevitably generated by a person's social practice and finds confirmation in this practice. From this objective connection of things and the practice that confirms it, it follows that it is necessary for our cognition to consider individual things and phenomena as separate links, as moments of a general process.

However, the separation of "causes" and "effects" (actions) makes sense only if, apart from the unity of the world's natural or historical process, we also have as a starting point their interaction, their movement, their intrinsically necessary natural connection. "Cause and effect," Engels sums up, "are concepts that have meaning only when applied to a single phenomenon, but... if we consider the same phenomenon in its general world connection, then these two concepts combine and pass into the idea of a universal interaction, in which cause and effect are constantly changing places, and then, if we consider the same phenomenon in its general world connection, then these two concepts combine and what is an effect now or here will become a cause there or then, and vice versa"³¹⁰.

"The human concept of cause and effect," according to Lenin, "always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of natural phenomena, only roughly reflecting it, artificially isolating certain aspects of a single unified one-world process"³¹¹.

A correct dialectical understanding of the causal relationship of phenomena is therefore fundamentally opposed to the mechanistic point of view and idealistic relativism. The concept of causality in itself cannot yet serve as a watershed between the materialist and idealist worldviews; even less can we speak of the principle of mechanical causality as a distinctive feature of dialectical materialism' - as L. Axelrod does, for example, forgetting the basic question of philosophy — the relation of being to consciousness. Mechanical causality should be understood as the lowest, simplest forms of causality that take place within the framework of pure mechanics. The counter-movement of solid bodies is the cause of an impact, the turning of a crane causes a jet of water, mechanical work causes heat, and so on. Here, at best, we have a purely external transition from one form of mechanical movement to another, which is just as simple; cause and effect remain external; they are not in the internal, necessary form. connections between each other. The cause of

308 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 14. Подчёркнуто, кроме последнего, нами. — Авт.

309 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 14.

310 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 15. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

311 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 128. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

the impact can be not only the meeting of bodies, but also the fall of the body.

The situation is quite different when we turn to more complex physical, chemical, and even more so biological and social phenomena. Causes and effects are here in *an internal, necessary connection* with each other, which can only be understood based on the regularity of development. The reason doesn't just *produce* its consequence, not only *passes*. In turn, the presence of this particular set of causes *must be assumed* by the presence of these consequences. Cause and effect are linked by an internal natural connection. It is therefore a mistake to say that the mere "recognition of the principle of mechanical causality is the soul of materialism"³¹². It is a mistake to assume, as K. Kautsky does, for example, that the concept of causality is necessarily connected with the concept of push, collision (*der Anstoss*)³¹³. A "push", as well as any previous action in socio-historical development, which is not connected with its consequence by an internal connection, can turn out to be only *an external cause*, and not *at all a necessary cause* of this phenomenon.

Engels strongly condemned "the ordinary non-dialectical idea of cause and effect as two invariably disconnected poles, which sees absolutely no interaction"³¹⁴.

This is precisely how Lenin puts the question of causality when, for example, he covers the causes of the Bolshevik victory in October 1917. The supporters of the Second International, he points out, cannot "even raise the most interesting historical and political question about the reasons for the Bolshevik victory"³¹⁵. However, this question is "resolved indisputably" if we proceed not from the external concatenation of events, but from the general "point of view of the class struggle and socialism"³¹⁶.

And Lenin proves the historical inevitability and necessity of the victory of Bolshevism. The Bolsheviks won *because* they had behind them an enormous majority of the proletariat, and the most class-conscious part *among* it, because they had an enormous majority in *the army*, because their forces were at crucial points, in the capitals and on the army fronts, because the proletariat was able to lead the broad non-proletarian working masses.

This is how the question of causality, etc., is raised. Stalin, when he explains: "what is the reason that the U.S.S.R., in spite of its cultural backwardness, in spite of its lack of capital, in spite of its lack of technically-trained economic cadres, is in a state of growing economic *recovery* and is making decisive progress on the front of economic construction *ynexu*, and that the advanced capitalist countries, in spite of their abundance of capital, the abundance of technical personnel and a higher level of culture are in a state of growing economic *crisis* and *are suffering defeat after defeat in the field of economic development* »"³¹⁷.

Comrade Stalin sees this reason not in external circumstances, but in the deep, intrinsically necessary *laws* of various economic systems. "The reason," notes T. Stalin: in *the difference* between the economic *systems* of the economy between us and the capitalists. The reason is the *failure* of the capitalist economic system. The reason lies in *the advantages* of the Soviet system of economy over the capitalist system"³¹⁸.

However, modern bourgeois idealistic philosophy prefers *not to talk about the causes* at all.

312 Аксельрод, Философские очерки.

313 Каутский, Материалистическое понимание истории, т. I.

314 Маркс и Энгельс, Письма, стр. 405.

315 Ленин, Выборы в учредительное собрание и диктатура пролетариата, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXIV, стр. 633–634.

316 Ленин, Выборы в учредительное собрание и диктатура пролетариата, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXIV, стр. 634.

317 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 537.

318 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 537.

Machists and other subjective idealists tend to use the abstract expression "functional connection" between phenomena. The concept of functions refers to the general *connection and interdependence* of phenomena: each of the interrelated phenomena is a function of the other. In other words, the use of the concept of function in this case is blurred by the fact that a given phenomenon, being connected in various ways with another, can be either *an action* (effect) or *a cause* another phenomenon.

Such outwardly "scientific" claims of bourgeois idealistic methodology, its desire to banish the concept of "causal connection" altogether, have their source in its idealistic *denial of objective causal connections*.

The dialectical understanding of the interaction of cause and effect has nothing to do with such a *relativistic* view. All our ideas about the causal relationship of phenomena are developed in connection with *human practical activity*: they are strengthened, hourly confirmed by our practice. Recently, we have seen a particularly great growth of mysticism and the denial of causality in bourgeois science. A number of discoveries in the field of the structure of matter are used by bourgeois scientists to deny causality. These are the works of physicists: Heisenberg, Schrodinger, Planck, etc.

The division into cause and effect, with all their inner unity and connection, exists objectively, independently of our knowledge, in things themselves. Causes and actions undoubtedly interact with each other; each cause already carries its own effect in the embryo and vice versa; nevertheless, in *this connection* of phenomena, *it is the cause* that is always the *source* the point of movement — its initial, causing, generating, *active* moment. Since the effect of a cause follows from the very essence of the regularity of a given phenomenon, this effect of causes must represent the initial *moment preceding* the effect and in time. However, Hume already noted that to say, "This phenomenon occurs after so-and-so (post hoc)" does not mean: "It occurs *as a result of* so-and-so (propter hoc)". Speaking about the cause, it is important to emphasize that in it we have not only the starting point of interaction, but also *the defining condition that causes, generates* a given consequence, a given object, *reproducing it in a certain way*.

To speak only of the functional connection of phenomena is essentially to confine ourselves to stating their mutual connection, without trying to get to the objective *basis* of their interaction: this position clearly leads to *relativism*, to sophistry! But to replace the knowledge of causes by the knowledge of all conditions in general is to follow the path of *eclecticism*, which does not know how to distinguish from *the whole* mass of possible conditions *the special*, most essential conditions *that really determine* the character of a given effect in this connection. Meanwhile, in the process of human activity, such determining, *essential conditions (causes) are constantly being "singled out", isolated* from the whole mass of other conditions — more general, less essential, etc. *Close connection with practice* allows the *materialist* understanding of causality to overcome both the relativism of "functional theory" and the eclecticism that replaces causality with "conditions".

It is also extremely important to be able to distinguish the causes of events from *the external reason* that led to them: you need to remember the *internal one* the relationship that always exists between cause and effect. Finally in the process of *concrete* to study this phenomenon, among the causes that cause the phenomenon, you need to be able to find the root, *main ones* the causes that can cause a repetition of this phenomenon in the future, distinguish these main causes from special, specific, temporary ones, which have only a temporary significance, but must also be taken into account in order to recreate the entire concrete situation.

So for example put T. Stalin The question of the causes of our difficulties on the grain front in 1928 The right-wing opposition looked for these reasons only in planned miscalculations, losing sight of the main reasons. Tov. Stalin identified *the main features of* the reasons, *the nature of* our difficulties, which at that time consisted in the dispersion of small-scale peasant farming at that stage, and the necessity of its collectivization. Tov. At the same time, Stalin also noted specific, temporary reasons for the difficulties — the rapid growth of effective demand on the part of the peasantry, the unfavorable state of grain prices, mistakes in planning management, etc.

It is easy to see that only such a deep understanding of the laws and causes of these phenomena can help us correctly highlight our *tasks and goals*. This inextricable link between causes and ends, however, is often ignored by bourgeois science, which opposes *expediency to causal knowledge*. The causal or causal point of view on the interdependence between phenomena has long been opposed to a completely different, frankly idealistic view—the *teleological point of view*. According to teleology, every phenomenon — whether it takes place in nature or in social life—is the realization of some *goal*. The realization of *a goal*—whether it is a goal intended by God or an internal goal peculiar to a given object — leads this phenomenon to development, to *perfection*. Therefore, say the "teleologists", if we establish a connection of constancy and regularity in the observed phenomena, then we must consider these connections not at all from the point of view of the causes that give rise to them, but from the point of view of how certain higher goals are realized in them.

This view has its original origin in *religious* beliefs about "divine providence." Ecclesiastical writers, beginning with the "father of the church" Augustine, applied teleology especially diligently to the understanding of social life; they depicted the earthly life of man as a path of sinful trials leading to a higher goal, to another "kingdom", to the erection of the "city of the Lord", etc.

Along with the development of productive forces and the development of scientific knowledge, the teleological point of view itself changed. The "goal" was no longer sought outside phenomena, but within *them*: the expedient character of a particular phenomenon of nature is declared to be inherent in this phenomenon, its *immanent* expediency.

The doctrine of the internal expediency of the structure of things was put forward by Aristotle. This teleological view was most developed by Leibniz, in his theory that the world is built up of isolated entities (souls) — "monads". Each monad, according to Leibniz, represents the realization of some *internal* goal that drives its development. In idealistic philosophy, a distinction is gradually created between the "effective cause" (*causa efficiens*), i.e., the cause in our usual sense, and the "final cause" (*causa finalis*) or goal.

The best example of internal expediency, which is most often pointed out by "teleologists", is the expedient structure of organisms in animals and plants; here the structure of each organ apparently finds its justification in the function it performs. Some modern bourgeois biological theories are based on a perverse understanding of this internal expediency of the structure of organisms. This is in particular the background of all *vitalist* theories that ascribe to living organisms the existence of some special vital force (in the modern leader of vitalism, Drisch, etc.). The doctrine of internal and organic expediency is carried out by bourgeois idealist science and in the study of social life — by representatives of the "organic school", neo — Kantianism—in the "subjective sociology" of the narodniks. All these branches of bourgeois science believe that 'that causal study is unsuitable for history and should be replaced or supplemented by the search for internal goals and higher values that are supposedly realized in the development of society.

Darwin dealt the greatest blow to teleology in natural science. He pointed out that the very expediency of the structure of organisms must and does find a *causal* and a logical explanation. This expediency is explained not by the reasonableness of their organization, but by the death over many millennia of all species that are not adapted to the conditions of existence, "inexpediently" constructed. It is quite obvious that nature does not set itself conscious goals. The most important thing, however, is that the teleological point of view completely inconsistently *opposes* the causal explanation of phenomena and their expedient character to one another, that it arbitrarily separates one side of the matter from the other. It is impossible to separate the question "why" certain actions of people take place, what is the purpose of, say, ciliated cilia infusoria, from the question "why" this phenomenon occurs. To do so is either *to presuppose in advance, outside of the very connection of phenomena, a rational will that fulfills them*, or at least to assume in advance that the "goal" *does not depend on the causes that cause the phenomenon*.

Meanwhile, a thing in all respects, including in the "goal" it fulfills, must be understood from the conditions that cause it: *every complete definition of a given phenomenon, every explanation of "why" it proceeds in a certain way, also contains an explanation of "why", for what purpose this*

phenomenon is used completed. When we found out why the eyes are so well designed, we also found out "what" they are so designed for. If we explain why and according to what laws these social actions of people are performed, and show that they can necessarily be performed only in the direction of this and not another goal, then we will also explain much more fully and correctly the goal that these social actions pursue. Marx and Engels explained Communism not as an ideal state that must be established, but as a real historical movement that destroys the present state, and by revealing the laws of capitalist development and class struggle, they clarified the historical mission of the proletariat.

"The concept of purpose," in Hegel's words, "is equivalent to a simple definition the item itself." "In fact," Lenin comments on Hegel, "man's goals are generated by the objective world and presuppose it — they find it as a given, present. But it *seemsto* a person that his goals are taken out of the world, independent of the world ("freedom")³¹⁹." Expediency should not be mechanically discarded in the process of our study of reality, but it should not be idealistically opposed to regularity and causality, it requires a special, but still causal and regular explanation of it. We must therefore consider the expediency of natural phenomena and human social actions as *a special*, specific expression, a special form of manifestation of their regularity, their causal connection, and the main trend of their development.

The internal expediency of the structure of organisms is a special expression *of the unity* of the whole and individual parts in them, the unity of the content of the functions of the organism and their form.

The meaning of the concept of purpose in social life is that it allows us to study phenomena in continuous connection with practice — with the practical role of things, with social actions of a person. "The idea as *truth*," Lenin notes, "is approached by Hegel *through* practical purposeful activity of a person", he goes "from a subjective concept and subjective goal to *objectivetruth*"³²⁰.

Marxism-Leninism by no means denies the significance of goals in the social life of man, in the practice of the class struggle, but, on the contrary, reveals their real historical significance. The pursuit of certain goals, Marx and Engels point out, is a characteristic distinguishing feature of social life, of people's socio-historical actions, which distinguishes them from the natural forces and laws of nature. Already analyzing the simple process of labor, Marx shows the profound difference between purposefully directed labor and the labor of the most skilful bee. The whole development of technology expresses these distinctive features of human goal-setting activity.

Explaining some of Hegel's propositions and translating them into the language of materialist dialectics, Lenin emphasizes the natural foundations of our purposeful activity, its *objective character* as forms of an objective process. At the same time, Lenin explains that the opposition of human goals to the laws of nature has its basis in the very process of cognition and in the peculiarities of human cognition, which "does not immediately and simply coincide" with the nature being known. "The laws of the external world of nature ... are the foundations *of expedient* human activity"³²¹. — "Two forms *of objective* process: nature (mechanical and chemical) and *goal-setting* human activity... man's goals at first seem alien ("different") in relation to nature. Human consciousness, science... reflects the essence, substance of nature, but at the same time this consciousness is external to nature (not immediately, not just coinciding with it)³²²."

The clash of goals pursued by different people and entire social classes has hitherto led to the fact that social life has developed according to spontaneous laws, not according to a pre-established plan, not in accordance with the goals set.

319 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 215–217.

320 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 219.

321 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 213.

322 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 215.

Marx shows how a contradiction arises between *the limited goal* of the capitalist—the increase of surplus value, and *the means* for this goal — the unlimited increase in production and the unconditional development of social productive forces.

However, it would be a mistake to think that under capitalism the class aims of the struggling classes of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are not pursued and realized.

The bourgeoisie uses State power as an instrument of violent suppression of the proletariat and all working people. The task of the proletariat is to overthrow the bourgeoisie, to take away State power from it, and to use *this instrument* — use it for *their own* class goals.

The realization of these class goals by the dictatorship of the proletariat leads to the disappearance of the contradiction of "means" and "ends" characteristic of capitalist production, and to the fact that *the ultimate goal* of the proletarian struggle is "the organization of socialism on the ruins of capitalism" (*Lenin*). — it is carried out in full accordance and unity with its means — the growing economic and political power of the Soviet country — on the basis of the planned, goal-setting activities of the working class and its party.

4.6. Necessity and randomness

"Every separate thing," says Lenin, "is connected by thousands of transitions with other *kinds* of separate things (things, phenomena, processes). *There are* already elements, rudiments, concepts of *necessity*, objective connection of nature, etc. The accidental and necessary, the phenomenon and the essence, are already present here, for when one says: Ivan is a man, a bug is a dog, *this is the case*. there is a leaf of a tree, etc., we *discard* a number of features as *random*, we separate the essential from the apparent and contrast one with the other³²³."

The recognition of the existence of an objective connection throughout the world, the recognition of the necessity of everything that happens — or, as they say, its determinism (conditionality) — is one of the most important starting *points for* knowledge, only if there is a universal connection does the materialistic dependence of the phenomena of consciousness on the existence around us also become clear.

However, the mere recognition of the world's dominant necessary connection, the recognition of determinism, is not yet a *watershed* between two main lines in philosophy — between materialism and idealism. The mere statement of necessity is far from determining *the character of a person*. the relationship that exists between being and consciousness. It is possible to recognize the necessity of all phenomena that occur, and at the same time to look for the basis of this necessity in thinking, in the objective "spirit," in God, and so on. On the basis of the bare statement of necessity alone, one can easily unite mechanical materialists, natural scientists-positivists, and even some idealists. The father of revisionism, Ed. Bernstein, believed that in order to be a materialist, it is enough only to affirm the necessity of everything that happens, to be a determinist. F. Mehring, objecting to Bernstein, quite reasonably referred to such thinkers as Voltaire and Schopenhauer, who were inflexible determinists, which did not prevent them from remaining ardent enemies of materialism. Determinism can become the starting premise of dialectical-materialistic cognition only in its strictly *materialistic* understanding: *content* — materialistic determinism follows from the relation established by materialism between being and consciousness. Equally important is the form of necessity that we recognize.

In the reality that surrounds us, at every step, in every *individual* case, something appears that at first glance is directly opposite to this necessity — an *accident* appears. Marx states this, for example, in the entire sphere of capitalist competition, "which, if we consider each *individual* case, is dominated by *chance*, and in which, consequently, *the internal law* that finds implementation among these accidents and regulates them becomes noticeable only if these accidents are combined into large masses³²⁴."

323 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 325.

324 Маркс, Капитал, т. III, 1932 г., ч. 2, стр. 597. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

Necessity and chance are usually *opposed* to one another. Random events are those events, facts, and actions that do not seem to find an explanation in the necessary course of things. By chance a person is crushed by a car, by chance we meet a friend on the street, by chance we win a government loan, etc. Not being able to explain randomness, bourgeois science at first seeks either to limit our knowledge to the circle of phenomena in which their necessity, the causal connection of phenomena, is most clearly manifested, or to banish the concept of "randomness" from the field of scientific by declaring randomness to be a purely subjective concept. Together with Spinoza, the entire mechanistic philosophy asserts that " a phenomenon is called random solely *because of the lack of our knowledge* ." Everything has its causes, and therefore everything happens necessarily. But we can't always pinpoint *all* the causes that caused this phenomenon. A number of reasons led to the fact that a car was passing along the street, another row led a person there, and as a result of the mutual action of these two rows of reasons, an event was created. So, says the mechanist, everything *that seems* random is actually *necessary* . The idea of randomness, therefore, has a relative meaning-only in relation to the causal connection of phenomena that has not yet been fully revealed. The latter view seems to be confirmed by the laws of statistics, which establish a certain pattern in the very "randomness".: strict repeatability of car fatalities, suicides, and so on.

In Soviet literature, the mechanistic view of randomness is particularly clearly expressed by Comrade Bukharin: identifying randomness with causelessness, Comrade Bukharin proves that we speak of randomness only because we do not know all the overlapping causal series: "Strictly speaking, there are no random, i.e., *causeless* phenomena. Phenomena may appear 'random' to us because we don't know enough about their causes³²⁵."

This point of view, however, speaks of a purely *mechanical* understanding of necessity. Chance is not causeless at all. Causality is one type of relationship between processes in the objective world. Chance and necessity are another type of relationship. These types of relationships assume each other. However, this does not mean that these types of relationships should be identified. The concept of necessity by no means excludes *accidents* that also have an *objective meaning*. To recognize the objective nature of accidents does not mean to deny the fact that they are also caused by certain causes. Every accident has its own extremely complex *causes* . More precisely, everything is causally determined — even the fact that a dry leaf of a tree fell on my hand, and not on the ground, that I choked while eating. But it is obvious that such an abstract *declaration of everything in the world as necessary* , any kind of reasoning about the necessity of "in general" explains absolutely *nothing* to us. But the most important thing is to find out what each time is a specific, *special character* a given *specific manifestation of this necessity* . Consistent materialism must *provide a concrete explanation for phenomena* . The dialectical materialist, therefore, does not speak only of causality, but always studies the concrete, definite forms of this necessity. It is impossible to speak *only* about the necessity of a given phenomenon or event when it *is a separate event*. an event that is part of the *overall* course of events *does not significantly affect the main* pattern of development. Our abstract recognition of everything as " necessary "will not differ from the old theological determinism, which explained absolutely everything in the world as predetermined by the will of "divine providence."

As Engels points out, metaphysical thinking has lost its way in this "impassable" contrast between necessity and chance because it is purely *abstract* it imagines necessity, without any doubt *excluding accidents from the general process* . In this case, two types of metaphysical worldview arise. Some people believe that "some thing, some relation, some process, *or other*" *is the same*. are random, *or* they are necessary, *but they cannot be both* »³²⁶." For example, the old naturalists declared the main specific features of animals and plants necessary, and the rest of the signs — random. They declared only necessary signs to be the only ones worthy of scientific

325 Бухарин, Теория исторического материализма, стр. 42.

326 Энгельс, Диалектика природы, стр. 107. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

interest, and everything accidental was indifferent to science. But with this view of *chance*, *all scientific explanation ceases*, and it is therefore possible to reduce the accidental to supernatural causes.

Thus an abstract understanding of necessity leads to religious conceptions.

Other representatives of mechanical materialism ~~excluded~~ deny randomness altogether, giving it a purely subjective meaning. The same point of view is shared by the Soviet modern mechanists. In this case, according to Engels, "the so-called necessity remains *a simple phrase* ... *Chance is not explained* here out of necessity: quite the opposite." If everything is necessary, then "*necessity itself is reduced to something purely accidental*"³²⁷."

A correct understanding of necessity therefore does not at all eliminate the notion of randomness as an objective category. Chance is not causeless at all. Hegel rightly wrote on this point that science has as its subject "a necessity hidden behind apparent chance; but we must not imagine that chance is *only the product of our subjective thought*, and that it is necessary to reject it in order to reach the truth"³²⁸." But for the idealist Hegel, the category of chance was a step in the development of the objective *spirit*, the world consciousness. Modern Menshevik idealists, taking randomness under their "protection", turn the whole question into a scholastic discussion of purely logical concepts.

Randomness *is necessary*, since every randomness is included in the connection of phenomena prevailing in nature and in society; and at the same time, randomness *is not necessary*, since randomness is not *essential*. It is important for the development of this pattern and does not significantly affect the course of its development, since here, in place of one randomness with the same general pattern, another randomness would be possible, due to other, external reasons, and not the internal pattern itself.

There is a randomness and therefore an *addition* necessity (its opposite) and *form of manifestation* the same necessity. Due to the complexity of social development, chance often turns out to be the *historical concrete form in which social necessity* is realized. The aspirations of men "intersect," says Engels, "and in all such societies *necessity reigns* supreme, the complement and form of which is *chance*"³²⁹." "Necessity," says Engels, "is composed entirely of the purest accidents, and these imaginary accidents are the form behind which necessity is concealed"³³⁰."

The role and significance of each randomness *is regulated* by necessity, and at the same time, randomness *forms* this necessity. Each individual phenomenon bears a *significant impact*. It is an imprint of the dominant pattern and at the same time has some *features that are not essential* for this pattern. Each individual randomness *is balanced* by other randomness and therefore may not affect the *overall course* of development, its main trends.

However, this does not mean that randomness does not play *a* role in the development of necessity. It must necessarily play a certain role precisely because it is a *special form of necessity*. Darwin also pointed out that small "random" changes in the body, increasing, can lead to a change in the most "necessary" character of a biological species. "History," Marx wrote to Kugelmann about the role of the individual in history, "would have a very mystical character if "accidents" did not play *any* role. These accidents *are*, of course, themselves an integral part of the overall course of development, *balanced* by other accidents. But *acceleration and deceleration* highly dependent on

327 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 108. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

328 Гегель, Наука логики, т. III, 1929 г., ч. 1.

329 Маркс и Энгельс, Письма, Письмо Энгельса Штаркенбергу от 25 января 1894 г., стр. 408.

330 Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах, 1931 г., стр. 41. «Экономическое движение как необходимое прокладывает себе дорогу сквозь бесконечную толпу случайностей (т. е. вещей и событий, внутренняя взаимная связь которых настолько отдалённа или настолько трудно определима, что мы можем забыть о ней, считать, что её не существует» (Маркс и Энгельс, Письма, Письмо Энгельса Блоху от 21 сентября 1890 г., стр. 375).

these coincidences³³¹." It all depends, of course, on how *significant this randomness is for this connection of phenomena*. It cannot be said, as former bourgeois historians did, that the course of history depended on the beauty of Cleopatra's nose or Napoleon's cold. But there is no doubt, for example, that the apparent dementia and short-sightedness of the last representatives of the House of Romanov only *accelerated* a revolutionary explosion in Russia. There is no doubt that the genius of Marx and Lenin had a tremendous accelerating effect on the course of development of the revolutionary working-class movement.

4.7. Possibility and validity

Essence and foundation, content and form, law, necessity — all these basic concepts of dialectical logic are steps in the process of cognition of the material world, they are forms of thinking in which the reality we know finds its diverse reflection *действительность*.

When we talk about reality, we mean something deeper than just actual *being* separate things or than their immediate, external *existence*. As Hegel pointed out, reality is a unity, an integral totality of all the internal and external moments that form it, a correlation of all sides; the process of development of reality is *a necessary*, internally conditioned, natural process. "Separate being (object, phenomenon, etc.)," Hegel elaborates, "is (only) *one side* of the idea (truth). Truth also requires other aspects *of reality ... the totality of all* aspects of the phenomenon, reality and their (mutual) *relations*-this is what truth consists³³²of."

The idealist Hegel, as is already known, identified the necessity, the regularity of things with the laws of reason, with the development of the absolute spirit. Hence his famous proposition: everything that is real *is reasonable*, everything that is reasonable *is real*. This proposition of Hegel's, applied to the course of social and historical development-because of the idealistic expression it received in Hegel-often led his followers to *reactionary* conclusions: among the so-called "Hegelian right" it served as a justification *существующих* for the oppression and exploitation that existed in society. Since everything that is real is reasonable, they interpreted, including, for example, our famous critic Belinsky, who at one time was completely under the spell of the "philosophical cap of Yegor Fyodorovich" (i.e., Hegel) This means that the existing Prussian semi-feudal monarchy, the autocracy of Nikolai Palkin, etc., are also reasonable and necessary: all this, they say, has its justification in the laws of the development of the world spirit. Hegel himself, however, put a different, essentially revolutionary content into his thought. He distinguished between the simple external existence of things, which may be unintelligent, and their reality, which must be reasonably necessary.

"Reality, as the unity of the inner and the outer, is so little opposed to reason that it is, on the contrary, entirely rational; and that *which is not rational is precisely for this reason not to be regarded as real* »³³³." "The reality that does not correspond to the concept is simply *a subjective, random*, arbitrary phenomenon, not the truth³³⁴."

Everything that is rational, or, in materialistic terms, everything that is historically necessary, must become a reality: consequently, all non-rational social institutions that still exist, but no longer have any internal foundations in the necessary, natural course of history, must sooner or later be destroyed by the course of historical development. From temporary, random realities, Hegel distinguishes the reality that "corresponds to the idea", i.e. considers it as something essential,

331 Маркс и Энгельс, Письма, Письмо Маркса Кугельману от 17 апреля 1871 г., стр. 209–291. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

332 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 227–229.

333 Гегель, Соч., т. I стр. 239. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

334 Гегель, Логика, Соч., т. I, 1930 г., стр. 142.

internally necessary, and natural.

Marxism reveals this materialistic content behind the idealistic shell of Hegel's thought. However, we cannot confine ourselves to a single translation of Hegel's thesis about the reasonableness of the real into the language of historical necessity, as Plekhanov does, for example. It should not be forgotten that even Hegel's own position led to a reactionary defense of the Prussian feudal³³⁵ system. To confine ourselves to admitting that everything that is real is historically conditioned and, in this sense, necessary, is to fall easily into the path of objectivism, fatalism, and contemplative materialism. The bourgeois philosopher Stammer once ironically pointed out that if socialism is historically inevitable, then there is no need to fight to accelerate its advance, just as there is no need to create a party for the onset of a lunar eclipse. Struve argued, on the other hand, that if capitalism is historically necessary in Russia, then there is no need to fight it. Kautsky later tried to use the same argument to defend imperialism, which is also historically necessary! The Russian Mensheviks, including Plekhanov, argued abstractly that the bourgeois revolution was historically inevitable for Russia, and did not seek in the real reality of our historical development the forces that could change the whole character of this revolution and lead to the victory of the proletariat. Meanwhile, the most important aspect, a necessary moment in the development of reality, is human *activity*, our *practice*, which puts forward certain *goals* and implements them by constantly *transforming* external reality in the process of its cognition.

"Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate reality³³⁶." The human will, which breaks away from external reality, sins with subjectivism and itself hinders the achievement of its goals.

Marxist-Leninist cognition requires not only strict consideration of the totality of *all aspects развёртывания* It also presupposes taking into account the real *possibilities* of the course of historical development, its *conditions*, its driving forces, including *the activities* of the revolutionary class in its development, its revolutionary *practice*, and *the ways and means necessary to turn the possibility into reality*. "The unfolding of the totality of the moments of reality NB = the essence of dialectical cognition,"³³⁷ Lenin points out.

In this connection, it should be pointed out that Marxist-Leninist theory emphasizes the difference that exists between possibility and *reality*, and at the same time notes the essential importance that real opportunities have for the development of reality.

When we talk about the possibility of anything, we must make a strict distinction between *an abstract*, purely formal possibility and *a real* possibility. From the point of view of formal logic, absolutely everything is possible that can only be thought of, that can be imagined (without formal-logical contradictions), everything for which any logical grounds can be devised. Here the possibility becomes abstract, *subjective* the concept; the content of a given conceivable possibility breaks out of a certain, objectively necessary connection of things. The dialectician Hegel scoffed at such talk of empty, abstract possibilities: "It is possible," he said, "that to — night the moon will fall to the earth, for the moon is a body separated from the earth, and may therefore also fall down like a stone thrown into the air; it is possible that the Sultan of Turkey will become pope, for he is a man, and as such may convert to the Christian faith, become a Catholic priest, etc.... The more uneducated a person is, the less he knows *the definite relations of the subjects* that he wants to consider, the more he is inclined to talk about all sorts of *empty* possibilities, as is the case in the political field with so-called beer-house politicians... Reasonable, practical people do not allow themselves to be deceived by the possible precisely because that it is only possible, but they hold on

335 См. например раннюю работу Маркса «Критика государственного права Гегеля», «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. III.

336 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 261. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

337 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 159.

to the reality³³⁸."

The Marxist-Leninist theory provided the most profound justification for this distinction between abstract and real possibilities. Lenin repeatedly emphasizes that *possibility is not yet reality*, that Marxists must proceed not from abstract possibility, etc., but from reality. Lenin proved the entire fallacy of the views of R. Luxemburg, who during the war put forward such an empty, abstract "possibility" — the transformation of the imperialist war into a war of national defense. In his notes on Bukharin's "Economy of Transition," Lenin pointed out the complete fallacy of Comrade Bukharin's abstract arguments about the "possibility" or "impossibility" of restoring capitalist relations in the period of their collapse, without testing these arguments *in practice*: "The impossibility" can only be proved practically, " Lenin said. "The author does not put the relationship of theory to practice dialectically³³⁹."

At the same time, when criticizing the Menshevik Sukhanov, Lenin pointed out that the peculiar situation in the era of imperialism opened up the possibility of a different transition to the creation of the basic premises of civilization than in all other Western European states, and that this possibility not only does not violate the general laws of world history, but lies along the general line of world development.

Identifying *real opportunities is essential* development and *conditions* of their transformation into reality. Real possibility has its *objective, necessary foundations* in the very content of developing reality, in the regularities of its development. A real possibility is already something that is not only conceivable, but also objectively existing; it consists in a certain set of conditions that are inherent in objective reality itself and which therefore contribute to the development of this latter. However, we must firmly remember that a *real possibility is not yet a reality*. One real possibility can be countered by *others* real possibilities that also have certain objective foundations in reality itself, although they are not necessarily embedded in this reality. The process of development of reality is a process in which the circle of possibilities is gradually more and more defined and thus limited, in which all other possibilities are gradually destroyed and disappear, and finally one definite *possibility turns into reality*.

What is the reason for the victory of one possibility over other possibilities? First of all, this victory is due to the presence in the very structure of the given subject of objective, necessary grounds in favor of the realization of this particular possibility and the absence of such necessary grounds in favor of another possibility. At the beginning of NEP, for example, Lenin also pointed out the possibility of a split between the two cooperating classes, the workers and the peasants. "If there are serious class differences between these classes, then a split will be inevitable, but our social system does not *necessarily contain the grounds for such a split* »³⁴⁰."

To understand the conditions for the victory of any possibility, when we speak of socio-historical reality, it is not enough to speak of its objective necessity: here, too, a decisive role is played by our definite *activity*, which transforms possibilities into reality. Here a definite struggle of the social class is decided, aimed at maintaining and strengthening one real possibility and at weakening, preventing, and destroying all other possibilities.

Certain *ways and means* by which this activity and this struggle are directed and used play an important role here. Lenin saw the main task of our party as being to closely monitor the circumstances from which " a split may arise, and to prevent them »³⁴¹."

It is extremely interesting to trace all the moments of the development of reality on the problem of the possibility of building socialism in one country. Trotsky's position was characterized

338 Гегель, Соч., т. I стр. 241. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

339 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 362.

340 Ленин, Как нам реорганизовать Рабкрин, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVII, стр. 405. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

341 Ленин, Как нам реорганизовать Рабкрин, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVII, стр. 405. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

by a subjective-idealistic, abstract understanding of possibility, which in fact led to opportunistic and later led him to counter-revolutionary conclusions. Trotsky denied that the working class in Russia could hold on to power without the direct State support of the European proletariat. Denying this real possibility, the possibility of the working class building socialism in one country, Trotsky at the same time put forward such an abstract, empty possibility as a "one-act" world revolution, in which the working class of one country begins the revolution in full confidence that its initiative will immediately give rise to revolution in other countries. "The true rise of socialist economy," the Menshevik Trotsky³⁴² argued, "will be possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the most important countries of Europe³⁴²." Subjectivism in understanding the possibilities of proletarian revolution easily forced Trotsky to pass from these groundless views to the outwardly opposite position of complete "hopelessness". "And if this had not happened, it is hopeless to think... that for example, a revolutionary Russia could have resisted in the face of a conservative Europe³⁴³."

In complete contrast to Trotsky, Lenin proceeds in his understanding of the possibility of building socialism in one country from the law inherent in historical reality itself, from the law of uneven development of capitalism, which is especially intensified and aggravated during the period of imperialism. - "Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. It follows that the victory of socialism is possible initially in a few or even in one capitalist country taken separately³⁴⁴." Lenin precisely defined the range of conditions that create the real possibility of building a socialist society in our country: the power of the proletarian state over all the large means of production, the power of the state in the hands of the proletariat, its alliance with millions of small and minute peasants and the leadership of these latter by the proletariat, the development of co-operation, etc. This is not yet building a socialist society, but it is all *that is necessary and sufficient* for this construction³⁴⁵."

At the same time, Lenin noted that "the free unification of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less long and persistent *struggle* between the socialist republics and the backward states³⁴⁶." Lenin pointed out at the beginning of the reconstruction period that although the imperialists, as a result of intervention, could not overthrow the new system created by the revolution, "they did not give it the opportunity to take *сейчас же* such a step forward at once that would justify the predictions of the socialists, which would give them *the opportunity with tremendous speed* to develop the productive forces, *to develop all the possibilities that would have developed into socialism*, to prove to everyone and everyone clearly and personally that socialism is fraught with gigantic forces and that humanity has now passed to a new stage of development that brings unusually brilliant possibilities³⁴⁷."

Comrade Stalin develops further Lenin's teaching about the real possibility of building socialism in one country. By waging a struggle on two fronts, against Trotskyism and right opportunism, Comrade Stalin has made clear the enormous importance that *confidence* in this possibility, which the Trotskyists denied, has for our practical action, and he has found out *the ways and means* of turning this possibility into reality, which the right did not see and distorted.

"What is the *possibility* of the victory of socialism in one country?"

The answer to this question is T. Stalin replies: "This is the possibility of resolving the

342 Троцкий, т. III, ч. 1, стр. 93.

343 Троцкий, т. III, ч. 1, стр. 90.

344 Ленин, О лозунге соединённых штатов Европы, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVIII, стр. 232.

345 Ленин, О кооперации, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVII, стр. 392. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

346 Ленин, О лозунге соединённых штатов Европы, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVIII, стр. 233.

347 Ленин, Лучше меньше, да лучше, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVII, стр. 415. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry by the internal forces of our country, the possibility of the proletariat seizing power and using this power to build a complete socialist society in our country³⁴⁸." And in contrast to the Trotskyists, Comrade Stalin distinguishes such a real possibility of building socialism in our country from the question of the impossibility of *the final* victory of socialism in one country without the victory of the revolution in other countries: "Without such a possibility, building socialism is building without prospects, building without confidence to build socialism... To deny such a possibility is disbelief in the cause of building socialism, a departure from Leninism³⁴⁹."

However, "between *the possibility* of building socialism and *its actual construction* there is a big difference. You can't confuse possibility with reality³⁵⁰." Along with this possibility, which the Trotskyists did not want to see, there was another possibility that the right — wing opportunists forgot—the possibility of restoring capitalism in our country. Only in *the struggle* against this latter possibility, in its prevention and elimination, and only under certain *conditions*, is the possibility of building socialism in our country realized and transformed from a possibility into a reality. "We can destroy *the possibility* of restoring capitalism, we can uproot the roots of capitalism and achieve a final victory over capitalism, *if* we carry out intensive work on electrifying the country, *if* we bring the technical base of modern large-scale industry under industry, agriculture and transport³⁵¹."

Summing up the results of the struggle against Trotskyism and right opportunism at the XVI Party Congress, Comrade Stalin pointed out: "The Soviet system offers enormous opportunities for the complete victory of socialism. But *possibility* is not yet *reality*. To turn a possibility into a reality, a number of conditions are necessary, among which the party line and the correct implementation of this line play a significant role³⁵²." These conditions were not understood by the right-wing deviators, despite the fact that they abstractly recognized the possibility of building socialism in our country. "The trouble with right-wing deviationists is that, *while formally recognizing them*, the possibility of building socialism in one country, they do not want to recognize *the ways and means* of struggle without which it is impossible to build socialism³⁵³." Thus, in fact, the right-wing deviators were sliding down to the point of denying the possibility of building socialism in our country.

Speaking of the results of the first five-year plan, Comrade Stalin therefore emphasized both *the necessity* and *the real possibility* of our implementing a policy of the most accelerated pace in the first five-year plan: "It is impossible not to urge on a country that is a hundred years behind and which is in mortal danger because of its backwardness. Only in this way was it possible to give the country the opportunity to quickly rearm on the basis of new equipment and finally get on the broad road." "But did the party *have a real opportunity* to implement the policy of the most accelerated pace? Yes, I did. It had this opportunity, not only because it had managed to shake the country up in time in a spirit of rapid progress, but above all because it was able to rely in the matter of extensive new construction on old or renovated factories and factories that had already been developed by workers and engineering personnel and which therefore made it *possible to carry out* the most effective accelerated pace of development"³⁵⁴.

348 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 222.

349 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 222.

350 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 351.

351 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 350–351.

352 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 548.

353 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 560. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

354 Сталин, Итоги первой пятилетки, Партиздат, 1933 г., стр. 24–25.

In the second five-year plan, especially in its first years, there is no longer such a need to implement a policy of the most accelerated pace, because a certain period is required for the development and full use of new technology.

The development of new technology, the organizational and economic strengthening of the collective farms—these are the ways and means, these are the conditions that will make it possible to turn into reality the real possibilities of the complete victory of socialism already won by the proletariat, which will lead to the destruction of classes and to the construction of a complete socialist society.

4.8. General nature of categories

In criticizing the theoretical eclecticism of Trotsky and Bukharin on the question of trade unions, Lenin laid down four basic requirements of materialist-dialectical logic. He puts forward here, first, the requirement to study the subject from all its sides, in all its connections and mediations, despite the fact that we will never "achieve this completely"; secondly, the requirement to "take the subject in its *development*" third, in Lenin's words, "all human practice must enter into a complete 'definition' of the subject, both as *a criterion of truth* and as a practical determinant of the relation of the subject to what *a person needs* ." Fourth, the requirement of *concreteness* of cognition.

These concise but deeply meaningful propositions put forward by Lenin must be borne in mind when considering *the categories* of materialist dialectics.

Let us focus on the most important features of the categories of dialectical logic.

The basic and most important requirement of materialist dialectics, Lenin points out, is "*objectivity* of consideration (not examples, not digressions, but the thing in itself)³⁵⁵." This is the basic premise of the materialist theory of reflection. The categories of materialistic dialectics are not *empty* concepts of formal logic, but content forms *that reflect the objective*, material, concrete content of the known world. These are "moments of human cognition of nature." "The form of reflection of nature in human cognition, this form is concepts, laws, categories³⁵⁶." There is something subjective in logical concepts, since they are concepts of human thinking, since they only reflect objective processes in our consciousness. As long as logical concepts remain "abstract" concepts, as long as they remain detached from the processes they reflect, they are subjective. However, it is important for us to emphasize that in the process of cognition, our concepts more and more fully express the objective content of the world. "Human concepts," Lenin sums up, "*are subjective* in their abstractness and isolation, but *they are objective* in general, in the process, in the end, in the trend, in the source³⁵⁷."

But an object, a thing, any question, as we already know, must be studied in all its connections and mediations; it must be taken, as Lenin puts it, "*the totality of the many-different relations* of this thing to others." We must study "*the development of this thing* (a relative phenomenon), its own movement, its own life³⁵⁸."

These requirements of dialectical logic primarily apply to the most general concepts. Each concept is in a certain relation, in a certain connection with *all* the others. This is because each concept, taken separately, reflects some *aspect* of a single objective reality. "*The totality of all aspects of the phenomenon, reality and their (mutual) relations*— this is what makes up the truth,"

355 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 275.

356 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 203.

357 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 249. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

358 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 275.

Lenin points out. - Relations (=transitions = contradictions) of concepts = the main content of logic"³⁵⁹.

The categories of logic, its basic concepts, must be considered by us in their interrelations — in those connections and relations that take place between essence and phenomenon, between content and form, between possibility and reality. *Each category is linked to all other categories.* These concepts do not " follow " purely logically from one another, as idealists believe, but reflect the objective world, nature, and society from different sides.

However, this circumstance by no means means means that the categories of logic are immobile: in immobile, dead concepts, the living life of nature and society, with all its changes, its connections, and changes in these connections, could not be correctly reflected... "If everything develops," Lenin asks in one place, " does this apply to the most important categories of logic?" *general concepts and categories of thinking* ? If not, then thinking is not connected with being. If so, then there is a dialectic of concepts and a dialectic of cognition that has an objective meaning³⁶⁰." That is why Lenin emphasizes, along with the interdependence of concepts *of all*"without exception", also "*transitions of concepts from one to another*, all without exception". "Human concepts," he observes, " are not stationary, but eternally moving, passing into each other, pouring one into another, without this they do not reflect living life. The analysis of concepts, the study of them," the art of working with them " (*Engels*) always requires the study *of the movement* of concepts, their connections, their mutual³⁶¹ transitions."

This movement and development of concepts is not, however, a purely logical self-movement of the concept itself; *the process* of human cognition reflects the objective movement of nature and society and of human activity. Cognition of the world, its reflection, the unity of the subject with the object, with things, is *a process* . Only in *the process* of cognition, which reflects the process of changing the objective world and therefore only gradually, side by side, step by step embracing the universal connection and regularity of the actual world, does our knowledge of absolute truth develop in a series of relative truths.

That is why Lenin compares human cognition, which reflects this world, with the river, and concepts with individual drops of the river, which reflect individual aspects, positions and connections of things. "Concepts such as *accounting* for individual aspects of movement, individual drops (= "things"), and individual jets³⁶²."

The development of the most general concepts and categories of logic is inextricably linked with the entire history of human society, with the practice of material production and the process of production development. It is connected with *the history* of thinking, with the history of philosophy.

Every process of development is a process that proceeds as a result of the struggle of opposites. We must study, "Lenin goes on to list the elements of dialectics," the development of a thing, "the internal contradictory *tendencies* (and sides) in this thing," "the thing as the sum and *unity of opposites*," " the struggle of respect for the unfolding of these opposites, the contradictory tendencies, etc."³⁶³.

Accordingly, our concepts "must also be hewn, broken, flexible, mobile, relativistic, interconnected, united in opposites, in order to embrace the world³⁶⁴." The reflection of nature in

359 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 229.

360 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 185.

361 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 181–183.

362 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 139.

363 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 275.

364 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 139.

human thought, says Lenin, must be understood "*not without movement* , not without contradictions, but in the eternal process of movement, the emergence of contradictions and their resolution"³⁶⁵." The movement of our cognition in its internal contradictions is a process in which the *forms of logical cognition* are bifurcated . Our thinking embraces the world in terms that are opposed to one another, in categories that are mutually exclusive and at the same time interpenetrating: essence and phenomenon, content and form, cause and effect, necessity and chance. These categories are opposites, but these opposites become identical, mutually permeate each other, they pass into each other.

The distinctive features of the concepts and categories of materialistic dialectics are thus their objectivity, their mutual connection, their movement and mutual transitions, and their development on the basis of the unity of opposites. But the concepts of dialectical logic are materialistic *abstractions* . They do not reflect individual objects or relations of individual things, but have a *universal*, universal meaning. With the help of logical categories, we reveal the general in individual phenomena and objects *объе*, we reveal the unity of the general and the special in each *individual object*.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin, in contrast to the vulgar creeping empiricism of bourgeois science, emphasized with all their might the enormous scientific significance of materialist abstractions. They have shown that the abstractions of matter, law, etc., *reflect reality more deeply, more accurately*, and more fully than each individual case or our individual representation, because with the help of scientific abstraction we recognize the hidden *essence* of phenomena, their *law* , and their necessary connection behind random signs.

At the same time, Marx, in his Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, pointed out that the method of dialectical logic presupposes that we not only distinguish from directly given concrete material, by analysis, some defining general relations, the simplest definitions, but also the opposite-an ascent, a movement from the simplest and abstract to the more complex and more *concrete* , not only disassembly, analysis, but also summation, connection, synthesis.

Each particular thing represents *the infinite* the set of sides and relations, each side separately is studied by us by identifying general definitions of the essence, laws, and necessary connections. We do not fully know, do not completely exhaust the subject in its concreteness, studying its general connections and individual aspects. However, there is no other way and way to even approach the knowledge of the concrete, *but through the general*, through the analysis (selection) of its individual aspects and synthesis, summing up the obtained general concepts, the simplest definitions. This idea is also emphasized by Lenin: "The meaning *of the general*," he says, " is contradictory, it is dead, it is impure, incomplete , etc., etc., but it is only a *step* towards the knowledge *of the concrete*, for we never fully know the concrete. The infinite sum of general concepts, laws, etc., gives the concrete in its entirety"³⁶⁶."

Our knowledge reveals directly in being, in immediate phenomena, their essence, their law, their causes, their identity, their difference. "Such," says Lenin, " is indeed *the general course* of all human knowledge, of all science in general. This is the course *of natural science, political economy, and history* »"³⁶⁷." Using the logic of Marx's Capital as an example, Lenin shows how the analysis here takes "the simplest, most ordinary, basic, most mass-like, most commonplace, and billions of times encountered *attitude* bourgeois (commodity) society: exchange of goods"³⁶⁸. Marxist analysis reveals in this basic cell of bourgeois society the germs of all the contradictions of modern society. Marx's further exposition shows the development, growth, and movement of these

365 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 227.

366 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 229.

367 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 290–291.

368 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 324.

contradictions and of this society in the sum of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end. Lenin shows that in any simple sentence that connects the individual and the general, for example — Ivan is a man, Bug is a dog — there is a dialectic. "*Already here*," Lenin emphasizes, "are the elements, the rudiments, the concepts of necessity, the objective connection of nature, and so on. Random and necessary, phenomenon and essence, are already here, for to say: Ivan is a man, a bug is a dog, *this is the case*. there is a leaf of a tree, etc., we *discard* a number of features as random, we separate the essential from the apparent and contrast one with the other³⁶⁹." Any example, Lenin says, can be used to show "the transformation of the individual into the general, of the accidental into the necessary, of transitions, overflows, and the mutual connection of opposites³⁷⁰."

Categories of logic are moments of the movement of cognition, in which there is an ascent from visual intuition to abstract thinking and a return to concrete reproduction of the concrete by thinking. In scientific thinking, as in actual development, we thus seem to move *in a circle*, to return, as it were, to the starting point, to the concrete, objective world, realizing in the dialectical method the unity of analysis and synthesis. At the same time, the very movement of our concepts, our discovery of the general in the particular, the essence behind the phenomena, our opposition of the whole to the parts, the essence to the phenomenon, the content to the form, the law to the form of its manifestation, the cause to action, etc. — all this movement of concepts in the Marxist method of research *only reflects the* The contradictions of categories only reflect the unity of opposites revealed by us in the objective world we are studying. This process of investigation and movement of thought in "circles" can be performed by us *endlessly*, because the sides and properties of things in their development are inexhaustible, because as things develop, each time an even deeper knowledge of their connections and interdependencies is possible, an even more complete assimilation of the concrete by thinking, because each new abstraction gives us only partial, relative information. the truth about the subject.

Lenin vividly expressed this idea when he formulated the "circles" of our knowledge:

"The movement of knowledge *towards* an object," says Lenin, "can always proceed only dialectically: to move away in order to hit more accurately — to retreat in order to jump better (to know?). Convergent and divergent lines: circles that touch each other. Nodal point = practice of man and human history"³⁷¹. Or in another place: "The activity of a person who has made up an objective picture of the world *changes* external reality, destroys its definiteness (=changes one or another of its aspects, qualities), and thus takes away from it the features of appearance, appearance and insignificance, makes it self-in-itself and self-for-itself existing (=objective truth)³⁷²."

Lenin includes practice and even more specifically technique — the technical practice of mankind, the process of developing its productive forces-in the process of knowledge, thus inextricably linking *logic and history*, transforming the categories of dialectical logic into *historical* categories, into categories of revolutionary practice. The concepts and categories of dialectical logic-essence, law, content and form, necessity, possibility and reality-must be considered not only in their connection, in their movement, in the unity of opposites, but also from the point of view of revolutionary practice as categories not only of logical thinking, but also of revolutionary *action*.

4.9. Formal logic and Dialectics

Dialectics, in its historical development, had to endure a serious struggle with the metaphysical worldview, which, as we already know (see Chapter III), reigned supreme in the

369 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 325.

370 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 325.

371 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 229.

372 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 269.

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and which to this day is a characteristic feature of bourgeois ideology, bourgeois science.

Describing metaphysics, Engels says: "For the metaphysician, things and their mental images, i.e., concepts, are separate, unchangeable, frozen data, *once and for all* subjects to be examined one after the other and one independently of the other. The metaphysician thinks *in complete, immediate opposites* ; his speech consists of " yes, yes, no — no; what is beyond that is from the evil³⁷³ one."

Both idealistic and materialistic metaphysics fit this description, despite the fundamental difference in their starting points. The materialist-metaphysician proceeds from the recognition of an objectively real world that exists independently of our consciousness. The idealist absolutely denies the existence of the material world, or in any case makes its existence dependent on consciousness, thought, and spirit. But both the former and the latter approach their subject matter equally metaphysically, be it things and concepts, as in the former case, or only concepts, as in the latter case.

Metaphysics distracts itself from the movement of the thing, from its internal processes, and takes the thing or concept as something quite *ready* , finished, frozen, once and for all given. Things and concepts *do not arise for metaphysics* , they always exist in a ready-made form or arise "suddenly", without any preparation, without the process of becoming. Existing things and concepts do not change in the period of their existence, they are always equal to themselves, new features do not appear in them, existing ones do not disappear, they are internally immobile, there are no contradictions in them, there is no internal source of movement, there is no self-movement. For the world of things, therefore, the metaphysician presupposes, or must inevitably admit, some primordial force, a first mover, an external impulse, which sets things in motion, or once set them in motion. The metaphysician usually makes the movement of concepts exclusively dependent on the arbitrariness of the subject. He does not understand and does not recognize the movement, internal connection and interdependence of concepts as a reflection of the movement and interrelation of things in the objective, real world.

The metaphysical view gets its justification *in formal logic* . Formal logic was born and developed in ancient Greece. The young Greek commercial bourgeoisie, which has been fiercely criticizing feudal principles and feudal morality in the face of *sophists*, as the victory of commercial capital is marked, comes to the necessity of providing a positive justification for logical methods and forms of thinking that can ensure the stability of the new bourgeois order and the development of its productive forces. This task is taken up by the logic of *Aristotle* , the brilliant thinker of antiquity, who first formulated the basic laws of logical thinking. For Aristotle himself, his logic did not yet have the character of the logical scholasticism of formal logic in the proper sense of the word, into which it was transformed by its later followers, who completely did not understand his requests and searches. According to Engels, Aristotle explored all the essential forms of dialectical thinking. "The logic of Aristotle," says Lenin, " is an inquiry, a search, an approach to the logic of Hegel, and from it, from the logic of Aristotle (who *всюду* raises the question of dialectics everywhere , at every step *именно о диалектике*) they made a dead scholasticism, throwing out all the searches, hesitations, and methods of posing questions³⁷⁴." The main drawback of Aristotle is that he allows helpless confusion around the basic question, the question of the general and the individual; this confusion is created by the fact that, not doubting the reality of the external world and spontaneously gravitating to materialism, Aristotle is *inconsistent* in solving the question of the relation of thinking to being. Fighting against the vulgar empiricism that sees only the individual, the separate, Aristotle admits the existence of a general concept. *независимо* from individual items.

According to Lenin, Aristotle is confused "*in dialectics* " general and separate — the concept

373 Энгельс, Анти-Дюринг, 1933 г., стр. 14–15. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

374 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 331.

and sensually perceived reality of a particular object, thing, phenomenon³⁷⁵." Lenin shows that this gap between the general and the individual, between concepts and sensually perceived reality, is characteristic of the entire further development of formal logic, and has its epistemological roots in *the idealistic* formulation of the question of being and thinking, concepts and things reflected in them: "Primitive idealism: the general (concept, idea) is *a separate being* . It seems wildly, monstrously (or rather: childishly) ridiculous. But isn't *совершенном* modern idealism, Kant, Hegel, and the idea of God in the same way (exactly in the same way)?"³⁷⁶

The gap between the general and the individual, already marked in Aristotle, is further developed, strengthened and sharpened first in medieval scholasticism (the so-called "realism"), then in bourgeois logic, especially as the bourgeoisie becomes a conservative and reactionary force. If the rising bourgeoisie sought to transform logic into a method of finding new results by introducing new methods of research (for example, the induction method introduced by Bacon), then already in Kant's logic we have an idealistic gap between the world of things and our concepts: the transformation of logical concepts into empty, meaningless forms is especially characteristic of neo-Kantian logic.

As mentioned above, the categories of dialectical logic reflect objective laws and are therefore *meaningful* forms of thinking. The development of the categories of dialectical logic reflects in a generalized form the real development of the objective world and human cognition. The profound difference between formal logic and dialectics lies in the fact that the concepts and laws of thought established by formal logic are only *formal ones* — principles of thinking "as such", taken regardless of what *the content is* — this mindset. The author of a large course in formal logic, the bourgeois idealist neo — Kantian Siegart, for example, considers logic as a collection of *technical thinking techniques* — and he says: "Compliance with its rules does not necessarily guarantee the material truth of the results, but *only the formal correctness of the techniques* »³⁷⁷." Formal logic reflects the external forms of things considered by it as unchanging, frozen. She is not interested in the content of thinking, even if it is obviously absurd. "Formally correct, but essentially a mockery" — this Leninist characteristic of bureaucracy is also applicable to formal logic.

Formal, metaphysical logic is inevitably *subjective* ; in any case, even the materialist-metaphysician, thanks to the principles of his formal logic, is always on the verge of subjectivism and sophistry, not to mention idealistic metaphysicians. Without seeing in concepts a reflection of the developing and moving world, formal logic is naturally unable to grasp the world as a unity of opposites, does not notice the internal movement and change of objects, their comprehensive, often contradictory connections and interactions. It metaphysically considers things and concepts as eternally unchangeable, as completely separate, isolated, disconnected from each other, without internal relationships. Therefore, formal logic does not conduct research historically. Analysis in formal logic is dead, mechanical; it is a simple, rough division of things in space, the dissection of an object into its cash, separate parts, a purely quantitative fragmentation of a thing, its fragmentation. Formal-logical synthesis is also dead, mechanistic, unhistorical — it is a simple addition of the existence of these things, bringing them into a purely external spatial or temporal connection. Analysis and synthesis are considered purely subjectively as simple research techniques. Truly scientific analysis and synthesis should be an analog, a reflection of the analysis and synthesis, differentiation and connection that takes place in the objectively real world. The forms of analysis and synthesis in dialectics are therefore qualitatively as diverse as the ways and forms of dividing and connecting things in the objective world are diverse. Formal logic divides analysis and synthesis into two absolutely opposite actions, completely external and alien to each other, while in reality they do not exist without each other, presuppose each other, and are mutually

375 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 337.

376 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 337.

377 Зигварт, Логика, т. I, стр. 10.

internally connected.

Formal logic sees, of course, not only the identity of things, but also their opposite. But it does not reach the unity (identity) of opposites. Identity is in one pocket, difference is in the other. In formal logic, identity is an abstract identity, and difference is an abstract difference. By dwelling on the unity of things or concepts, metaphysical logic loses sight of their bifurcation, and by passing on to the bifurcation of things, it loses sight of their unity. In short, formal logic recognizes both identity and opposition, without seeing their unity. Therefore, the contradictions of formal logic are contradictions of concepts, not contradictions of the objective world. These are *unsolvable problems*. contradictions, immobile, dead, are not dialectical contradictions, they are neither the source, nor the basis, nor the result of movement. At the same time, formal logic absolutely does not tolerate real contradictions; its logical "principles" are entirely pointed out against the materialist-dialectical law of the unity of opposites.

The three basic "principles" and laws of formal logic perfectly illustrate the above.

The first "principle" of formal logic says: A is A, or A is equal to A. This is the principle of abstract *identity*. All things in the world and all concepts are once and for all a definite A, they are always identical, equal to themselves, regardless of any development, of any movement. The world is one, not opposite, not divided in itself, not contradictory, unchangeable, without movement.

The second "principle" of formal logic, the principle of *contradiction*, states: A is not non-A, and is not equal to non-A. This proposition is a negative expression of the first principle, the principle of identity: If A is A, it cannot be equal to non-A. But, on the other hand, it can also be regarded as the absolute opposite of the first principle (which Hegel has long pointed out and which Plekhanov does not understand at all when describing formal logic in his preface to Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach*). If the first "principle" speaks of the absolute identity of the world, the second "principle", on the contrary, proceeds from absolute difference, from the inner fragmentation of the world, from its absolute duality, since each A is opposed eternally and invariably by each absolutely opposite non-A. Therefore, there is an opposite in the world, but this world is not one, its opposite parts exist absolutely independently of each other, they are external and alien to each other, there is no connection between them, there is no movement, just as there is no movement in each of them separately. They are absolute opposites, but they do not fight each other because the struggle requires some form of unity. Therefore, the combination of opposites in formal logic is possible only in a purely mechanical, external, eclectic way, and this connection inevitably depends on the arbitrariness of the subject.

The third "law" of formal logic it says: something is either A or not-A, something is equal to either A or not-A. This statement of formal logic (the law of exclusion of the third) is a generalization of the first two principles. Every existing "something" — every thing or concept — is either A or its opposite, not-A, but only not a unity of opposites. Thus, this principle denies the unity of identity and opposites. Consequently, this law is the core of formal logic, fundamentally opposed and hostile to the core of dialectical logic, i.e., the law of the unity of opposites.

In addition to the basic laws of formal logic, the subject of its research is usually the study of *concepts, judgments, and inferences*.

The empty formalism, the separation of the laws of thought from any real content, which is characteristic of metaphysical logic in the doctrine of the laws of thought, is also manifested in the question of concepts, judgments and inferences. In its theory of the concept, formal logic proceeds from the following proposition: *"the scope and content of the concept are inversely proportional to each other."* The meaning of this law is that the more concrete content in a concept, the narrower its scope and vice versa: the smaller the content, the wider the scope of the concept. The task of creating concepts from the point of view of metaphysical logic is to approach concepts as broad as possible in their scope, in other words: to emasculate all content from the concept more and more. Formally, logical abstraction consists in distracting all separate, special features from things or processes until a general concept is obtained, in which all separate, special features have already disappeared. For example, the general concept of a tree is broader in scope than that of an oak, apple, or linden tree; the concept of a plant is broader in scope than that of a tree, bush, etc.

At first glance, it may seem that the point of view of formal logic on the question of the concept correctly reflects reality. Meanwhile, it is easy to see the metaphysical nature of this position.

The formal-logical theory of the concept is based on a perfect idealistic *gap between the individual, the particular and the general*, their opposition. Even Hegel seeks to bridge this gap: he advanced the doctrine of the concept as the unity of the general, the particular, and the individual. Hegel gave a deep critique of the emptiness of formalism and the metaphysical nature of the formal-logical doctrine of the concept. However, his teaching about the unity of the individual, the particular, the general is based on the fact that *the concept, the idea*, is the essence of the world. The gap between the world of individual things and the general is thus preserved in Hegel, since the concept generates the objective world.

Materialistic dialectics provides the only fully consistent teaching about a concrete, meaningful concept. *This is a teaching about a specific concept* completely and completely overcomes all the emptiness of formal logic, vulgar empiricism and idealism in the doctrine of the concept. Marx, in his Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, gives guidance on this question. Considering the basic concepts with which political economy usually begins, he points out: "It seems correct to start with the real *and concrete*, with actual prerequisites, and therefore, for example, in political economy, with the population, which is the basis and subject of the entire social process of production. However, upon closer inspection, this turns out to be erroneous. A population is an abstraction, if I leave aside the classes it consists of, for example. These classes are again empty words if I do not know the elements on which they rest, for example, wage labor, capital, etc³⁷⁸."

In criticizing this method of presenting political economy, Marx goes on to point out what the method of truly scientific knowledge of reality should be. Moving from the directly concrete to more and more simple concepts, to more and more lean abstractions — is one way. This was the path taken by political economy when it emerged in the seventeenth century. However, after some general basic definitions have been obtained by analysis, it is correct to move from the abstract to the concrete. "The latter method is obviously correct from a scientific point of view. *The concrete is concrete because it is a combination of numerous definitions, being the unity of the manifold*. In thinking, therefore, it appears as a process of connection, as a result, and not as a starting point, although it is a starting point in reality, and therefore also the starting point of intuition and representation. In the first way, the complete representation evaporates to the degree of an abstract definition; in the second, abstract definitions lead to the reproduction of the concrete by thinking. Hegel, therefore, fell into the illusion that the real must be understood as the result of thinking that goes up to an inner unity... that goes deeper into itself and develops out of itself, whereas *the method of ascending from the abstract to the concrete is only the method by which thinking assimilates the concrete*, reproduces it spiritually as concrete. However, this is by no means the process of the emergence of the concrete³⁷⁹ itself."

These propositions of Marx give the deepest interpretation of a concrete concept from the point of view of materialist dialectics. Marx first of all reveals Hegel's idealism in his doctrine of the concrete concept, which consists in the fact that he considers the real world as the result of the development of thinking. The concrete concept of materialistic dialectics reflects directly the given concrete reality, but taken in its *internal connections* and regularities. It is *unity* general, special, individual. The concrete concept of materialist dialectics does not mortify the individual, does not discard all that is special, does not give an empty and meagre abstraction. On the contrary, being a general concept, a concept that reveals patterns, it includes *a wealth of individual and special things*. The concrete concept of materialist dialectics reproduces in thought the real, the concrete in all its concreteness. Every category of Marx's "Capital," from commodities to land rents, is an example of

378 Маркс, К критике политической экономии, 1933 г., стр. 25–26. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

379 Маркс, К критике политической экономии, 1933 г., стр. 26. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

such a concrete concept. Materialistic dialectics by no means denies the role and significance of abstract thinking, analysis, and the task of creating general concepts.

On the contrary, it raises this issue to the highest level. However, there is a huge difference between the abstractions of formal logic and the concepts of materialistic dialectics. The concrete concept of materialist dialectics is *a meaningful one* – a concept is a concept that reflects all the richness of reality and at the same time the internal, general laws of the development of this reality.

The wider it is in its scope, the *richer* it is in its content. The concept of a product, the concept of a class, is not empty, meaningless abstractions: they do not belong *only to thinking*, as modern mechanists believe, for example. They reflect the real, objective connections of things. The working class is not an empty abstraction from the multitude of individual workers, but their integral unity, a real social group that occupies a certain place in a historically defined system of production.

In contrast to formal logic, which emasculates all concrete content from its empty forms of thought, dialectical logic highlights the *concreteness* of our scientific knowledge. There is no abstract truth, truth is always concrete' – this position was repeatedly repeated by Lenin. Not only must the concepts of dialectical logic be concrete, include all the richness of the particular and the individual, but also vice versa – the cognition of a single, individual object must be concrete, must embrace this individual as *a unity of the general and the special*, as a special case of the manifestation of a general law, and reveal its place and role in the general development.

This comprehensive, concrete knowledge *of individual* moments, aspects, areas, etc. of development in that *special*, decisive significance which they acquire at special stages for the whole development, for the development *of a general* law, ensures the unity of theory and revolutionary *practice*. In this concrete knowledge of the individual lies Lenin's formulation of the question of the decisive *link* in the strategy and tactics of the proletarian struggle. The link that needs to be grasped at this stage in order to pull out the chain of development can only be determined on the basis of the indissoluble unity of theoretical knowledge and revolutionary practice, only by a concrete study of individual aspects of the process, their features and their significance for the whole development. The doctrine of Lenin and Stalin on the possibility of the proletarian revolution breaking through the medium-weak links of the imperialist chain; strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet government as a decisive link during the entire transition period; mastering trade as the most important link in the recovery stage of NEP; mastering new technology as a decisive link in technical reconstruction; strengthening the collective farms organizationally and economically and In these and many other examples, Lenin and Stalin reveal the full force and enormous significance of dialectical logic.

Formal logic has carefully developed a classification of various types of judgments and inferences. Remaining true to its starting point, it analyzes only *the form* of the judgment, the type of connections between concepts, distracting from the real content of the judgments.

Formal logic, because of its anti-historical and metaphysical nature, cannot apply the developmental point of view to the forms of judgments and inferences it studies. "Dialectical logic," wrote Engels, "in contrast to the old, purely formal logic, is not content to enumerate and compare without connection the forms of movement of thought, i.e., the various forms of judgment and inference. It, on the contrary, *deduces these forms from one another*, establishes between them a relation of subordination, not coordination; it *develops* higher forms from lower³⁸⁰ ones."

It is *the developmental point of view*, the historical point of view applied to the study *of forms of thought*, forms of judgment and inference, that turns logic into a science. This work was largely done by Hegel on an idealistic basis. True to the principles of all his *logic*, he gave for the first time in the history of philosophy and logic a rational grouping of judgments as judgments of singularity, judgments of particularity, judgments of universality. Using examples from the history of the development of science, Engels shows the "inner truth and necessity" of Hegel's grouping, showing at the same time the dependence of their development on the socio-historical practice of man.

380 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 100. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

As we have already pointed out, only a long historical development of practice and knowledge has led to a positive judgment: "*Friction is the source of heat* »³⁸¹." This judgment can be considered as *a single one* . Further historical development of science led to a deeper generalization: "Any mechanical movement can be transformed by friction into heat"³⁸². This is *a special judgment* , because we are talking about a special form of movement — mechanical. Further historical development led to the proposition *of universality* , to the universal law: "Any form of movement is capable and forced, under conditions determined for each case, to transform itself directly or indirectly into any other form of movement"³⁸³."

We thus see that only *the historical approach*, the approach to the problems of logic from the point of view of the development of science and technology, provides a real basis for dialectical-materialistic, truly scientific logic. Hence it is also clear that there is not and cannot be any special science of logic, separate from the theory of knowledge, from dialectics. Logic, dialectics, and the theory of knowledge are one and the same philosophical science — materialistic dialectics.

Materialist dialectics overcomes and "removes" formal logic in the sense that it gives *its own meaning*. the answer to all the problems of logic, based on the history of technology and science.

Formal logic as a whole does not reflect the actual laws of the material world. But it is not just nonsense, but, to use Lenin's words, an empty flower growing on the mighty tree of dialectical knowledge. Formal logic is the result of one-sided, forced rectification in the process of cognition of curves, mobile, flexible faces into ossified straight lines. If dialectical logic fights against the vagueness of concepts, for their definiteness in the sense of concreteness and saturation with living, real content, then formal logic turns this definiteness into something absolutely stable, once and for all given, limited by fixed frames, always identical with itself. Therefore, the social basis of formal logic has historically been backward, sedentary forms of social life, such as the feudal system or a society whose deep internal dialectic is hidden under the form of a rough external movement of things (goods), such as capitalism. To this it must be added that formal logic, while distorting the picture of the world, has always served as the surest tool in the hands of the ruling exploitative and oppressive classes, and has always been the mainstay of religion and obscurantism. The hostility and irreconcilability of dialectics and formal logic becomes clear. This circumstance does not exclude the fact that historically formal logic, in the hands of the progressive classes, has played a certain positive role both in science and in social development. Study of formal logic *with known corrections* even at the present time, it will bring its own benefits, if we do not forget its root vices. To a certain extent, this lower stage of knowledge makes it possible to combat vulgar empiricism and relativism and prepares for the perception of a higher stage of dialectical knowledge.

But if the history of knowledge has been dominated for a long period by formal, metaphysical logic, if an individual becomes a dialectician only in the process of practical experience and accumulation of knowledge, then it does not follow that dialectics and formal logic are fundamentally related to each other, are equivalent things, or differ from each other only quantitatively, as a whole and a part.

Quite erroneous is the very common point of view, according to which formal logic is declared to be a subordinate moment and a special case, an *integral part of dialectics* . The author of this point of view is Plekhanov. Plekhanov argues that the laws of dialectics apply only where the subject is in a state of visible change, of transition; but when it comes to individual objects as such, formal logic reigns supreme. "*Thinking according to the rules of formal logic (according to the basic laws "of thought") is a special case of dialectical thinking* »³⁸⁴," says Plekhanov. In another

381 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 101.

382 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 101.

383 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 102.

384 Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах, 1931 г., Предисловие Плеханова, стр. 22.

passage, Plekhanov puts it this way: "*Dialectical thinking also does not exclude metaphysical thinking.*" : it only assigns certain limits to it, beyond which the realm of dialectics³⁸⁵ begins."

With regard to this division of the "two kingdoms" — dialectics and formal logic — it should be noted at once that it is most closely connected, first, with Plekhanov's general understanding of dialectics as a sum of examples, and secondly, with his tactical opportunism. It justifies Plekhanov's liberalism and opportunism in politics. By direct reference to Plekhanov, this point of view is developed by the idealist Asmus, who has been warmed up by the Menshevik idealists. The latter comes to the anti — Leninist and thoroughly idealistic conclusion that dialectics is only the sphere of "broad" horizons, i.e., general concepts of philosophy, while formal logic is the sphere of "narrow" horizons, the sphere of *practice*, i.e., class struggle and socialist construction. This is how Asmus helps the mechanists and Menshevik idealists to justify the metaphysics of opportunism and counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. He has no idea that truly revolutionary practice is impossible without dialectics, and in turn is its cradle and element.

To include formal logic as a moment in dialectical logic is as absurd as declaring alchemy to be the moment of chemistry, astrology to be the moment of astronomy.

Scholastic defenders of "offended" formal logic like to refer to Lenin's remark that formal logic should be studied in the lower grades of school; they should respond with an exact quote from Lenin: "Formal logic, which is restricted in schools (and should be restricted — with amendments — for the lower grades of school), takes formal definitions, guided by the following principles: what is most common or what most often catches the eye and is limited to this... Dialectical logic demands that we go further³⁸⁶."

Consequently, it is not at all the case that Lenin recommends studying formal logic rather than dialectics at school. This "limitation" is the lowest stage of cognition, a preparation for the study of dialectics. In addition — and this is the main thing-Lenin adds: with certain "amendments". Formal logic "with amendments" is far *from being the old formal logic*.

To the advocates of formal logic who supposedly prove "according to Engels" that formal logic is suitable in everyday domestic settings, we must answer: we are no less struggling with this domestic environment, for which formal logic is also good, than with its logical product. We are fundamentally rebuilding everyday life, raising it to the level of the great tasks of socialist construction. The new socialist way of life will, along with all the processes of struggle and socialist reconstruction of life, develop dialectical thinking.

The learned lackeys of the bourgeoisie use formal logic for their class interests; they fight against the materialist dialectic, which is the basis of the revolutionary worldview of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, we need to study formal logic not only from the point of view of using its actual content, but also in order to study the weapons of our class enemy. Only the materialist dialectic is a scientific method of research and the logical basis of socialist practice and the class struggle of the proletariat.

Just as materialist dialectics is the methodological basis of the general party line, so metaphysics and formal logic under Soviet conditions are the methodological basis of both right and "left" opportunism and counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. For example, NEP is an economic policy of the proletariat designed to admit capitalism within certain limits and at the same time to fight, oust and destroy capitalism. "Anyone who does not understand this transitional, dual nature of NEP departs from Leninism³⁸⁷." - says Stalin. But the Trotskyists, as metaphysicians who do not understand the dialectical inconsistency of NEP, saw only one side — the assumption of capitalism — and therefore called NEP state capitalism. Bukharin also saw only one side of NEP — freedom

385 Плеханов, Гром не из тучи, сб. «Группа освобождения труда» № 6, стр. 22.

386 Ленин, Ещё раз о профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 134.

387 Сталин, Об оппозиции, стр. 211.

of market relations - and missed the fact that NEP also presupposes state regulation of trade: "Destroy one of these sides and you will not have NEP³⁸⁸," says Stalin. Our difficulties are the difficulties of growth, the party says, and the opportunists do not understand this dialectic, regard the difficulty "as such," identify our difficulties with the hopeless difficulties of capitalism, and cry out for the destruction of the Soviet government. The nature of the average peasant is twofold: on the one hand, he is a hard worker, and on the other, a small proprietor. The Trotskyists see only the petty-proprietorship side of the peasantry, while the right-wing opportunists, on the contrary, forget this side of the peasantry. Anything purely *formal* — the methodological basis for implementing a party directive is metaphysics: they carry out the letter, not the meaning of the directive, beat out the "number", perform it one-sidedly, incorrectly. For example if the party speaks of eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis of *complete collectivization* then a "leftist" who formally complies with the party's directive will carry out the liquidation of the kulaks, forgetting its basis. The party proposes to increase the percentage of collectivization, seeking to strengthen organizational and economic work in the collective farms, and the "leftist" drives the percentage of collectivization, forgetting about the need to work on strengthening collective farms.

A one-sided view of the contradictory process of socialist construction is typical of both Trotskyists and opportunists — and this is formal logic: a one-sided approach to a thing from the point of view of its abstract *identity*.

Varieties of metaphysical thinking are *eclecticism and sophistry*.

Eclecticism is any unprincipled combination of internally unrelated, fundamentally contradictory points of view or teachings. Lenin calls the Machist Bogdanov eclectic because he wanted to combine historical materialism and Mach's idealistic philosophy. Eclecticism includes both mechanists and Menshevik idealists, who combine mechanical materialism, Kantianism, positivism, and so on in their anti — Marxist philosophy, while others combine Hegelianism with elements of Kantianism, mechanism, and so on. A brilliant critique of eclecticism was given by Lenin in 1921 during a trade union discussion³⁸⁹ in connection with Bukharin's eclectic position in this discussion. The dispute was about what trade unions are under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky took a purely metaphysical position in this dispute: trade unions are either a school of communism or an administrative apparatus — there is no other way - and adopted the view of nationalizing trade unions. In contrast to Trotsky, Lenin pointed out that trade unions should be taken as a dialectical unity of political and educational (trade unions are the school of communism) and economic functions (participation in state administration, for example, in economic planning), but with the latter subordinated to the former, with the economy subordinated to politics. Lenin demanded to know what is most important and decisive for the trade unions, and what is the internal connection between the various functions of the trade unions. This main function was educational, and in accordance with this, the party decided: trade unions are a school of communism. Bukharin took a "buffer" position: trade unions, *the* school of communism, *the* administrative apparatus, *upolitics, andeconomics*. "The theoretical essence of the mistake Comrade Bukharin makes here," says Lenin, "is that he substitutes eclecticism for the dialectical relation between politics and economics (which Marxism teaches us). "Both", "on the one hand, on the other hand" — this is Bukharin's theoretical position. This is eclecticism³⁹⁰." Lenin gives the well-known example of the glass. The glass is also a faceted cylinder, a butterfly cap, a device for a prespapper, a tool for striking, and a drinking tool. All this should be taken into account. But it is necessary to indicate the main thing in this particular connection and situation: what is it for the speaker speaking on the podium? A drinking tool.

"If (as Bukharin does. *Авм*. If two or more different definitions are taken and put together

388 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 405.

389 Ленин, Ещё раз о профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 132.

390 Ленин, Ещё раз о профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 132.

quite randomly (both a glass cylinder and a drinking instrument), then we get *an eclectic* definition that points to different sides of the subject and only³⁹¹ that."

Sophistry there is "flexibility applied subjectively" (*Lenin*) , there is an identification of opposites that does not see their struggle, there is a blurring of the lines between opposites on the grounds that they can turn into one another.

Once in ancient times, Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus, perverted the words of his teacher (who said that you can not step into the same river twice), adding in the formula of Heraclitus that you can not step into the same river once. If Heraclitus claimed that the river (water) flows, and therefore, when we enter it for the second time, it will actually be another river (water), then from the point of view of Cratylus, the river is never itself at all. This is a clear exaggeration. Plekhanov rightly points out that Cratylus substitutes *the moment of present existence for the moment of becoming*³⁹².

This is sophistry, for dialectics requires that every thing be taken from the point of view of the unity of the moment of becoming, of development, i.e., of the changes that take place in a thing, and of the moment of *being* present , i.e. , of the qualitative definiteness of a thing *at a given stage of its development*, in a given connection and setting. A living person is a living person, not a corpse, because the process of life takes place in him. There is no doubt that his body is undergoing a simultaneous process of cell death, but it would be sophistry to call him a corpse on this basis. The materialist dialectic demands precise and definite answers at any given moment. Capitalism, as long as it is not destroyed by the proletarian revolution, is precisely capitalism, and not socialism, although it contains in its depths its negation — the socialist proletariat. It would be sophistry, however, to declare capitalism socialism on this basis. Lenin explained to R. Luxemburg that it is sophistry to blur the line between imperialist and national war on the grounds that one *may* turn into the other. The modern Menshevik social-fascists, who declare the growth of state monopoly capitalism to be the growth of socialism, are thoroughly hardened sophists, outspoken defenders of wage slavery.

From all this it follows that eclecticism and sophistry are the sworn enemies of materialistic dialectic. It is necessary to fight against them as against the methodology of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, fascism and social-fascism.

Chapter 5. The struggle on two fronts in philosophy

5.1. Philosophy and Politics

Marxism-Leninism develops in the struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois trends that oppose it or recognize it in words, but distort it in essence. The struggle of these trends against Marxism was carried out in various forms and forms, from the direct denial or silencing of Marxism to attempts to unite Marxism with the bourgeois worldview and blow it up from within by emasculating its revolutionary content. The struggle of Marxism for hegemony in the international working-class movement has been going on and is going on in various forms in all spheres from the first days of the emergence of Marxism to the last.

"When Marxism supplanted all the doctrines that were in any way integral and hostile to it, the tendencies that were expressed in these doctrines began to look for other ways. The forms and causes of the struggle changed, but the struggle continued. And the second half — century of Marxism's existence, "says Lenin," began (in the 90s of the last century) with the struggle of a current hostile to Marxism within Marxism³⁹³."

391 Ленин, Ещё раз о профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 134. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

392 Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах, 1931 г., Предисловие Плеханова, стр. 22.

393 Ленин, Марксизм и ревизионизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XII, стр. 184.

Lenin and Stalin identified the deep *social roots* of various deviations from Marxism in the development of the international labor movement. Alien and corrupting influences oppose the proletariat not only in open struggle, but they penetrate the ranks of the struggling army of the proletariat, and there they find elements of instability, vacillation, and vacillation. The capitalist elements that persist and revive on the basis of small-scale production " surround the proletariat on all sides with a petty-bourgeois element, imbue it with it, corrupt it with it, and constantly cause within the proletariat relapses of petty-bourgeois spinelessness, fragmentation, individualism, and transitions from infatuation to despondency³⁹⁴."

This *pressure of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements*, to which the least stable strata of the proletariat and its party often succumb, is one of the sources of contradictions within the proletarian party, a source that feeds various opportunist trends.

The second source specified by T. This is the *heterogeneous composition of the working class*. The working class struggles and comes to power, being *heterogeneous*. The bulk are " pure-blooded " proletarians, who "have long since broken ties with the capitalist class. This stratum of the proletariat is the most reliable support of Marxism³⁹⁵." The other stratum consists of people from the peasantry, the bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia, who have recently joined the ranks of the proletariat and have brought with them the old habits, habits, vacillations, and vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie. "This stratum is the most favorable ground for all sorts of anarchist, semi-anarchist and ' ultra-left ' groups³⁹⁶." It was this stratum that followed the "left communists "in the Brest period, then the " workers ' opposition "and the Trotskyists (until 1928-1929), when these groups formed the ideology of the " enraged petty bourgeoisie", and the recent left-wing hypocrites. The third stratum, which is characteristic of the proletariat of capitalist countries, is "the working aristocracy, the upper part of the working class, the most well — off part of the proletariat³⁹⁷." This section has a strong desire for compromises, an agreement with the bourgeoisie, from which it has received certain handouts. "This stratum represents the most favorable ground for outspoken reformists and opportunists³⁹⁸."

This characteristic is T. Stalin's speech, given by him at the seventh Plenum of the ECCI, has in mind, first of all, the proletariat of the capitalist countries. But in essence (taking into account the fact that in Soviet conditions there can be no workers ' aristocracy and trade union bureaucracy associated with monopoly capitalism, but only individual elements of the working class and the party that have decayed and become bureaucratized are possible) This characteristic also applies to the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the development of Marxism, within it, and in the international working-class movement itself, *two main streams of deviations from the revolutionary Marxist line were revealed* with theoretical and practical attitudes opposed to Marxism. Lenin had already revealed their peculiarities in 1910. Speaking of this, Lenin wrote:: "The main tactical differences in the modern working-class movement in Europe and America are reduced to the struggle against two major trends that deviate from Marxism, which has actually become the dominant theory in this movement. *These two trends are revisionism (opportunism, reformism) and anarchism (anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-socialism)*. Both of these deviations from the prevailing Marxist theory and tactics in the working-class movement have been observed in various forms and with various shades

394 Ленин, Детская болезнь «левизны» в коммунизме, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXV, стр. 190.

395 Сталин, Об оппозиции, стр. 444.

396 Сталин, Об оппозиции, стр. 444.

397 Сталин, Об оппозиции, стр. 444.

398 Сталин, Об оппозиции, стр. 444.

in all civilized countries throughout the more than *half-century* history of the mass working-class movement. This fact alone makes it clear that these deviations cannot be attributed either to accidents or to the mistakes of individuals or groups, or even to the influence of national peculiarities or traditions, etc. *There must be root causes that lie in the economic system and in the nature of development of all capitalist countries and constantly give rise to these deviations*³⁹⁹."

In this position, Lenin thus establishes two types of trends that deviate from Marxism: the overtly right-wing trend and revisionism "from the left", which deviates to anarchism. The roots of these revisionist tendencies lie in the economic structure and development of capitalism, both in general and in individual countries. Among the causes that give rise to these two trends, Lenin points not only to the contradictory and abrupt development of the working — class movement, but also to the source of it — *the uneven development of capitalism and the dialectical character of social development in general*. Lenin explains the latter as follows: "A constant source of disagreement is *the dialectical character of social development, which proceeds in contradictions and by contradictions* ... Capitalism itself creates its gravedigger, it creates elements of a new system, and at the same time, without a "leap", these individual elements do not change anything in the general state of things, do not affect the rule of capital. Marxism, as a theory of dialectical materialism, is able to grasp these contradictions of the living life, the living history of capitalism and the working-class movement *марксизм, как теория диалектического материализма*. But it goes without saying that the masses learn from life, and not from books, and that is why individuals or groups constantly exaggerate, elevate one or another feature of capitalist development, now one or another "lesson" of this development, into a one-sided theory, into a one-sided system of tactics⁴⁰⁰."

This extremely important proposition of Lenin's is of great importance for understanding the dialectic of the struggle on two fronts. It indicates both the class and theoretical roots of various deviations from Marxism. Both the right and the "left" currents, both reformism and anarcho-syndicalism, take any *one side* or tendency of the working-class movement, elevate it to the absolute, develop it one-sidedly, and consider it the only correct and possible one. They do not understand the dialectical contradictions of reality. "And real life, real history, *include* these various tendencies, just as life and development in nature include slow evolution and rapid leaps, interruptions, gradualness⁴⁰¹."

Reality also includes gradual, slow development. But this development prepares leaps, evolutionary development is replaced by a revolution that opens a new era, elevating all development to a new higher level. And the reformists take *one of these aspects of reality, namely gradual development*.

In reforms, in all kinds of partial changes and improvements, they see the realization of socialism. Anarchists and syndicalists, on the contrary, deny gradual development. They fail to see that "the new content makes its way through all and every form" (*Lenin*), including some of the old forms. Metaphysical one-sidedness is characteristic of both the right and the "left", and reformism and anarchism. *Outwardly*, these are the two extreme poles. In essence, both hinder the development of the revolutionary movement, the organization and consolidation of the proletariat, and they clog up its *theory* with bourgeois rubbish, hindering its political enlightenment. Consequently, revisionism and anarcho-syndicalism are two types of perversions of Marxism-Leninism, two types of deviations from Marxism, two types of revision of Marxism. These two types — the right and the "left" - are observed in the working-class movement in all civilized countries, but in different forms and forms, with very different shades at different stages of the

399 Ленин, Разногласия в европейском рабочем движении, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XV, стр. 5. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

400 Ленин, Разногласия в европейском рабочем движении, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XV, стр. 6. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

401 Ленин, Разногласия в европейском рабочем движении, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XV, стр. 7.

development of the working-class movement. In the struggle against these two types of deviations from Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary theory of the proletariat continued to develop.

These two types of perversions of Marxism have also taken place in our country, in the history of Russian social-democracy, where their development has taken special forms that reflect the peculiarities of the class struggle in Russia. *Bolshevism grew and hardened itself in the struggle on two fronts against the two types of revision of Marxism mentioned above, in the struggle against opportunism.*

Since the 1990s, there has been a split among the social democrats into "Iskra-ists" and "economists". The latter represented the opportunist trend of Russian social-democracy. In the period of the growing bourgeois-democratic revolution, "economism" was transformed into Menshevism, which advocates a bloc with the bourgeoisie. Only the Bolsheviks consistently fight for the revolutionary tactics of the proletariat. At the same time, there was a struggle against such a "left"-syndicalist trend as "Makhaevschina". The epoch of reaction (1908-1910) again raised the question of the opportunist and revolutionary tactics of social-democracy in an entirely new form. The main channel of Menshevism gave rise to a current of liquidationism, renunciation of the struggle for a new revolution in Russia, renunciation of illegal organization and work, and contemptuous ridicule of the "underground". The emergence of *Otzovism*, a "left" movement in Bolshevism, which preached the rejection of the use of legal forms of struggle, participation in the State Duma and the withdrawal of the party faction from there, also dates back to this time.

Bolshevism waged an irreconcilable and consistent struggle on two fronts against both these trends, which represent two varieties of bourgeois influence on the proletariat. In this connection, Lenin wrote that "the Bolsheviks actually conducted *на деле* struggle on two fronts from August 1908 to January 1910, i.e., a struggle against the Liquidators and Otzovists"⁴⁰²."

Lenin explains the emergence of these trends by a number of deep objective historical reasons. Not an accident, not a mistake, "but the inevitable result of the action of these objective causes — and the superstructure over the entire working — class movement of modern Russia, which is inseparable from the "basis" — is the bourgeois influence on the proletariat that creates liquidationism (= semi-liberalism, which wants to count itself among the social democrats) and Otzovism (= semi-anarchism, which wants to count itself among the social democrats). S. D.)"⁴⁰³.

Lenin, in his infantile disease of "Leftism" in Communism, enumerates all the main points in the development of Bolshevism and considers the question: "in the struggle against what enemies within the working-class movement did Bolshevism grow, strengthen and harden?" — reveals the essence of the struggle against Menshevik opportunism, "which in 1914 finally developed into socialism- chauvinism has finally gone over to the side of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. This, according to Lenin, was naturally *the chief enemy of Bolshevism* within the labor movement. This enemy remains the main one on an international scale"⁴⁰⁴." At the same time, "Bolshevism has grown, developed, and hardened itself in the long struggle against *petty-bourgeois revolutionism*, which resembles anarchism or borrows something from it, and which deviates in any essential way from the conditions and needs of a sustained proletarian class struggle"⁴⁰⁵."

Describing both these deviations within Marxism, right-wing and left-wing doctrinarianism, Lenin wrote: "Right-wing doctrinarianism has stuck to the recognition of *the old forms alone* and has gone completely bankrupt without noticing *the new content*. Left-wing doctrinarianism rests on the unconditional *rejection of certain old forms*, without seeing that the new content makes its way

402 Ленин, Заметки публициста, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIV, стр. 305–306.

403 Ленин, Заметки публициста, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIV, стр. 304. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

404 Ленин, Детская болезнь «левизны» в коммунизме, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXV, стр. 179. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

405 Ленин, Детская болезнь «левизны» в коммунизме, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXV, стр. 180.

through all and every form⁴⁰⁶."

This conclusion of Lenin's is also of great methodological importance. This basic characteristic covers *the essential side* of each variety of hostile tendencies within Marxism. One of them, *the right* — hand form of revision, does not see *the new content, the new quality*, and does not go beyond the old forms; the other revision, *the left*, on the contrary, notices only the new content, the new quality, but does not understand the ways and stages of development of this content, completely rejecting the forms of struggle that still need to be used in the given situation.

In Lenin, however, we find a dialectical justification *for the necessity of combating deviations within the party*. The very deviation from Marxism-Leninism, from the revolutionary path, goes through various stages of development. As Lenin says: "A deviation is not yet a ready-made trend. The bias is something that can be corrected. People have lost their way or are starting to lose their way, but they can still be corrected. This, in my opinion, is expressed by the Russian word "bias"⁴⁰⁷." Therefore, a slope is a deviation from the correct line, a departure away from it. This is not yet a ready-made trend, but a deviation that leads away from the correct line, and if we persist in this deviation consistently, then at a certain stage it may develop into a definite opportunist current, completely alien and hostile to Marxism and the party.

In contrast to Lenin, Trotsky took an opportunist position on this question in the pre-revolutionary era. Like Kautsky, he contrasted the correct Marxist-Leninist demand for a two-front struggle with his formula of "overcoming by expanding and deepening", which amounted to the tactics of *centrism*, i.e., to an attempt to occupy the "middle" line, to an eclectic *reconciliation* of the various trends, i.e., in practice it helped and covered opportunism.

That is why "Trotsky's proposal to replace the struggle on two fronts with 'overcoming by expansion and deepening' met with the ardent support of the Mensheviks and Vperyodists⁴⁰⁸."

As early as the 1880s, Engels wrote to Bernstein: "As can be seen, any workers' party in a large country can develop *only in internal struggle, in full compliance with the laws of dialectical development* »⁴⁰⁹."

Comrade Stalin pointed out at the seventh Plenum of the ECCI, quoting in particular these words of Engels: "There is not and cannot be a 'middle' line in questions of a principled nature⁴¹⁰." "The policy of a "middle" line of principle is not our policy. The policy of a "middle" line of principle is the policy of withering and degenerating parties⁴¹¹." "The history of our party is the history of the struggle of contradictions within this party, the history of overcoming these contradictions and the gradual strengthening of our party on the basis of overcoming these contradictions⁴¹²." "*Overcoming internal party differences by fighting is the law of our party* »⁴¹³s development."

Materialist dialectics is the methodological basis of the practice of the revolutionary proletariat and of the general line of its party. It is the materialist dialectic, its application to the

406 Ленин, Детская болезнь «левизны» в коммунизме, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXV, стр. 238. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

407 Ленин, X съезд РКП(б), Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXV, стр. 267.

408 Ленин, Заметки публициста, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIV, стр. 306. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

409 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 324–325. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

410 Сталин, Об оппозиции, стр. 439.

411 Сталин, Об оппозиции, стр. 440.

412 Сталин, Об оппозиции, стр. 439.

413 Сталин, Об оппозиции, стр. 442. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

cognition of society, that makes it possible to correctly reveal and understand the regularity of the class struggle, to take into account the alignment of classes at any given moment, to correctly determine the nature of social contradictions, to outline trends and directions of development, to separate the essential, important, necessary from the insignificant, secondary and accidental, to understand their dialectical unity, a link in the struggle of the proletariat, by grasping which it would be possible to pull out the whole chain of development; to secure the successes of the proletarian revolution and to consolidate them as the basis for further progress.

The Comintern also conducts its struggle on the basis of dialectical materialism, which is reflected in the program of the Comintern. "While defending and propagating *the dialectical materialism of Marx — Engels* , and applying it as a revolutionary method of cognizing reality in order to revolutionize this reality, the Communist International is actively fighting all kinds of bourgeois worldview and all kinds of theoretical and practical opportunism⁴¹⁴."

The main thing in Marxism-Leninism is *the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat* . Just as Marxism as a whole, so this doctrine has a materialist dialectic as its philosophical basis. The lack of understanding and distortion of the philosophical basis of the proletarian policy must inevitably affect the practical implementation of this policy. The theoretical and philosophical struggle is a form of class struggle, and like every form of class struggle, it is filled *with political* content, it is subordinate to the political struggle. The perversions of dialectical materialism *are always* They are closely connected with deviations from the general party line, non-proletarian political trends, and the reflection of class-hostile ideology in the ranks of the proletariat and its party. The philosophical development of Marxism-Leninism is always closely connected with the political development of the working class, with its struggle against reformism, anarchism, right and "left" opportunism. This was repeatedly pointed out by Lenin. "The dispute about what philosophical materialism is," Lenin wrote in 1911, "and why deviations from it are erroneous, dangerous, and reactionary *is always* linked by a 'living, real connection' with the 'Marxist socio-political trend' — otherwise the latter would not be a Marxist, socio-political, or current. Only limited "real politicians" of reformism or anarchism can deny the "reality" of this connection⁴¹⁵."

Lenin, when speaking of political deviations, does not detach them from the general philosophical attitudes. It reveals their social roots, their political essence, establishes which of these deviations is the main danger, the reasons for this, characterizes the role of conciliationism in the struggle on two fronts, it also reveals the methodological side of deviations, etc., i.e., it gives a comprehensive, concrete analysis of the conditions, forces and forms of the struggle, while applying both approaches to the struggle and to the developing a materialistic dialectic.

The revolutionary role of materialist dialectics has always been the cause of the most acute hatred and furious anger of the bourgeoisie throughout the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. There are thousands of subterfuges devised by the bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois agents within the working-class movement to somehow separate Marxist theory from revolutionary practice and to emasculate the revolutionary "soul" of Marxism — materialist dialectics. Marxism had to wage a merciless struggle both against its fundamental enemy, idealism, and against the petty-bourgeois agents within Marxism itself, i.e., against various forms of philosophical revisionism, which, under the plausible pretext of introducing amendments, "additions", clarifications, etc., invariably tried to bourgeoisize Marxism, to turn it into an empty shell for carrying bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories.

Such is the class position of the petty bourgeoisie, which vacillates between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, that even in the ideological sphere it shows its indecision, inconsistency, and disregard for serious theoretical work, confining itself to fragments of theories borrowed partly from the theoretical arsenal of the proletariat, partly from the reactionary bourgeoisie and other classes. Minutiae, snatching up individual pieces and fragments from everywhere and mechanically

414 Программа Коминтерна, Введение, стр. 12.

415 Ленин, Наши упразднители, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XV, стр. 88.

combining them, reconciliation, eclecticism-in theory, and cowardice, vacillation, vacillation-in practice-these are the features that Lenin repeatedly pointed out among the ideologists and "leaders" of the petty-bourgeois parties: the Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, etc. a coherent and consistent materialist worldview, and limited itself either to half-hearted forms of materialism mixed with elements of idealism (Kantianism, Humism, Berkleianism), or openly took the ground of idealism, or sought some third, nonexistent line of "golden mean" between materialism and idealism, trying to rise above both.

Marx and Engels, and then our party, have also always waged an irreconcilable, merciless theoretical struggle against philosophical revisionism *on two fronts*: both against the vulgarization of materialism and against the idealistic perversions of dialectical materialism (Marx, Engels and Lenin delivered their main blows at any given moment against the form of revision that was *the main danger* to the practical world).political movement of the proletariat). The conditions of the political struggle, depending on the main form of the struggle against the bourgeoisie, also determined the main direction of the theoretical blows dealt to philosophical revisionism within the party. For example, after the revolution of 1905, Lenin, the leader of our party, had to simultaneously wage a theoretical struggle on two fronts: against the machism of Bogdanov, Bazarov, and others, and against the Menshevik, mechanistic, and agnostic perversions of materialist dialectic by Plekhanov, as well as by his students Deborin and Axelrod. *The main danger then was an idealistic, Machist revision of materialist philosophy.* This revision led directly to the rejection of Marxism and the complete theoretical disarmament of the proletariat before the bourgeoisie. "The ever — more subtle falsification of Marxism," Lenin wrote of Machism and the Machists, "the ever-more subtle falsification of anti-materialist doctrines under Marxism, is what characterizes modern revisionism in political economy, in questions of tactics, and in philosophy in general, both in epistemology and in sociology"⁴¹⁶."

This revision was the main danger for that time, because it was a theoretical expression of the crisis, of vacillation in the ranks of the Marxists after the defeat of the 1905 revolution. "A resolute rebuff to this disintegration, a resolute and persistent struggle for *the foundations* of Marxism, was once again on the agenda"⁴¹⁷," Lenin wrote at the time. Machism theoretically fed both the political liquidationism of the Mensheviks (Valentinov, Yushkovich, and others) and the ultra-"left" Otzovism of Bogdanov and others. That is why Lenin directed the main blow against the Machists, waging this struggle together with Plekhanov and his disciples, but without ceasing for a single moment to fight either Plekhanov's Menshevik distortion of the materialist dialectic or his individual philosophical errors in questions of materialism. And then Lenin fought on two fronts.

During the period of the imperialist war and revolution (1914-1917), the revision of dialectical materialism by the theorists of the Second International flourished especially strongly on the front of Marxist theory — it caused colossal harm to the revolutionary movement of the proletariat) - *the mechanistic and idealistic perversions of dialectical materialism by Kautsky, Bauer, Plekhanov, and others.*

This revision was concretely expressed in arguments about the "immaturity" of the presuppositions of the proletarian revolution, in the separation of revolutionary theory from practice, in the substitution of the concrete for the abstract, and of dialectics for eclecticism and sophistry. The years 1914-1917 were a period of fierce struggle by Leninism against the prostitution of Marxism, and the renunciation of Marx's concrete and revolutionary dialectic by the leaders of international Menshevism. This is the period of the most passionate and irreconcilable war with the Menshevik idealist and mechanistic revision of the foundations of dialectical materialism. At the same time, Lenin is also fighting "leftist" errors in theory — Bukharin's anarchist errors on the question of the state, etc. The theoretical struggle on two fronts unfolds in exactly the same way in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

416 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 270.

417 Ленин, О некоторых особенностях исторического развития марксизма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XV, стр. 74.

The defence of the general line of the party necessarily includes the struggle for the purity of materialist dialectics — that surest and sharpest weapon of the proletarian struggle. *The struggle against reformism and anarchism, the struggle on two fronts — against right and "left" opportunism — necessarily presupposes a struggle on two fronts also in the field of philosophy.*

There is always a connection between philosophy and politics, between philosophical deviations and political trends. But this connection between philosophy and politics does not appear as a direct, immediate, and permanent correspondence between philosophical and political trends. Mechanismism is the philosophical basis of the right deviation, Menshevik and Menshevik idealism is mainly the theoretical basis of the "left" deviation and Trotskyism. However, it does not at all follow that the right has only mechanismism and no elements of idealism, while counter-revolutionary Trotskyism and the "left" have only idealism and no mechanismism. Trotskyism, for example, is also thoroughly imbued with the most vulgar and vulgar mechanismism. An abstract arrangement of slopes according to contrived "schemes" would be completely wrong. The only consistent method and worldview is dialectical materialism. Any deviation from it inevitably leads to bourgeois eclecticism, with a predominance of either vulgar mechanical materialism or more or less disguised idealism.

Philosophy and politics are always inextricably linked. This indissoluble connection is due to their *specific social roots in a given society*. But this connection between philosophy and politics does not always receive direct and immediate expression. We observe here various transitions, tides, zigzags, and deviations in determining the relationship between various philosophical and political biases. This connection can only be established by a concrete analysis of all aspects of a particular philosophical and political bias. The struggle against opportunist deviations in theory and in political practice cannot be limited to the struggle against any of the parties — political or only theoretical—it must be comprehensive.

The Menshevik idealists, just like the mechanists, do not understand the dialectical connection between philosophy and politics, nor do they understand the Marxist-Leninist formulation of the question of the struggle on two fronts in politics and philosophy. They completely identified the deviations in both areas, substituting the struggle against right-wing opportunism for the struggle against mechanismism alone. Moreover, the Menshevik idealists regard the party's struggle against the right, especially in the theoretical sphere, as a mere continuation of their "struggle" with the Mechanists! As one of the representatives of Menshevik idealism wrote: "the struggle against the theoretical foundations of the right deviation is a direct continuation of our struggle against the Mechanists and a test of the correctness of the theoretical philosophical positions that we have taken in this struggle. This is a political test of our theoretical positions »⁴¹⁸."

The Party has waged and continues to fight against all deviations from the positions of Marxism-Leninism, against opportunism in politics, and against all revisionism in theory and philosophy. In its struggle against political opportunism, it digs into the theoretical and philosophical foundations, proceeding from Lenin's instruction that "no mistake, including a political one, can be fully understood if one does not find *the theoretical roots* of the mistake in the person who makes it, proceeding from certain propositions that he consciously accepts⁴¹⁹." In the struggle against deviations in the field of theory, including philosophy, the party exposes their political content, exposes the class essence of theoretical opportunism and revisionism, no matter what mask they hide behind.

The struggle against only one deviation, while ignoring the second front, shows that the foundations and positions of this struggle are not Marxist-Leninist. Such a line leads to a distortion of the struggle on two fronts, to one-sidedness, which creates conditions for new perversions of a different order, the accumulation of errors that follow the line of a different deviation. Thus, the ground is created for a bow with a different front. This convergence of different opportunistic trends

418 «Вестник Коммунистической академии» № 35–36 за 1929 г., стр. 280. Речь т. И. Подволоцкого.

419 Ленин, Ещё раз о профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 131. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

is very common in practice. The right helps the "left", the "left" pours water on the mill of the right. The "struggle" against deviations, while ignoring this wrong side, the reverse side of each deviation, does not help the party, but opportunism, and only leads to confusion and new forms of perversion of Marxism-Leninism.

5.2. The struggle on two fronts and the problems of theory under the dictatorship of the proletariat

The dictatorship of the proletariat *has put forward new tasks for revolutionary theory*, and they are immeasurably broader and more difficult than they were before. The dictatorship of the proletariat does not mean the end of the class struggle, but the continuation of the class struggle in new forms: in the form of merciless suppression of the resistance of exploiters, in the form of acute and bitter civil war, in the form of leadership of the main masses of the peasantry, the use of bourgeois specialists and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, in the form of education of a new discipline for achieving a new, immeasurably higher level of labor productivity.

What is needed is a whole period of struggle by the proletariat against the remnants of the exploitative classes, against attempts to restore the capitalist system, a period of struggle for the transformation of small — scale commodity economy, on the basis of which "capitalism and the bourgeoisie are preserved and revived again — in the fiercest struggle against communism". It is necessary to fight for the preservation and consolidation of the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry, for the leadership of the non-Proletarian mass of working people, for the re-education of this mass in the spirit of organizing a new social discipline of labor. A whole period is needed to create the material and technical basis and economic basis of socialist society, and a certain amount of time is also needed to re-educate the workers themselves in the process of "a long and difficult mass struggle against mass petty-bourgeois influences" (*Lenin*).

The victorious proletariat cannot immediately throw off the legacy of capitalism and put it out of its head. The habits of the past, the bourgeois tendencies of the backward strata of the proletariat, are making themselves felt and will continue to manifest themselves until the classes are completely eliminated. The difference in the views, skills, and moods of different strata of the proletariat at the turning points of the transition period, in the course of the development of the class struggle, is reflected in the appearance of opportunist deviations in the party, manifestations of right and "left" opportunism. Here it must be borne in mind that the party includes not only representatives of various strata of the proletariat, but also people from other classes who have not broken ties with them or who have made their way into the party of the proletariat because it is the only party under the dictatorship of the proletariat, who have made their way into it because it is the ruling party. "They, these deviators," says T. Stalin: both the right and the "left" are recruited from the most diverse elements of the non-proletarian strata, elements that reflect the pressure of the petty-bourgeois element on the party and the disintegration of individual links in the party⁴²⁰."

Despite the apparent contrast between right-wing and "left" opportunism, they often *agree* in their assessments and demands, since they feed from the same class roots. Both varieties of opportunism express the pressure of bourgeois ideology in the petty-bourgeois element, with the only difference being that outright right — wing opportunism reflects mainly the ideology of the kulaks, while "left" opportunism mainly reflects the ideology of the urban capitalist classes, the urban petty bourgeoisie that is going bankrupt. This combination of both types of opportunism is not surprising. Lenin said more than once that the "ultra-left" opposition is the wrong side of the right-wing, Menshevik, opportunist opposition.

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle, bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, pedagogical and administrative, against the forces and traditions

420 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 381.

of the old society⁴²¹." Only the Communist Party, armed with materialist dialectic and hardened in struggle, can successfully lead the class struggle of the proletariat in the era of its dictatorship.

Dialectical materialism has become the dominant worldview in our country, a weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat for uprooting hostile ideologies, a weapon against religious obscurantism and clericism. The proletarian worldview has become the most important tool for the revolutionary education of the vast masses of the peasantry, a weapon for the liberation of the working people from spiritual slavery for centuries, from political and national oppression by the exploiting classes.

New forms of class struggle have increased the demands placed on revolutionary theory. First, the demand for maximum *flexibility of the theory*, so that it can not only keep up with practice in a period of rapid revolutionary changes, but also *outstrip* practice, correctly orienting practitioners at the biggest and sharpest turns and transitions from one form of struggle to another, indicating the direction during transitions from one stage of development to another. Secondly, the theory should provide an accurate Marxist analysis of class relations in their uniqueness at each stage of the movement, helping to make sense of the movement as a whole. Thirdly, that theory should help *to reveal the main contradictions and the main trend of development*, so that at every new turn the party can correctly grasp the main link, the main decisive task on which the success of the whole movement depends.

Hence the important task assigned by Lenin to the Marxist-Leninists — to develop *the theory of materialist dialectics in every possible way* from all sides, while at the same time completely *subordinating this theoretical development to the general interests of the class struggle of the proletariat and to the political tasks of the party*, i.e., linking the task of developing the theory with the practice of socialist construction and world revolution.

A wrong and one-sided understanding of this problem leads to two kinds of dangers: either to *the separation of theory from practice*, i.e., empty scholasticism, or to an underestimation of theory, to narrow division, tailedness, and empiricism. The latter also actually means the reverse side of the first danger — *the separation of practice from theory*. The development of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic can be ensured only in a resolute, merciless struggle on two fronts, only in the struggle against both these dangers, which lead equally, though from different sides, to a Menshevik break between theory and practice.

Lenin's brilliant elaboration of materialist dialectics under the dictatorship of the proletariat was based on concrete problems raised by the world revolution and socialist construction in the USSR. This work was *continued by T. Stalin* based on the solution of the key, fundamental problems connected with the construction of the foundation of the socialist economy and the destruction of classes. The decisions of the CPSU (b) and the Comintern are based on the consistent Marxist-Leninist application of the theory of materialist dialectics to the concrete stages of the proletarian class struggle. The party solved and continues to solve all the fundamental tasks of the revolution in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist dialectic, while simultaneously developing and refining it on the basis of new concrete material provided by revolutionary practice in the practical and theoretical struggle on two fronts.

The correct application of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic in the field of political leadership of economic and cultural construction made it possible for the Leninist party to win victories of world-historical significance in successfully building the foundation of the socialist economy, carrying out the plan of complete collectivization and, on its basis, eliminating the kulaks as a class.

Fighting on two fronts — right and "left" opportunism - the party determines the main danger at every basic stage *опасность*. At the same time, the party is guided in determining the nature of deviations by the desire to reveal the class essence of these deviations. For example, the "left" deviation of the Trotskyists and the Trotskyist-Zinovievist opposition was the main danger in the transition to the reconstruction period, at its beginning, before the Fifteenth Party Congress. With

421 Ленин, Детская болезнь «левизны» в коммунизме, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXV, стр. 191.

the socialist offensive unfolding, the main danger for the party is the right deviation.

Every attempt at a double-dealing policy, any attempt to take the position of undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, by representatives of the right-left bloc, has always received a crushing blow from our party.

The path of opportunism is the path of unstable Communists departing from the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist line, from the general line of the party. The way to reject party ideology is the process of creating a hostile and alien ideology. The path of opportunism is a transition to the position of class forces hostile to the proletariat, a movement that objectively reflects the pressure of the bourgeoisie and its ideology. Deviationists objectively become a channel through which the influence of the petty-bourgeois element and the capitalist elements emerging from it penetrates the party and its unstable links. The deviators are becoming the mouthpiece of the anti-Proletarian class forces in our country. These are the class roots of right and "left" opportunism in the transition period.

But the ideology that is politically hostile to the proletariat *is also reflected in the field of theory and methodology*: these types of opportunism differ from each other not only in their social nature, but also in their general theoretical roots *and philosophical* basis. And this is despite some *common features* of their methodology that Lenin pointed out: their perversion of materialist dialectics, eclecticism, etc. Modern right-wing opportunism is based mainly on mechanistic methodology. It is characterized by the fact that it does not see a new content, a qualitative peculiarity of the proletarian dictatorship, denies the contradictory nature of development, advocates "peaceful" evolution, denies the class struggle, etc.

"Left" opportunism and "left" twists start from a methodological attitude that tends to reject certain old forms, does not see the paths and stages in development, does not take into account the material foundations for moving forward, jumps over incomplete stages in development, which leads to adventurism in politics, substitutes the desired for reality, confuses possibility and reality, and so on. etc. The main methodological basis for this type of opportunism is *Menshevik idealism*.

The struggle for the general party line requires Bolshevik party clarity, an irreconcilable struggle on principle against right-wing opportunism — the main danger at this stage - against "left" opportunism, against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. But this struggle for the general line of the party requires a struggle on *two fronts, both in theory and in philosophy*: against the Mechanists, the main danger at the given period, against Menshevik idealism, against conciliatory attitudes towards both, as well as against open bourgeois influences on the proletariat, and it requires a struggle from consistent Marxist-Leninist positions on the basis of an indissoluble political system. connections between theory and practice of socialist construction.

The Trotskyists and "left-wing" scribblers could not understand the essence of the struggle *on two fronts*. They called the struggle waged by our party "centrism." They slandered the party, considering that two extreme wings are being created in the party, and that the general line of the party is being created as a result of the "equilibrium" of both currents. The Deborinists also interpreted the problem of the struggle on two fronts in philosophy in the same spirit, when the party raised the question of turning the philosophical front towards the tasks of socialist construction and of developing self-criticism. Under the guise of fighting "centrism" and "eclecticism," both Trotskyism and Menshevik idealism *were denied* the task of fighting on two fronts. In fact, the party's struggle on two fronts involves, and presupposes, a struggle against centrism—this disguised opportunism, *this conciliatory attitude* towards opportunism. The party's consistent struggle for the foundations of Marxist-Leninist theory went through several stages during the transition period. After the October Revolution, the deposed exploiting classes were deprived of the means of ideological influence within the country, and their brutal hatred of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism was expressed by the world bourgeoisie and its social-democratic agents, represented by the Kautskys and Vanderveldes, outside the country, and by the rags of Russian Menshevism and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, both outside and inside the country. Bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, especially Menshevism, whose social property, as Lenin repeatedly emphasized, is an amazing adaptability, began to penetrate Marxism under all sorts of

signs of "Marxist science."

The openly Menshevik theories of Sukhanov and Co. proved the "untimeliness" of the proletarian revolution in Russia, which had not reached the necessary "height of productive forces". Not understanding the unique situation in the era of imperialism and the peculiarities of the historical development of Russia, they mechanically transferred here the general forms of capitalist development. A more veiled form of bourgeois attack on dialectical materialism in the early period of the dictatorship of the proletariat was again machism, which was combined in a peculiar way with mechanismism and was expressed in a number of Bogdanov's works during this period.

Bogdanov carefully disguised his idealism, speaking under the banner of "proletarian culture", "socialism of science", "organizational science", etc. He allegedly "renounced" all philosophy, but in reality, under "Marxist" phrases, he dragged idealism into political economy, into the theory of historical materialism, into literary studies. Bogdanov replaced the materialist dialectic with the idealistic theory of the "organizational process" and the mechanistic theory of equilibrium — the theory of reconciling contradictions. As the main form of the movement towards socialism, he put forward "cultural" work, labeling his theories with the loud name of "proletarian culture", contrasting them with the revolutionary political struggle. Bogdanov's objectively reactionary philosophy reflected the deep *defeatist and decadent sentiments of the cowardly bourgeoisie*, hiding from the revolution and trying to escape it by returning to peaceful "organizational" work within the "normal" framework of the glorified bourgeois democracy.

Bogdanov's rotten philosophy was reflected among a part of the university youth, among the workers of the Proletkult, in the group of the so-called "workers' opposition", in the views of some theorists — "left" communists. She mentioned in particular her influence on Comrade Bukharin's theoretical views. The idealistic "leftist" mistakes of vol. Bukharin's "Economy of Transition" is "grounded" in Bogdanov's idealism and mechanismism.

During this period Lenin gave a sharp rebuff to the Menshevik ideology of the Sukhanovs. But Lenin is also waging a decisive struggle against "left" communism and its methodological errors — its subjectivism and abstractness. In particular, Lenin responded to Bogdanovism with a second edition of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, with an appendix to an article by V. I. Nevsky, which gave a critical analysis of Bogdanov's latest works. In the preface to this book, Lenin pointed out that under the guise of "proletarian" culture, A. A. Bogdanov held bourgeois and reactionary views.

With the introduction of NEP and the well-known growth of capitalist relations in town and country, the bourgeoisie began to count on a *peaceful* return to capitalism through gradual *rebirth* Soviet power. Some of the bourgeois professors who were recruited to work in Soviet institutions took an openly hostile position towards the Soviet government. From the university departments, from the pages of journals, it carried on counter-revolutionary work and came out as an open enemy of dialectical materialism along the entire line of science, opposing it with idealism and reactionary views. Another section of the bourgeois intelligentsia proclaimed a "*change of milestones*", but "change of milestones" also meant nothing more than proclaiming the need for cooperation with the Soviet government in order to "facilitate" the latter's peaceful return to capitalism.

In order to combat idealism and religion, in order to combat vulgar empiricism and mechanismism, in order to expose the learned serfs and certified lackeys of the priests, in order to propagate the foundations of dialectical materialism and to further develop the theory of materialist dialectics, an organ of militant materialism was organized on the initiative of V. I. Lenin *воинствующего материализма* — the journal Under the Banner of Marxism. They were formulated by Lenin in his famous article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism."

For a number of years, the main danger for the party continued to be "left" opportunism. Counter-revolutionary Trotskyism begins its subversive work first as a fraction of communism and as an internal party opposition. We have in all areas of theory various forms of the Menshevik theories of the Second International that have penetrated under all possible disguises: the methodology of "left" opportunism, Trotskyism, and the "bourgeois" groups that are conciliatory to it, which is characterized by the combination of idealism and mechanismism; Rubin's

Menshevik-Kautskyite idealist theory of political economy; Riazanov's Menshevik "elaboration" of the history of Marxism, the dragging through of the history of Marxism by the and the further deepening of Plekhanov's mistakes in Marxist philosophy by his students Axelrod and Deborin, both along the lines of the positivist-Kantian and mechanistic revision of Marxist-Leninist philosophy (Axelrod) and Menshevist idealism (Deborin, Karev, Stan); the revival of subjective-idealist and Kantian concepts in philosophy (in Sarabyanov et al.), Menshevist-Leninist idealism, etc. idealistic theories in literary studies (Pereverzev, Voronsky, etc.). In the field of party politics, the struggle of the party is being developed, led by Comrade Lenin. Stalin against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. The main danger in theory was the idealistic revision of Marxism, which, having been shattered in politics as the methodology of Trotskyism and "left" opportunism, was still not fully exposed in certain areas of theory and philosophy. This reflects both the general lag and separation of the work of our theoretical institutions from the practice of the party struggle, and the lack of proper leadership in these particular areas of theoretical work.

But in the recovery period, along with idealistic danger, various forms of *mechanismism* and *vulgar, vulgar empiricism* also emerged. The most vivid expression of creeping empiricism and a bourgeois form of revision of Marxism were Mininism (1922) and Yeongmenism (1923). Minin threw out the slogan: "Philosophy overboard", and Yeongmen followed him to propagate a confusing biological theory among young students, contrasting it with supposedly "outdated" Marxism.

The *mechanistic danger* was most clearly expressed in Bukharin's revision of dialectical materialism, namely in the application and further development of Bogdanov's scholasticism both in the theory of historical materialism and in political economy. Despite Lenin's warning, Comrade Bukharin and his students persisted in developing Bogdanov's *theory of equilibrium*, contrasting it with the materialist dialectic. In addition to Bukharin's theoretical "school", there was also a significant group of mechanists from among the natural scientists and some anti-religious propagandists, who tried to react in this vulgar and empirical form to the popishism that was raising its head.

They replaced the open attack on Marxism with a veiled struggle - under the slogan of defending science from "philosophical scholasticism", identifying dialectical materialism with the latest conclusions of natural science.

By the beginning of the reconstruction period, Mechanismism has become a mouthpiece for various trends hostile to Marxism-Leninism (Machism, Freudianism, Kantianism, positivism, etc.), and it joined forces with the Menshevik-Kantian Axelrod group and the Bukharin-Bogdanov "sociological" school. Mechanists-naturalists and anti-religionists (Timiryazev, Sarabyanov, Varyash, etc.) became peddlers of Bukharin-Bogdanov's theory of equilibrium. The transition from the reconstruction period to the reconstruction period was a transition to new forms of class struggle of the proletariat, to the solution of the most difficult and highest tasks of the proletarian dictatorship: 1) to build the foundation of a socialist economy, 2) to completely transfer small-scale peasant farming to the socialist system of large-scale, mechanized collective production, and 3) on this basis to the task of destroying the kulaks as a class and then destroying classes in general.

The world-historical task of building socialism could not be solved by using Trotskyist or Bukharin-Bogdanov, essentially bourgeois formulas. The questions raised by the party about the ways of further development required to be resolved using the method of Marxist-Leninist dialectics, the method of the class struggle of the proletariat.

"Development has been going on in our country and continues to go not according to the formula of Comrade Bukharin. Development went on and continues to go on according to Lenin's formula - "who is who". Whether we, the exploiters, will crush and suppress them, or whether they will crush and suppress us, the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. — that is the question... *organizing the offensive of socialism on the entire front* — that is the task that has confronted us in the course of developing the work of reconstructing the *entire* national economy. This is how the

Party understood its mission⁴²²."

Beginning with the Fourteenth Congress, the Party mobilized all the material resources of the State and the forces of the proletariat to accelerate the pace of industrialization of the country in every possible way, and from the Fifteenth Congress it set about resolutely carrying out the plan for state-farm and collective-farm construction. By carrying out its policy of restricting the kulaks more and more strictly and attacking them closely, by the summer of 1929 it had achieved a radical change in the development of agriculture from small-scale, individual to large-scale, and collective.

At the same time, there was a decisive turning point in the field of labor productivity: the development of mass social competition and percussionism. This moment was a "leap", a transition to accelerated progress, a decisive and radical turn in our policy from restricting the kulaks to eliminating the kulaks as a class, a transition to a full-scale offensive of socialism against capitalism on the entire front.

The general line of the party in the reconstruction period is developing under the sign of an organized attack on capitalism. Such is the course of the proletarian class struggle to complete the foundation of the socialist economy. This is also the path of development of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic developed by the Central Committee of the Party and its leader, Comrade Lenin. By Stalin.

The forms of class struggle in the reconstructive period differ from the forms of class struggle in the previous stage. The transition of socialism to a general and full-scale offensive could not fail to arouse the desperate resistance of the old world and the aggravation of class contradictions. Carefully concealed "malicious sabotage by the top of the bourgeois intelligentsia" in all branches of our industry, the brutal struggle of the kulaks against collective forms of farming in the countryside, sabotage of the measures of the Soviet government by the *bureaucratic elements of the apparatus*, which are agents of the class enemy — these are so far the main forms of resistance of the obsolete classes of our country⁴²³."

The struggle against the wrecking bourgeois theories of Kondratiev, Chayanov, Groman, and the Menshevik ideology of Bazarov, Rubin, and Sukhanov gained a purely practical and political significance in the conditions of the reconstruction period. "*Without an irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois theories based on Marxist-Leninist theory, it is impossible to achieve complete victory over class enemies*»⁴²⁴."

The intensification of the class struggle and the revival of the petty-bourgeois element in the country were reflected in the form of right and "left" deviations from the general line of the party, which threatened the party with the disruption of the policy of the socialist offensive. At the same time, the right slope (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky) As a kulak agent within the party, it was the main and *main danger* at this stage. Only in a merciless struggle against deviations could the party achieve the results that we now have.

Marxist philosophy was faced with the task of theoretically destroying the philosophical foundations of both these deviations and the openly hostile wrecking methodology. Meanwhile, the philosophical leadership headed by Deborin separated philosophy from party policy, from the practice of socialist construction, and from concrete knowledge. Not only did it fail to expose hostile methodologies, but it itself was captured by the wrecking concept of Rubinism; for a number of years it got along peacefully with it, and at a crucial moment, during the economic discussion, it took up a position of active defense of Rubin, publishing his articles in the magazine "Under the Banner of Marxism" and praising him as a leader. the "deepener" of Marxist political economy.

The pressure of hostile ideologies was reflected in the further strengthening of the mechanistic and idealistic danger in various areas of Marxist-Leninist theory: in philosophy, natural science, political economy, literary studies, history, etc. This danger was revealed *by the party* in a series of

422 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 528.

423 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 526.

424 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 443. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

discussions in various areas of theory.

The mechanistic revision of Marxist dialectics in the field of historical materialism, political economy, etc., in the new situation, in the dramatically changed conditions of the class struggle in the country, took on a particularly relevant, political character, becoming *the theoretical banner* of the right-wing deviation in the party. In order to defeat right-wing opportunism as the main danger in the party, it was also necessary to defeat the whole system of Bukharin's philosophical, mechanistic views, which he used to justify his opportunism in politics. *Under these conditions, mechanismism proved to be the main danger.*

The revision of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle and the Bukharin-Bogdanov mechanistic concept that underlies it were taken up at the same time by the Menshevik group of Groman-Bazarov-Sukhanov, who completely shared Bogdanov's theory of the "organizational process", i.e., the theory of equilibrium, and tried to implement it in their practical works in the field of planning, planning, and planning. supply lines, etc. Thus, at the new stage, mechanismism was transformed not only into the philosophical basis of the right deviation, but also into the theoretical banner of the Menshevik wrecking Bazarov-Gromanov group, the banner of capitalist restoration.

Comrade Stalin, in his speech at the conference of agrarian Marxists, pointed out the *unacceptable lag* theoretical work depends on the practical success of socialist construction and the need to eliminate this gap as soon as possible in certain areas of Marxist theory. "I must admit," said T. Stalin — that our practical successes have not kept pace with theoretical thought, and that we have a certain *gap between practical successes and the development of theoretical thought*. Meanwhile, it is necessary that the theoretical work *should not only keep up* for practical work, but also *ahead of it* by arming our practitioners in their struggle for the victory of socialism⁴²⁵." Tov. Stalin harshly criticized a number of opportunist and bourgeois, wrecking theories that were current in our literature, and set the theoretical front the task of both uprooting these theories and working out new questions put forward by practice.

But *the Deborin philosophical leadership* failed to set any of these tasks for the existing philosophical cadres, and failed to mobilize these cadres to help the party overcome the difficulties of the reconstruction period. The Deborin group continued to ignore the task of eliminating the separation of theory from practice, even after the introduction of T. V. Kropotkin. Stalin's slogan of a turn on the theoretical front.

The persistent unwillingness of this group to understand the tasks of the party line in philosophy at a new stage, the well-known political and theoretical blindness of this group, had deep *roots in the conditions of the class struggle* in the country. Even during the struggle against the Trotskyist opposition, an active part of this group had a close connection with Trotskyism, sharing Trotskyist anti-party attitudes in politics. By systematically avoiding theoretical criticism of Trotskyism and "left-wing" bends, and continuing to defend a number of Trotskyist attitudes in theory, it actually continued to feed Trotskyist sentiments in theory. At the same time, group T. Deborina also failed to provide timely assistance to the party in exposing the ideology of *right-wing opportunism*. Only after the right-wing deviation had been shattered by the party did the Deborin group attempt to link the abstract critique of mechanismism with the critique of right-wing opportunism in politics, but it was unable to carry it out to the end because of its revisionist attitude towards Marxism-Leninism. Nothing was done by the Deborin group to expose the bourgeois and Menshevik wrecking methodologies of the Gromans, Kondratievs, Chayanovs and other ideologues of the hostile classes. On the contrary, as we have already pointed out, the Deborin group itself found itself in thrall to the idealistic theory of Rubinism in political economy.

The party organization of the Communist Party of Philosophy and Natural Science correctly understood the instructions given by T. V. Tolstoy. She was able to develop a discussion with the Deborin group and correctly identify the main lines of disagreement: "on the necessity and nature of

425 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 442. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

a turn on the philosophical front, on the partisanship of philosophy, natural science, and theory in general, on Leninism in philosophy as a new stage in the development of dialectical materialism, on the need for an extensive struggle on two fronts in philosophy and natural science, on the new tasks of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in connection with the practice of socialist construction, etc⁴²⁶."

As a result of the discussion under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party, etc. Stalin succeeded in exposing the Menshevik idealistic anti-party nature of the views of the Deborin group. The course and results of the philosophical discussion have once again revealed the closest connection that exists between philosophy and politics, between science and the class struggle, and the inadmissibility of any rupture between them, especially in the context of the intensified class struggle, the elimination of the kulaks as a class, and a full-scale offensive along the entire front. The discussion has once again revealed that *the slightest deviations from the correct Marxist-Leninist positions, even in the most abstract questions of theory, now acquire important political significance and express a certain class conditioning, which is ultimately directed against the dictatorship of the proletariat* .

The Central Committee of our Party, in its resolution on the journal Under the Banner of Marxism, put forward in the field of Marxist-Leninist philosophy the slogan "to wage a steady struggle on two fronts: against the mechanistic revision of Marxism as the main danger of the modern period, and against the idealistic perversion of Marxism by the tt group. Deborin, Karev, Stan, and others "⁴²⁷ and set the task of Marxist philosophy and the journal Under the Banner of Marxism "to" wage a resolute struggle for the general line of the party, against any deviations from it, consistently carrying out in all its work the Leninist principle of party philosophy⁴²⁸."

"By separating philosophy from politics, "the Central Committee's decision says," and by not following the party line of philosophy and natural science in all its work, the group that headed the journal Pod Znamenem Marxizma was reviving one of the most harmful traditions and dogmas of the Second International — *the gap between theory and practice* , slipping in a number of crucial questions to the position of Menshevik idealism⁴²⁹."

The Party has paid serious attention to the theoretical section, including it as an integral link in the general chain of the full-scale offensive of socialism against capitalism along the entire front.

Life has placed on the agenda the task of strictly implementing Lenin's principle of party science, of subordinating science to the tasks of party policy in the construction of socialism. The Party demanded *an irreconcilable struggle on two fronts in theory and the eradication of all hostile influences in science*.

5.3. Mechanistic revision of dialectical materialism and Right-wing Opportunism

As we have already seen, the modern mechanists represent an unprincipled bloc of revisionist groups: here we have the natural mechanists (Timiryazev, Perov), the Bogdanov-Mechanist group of Bukharin, the Kantian Mensheviks (Axelrod), the Freudian Mechanists (Varyash), and the positivists who are sliding towards subjective idealism (Sarabyanov).

Despite the existing shades of philosophical views, despite all the differences in the political views of N. I. Bukharin and L. Axelrod, all of them are united *by the revision of the foundations of dialectical materialism* , the replacement of materialistic dialectics with mechanistic methodology. They are all united by a lack of understanding of the partisanship of Marxist-Leninist philosophy

426 Из резолюции партийной ячейки ИКП Ф. и Е. «Правда» от 26 января 1931 г.

427 «Правда» от 26 января 1931 г.

428 «Правда» от 26 января 1931 г.

429 «Правда» от 26 января 1931 г. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

and the class roots of mechanismism, and they are all characterized by a rejection of Marxist-Leninist dialectics as a science.

A common feature for all mechanists, which is inextricably linked with their lack of understanding of revolutionary dialectics, is the absence of *historicism*, the lack of *understanding of partisanship* in theory and the unity of theory with revolutionary practice. Borrowing from the old revisionists the worn-out, hackneyed "arguments" and sophisms against materialist dialectics, the mechanists forget and revise the basic thesis of dialectical materialism, that every theory is determined by revolutionary practice. The mechanists, as well as the Menshevik idealists, who have been discussing it for a number of years, have never once asked themselves the question: with what social and political trends, with the ideology of what classes, was mechanical materialism connected in the historical past, with what classes is it connected in the present? If the mechanists could put this question to themselves, they would immediately expose themselves as ideologues of the petty bourgeoisie.

Until the proletariat entered the arena of historical struggle, the old mechanical materialism was a *revolutionary theory*. Despite its shortcomings, it was a revolutionary weapon of the French advanced bourgeoisie in the struggle against feudalism and religion as the bulwark of medieval reaction; it was the revolutionary theoretical basis for the first socialist and communist doctrines that emerged long before the independent movement of the proletariat. Feuerbach's materialism, which was opposed by the radical German bourgeoisie to the old idealism, was also revolutionary at a certain historical stage. But already with the emergence of the *dialectical* Marx and Engels' materialism, and with the first battles between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the old metaphysical materialism began to turn its reactionary side against Marxism, becoming more and more "the refuge of indecisive cripples and writing industrialists." On the philosophical basis of Feuerbach's limited materialism, grasping at its "idealism" above and its contemplative, metaphysical character, the reactionary petty-bourgeois "true" socialism of Gruen flourished in Germany, with which Marx and Engels waged a decisive struggle even before the revolution of 1848. Contemplative materialism, which reflected the indecision, passivity, and inconsistency of the petty bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels had to fight hard for decades, because these forms of inconsistent materialism served as the theoretical basis for numerous petty-bourgeois trends in socialism. Only in the indefatigable struggle against reactionary petty-bourgeois tendencies did Marxism become the dominant teaching in the ranks of the proletariat.

The whole struggle between Marx and Engels with the inconsistent materialist Duhring, who at every step stumbled into idealism, and his supporters-the left-wing phraseologist Most and the opportunists Vollmar, Bernstein, and so on-also shows that inconsistent mechanical materialism is an ideology alien to Marxism.

But mechanismism was *bourgeois* not only in the past, but mechanismism and idealism continue to play a significant role in bourgeois theory today. The mechanical theory of equilibrium serves as a theoretical basis for the bourgeois evolutionary theory of slow and calm progressive development, the teachings on the need to preserve the capitalist system in "equilibrium". Social fascism (Kautsky and others) also justifies its hatred of the proletarian revolution by the theory of the equilibrium of society and the necessity of adapting society in its development to the natural environment. This bourgeois ideology was reflected in Soviet conditions in the views of "our" mechanists.

Modern mechanists continue to call themselves dialectical materialists. In words, Bukharin, Axelrod, Sarabyanov, Varyash, etc. they "recognized" and "defended" dialectics.

In fact, they "defended" mechanismism from *materialist* dialectics, from revolutionary Marxism-Leninism. Is it not a direct mockery of Marxism when Bukharin claimed that the "general trend" of his innovations in Marxist philosophy "follows the line of developing an orthodox, revolutionary understanding of Marx"? In fact, N. I. Bukharin has been promoting the bourgeois theory of equilibrium for more than a decade. Isn't it strange that even now, when these theories have been shattered by the practice of socialist construction, Comrade Bukharin does not renounce his erroneous mechanistic philosophy? The same applies to the rest of the mechanists-Timiryazev,

Axelrod and others, who for a number of years fought against Marxist-Leninist philosophy, expelling it from the field of theoretical natural science-again with an oath of allegiance to dialectical materialism.

What arguments have the mechanists put forward so far against materialist dialectics and in favor of a mechanistic worldview?

First of all, following their revisionist predecessors, Bogdanov and other "exterminators" of dialectical materialism, modern mechanists have again put forward as the main argument against dialectics *the identification of dialectical materialism with the "latest conclusions of modern natural science"* and positive science, which supposedly require a revision of the views of Marx, Engels and Lenin. As another "argument" they put forward the bare phrase about the presence of elements *of mysticism and teleology* in dialectics: they substituted Hegelian idealistic dialectics instead of Marxist dialectics. This hackneyed, worn-out method, which the revisionists have always used throughout the history of Marxism, for some reason pleased N. I. Bukharin as well. To make it easier to combat Marx's dialectic, he invariably fights with the Hegelian triad, believing that this is the essence of Marxist dialectics and imitating in this matter Mikhailovsky, Bogdanov and other Machist positivists, the social fascists Bauer, Adler, etc. Other mechanists-Axelrod, Varyash-fought with the Marxist-Leninist dialectic under the flag of the struggle against "Deborin scholasticism".

The third argument of the mechanists is an appeal to *empiricism*. In this respect, the mechanists have completely followed the old vulgar materialists, whom Engels still called pathetic, insignificant minutiae, who have not made a single step forward in the development of theory. They considered it possible to replace Marxist theory with narrow-minded division, vulgar empiricism, revealing a complete lack of understanding of the meaning of revolutionary theory. These are the main "arguments" of the Mechanists, which, on the whole, are nothing new for Marxism and the party.

And the mechanists' methods of mechanistic perversion of Marxism have remained the same as those of all revisionists. The constant evasion of the essence of the question, the omission and circumvention of the main, fundamental thing in the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the snatching out of individual quotations, the deliberate distortion of them in order to bring Marxism under Mechanismism, and Marx, Engels, and Lenin under mechanists, sophistry and eclecticism in all the writings of mechanists-these are the old revisionist techniques, with the help of which the mechanists have been systematically perverting Marxism-Leninism for a number of years.

This is also Bukharin's attitude to the philosophical foundations of the theory of historical materialism and Marxist political economy. Bukharin transforms the dialectical laws of historical development and capitalist economic formation into metaphysical laws of equilibrium, substituting bourgeois sociology for Marxism and flat evolutionism for dialectics. This is also the attitude of Timiryazev and other mechanists towards Engels: They carry out a mechanistic perversion of Engels' "Dialectic of Nature" and a rejection of Engels' dialectic under the guise of revising the supposedly outdated form of Engels' materialism.

How do the mechanists view Lenin's *philosophical legacy*? On the part of the mechanists, we had a complete disregard for Lenin's works on dialectics and natural science. With regard to Bukharin, the words of Comrade Lenin are fully justified here. Stalin on the "hypertrophied pretentiousness of an undereducated theorist". Leninism as a new stage in the development of dialectical materialism did not exist for Comrade Bukharin. As for Axelrod, she has long waged a systematic struggle against Lenin's revolutionary dialectic.

Other mechanists, such as Varyash, in their writings try to turn Lenin into an apologist for Mechanismism and Menshevism, and in bad faith try to slip Lenin mechanistic formulations, while most carefully avoiding the question of the struggle of Lenin and our party against Menshevism and the Menshevik perversions of materialist dialectics, politics, and tactics.

The blindness of our mechanists to the Menshevik danger, the desire to cover up this danger, reveals the petty-bourgeois nature of modern mechanismism. This is further confirmed by the fact that the mechanists do not want, *do not want to learn* Lenin's revolutionary dialectic, are at war with it, distort and distort it. They ignore the problem of developing a theory of dialectics, put forward by

Lenin, and the problem of studying the dialectics of Marx and Engels.

On the other hand, the mechanists do their best to resurrect and deepen Plekhanov's theoretical errors. Axelrod, Timiryazev, Perov, and others confirmed their mechanistic worldview and refuted Engels' materialism. Stepanov referred to Plekhanov, and raised his mistakes to a whole system of anti-Marxist views.

In brief, the revisionist attitudes of the Mechanists are as follows:

1) Identification of dialectical materialism with the modern mechanistic worldview; identification of philosophical materialism, as the worldview of the proletariat, with modern natural science and "the latest conclusions of positive science". Hence the elimination of materialist dialectics as a philosophical science. Hence-positivism, vulgar empiricism, separation of practice from theory, disregard for the development of a revolutionary theory.

2) A revision of the materialist theory of reflection and a slide towards agnosticism, positivism, Kantianism, and idealism.

3) Denial of dialectics as a theory of knowledge. Opposition of the theory of knowledge to dialectics. Revision of dialectics as the science of universal laws of the development of nature, society, and thought. Replacing dialectics with mechanics, flat evolutionism, and equilibrium theory. The mechanists' misunderstanding of the law of unity of opposites and its replacement by the theory of reconciliation of contradictions, the collision of differently directed forces. Hence the denial of the objective character of quality and thus the denial of qualitative leap-like development. Reduction of dialectical causality to mechanical causality. Denial of the dialectical unity of chance and necessity. Hence-fatalism, the theory of gravity, khvostivism, lack of understanding of the active revolutionary role of the proletariat, of revolutionary practice. In the field of historical materialism — it is a revision of the Marxist doctrine of the class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the abolition of classes, i.e., the foundations of Marxist-Leninist politics.

4) Replacing dialectical logic with formal logic, eclecticism, and scholasticism.

The result is an unprincipled surrender of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist positions and the dissolution of Marxism into petty-bourgeois ideology.

This is basically the essence of modern mechanismism. There is no doubt that mechanismism has nothing in common with the revolutionary theory of the proletariat.

The Party has more than once repulsed the petty-bourgeois agents in its ranks who tried to replace consistent materialism with some old theoretical waste paper. The same historical rubbish is the mechanistic methodology, which at the first practical test turned out to be a weapon of kulak agents directed against the party, against socialist construction. The mechanistic methodology of the right has already *been shattered* by the revolutionary practice of the class struggle of the proletariat. In the fire of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, in the fire of living practice, mechanismism could not stand the critical test. The basic point of the Marxist teaching that revolutionary theory "is finally formed only in *close connection with the practice* of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement"⁴³⁰ — this point the theorists of modern rotten mechanism have cowardly passed over, they have "forgotten" it.

What class-alien influences in the ranks of the party are reflected in mechanismism, what ideological and political trends are it associated with in the past, and the worldview of what classes and class groupings is it in our era? Without a thorough clarification of these questions, without an explanation of the political consequences of their theoretical errors, the criticism of the mechanists would have been half-hearted and one-sided. The Deborin group criticized the mechanists in an abstract "professorial" way, criticized them from the standpoint of idealistic dialectic, without linking their criticism with the revolutionary practice and policy of the party. Therefore, their criticism, while having some positive significance, could not fully expose the Mechanists, because it was itself conducted from an anti-Leninist position. Moreover, on a number of issues, the Deborins were close to the Mechanists.

⁴³⁰ Ленин, Детская болезнь «левизны» в коммунизме, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXV, стр. 174. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

Now let us take a closer look at the main theoretical errors of the mechanists.

5.3.1. Positivism of mechanists and their rejection of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism

While the mechanists do not understand the class character of revolutionary practice, they also do not understand the role and significance of revolutionary theory. They are slipping into a vulgar, vulgar empiricism, a rejection of philosophy, a rejection of the theory of materialist dialectics.

"Does dialectics exist as a special science, or is it a method? "the truly" metaphysical heads " of the mechanistic camp ask. They give the monstrously illiterate revisionist answer that to speak of dialectics as a science, and even more so to speak of some kind of dialectic, for example, in natural science there is "scholasticism", "logistics", "mysticism", "lack of thought", etc *Найка сама себе философия*. on the tail of vulgar, vulgar empiricists. "For Marxists, there is no field of philosophizing ' that is separate and distinct from science: for Marxists, materialist philosophy is the last and most general conclusions of modern science,"⁴³¹wrote T. V. Tolstoy. Stepanov, having fallen for the bait of bourgeois professors who "banish" dialectics from science. Axelrod, Bukharin, and other mechanists tried in one way or another to reduce the philosophy of Marxism to "modern" science, "modern conclusions of natural science", to eliminate Marxist dialectics as a philosophical science, and declared it "obsolete scholasticism". In this respect, the Mechanists are definitely following in the footsteps of the former revisionists and are trailing behind the Menshevism of the Second International. Marxism has no philosophy of its own, says the modern social-fascist M. Adler. Marxism is compatible with any philosophy, " the social-fascist Kautsky now preaches. Marxism is quite compatible with Kantianism, as Struve, Bernstein, Forlander and other bourgeois theorists said earlier. Now our mechanists have been added to this gallery of "fighters" of dialectic. Their slogan: "Science is its own philosophy" is *liquidationism* marxist philosophy. It means renouncing the revolutionary materialist dialectic, i.e., Marxism.

When Minin threw out the slogan "*philosophy overboard*" in the early years of NEP, his performance in the ranks of the party was resolutely rebuffed as a hostile outing. The Mininism was a manifestation of petty-bourgeois vacillation on the part of theoretically unstable elements in the party. The same empty petty-bourgeois claim to "overcome" Marxist philosophy, i.e., to reject it, which was voiced in Minin's own time, can be heard in the slogan of modern mechanists. Minin openly proposed to throw the philosophy of Marxism "overboard", and our mechanists propose to" replace "it with the conclusions of"modern science". But the essence remains the same-the desire to eliminate Marxist philosophy as a science.

In the case of natural mechanics, this aspiration means a direct refusal to defend Marxism, to pursue a consistently materialist line in the field of natural sciences. Abandoning dialectics means weakening the materialist front in the struggle against idealism, ceding materialist positions to the class enemy.

Of course, the mechanists can free themselves from philosophy only in imagination. In fact, no science has ever been able to do without a philosophical basis, without a clear answer to the elementary questions of whether to take matter or thought as a starting point, without a clear answer to the question of what we are studying: is the world and its objective laws real, objective, independent of consciousness as materialism teaches, or it is based on a fantastic world of illusions, sensations and its laws invented by people, as idealists think. No science is possible without *the theory of scientific thinking* . For without thinking, it is impossible to connect the two simplest facts of natural science, not to mention the study of natural relationships in nature and in society. Similarly, no science can do without a clear answer to the question of the knowability of the world.

No matter how much the mechanists cry out against philosophy, they can't do without it. And since in class society there are only *two fundamental trends in philosophy*-materialism and idealism

431 Степанов, Исторический материализм и современное естествознание, 1925 г., стр. 57.

- they thereby side with a particular trend, for the despicable, cowardly" party of the imaginary middle", called positivism, agnosticism, etc., is also the expression of one of the main trends, which is called the "party of the imaginary middle". only littered, littered with the garbage of petty-bourgeois prejudices.

"Natural scientists," says Engels, " imagine that they are freed from philosophy when they ignore or scold it. But since they cannot move a single step without thinking, and logical definitions are necessary for thinking..., in the end they still find themselves in captivity to philosophy, but unfortunately for the most part — the worst; and so people who especially diligently scold philosophy become slaves to the worst, vulgarized remnants the worst philosophical systems"⁴³²."

Engels considers the transition from metaphysical to dialectical thinking to be the only way out of the impasse to which flat naturalism and empiricism lead in the field of natural science. Engels criticized the vulgar materialists such as Buchner, Focht, and others for their vulgar empiricism — — because they, like our mechanists, arrogantly treated dialectics, neglected philosophy, and, as Engels says, having no vocation for further development of theory, "did not go one step further than their teachers", the French materialists. Our mechanists, as if in mockery of Engels, are now again trying to drag us into the vulgar empirical swamp of the Buchners. "The names of Moleschott' Focht and Buchner, 'sighs the mechanist Borichesky," are still the epitome of 'vulgar' materialism. Meanwhile, after a real study of these half-forgotten thinkers, *we come to a completely different conclusion* : we are facing very respectable scientists who stand at the level of the then positive knowledge with all its advantages and with some problems"⁴³³." Such speeches directed against Engels and Lenin are also very common among other modern mechanists, who have lost the remnants of their party-theoretical flair. They are ready to raise from their graves all the old mechanists, as well as the creeping empiricists, if only to "defeat" the consistent dialectical materialism of Marx and Lenin.

The mechanists completely ignore Lenin's proposition, which is clear and obligatory for every party member who studies the natural sciences, that "without a solid philosophical foundation, no natural sciences, no materialism can withstand the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas and the restoration of a bourgeois worldview. In order to survive this struggle and carry it out to the end with complete success, " says Lenin,"a natural scientist must be a modern materialist, a conscious supporter of the materialism represented by Marx, i.e., he must be a dialectical materialist"⁴³⁴." Lenin, as well as Engels, insists on further elaboration of the materialist dialectic. Without a thorough development of the theory of dialectics, Lenin says, " materialism cannot be militant materialism. He will remain, to use Shchedrin's expression, not so much *fighting* as *being fought* . Without this, major natural scientists will just as often as hitherto be helpless in their philosophical conclusions and generalizations"⁴³⁵."

The mechanists completely ignore Lenin's instructions on the development of the theory of dialectics, which are now a directive of the party. In opposing Leninist philosophy, they reject the consistently materialist theory of knowledge, falling straight into bourgeois positivism.

What is *positivism*, with which modern bourgeois science is now infected and which is professed by the "certified" lackeys of the priests, the modern" learned " feudal lords, reactionaries? Positivism (from the word "positive" — positive) is a trend in bourgeois science that has developed since the second half of the nineteenth century, which *in words* wants to know nothing but positive (positive) science, which in words rejects all philosophy as scholasticism. But in reality, under the

432 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 21–22.

433 Сборник «Механистическое естествознание и диалектический материализм».

434 Ленин, О значении воинствующего материализма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVII, стр. 187.

435 Ленин, О значении воинствующего материализма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVII, стр. 188. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

mantle of scientific "positivity", reactionary and idealistic views and clergymen are often dragged along. Positivism considers the theory of knowledge altogether superfluous. The basic question of all philosophy — the question of the relation between consciousness and matter — is considered by positivists to be "unscientific", "scholastic", and unsolvable. Therefore *in practice* Positivism is also a kind of *philosophical* doctrine that carries the philosophy of Kant, Hume, Mach or another idealist under the banner of "scientific". Positivists are actually either agnostics or outright idealists.

Positivism is especially dangerous now, when, under the influence of the deepest crisis and the decay of capitalism, on the one hand, and the tremendous success of the natural sciences, which confirm dialectical materialism, on the other, there is a stratification among modern bourgeois scientists. Some of them are beginning to adopt the position of dialectical materialism, while a significant part of scientists, especially in capitalist countries, have swung towards open reaction, are leaving the position of shamefaced materialism (disguised as positivism, agnosticism) and are moving to the reaction camp, turning to mysticism and popery (all under the same flag of positivism). Major modern scientists, such as Planck and others, who used to defend materialism more or less shamefacedly under the banner of positivism, are now trying to find a compromise with religion in their scientific works. Today's major physicists, Millikan and Eddington, are engaged in a popish argument about how the " God " could have created the world. Eddington preaches that the world was created by a single act, and Millikan uses all his scientific erudition to "prove" that "the creator *is relentless.*" at work." Such is modern scientific positivism, which is a direct agent of fideism, mysticism, clerical behavior, and modern imperialist reaction. And all this shame is being committed under the banner of positive " science!

Hence it is clear that the rejection of philosophy and the preaching of positivism is a complete rejection of Marxism. To this day, however, mechanists continue to hold the view that Marxist philosophy does not exist as a science and that it is replaced by "modern science", modern mechanistic natural science.

5.3.2. Revision of dialectics and the materialist theory of reflection

Modern mechanists have failed to understand the basic meaning of *materialism* and have abandoned the materialist theory of reflection in the form developed by Marx and Engels and raised to a new level by Lenin.

Even in his controversy with the metaphysical materialist Duhring, Engels ridiculed Duhring's manner of throwing out "eternal truths in the last instance" and his lack of understanding of the relationship between absolute and relative truths. In contrast to Duhring's metaphysics, Engels showed that concepts, logical categories, all scientific knowledge obtained by experiment are not fixed, unchangeable, but developing relative *historical ones* products that *reflect* the objective laws of the historical development of nature and society. Marx also criticized Proudhon in *The Poverty of Philosophy* and the classics of bourgeois political economy and vulgar economists for their lack of understanding of dialectics, showing and proving in *Capital* the transitory and relative nature of economic categories, which are only mental reflections of objective, historically transitory material and production relations of the capitalist social formation.

Bogdanov, Bazarov, and other Machists could not understand the dialectical doctrine of relative and absolute truth in their time. Lenin wrote of the Machists that they "understood absolutely nothing about Engels' application of dialectics to epistemology (absolute and relative truth, for example)⁴³⁶." By recognizing the relative nature of the concepts of physics, the Machians descended into relativism: they could not understand their *objective meaning*. They refused to recognize them as reflections of the objective material world that exists independently of humanity. As we have already pointed out, Plekhanov also paid insufficient attention to this aspect of the matter in his criticism of the Machists. Lenin finds a characteristic feature of Plekhanov's criticism

436 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 197.

of the Kantians, Agnostics, and Machists in the fact that this criticism was conducted "more from a vulgar materialist point of view than from a dialectical, materialist point of view."

In this connection, Lenin's words that "Plekhanov, in his remarks against Machism, was not so much concerned with refuting Mach as with inflicting factional damage on Bolshevism" are now deeply significant⁴³⁷. In criticizing the Machists, Plekhanov made a number of unacceptable concessions to Machism, losing sight of the need for a dialectical view of the nature of knowledge. He himself was of the opinion that we will never know how our consciousness arises⁴³⁸. This was undoubtedly a tribute to agnosticism.

Plekhanov's hieroglyphic theory of knowledge was also a liability to the Machists, because it ultimately led to subjectivism, to the denial of objective reality and objective truth, i.e., it led to the Machist subjectivist swamp. With his hieroglyphic theory, Plekhanov "made a clear mistake in presenting materialism" (*Lenin*). Plekhanov made a concession to Machism with his incorrect theory of "experience" and a number of other mistakes.

Lenin's critique of Machism, and along the way of Plekhanov's mistakes, helps us to uncover the *epistemological* roots of modern Mechanist positivism. The main epistemological error of the mechanists is that they incorrectly, undialectically pose and solve the basic philosophical question of the relation of thinking to being, the question of the relation of the subjective and the objective, the relative and the absolute. And they cannot be properly understood scientifically without recognizing the Marxist-Leninist theory of *reflection*, without teaching about absolute and relative truth, i.e., without applying dialectics to the theory of reflection.

From a *consistently materialist* standpoint, Lenin reveals the epistemological roots of Comrade Bukharin's mistakes in his notes on the Economy of Transition and in other works. "The error of Bogdanov's 'terminology' in Bukharin ' comes out: *subjectivism*, solipsism. It is not a question of who is "considering" or who is "interested", but of what exists independently of human consciousness⁴³⁹." Where Bukharin speaks of the "cognitive value" of Marx's method, Lenin writes in the margin:: "Only 'cognitive value'? rather than reflecting the objective world? "shamefaced ... agnosticism!"⁴⁴⁰ In another passage, where Bukharin, instead of talking about revealing the objective dialectic of the transitional epoch, again subjectivistically discusses only the "dialectical-historical *point of view*", Lenin writes: "From this phrase it is remarkably clear that for an author corrupted by Bogdanov's eclecticism, the dialectical "dialectical" point of view is not the same as the "dialectical-historical" point of view. the point of view" is only one of many equal 'points of view' ... "⁴⁴¹And Lenin, in his final review of Bukharin's book, reproaches the latter for uncritically borrowing the terminology of the machist Bogdanov, without thinking about its content:" Therefore, very often, too often, the author falls into a conflict with dialectical materialism (i.e., Marxism) scholasticism of terms (agnostic, Hume-Kantian, on philosophical grounds), in idealism ("logic", "point of view", etc.). *вне* the consciousness of their production depends *on matter*, on objective reality, and so on"⁴⁴².

The unwillingness to correctly and dialectically understand the derivative character of sensations and their logical categories, their dependence on matter, on objective reality, and the constant silence about the objective content of concepts is characteristic of revisionists in general —

437 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 290. Примечание.

438 Плеханов, т. XI, стр. 46.

439 «Ленинский сборник» XI, стр. 385.

440 «Ленинский сборник» XI, стр. 348.

441 «Ленинский сборник» XI, стр. 387.

442 «Ленинский сборник» XI, стр. 400–401.

both mechanists and Menshevik idealists. Bukharin is professedly *pro*-philosophy, he even came out in "defense" of philosophy — as for example in his critique of the Phenomenon, but in this defense he has no understanding of the dialectical theory of knowledge. Nowhere did Bukharin raise or analyze the question of the relation of subjective and objective, relative and absolute moments in the cognition of objective reality, or of the dialectical character of the process of cognition. There is nothing accidental about this for Bukharin. He was never a consistent, i.e., dialectical materialist. He had vacillated before, in his younger years, and after the revolution he continued to vacillate between materialism and positivism. In his younger years, Bukharin eclectically "combined" Marxist views with the philosophy of Mach — Avenarius; during the revolution, he began to justify Bogdanov's Machist scholasticism with the help of Marxist phraseology, reconciling Marxism with Bogdanovism.

It is not for nothing that V. I. Lenin, when he had to expose certain mistakes of Bukharin, always focuses the fire of his criticism on *гносеологической* Bukharin's epistemological slovenliness, pointing out that he is unacceptably ignoring the materialist theory of knowledge.

"His theoretical views," Lenin wrote about him, "can very doubtfully be classified as completely Marxist, because there is something scholastic about him (he never studied and, I think, never fully understood dialectics)"⁴⁴³.

As can be seen from the above review of Bukharin, Lenin puts the latter's anti-dialectical, scholastic errors in direct connection with the misunderstanding of dialectics as a theory of knowledge and the rejection of the theory of reflection. Other mechanists (Stepanov, Varyash, Timiryazev, Perov) openly substitute vulgar materialism for philosophical materialism. The problem of the relation of thought to matter is solved metaphysically, not dialectically.

The mechanists Axelrod and Sarabyanov do not trust human cognition at all. Their views are close to Kantianism and Machism. In his polemic with the Machists, Lenin asked them the question: "Is objective reality given to man when he sees red, feels solid, etc., or not?"⁴⁴⁴

The Machists gave a negative answer to this question, they denied the objective source of sensations. Akselrod and Sarabyanov gave the same approximate answer now. In their opinion, sensations of red, solid, etc., i.e., in general, human sensations are devoid of objective content, they do not reflect the objective world independent of sensation. In their opinion, sensations, concepts are conditional signs, hieroglyphs, they *do not reflect* objective reality.

Plekhanov's philosophical mistakes, which follow the line of a certain departure from consistent materialism to vulgar materialism and Kantian agnosticism, are now repeated by L. I. Axelrod (the Orthodox), defending them and deepening them further. Axelrod strongly defends Plekhanov's agnosticism and hieroglyphism. It stands on the essentially Kantian point of view that "sensations caused by the action of various forms of motion of matter do not resemble the objective processes that generate them"⁴⁴⁵. It especially emphasizes this "dissimilarity" of the forms of cognition to the forms of the material world. Thus, she has, as with Kant, knowledge does not connect man, does not bring him closer to nature, but only separates him. The hieroglyphism of L. I. Axelrod is in blatant contradiction with the Marxist-Leninist consistent materialist theory of reflection. In Axelrod's work, we actually have *a gap between knowledge and the material world*. Axelrod's dialectic turns into subjectivism and sophistry and is not a reflection of the dialectic of the objective world. Axelrod's agnostic theory inevitably implies the rejection of dialectics as a science and the transformation of dialectics "into a system of formal principles" that do not reflect anything objective, but serve only as some purely subjective conditional cognitive means, a well-known "point of view" for approaching the subject of knowledge.

443 Цитировано по книге: Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 416.

444 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 105.

445 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, Рецензия (Ортодокс) Аксельрод на книгу «Материализм и эмпириокритицизм», стр. 331.

The mechanical materialists of the eighteenth century did not suffer from such an ugly one-sidedness as the modern mechanists, who are distinguished by an exceptional "stiffness" and "ossification" of thought. The old materialists were also able to understand and find *the subjective image of the objective, material world in sensations*, and they were able to find *reflection in the subjective objective*. And with modern mechanists, the subjective is only subjective.

Mechanists do not understand that the question of the objective content of sensations and concepts is at the same time a question of recognizing *their objective source*, i.e., *matter*, as the only and final objective reality independent of human consciousness. The knowledge that the material world exists outside of us is given as a result of historical, social, and sensuous human practice. Nature is reflected, i.e. it makes itself known, is copied in the feelings and concepts of a person, and this existence of an objective reality independent of man and humanity, confirmed in life at every step, is an objective truth. "To consider our sensations as images of the external world — to recognize objective truth — to stand on the point of view of the materialist theory of knowledge — these are *the same* »⁴⁴⁶ things." This is true for every consistent materialist, both for Marx and Lenin, as well as for Feuerbach and the French materialists.

When Sarabyanov and Axelrod refuse to recognize the objectivity of the content of our sensations, it shows that they *have moved away from materialism altogether*.

The mechanists agree with the old materialists only in their inability to apply dialectics to the process of cognition. Marxism-Leninism teaches that dialectics also includes "what is now called the theory of knowledge, epistemology, which must treat its subject equally *historically*, studying and generalizing the origin and *development of knowledge*, the transition from *non-knowledge* to knowledge⁴⁴⁷."

This is absolutely beyond the comprehension of the mechanists. And yet the theory of reflection cannot be properly understood if we consider it metaphysically, anti-dialectically, as Feuerbach and the old materialists did. *Marxist theory of reflection* He considers cognition as a process, as *a transition from ignorance to knowledge*, as *a historical process* of more and more profound reflection in the minds of people of the ever-evolving nature and society.

What kind of scholasticism L. I. Axelrod held, and to what extent she has a vulgar idea of the theory of reflection, can be seen at least from her polemic on this issue with Lenin. "If sensations were images or copies of things," she wrote, "what the devil would we want with things that would then really be things in themselves, in the absolute sense of the word? To recognize sensations as images or copies of objects is to re-create the impassable dualistic chasm between object and subject⁴⁴⁸."

As can be seen from the above quote, Axelrod did not understand dialectics at all. It kept hovering around *Feuerbach's nonhistorical man*, the abstract nonhistorical categories of "subject and object." Moreover, it goes back from Feuerbach, who nevertheless recognized in sensations and concepts an image or a copy of the objective material world, to the metaphysics and idealism of Kant, who, as is well known, could not connect reflection with the reflected, copy with the model, phenomena with the thing-in-itself, i.e., separated sensation from matter. Axelrod's anti-historism is the anti-historism of Feuerbach and Kant in the theory of knowledge, put together in an ugly way.

The metaphysical, anti-dialectical view of the relation of thought to matter, which is common to all mechanists in general, has nothing in common with Marxism.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin enriched the theory of reflection with dialectics, the doctrine of relative and absolute truth. They taught us to consider the process of reflecting the material world in the human mind historically, in the course of historical *practice* in the course of labor activity, in

446 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 106. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

447 Ленин, Карл Маркс, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XVIII, стр. 11. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

448 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, Рецензия (Ортодокс) Аксельрод на книгу «Материализм и эмпириокритицизм», стр. 330.

the course of *the class* battles of humanity. Just as consciousness in general reflects matter, so concretely historical social consciousness reflects the historical material process of the production of social life — this is the basic premise of Marxist theory of knowledge. The revisionist, formal-logical views of the Mechanists on knowledge have nothing in common with Marxist dialectics.

The mechanists do not understand the objective meaning of dialectical-materialist logic, nor do they understand its *derivation from the material world, from the historical* development of the world and society. Therefore, they also turn logical categories into empty abstractions, mysticism, scholasticism, without being able to specifically apply them in practice.

Mechanists, as we have seen, forget the role of revolutionary, world-transforming practice, which confirms that in relative truth there is an objective, absolute content that reflects objective reality. Therefore, they do not understand that "human thinking is inherently capable of giving and gives us absolute truth, which is made up of the sum of relative truths"⁴⁴⁹.

Modern mechanists, not understanding the doctrine of absolute and relative truth, are slipping into the agnosticism of Kant, Hume, subjectivism, relativism and sophistry.

The agnostic theory of hieroglyphs, like Axelrod, was stubbornly defended, and so on. Sarabyanov. He went so far as to recognize truth only as something subjective and to deny objective truth, i.e., not only to the Kantian direct denial of the cognizability of the objective world, but also to the subjective-idealistic denial of the existence of a world outside of consciousness.

Sarabyanov also agreed with the denial of objective truth to the denial of objective qualities, etc. Sarabyanov thus entered the position of subjective idealism, he was left with only a materialist phrase, only the appearance of materialism.

"Why," says Sarabyanov, "do I call all truth subjective? Yes, because truth is not objective being, because truth is our *representation* about the world, things, and processes"⁴⁵⁰.

That's how T. signed his name. Sarabyanov in his subjectivism. "To make relativism the basis of a theory of knowledge," Lenin wrote, "is to inevitably condemn oneself either to absolute skepticism, agnosticism, and sophistry, or to subjectivism"⁴⁵¹. Sarabyanov's relativism and Axelrod's Kantian skepticism have nothing in common with Marxist epistemology. "The difference between subjectivism (scepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics," writes Lenin, "is, among other things, that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is relative (relative). *For objective dialectics, there is also an absolute in the relative.* For subjectivism and sophistry, the relativistic is only relativistic and excludes the absolute"⁴⁵². The difference between the ideal and the material is also not absolute, not excessive, and historical practice confirms to us at every step how human concepts, thoughts, and knowledge, being derived from matter and entirely conditioned by it, are transformed back into practical action, into material force, when they take possession of the masses.

For the vulgarizers of Marxism, these truths are incomprehensible, because they try to resolve the relation of thought to matter in an abstract, scholastic, contemplative way, and not in a dialectical way. The subjective is subjective, the objective is objective, what is relative is not absolute, what is not objective, and so on. The mechanists have a whole series of other idealistic, Kantian, and Humorous errors. Axelrod defends the Menshevik-Kantian extra-class theory of morality, conciliating Kautsky on this point. Sarabyanov, for example, supported the idealist biologist Berg and opposed Darwin. He considered it wrong, for example, that "we in the mass still stand unconditionally on the positions of Darwinism"⁴⁵³. Varyash still has his Freudian, idealistic

449 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 110.

450 Журнал «Под знаменем марксизма» № 6, стр. 66.

451 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 111.

452 Ленин, К вопросу о диалектике, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 302.

453 Сарабянов, Исторический материализм, стр. 147.

mistakes.

All these idealistic vacillations of the mechanists are by *no means accidental*. They inevitably follow from the false positivist position taken by the mechanists in relation to Marxist philosophy, from their revision of the Marxist-Leninist theory of reflection, from the revision of materialist dialectics as a philosophical science.

No matter how much the mechanists want to be materialists, Marxists, a retreat to the position of inconsistent mechanical materialism against their will and desire leads to idealistic vacillations, to open revisionism. The mechanical, inconsistent, vulgar materialism of the Mechanists could not withstand the onslaught of bourgeois ideas; the Mechanists surrendered a number of the most important strongholds of materialism to Kantianism, Humism, and subjective idealism. In other words, the mechanists could not withstand the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elements during the period of acute class struggle in the country, and succumbed to the ideology of bourgeois-Menshevik positivism.

5.3.3. Opposition of the theory of knowledge to dialectics

The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of dialectics as a theory of knowledge and logic is the only consistent doctrine from which one cannot deviate a single step, so as not to fall into the swamp of revisionism and bourgeois reaction. The modern mechanistic camp has been waging a systematic struggle against dialectics as a theory of knowledge for a number of years, developing a thoroughly hostile positivist empirical philosophy, or, as Axelrod calls it, "the philosophy of scientific experience", *as opposed to dialectics as a theory of knowledge*. "There is still no systematic development of the philosophy of dialectical materialism⁴⁵⁴," says Axelrod; although she still believes that only Marxism "can give a truly scientific theory of knowledge, or a *theory of experience*, and a general philosophical worldview that is scientifically grounded⁴⁵⁵." The materialist dialectic of Marx and Engels and its development by Lenin-is this not a "truly scientific theory of knowledge"?

Obviously, Lenin and his party, on the one hand, and Axelrod, and the whole mechanistic camp behind him, on the other, speak different languages. Lenin, following Marx and Engels, understands Marxist theory as a materialist dialectic that aims to change the world. Axelrod, following Kant, understands philosophy, the theory of knowledge — as the theory of experience, epistemology, which deals with questions about the "conditions and prerequisites "of " experience", the possibility of justifying "experience", the possibility of "justifying" causality, etc. Dialectics, according to Axelrod, cannot be a theory of experience, epistemology, because it understands dialectics metaphysically, only as *a method* or the doctrine of *purely formal principles of thought*, and not as a philosophical science about the universal laws of the development of nature, society, and thought.

What should be the theory of knowledge according to Axelrod? Following the revisionist and bourgeois philosophers, Axelrod believes that "the theory of experience must be based on the data of experience", and that experience in turn "requires its justification"⁴⁵⁶. Her positivist philosophy of experience should, in her opinion, deal with serious problems, including "the important problem of the primary premises of experience": the problem of reality as it manifests itself in experience, "the problem of causality, the problem of the criterion of truth", "the question to what extent the ontological premises necessary from the point of view of dialectical materialism are

454 Аксельрод, В защиту диалектического материализма, стр. 224.

455 Аксельрод, В защиту диалектического материализма, стр. 224.

456 Аксельрод, В защиту диалектического материализма, стр. 226.

permissible"⁴⁵⁷ and so on.

What is experience? How is the experience possible? What are the conditions and prerequisites for the experience? -this is what, in her opinion, revolutionary Marxism-Leninism should do in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In other words, the Bolsheviks should tackle the old cud of Kantian problems. However, the party has to expose this old rot, because the mechanists persist in defending this theory of experience, directing it against the Marxist-Leninist dialectic. None of the mechanists opposed the Menshevik-Kantian prostituting of Marxist dialectics; on the contrary, they fully pursue the same line in their "philosophical works".

Varyash, in his special book devoted to Leninist dialectics, bypassed the central position of Marxist-Leninist philosophy that dialectics is the theory of knowledge and logic of Marxism. He attributed to Lenin his own and Axelrod-Plekhanov's views on dialectics only as a "method" and not as a theory of knowledge and logic of Marxism. Therefore, Varyash's first question in the section devoted to Lenin's dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge is: "What is experience?" Lenin's criticism of the word "experience" as covering up both the materialist and idealist line in philosophy, as well as Lenin's harsh criticism of Plekhanov's mistake on the question of experience — all this was forgotten and passed over by Varyash in favor of Menshevik positivism. The concept of experience according to Varyash, which he also attributes to Lenin, is supposedly an "important category" of the materialist theory of knowledge. Analyzing Kant's justification of experience, Varyash notes: "the explanation of experience according to Kant ... amounts in essence, if not to the complete abolition of experience, then at least to a radical reworking of this important concept", and the only trouble is that "experience in Kant does not mean what it means for us". According to Varyash, it is still possible to save the theory of experience by making materialistic corrections, which he makes in his book in full agreement with the program for developing the "theory of experience" that Axelrod outlined.

None of the Marxists so sharply and mercilessly attacked "the uncritical borrowing of the concept of 'experience', which is alien to Marxism and has been worn out by all philosophical reaction", as Lenin. "At the present time," Lenin wrote, "professorial philosophy dresses up its reactionism in all sorts of shades in the garb of declamation about 'experience'⁴⁵⁸." Empirical idealists, all empirio-critics, all Machists started from experience, and Fichte, the subjective idealist, connected his philosophy only with experience. "I declare solemnly —" Fichte wrote, "the inner meaning, the soul of my philosophy, is that man has nothing at all but experience; man comes to everything he comes to only through experience"⁴⁵⁹.

The same word "experience" is used by the mechanists to revise dialectics. "All our knowledge comes from experience and rests on experience. Dialectical materialism is empirical from beginning to end," Axelrod echoes the general chorus of the enemies of Marxism. At the same time, Axelrod understands experience idealistically in one case, and materialistically in the other. When she writes that "Kant's whole mistake was to separate the form of experience from the content of experience, and the a priori forms from sensuality," she identifies experience with consciousness, i.e., she interprets "experience" idealistically. When does it say that "experience" is a process of interaction between the subject and *the independent* if the object depends on it, then it understands it in a materialistic way. But even in this case, it does not go beyond Feuerbach's contemplative understanding of "experience." In addition, it further surrenders its materialistic positions to Kantianism. According to Axelrod, the sensations that arise in the process of this interaction are not representations of the real world, but hieroglyphs, conventional signs. In other words, Axelrod's philosophy of "experience" should serve as a foundation for the theory of hieroglyphs, a cover for the old Feuerbachian contemplative materialism and Kantian agnosticism.

457 Аксельрод, В защиту диалектического материализма, стр. 223.

458 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 122.

459 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 122.

This is the objective class-political content of the latest "Marxist theory of knowledge" developed by Menshevik empiricists in opposition to the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist dialectic. The struggle of the mechanists against dialectics as a theory of knowledge is clearly essentially *a struggle between Menshevism and Bolshevism in philosophy*.

The theory of knowledge of Marxism has nothing in common with the Menshevik semi-Kantian declamation about "experimental", "empirical" knowledge. In materialistic dialectics, the source of knowledge is moving matter, independent of consciousness. Living, sensuous cognition, determined by practical, revolutionary-critical activity, is the most important moment of the unified dialectical process of cognition, which is only a reflection of the dialectic of the objective world.

What kind of "empiricism" the mechanists are talking about is evident at least from the following thesis of Sarabyanov: "not only do the senses deceive us," Sarabyanov wrote, "but nature itself misleads us." According to Sarabyanov's theory, all sensory cognition turns into a complete deception, and therefore all human actions must also turn into a complete mistake, i.e., some eternal, fundamental discord between perceptions and the material world is legalized. On the basis of the "empiricism" of the mechanists, it is impossible to build a scientific revolutionary theory that would make it possible to foresee the course of concrete historical reality and put words into action in a revolutionary way, i.e., it is impossible to build bold, revolutionary, and decisive tactics of Bolshevism. Lenin's basic thesis that our sense organs are capable of reflecting objective truth, that living, concrete perception is an image, a copy, a reflection of objective reality, is precisely directed against such rotten "empiricism".

Our mechanists do not talk about empiricism in order to seriously study *the role and significance of empirical, sensory knowledge* for the justification of a revolutionary theory and successful practical action. On the contrary, by shouting about empiricism, they want to cover up their rejection of dialectics, of revolutionary theory, in order to oppose empirical knowledge to theoretical knowledge, in order to oppose the semi-Kantian, agnostic epistemology to dialectics as a theory of knowledge.

Marxist dialectics is revolutionary and concrete; it is not divorced from sensuous, living historical practice and from sensuous empirical knowledge. The mechanists are trying to isolate it, tear it away from empirical knowledge, banish dialectics from its "positive" theory of knowledge, turn it into non-objective, non-reflective forms of thinking. In this way they show only their complete ignorance of the dialectical character of empirical sense-knowledge itself, and their lack of understanding of the connection between empirical and theoretical knowledge.

After science has proved the historical development of nature, the historical origin and development of the organic world and human society, it is absolutely absurd to return to the old *metaphysical theories about nature, limits and abilities of knowledge* and to separate the doctrine of method from epistemology, logic, etc., as the mechanists try to do. The metaphysical view of the essence of knowledge is a long-passed historical stage. Meanwhile, the reasoning of the mechanists is thoroughly metaphysical. They completely lack a dialectical understanding of the relationship between sensory and theoretical knowledge. They take a separate perception of a separate individual without a historical approach to it, select individual cases of erroneous perceptions, whether due to damage to any sense organ, incomplete conditions for correct perception, etc.-and on the basis of such "experience" they conclude, like Sarabyanov: "after all, the senses deceive us." Or, they argue, "the sensitivity of the senses changes all the time depending on training and the state of the body," and therefore "you can not trust the senses." The question is, how do we know the world if our senses deceive us and nature leads us by the nose? "Only by means of a tool and an experiment," replies T. S. Tolstoy. Sarabyanov, "we can learn things and their processes", and "we correct our senses". A truly pathetic, wretched "theory of experience" of the mechanists. It turns out that the senses deceive us only in relation to the subjects studied, but they never deceive a person who learns with the help of tools...

Meanwhile, in reality, just the opposite is true: experiment, practice, technology-the same tools prove that *in the end*, in the sum of *the human senses*, they reflect objects and processes of nature. If they were deceiving us, there would be no technology, no tools; effective historical

practice would be impossible. Of course, the sense organs of a single person, as well as any single instrument, will not give us *an absolute picture*. They are never able to fully and accurately reflect nature. But humanity in its historical development can endlessly develop and refine its knowledge. It is impossible to draw conclusions based on the varying degree of limitations of our individual perceptions that our senses deceive us at all. The experiment does not refute, but confirms the ability of perceptions to correctly reflect things. The experiment does not undermine confidence in sensory cognition, but expands and enriches the spheres of sensory cognition, turning forms of material movement that are not perceived or difficult to perceive by the senses into movements that are accessible to our perception. Artificial tools of cognition do not oppose the senses, but *complement them*, helping to better understand the phenomena and connections of nature.

Engels, contradicting agnostics like Helmholtz, provides detailed and detailed evidence that perceptions correctly reflect nature. He developed a dialectical view of the nature of sensory cognition, pointing out its active and historical character, the dialectical *connection* between sensuality of thinking and practice. In his article "On the Role of labor in the process of humanizing the Ape," Engels gave a consistently materialistic, i.e. dialectical, justification for the origin and development of human cognition—unlike the modern mechanists, scholastics, who still follow Kant in asking: "How is experience possible?"

According to Engels, the origin and development of sensory cognition and thinking cannot be understood outside of historical practice, outside of active labor activity and the class struggle. Marx, Engels, and Lenin set us the task of establishing and developing dialectics as a theory of knowledge based on the development of technology, the history of all sciences, and in particular the development of the organic world, the history of the development of the child. Darwin's theory of development, says Engels, "provided not only an explanation of the existing representatives of organic life, but also laid the foundation for the prehistory of the human spirit, for studying the various stages of its development, starting from the simple, structureless, but irritating protoplasm of lower organisms and ending with the thinking human brain. Without this prehistory, 'adds Engels,' the existence of a thinking human brain remains a miracle⁴⁶⁰." Thanks to the theory of development, thinking is explained *by natural causes*. That is, it is scientifically justified and explained. To ignore, like the mechanists, the dialectical active character of human knowledge as a whole and its direct dependence on practical activities aimed at changing nature and transforming society, is to engage in empty scholasticism. Therefore, the attempt of the mechanists to separate dialectics as a theory of thought from sensuous, empirical knowledge and from objective dialectics is a thoroughly reactionary undertaking that has nothing to do with Marxism, with Marxist science in general.

5.3.4. Replacing dialectics with mechanics. Equilibrium theory

The lack of understanding of materialist dialectics as a theory of knowledge is combined by mechanists with a one-sided mechanistic view of nature and society, with the restoration of the old mechanistic materialism.

"The materialism of the last (eighteenth) century," wrote Engels, "was mainly mechanical, because only mechanics, and precisely the mechanics of solid bodies (terrestrial and celestial), in short, the mechanics of gravity, had reached a certain completeness by that time out of all the natural sciences. Chemistry still had a childish look, it still adhered to the theory of phlogiston. Biology was still in its infancy: the plant and animal organism was studied only in rough detail, it was explained by purely mechanical reasons. In the eyes of eighteenth-century materialists, man was a machine, just as animals were in the eyes of Descartes. The exclusive application of the standard of mechanics to chemical and organic processes, in which the mechanical laws, although still valid, recede into the background before other higher laws, constitutes the first, peculiar, but

460 Энгельс, Дialeктика природы, стр. 216.

then unavoidable limitation of classical French materialism⁴⁶¹."

The greatest achievement of Marx and Engels is to overcome the shortcomings of the old, contemplative anti-dialectical materialism, to enrich materialism with dialectics. Materialist dialectics, as a comprehensive study of the universal laws of the development of nature, society, and thought, is the only consistent materialist theory of knowledge and method of revolutionary action.

The universal character of dialectics as a science of the laws of nature and society has been repeatedly revised by the bourgeois companions of Marxism. Lenin criticized the bourgeois apologist Struve for his "primordial ignorance of dialectics." Lenin harshly criticized the contemporary naturalists for their inability to rise from spontaneous materialism to dialectical materialism, for their descent from materialism to Machism. Modern mechanismism is also connected with the "primordial ignorance" of dialectics among a number of comrades who are engaged in Marxist theory.

The universal character of the laws of materialist dialectics is subject to revision by the entire modern mechanistic trend. *Natural mechanics try to replace dialectics with mechanics in the field of natural sciences.* A significant part of the mechanistic camp, mainly represented by Bukharin and his "school", substituted for dialectics a mechanistic theory of equilibrium in the field of *history, political economy, strategy and tactics of the class struggle of the proletariat*, i.e., in the field of social cognition and action. Thus, the aspirations of the mechanistic camp are aimed at undermining the dialectical-materialist basis of revolutionary Marxism as an integral and unified worldview and replacing it with a mechanistic worldview. It is true that while the mechanists banish dialectics from nature and society, they continue to speak of Marx's "dialectical" method. But this is only a phrase; in fact, their dialectical method of thinking is transformed into formal logic, eclecticism, sophistry, and dead scholasticism.

The mechanists consider Marxist dialectics insufficiently materialistic, try to "supplement" it, "deepen" it, and "concretize" it, and under the guise of developing the "concretization" of dialectics, they revise Marxism-Leninism along the whole line.

The attempt to replace revolutionary dialectics with mechanics, the attempt to narrow and discard Marxist dialectics and reduce it to an empty verbal trinket, characterizes the revisionist essence of modern mechanismism. This aspiration is expressed first of all by N. I. Bukharin.

Bukharin wrote as early as 1922 that Marx and Engels "freed dialectics from its mystical husk in *action*"⁴⁶², but allegedly did not substantiate it theoretically and nowhere did they give a theoretical and systematic exposition of it. Bukharin reproaches Marx and Engels for leaving the proletariat with a worldview that is not "free from *teleological thinking*," a taste inevitably associated with the Hegelian formulation, which is based on *self-development* "The Spirit"⁴⁶³. This is why he suggests that instead of the "mystical" Marxist dialectic, Marxism should be based on a mechanistic "theory of equilibrium", which supposedly "is also a more general and idealistic formulation of the laws of moving material systems"⁴⁶⁴. "We consider it quite possible," says Bukharin, "to translate the 'mystical' language of Hegel's dialectic, as Marx called it, into the language of modern mechanics"⁴⁶⁵.

Bukharin, following the bourgeois professors, does not hesitate for the thousandth time to reproach Marxist dialectics with Hegelian mysticism, to point out that the Marxist worldview has a "teleological (mystical) flavor", "idealistic elements", to hint at the "narrowness" of Marxist

461 Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах, 1931 г., стр. 23.

462 Бухарин, Сборник «Атака», стр. 118.

463 Бухарин, Сборник «Атака», стр. 118.

464 Бухарин, Сборник «Атака», стр. 118.

465 Бухарин, Теория исторического материализма, стр. 76.

dialectics, and to seek "a more general (!) formula for the laws of motion of matter". But this also means leading a new campaign against Marxism in favour of a "more general" bourgeois "point of view"! Bukharin is aware that the revision of dialectics inevitably involves a revision of the whole of Marxism, and that a corresponding revision of the whole of Marxist science—the theory of historical materialism, political economy, and Marxist-Leninist politics and tactics—must be carried out with the introduction of the theory of equilibrium under Marxism. The "theoretical work" carried out by Bukharin and his "school" on the perversion of Marxism is inextricably linked with the right-wing opportunist views of this "school".

However, in reproaching Marx and Engels for "mystification," Bukharin bypassed their main statements about dialectics. Marx and Engels were well aware that the bourgeoisie and its theoretical minions would throw mud at their revolutionary teaching, calling it "Hegelian sophistry." Marx responded to bourgeois criticism with the following words: "I criticized the mystifying side of Hegel's dialectic almost 30 years ago, at a time when it was still in fashion." "My dialectical method," said Marx, "is not only radically different from Hegel's, but is its direct opposite"⁴⁶⁶.

Bukharin did not understand the revolutionary significance of materialist dialectics. And he didn't say anything new. He repeated only the old Bogdanov-Machist slander of Marxism: "The basic concept of dialectics in Marx, as in Hegel, did not reach full clarity and completeness; and this makes the very application of the dialectical method inaccurate and vague, its schemes are mixed with arbitrariness, and not only the boundaries of dialectics remain undefined, but sometimes the very meaning of dialectics is not clear. it's very perverse"⁴⁶⁷.

Bukharin also repeated word for word Bogdanov's idea about the narrowness and historical limitations of dialectics and the need to move to a broader and "general point of view." "Organizational processes in nature," Bogdanov wrote, "take place *not only in the form of* through the struggle of opposites, but also in other ways; dialectics is therefore a special case, and its scheme cannot become a universal method. The resulting new point of view is formulated"⁴⁶⁸ by empiriomonism." This point of view of Bogdanov's empiriomonism, about which Bukharin is silent, is Bogdanov's mechanistic "organizational science" with its notorious theory of equilibrium, which Bukharin seized upon without heeding Lenin's warnings about the idealistic, reactionary basis of Bogdanov's "organizational science", his "tectology".

"Bogdanov ~~had~~ deceived you by changing... and trying to ~~move~~ the old dispute. And you give in!"⁴⁶⁹ — wrote Vladimir Ilyich Bukharin. In response to this warning, Bukharin revealed a complete reluctance to understand Lenin. "But this is exactly what needs *to be proved*," he replied to Lenin. — In my opinion, *no сущест* there really is no philosophy here, and tectology is something other than empiriomonism. It's not so easy to fool me about such things"⁴⁷⁰.

This pretentious reply of Bukharin's "half-educated theorist" very clearly characterizes his attitude to Lenin as a theorist and to the Leninist stage of development of Marxist philosophy in particular.

Bukharin has not abandoned this Bogdanov-scholastic methodology to this day, despite its clearly idealistic, reactionary, and thoroughly hostile character to Marxism-Leninism. In fact, let us see how Bogdanov's mechanistic, or as he calls it, "tectological" point of view should differ from the Marxist critical-revolutionary dialectic.

466 Маркс, Капитал, т. I, 1932 г., стр. XXIII.

467 Богданов, Философия живого опыта, 1920 г., стр. 189.

468 Богданов, Философия живого опыта, 1920 г., стр. 208.

469 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 385.

470 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 385.

First of all, Bogdanov's tectological "point of view", in accordance with his subjectivism, should be a universally broad scheme, completely *indifferent to its content* . "Before tectology, as before mathematics, all phenomena are equal, all elements are indifferent" — this is the basic principle of Bogdanov's methodological scholasticism. A mechanistic methodology must drown all that is alive and concrete in the abstract, and produce universal, meaningless, empty, formal "symbolic schemes" according to all the rules of formal logic, separating the general from the particular and singular. "Its generalizations, like mathematical symbols, should *be distracted from the concreteness* of the elements whose organizational connection they express, and should hide this concreteness under indifferent symbols"⁴⁷¹."

Thus, Bogdanov contrasts concrete materialist dialectics, for which there is nothing general outside of the particular and individual, no abstract outside of the concrete, with idealistic abstract-scholastic, *universal schematics*, like the world schematics of the positivist Duhring. This dead scholasticism, which is capable of killing everything revolutionary in an empty abstraction, of covering up everything with an empty phrase, of smearing everything, of circumventing everything, is an invaluable methodology for the bourgeois agents in the working-class movement. Bukharin adopted this universal Bogdanovian schematism entirely.

The second subjective-idealistic principle of Bogdanov's methodology, which the Marxist Bukharin "did not notice", states that "for tectology 'the unity of experience is not found,' but is created in an actively organized way." According to Bogdanov, we must proceed not from the conditions of a concrete objective situation, not from the material external world and its unity, which for the idealist Bogdanov do not exist, but from our own head, from the psychic "elements" we must create, create, organize, construct nature and society, create the unity of experience. "How is experience possible , how to form a system of elements, how to harmonize experience?" - this is the question that haunted Kant; it haunts both Bogdanov and ... Bukharin. The less contradictions there are between the "elements", the easier *the organizational process should be*, the higher and better the system should be. Therefore, " the problem of practice and theory is reduced to a tectological question: what is the most *appropriate way to organize* a certain set of elements, real or ideal?"

Bukharin tries to "materialize" this essentially subjective-idealistic method of constructing systems from elements a priori! "Any thing," he says, "whether it is a stone, or a living object, or a human society, or anything else, we can consider as a whole consisting of parts (elements) connected with each other; in other words, we can consider this whole as a system"⁴⁷²." "Each system consists of components (elements) connected to each other in one way or another. A human society is made up of people, a forest is made up of trees and bushes, a pile of stones is made up of these stones, a herd of animals is made up of individual animals, etc"⁴⁷³." The whole wisdom of Bukharin's "organizational", i.e. mechanistic, "dialectic" consists in the formula: "If such and such elements are given, then *what must be* the conditions under which it is possible *to maintain equilibrium* the system that its elements are or should be included in."

Bukharin did not advance one step from the Kantian question, "how is experience possible, ""how is the unity of experience possible," and how is equilibrium possible? Bukharin's answers are made in the following spirit: class societies *exist* , so there must be additional conditions of equilibrium. There must be something that plays the role of a hoop that binds classes together, that does not allow society to disintegrate, to fall apart, to finally split. Such a hoop is the state, that is, the condition for the unity of society, according to Bukharin, must be a conciliating hoop, linking classes, smoothing out contradictions — the state. This empty idealistic and reactionary scholasticism blurs the class essence of the state and leads to bourgeois lies about the extra-class

471 Богданов, Тектология, стр. 105.

472 Бухарин, Теория исторического материализма, стр. 77.

473 Бухарин, Теория исторического материализма, стр. 793.

nature of the state. Here Bukharin reduces classes to empty abstractions, "elements", and society to an equally dead abstraction — a system. The state is reduced to an external hoop—an empty abstraction that should connect elements, give "unity", consistency, stability to the system.

Bukharin tries to attribute this Kantian method of constructing a "system" of elements, a method of finding conditions, to Marx and Engels. "Method for finding *necessary conditions* according to available (or assumed) facts, it was extremely often used by Marx and Engels, although until now very little attention has been paid to it. And yet, in fact, all Capital is constructed in this way⁴⁷⁴."

The method of finding the necessary conditions has nothing in common with Marxism as a consistently materialist doctrine. This method is thoroughly imbued with *anti-historicism*. Meanwhile, the Marxist method consists in a *historical* approach, in an approach from the point of view of *development* to the question of the grounds and conditions. This is what really permeates the whole of Marx's Capital. Bogdanov and Bukharin, in their theoretical constructions, do not start from the material world, as the consistent dialectical materialists Marx, Engels, and Lenin do, but from the original, disjointed, disjointed "elements", parts, from which they then mechanically construct the whole, unity, with the help of their heads, looking for "conditions" for it. Therefore, their elements and "systems" made up of them remain dead abstractions, and not reflections of the living, concrete, material world. The living material unity of the world, which develops through the struggle of opposites, generates its own parts. But for Bukharin and our other metaphysical mechanists, the parts exist *before the whole*, separately from the whole.

Third, Bogdanov demands that his idealistic organizational mechanistic scholasticism should not be confused with the "harmful" materialist dialectic. Bogdanov is a sworn enemy of materialism, and this is precisely what N. I. Bukharin, an ardent opponent of the basic law of materialist dialectics: the unity of opposites, did not understand. Materialism—the recognition of the external world, according to Bogdanov, is mysticism. Therefore, he wants nothing to do with the "mystical", i.e., materialist, Marxist dialectic, and denigrates it in every possible way. However, he attacks Marx's dialectic not only by attacking materialism, but also by using a different method, accusing Marx of Hegelianism. He believes that Marxist dialectics is "formal" because it makes the concreteness of research a prerequisite, and takes the external material world, objective reality, as its starting point. Bogdanov lumped together Marx's materialist dialectic and Hegel's idealist dialectic on the grounds that both Marx and Hegel recognized development as a struggle of opposites. Bogdanov sees "logism", "mysticism", and "teleology" in Marx and the Marxists in materialist dialectics as the doctrine of the self-development of matter.

Instead of criticizing the reactionary nature of Bogdanov's theory, Bukharin reconciles it with revolutionary Marxism. In his remarks on the "Economy of Transition," Lenin notes Bukharin's fascination with Bogdanovism. "The author gives valuable *new facts*, but degrades, verballhornt, Marx's theory by 'sociological' scholasticism⁴⁷⁵." Dialectical process — "the author puts it *next* (and in 2nd place) to Bogdanov's Begriffsscholastik. But you can't put either — or next⁴⁷⁶ to it." Bukharin combines "human language with Bogdanov's organizational gibberish."

How slavishly and blindly Bukharin follows Bogdanov is evident from the fact that Bogdanov's identification of the organic with the mechanical is among the innovations he "introduces" into Marxism.

Bukharin's entire argument is borrowed from Bogdanov, and "organic" is understood by him not in a biological sense, but in a specifically Bogdanovian sense, in the sense of an organizational process. And for this purpose, Bukharin, following Bogdanov, refers to the electronic theory, which supposedly represents an "organized system" of elements in contrast to the old, isolated, single and

474 Бухарин, Теория исторического материализма, стр. 46–47.

475 «Ленинский сборник» XI, стр. 356.

476 «Ленинский сборник» XI, стр. 361.

now extinct element — the atom. There is nothing more shameful and shameful for a Marxist theorist than this reference to electronic theory to refute Marxist dialectics and justify mechanism and Machist scholasticism!

So the whole point of Bukharin's slogan of translating dialectics into the language of mechanics is an attempt to "kill" dialectics, the revolutionary soul of Marxism, and turn Marxism into a bourgeois theory, to substitute Machist, metaphysical scholasticism for Marxist theory.

Other mechanists also replace dialectics with mechanics, although they do so in a much more hidden form. Tov. Stepanov, for example, considered dialectical understanding of nature to be "too general a name" and tried to "concretize" dialectics as a mechanistic worldview. He believed that "to understand any phenomenon of life for modern science means *to reduce it to relatively simple chemical and physical processes* »⁴⁷⁷."

The main starting point and at the same time the crowning achievement of the entire methodology of the mechanists — in their attempt to replace dialectics with mechanics — is their perversion of the essence, the core of dialectics, the law of the unity of opposites, and its replacement by the *theory of equilibrium*. The idealistic roots of this theory, which appears in various forms in the works of bourgeois positivists and was especially developed in our country by Bogdanov and Bukharin, are revealed to us by Bogdanov's "organizational science". According to Bogdanov, the "organizational process" (which Bogdanov calls organizational "dialectic" to catch simpletons) does not tolerate any *internal contradictions* in its elements and systems. Bogdanov's organizational "dialectic" banishes every living contradiction in the world. It allows only *внешняя* an external lack of coherence, an external collision of "elements", parts, which, however, must be fully coordinated in any system, so that these elements themselves grow mechanically, "organizationally" into the system. To do this, the system must be stable, at *rest, and in balance*. But since there is no absolute equilibrium in nature, Bogdanov is also forced to allow an imbalance in his "organizational process" *нарушение равновесия* in order for the system to get at least the appearance of movement. This organizational process must take the form of a Hegelian triad: first equilibrium — then its violation — then restoration of equilibrium. This is the whole Bogdanov-Bukharin "dialectic" of the "organizational process."

The normal state of the system is declared to be the consistency and balance of parts, "elements". Any internal contradiction is a violation of the equilibrium of the system, which leads to a collapse, destruction — as Bukharin says, the connections between "elements" are "broken". Therefore a violation of the balance according to both Bogdanov and Bukharin is *an abnormal state* in nature and society, and it can't last long.

The theory of equilibrium is most clearly expressed in Bukharin's book "The Theory of Historical Materialism".

"In the world," says Comrade Bukharin, "there are various forces acting against each other. Only in exceptional cases do they balance each other for a certain moment. Then we have a state of "rest", i.e. their actual "struggle" remains hidden. But as soon as one of the forces changes, "internal contradictions" are immediately revealed, the equilibrium is disturbed, and if a new equilibrium is established at the moment, it will be established on *a new basis*, i.e., under *a different one* combination of forces, etc. What follows from this? *Hence it follows that the "struggle" of "contradictions," i.e. , the antagonisms of forces directed in different directions, determines the movement* »⁴⁷⁸." Bukharin, as can be seen from the above excerpt, takes the state of equilibrium of forces directed against each other as a starting position. From here it is sent in order to explain how and for what reason the object *moves*, develops. It turns out, according to Comrade Bukharin, that when an object or phenomenon enters into motion, it is brought out of a state of equilibrium or, what is the same thing, out of a state of rest — thanks to a change *in one* of the forces (note, thanks to one of the forces — *Auth.*) that are in the phenomenon. The question is, for what reason does one

477 Степанов, Исторический материализм и современное естествознание, 1925 г., стр. 26.

478 Бухарин, Теория исторического материализма, стр. 75.

of the forces change, and therefore, what causes the state of rest to be disturbed? To this question Bukharin answers definitely: "It is quite clear that the internal structure of the system (internal equilibrium) must change depending on the relationship that exists between the system and *the environment* . The relationship between the system and the environment is a crucial quantity. For all the positions of the system, the basic forms of its movement (decline, development, stagnation) will be determined precisely by this relation⁴⁷⁹."

If so, since the state of an object (system) changes depending on the relationship between the object ("system") and the external environment (i.e., other objects surrounding it), then we cannot speak of an internal contradiction inherent in the object itself. According to the materialist dialectic, the struggle of opposites is an internal source of self-movement of each object or phenomenon. Bukharin, however, like all mechanists, transfers *in and out* the source of movement and development, portraying the external environment as the cause of a violation of the "balance".

Therefore, we can only talk about the contradiction between the system and the environment. As for *the internal* contradiction within the "system", which Bukharin sometimes tries to talk about, its opposites coexist peacefully, forming a state of equilibrium and changing their position in relation to each other only depending on the conditions of the external environment.

For example, the relationship between classes in society is explained by the relation of society to nature. Nature is the cause of the direction in which one of the classes will change, and consequently the class struggle will go. But if the development of society is explained by the influence of nature on it, then where is the cause of the movement and change of nature itself?

To this com. Bukharin does not give a clear answer. And there can be no other answer, if of course only to follow a logical sequence, than that this reason is a supracosmic force, which can be called anything and which in the XVII–XVIII centuries was called either the first divine impulse, or simply the creator! So the theory of equilibrium leads directly to the justification of religion...

The theory of equilibrium primarily attempts to eliminate self-movement, and hence the self-development of phenomena — this is one of the basic principles of materialistic dialectics. Comrade Bukharin sees in the very concept of self-movement a bad, "teleological" flavor. Secondly, the opposite sides of the subject matter are understood as the opposite sides of the subject. Bukharin as *external* each other, purely mechanically touching each other. And, thirdly, as follows from all the preceding, contradiction is understood *only as an antagonism of forces* . Bukharin puts it so bluntly: "The struggle of 'contradictions', i.e., antagonism."

But contradiction and antagonism are not the same thing. Antagonism is only a special case of contradiction. The antagonistic form of contradiction alone is not necessary. For example, the antagonism of classes in capitalist society will disappear along with classes, and the contradictions that internally determine the movement and development of society will remain under socialism.

Thus, the mechanists reject the dialectical law of the unity of opposites, replacing it with a purely mechanical law of equilibrium. To make sure of this, it is enough to compare Bukharin's presentation of the theory of equilibrium with the basic formulations of the laws of mechanics.

Laws of mechanics:

According to the first law, " each body retains *its state of rest or uniform* rectilinear motion, if it is not *forced by the forces acting on it.*" change this state." The second law states: "*the change in motion* is proportional to the action of *the driving force* and occurs in the direction of the straight line in which this force acts." Finally, according to the third law, "action is always *equal to reaction* , or the actions of two bodies on each other are always equal and *противоположным* directed in the opposite way."

Equilibrium theory:

"*The relationship between the environment and the' system* '(read: external cause and phenomenon. - Author) is a quantity that ultimately determines the motion of any system! »⁴⁸⁰

479 Бухарин, Теория исторического материализма, стр. 80.

480 Бухарин, Теория исторического материализма, стр. 364.

"There are different forces operating in the world, directed against each other. Only in exceptional cases do they balance each other for a certain moment. Then we have a state of "rest", i.e. their actual "struggle" remains hidden. But as soon as *one of the forces changes*, "internal contradictions" are immediately revealed, *the equilibrium is disturbed*, and if a new equilibrium is established at the moment, it will be established on a *new basis*, i.e., with a different combination of forces, and so on.⁴⁸¹

After this, it is not difficult to notice the complete inconsistency of the theory of equilibrium. the theory of equilibrium distracts from the absolute, universal character of motion, without which, as we have shown earlier, neither the existence of matter nor its cognition is possible. This is the mechanistic and metaphysical nature of equilibrium theory. But the recognition that the movements of objects occur not because of an internal contradiction, as materialist dialectics teaches, but because of *an external one* — the interaction of phenomena, things, and the surrounding world is essentially a negation of their actual movement and development. It inevitably entails a denial of their historical development, i.e., a change in their *quality*.

It is not surprising that the mechanistic theory of equilibrium denies *the objectivity* of qualities and *distinctiveness* — different forms of traffic. It reduces all types and forms of movement to movement. Mechanists believe that "it is quite possible to translate the 'mystical' language of Hegel's dialectic, as Marx called it, into the language of modern mechanics"⁴⁸².

It is well known that the mechanists reduce the whole essence of materialist dialectics to the theory of evolution. The most outspoken of them, T. Stepanov, wrote: "*The evolutionary point of view — the point of view of development*—is one of the characteristic features of modern science"⁴⁸³. Moreover, by "modern science" T. Stepanov also meant dialectical materialism.

The mechanistic theory of equilibrium is therefore inextricably linked with the mechanists' denial of *the objectivity of qualities*, with their return to Locke in the question of qualities: only the "primary" qualities of things studied by mechanics are recognized as objectively existing by them. Mechanismism, therefore, requires *the reduction* of all other qualities to those studied by mechanics, the reduction of all higher forms of motion to its lower, mechanical forms. The mechanists' perversion of the law of the unity of opposites entails a misunderstanding of the unity of internal and external, content and form, necessity and randomness, in particular, the mechanists' denial of randomness as a special form of necessity (see previous chapters).

The theory of equilibrium is a necessary component of *the bourgeois theory of equilibrium*. worldviews. It is inextricably linked with bourgeois philosophy — with its positivism and empiricism, with their denial of the significance of theory and philosophy. It is one of the whales of bourgeois science in the task of "demolishing" and overthrowing "Marxism with its dialectical materialism and revolutionary dialectics. *The theory of equilibrium is inextricably linked to the political views of the bourgeoisie, which seeks to portray the existing capitalist order as a "harmonious" cooperation of classes, and tries with all its might to preserve the balance of capitalist society.* The mechanistic theory of equilibrium helps bourgeois scientists to "scientifically" justify the class goals and tasks that bourgeois sociology puts forward directly and openly. In the future, we will have the opportunity to show how the theory of equilibrium fully reveals the goals and objectives of modern sociology as a bourgeois science of society. It is not surprising that the theory of equilibrium is also held in high esteem by social-fascist theorists (Kautsky et al.).

Bogdanov, much more openly than Bukharin, contrasted his theory of equilibrium with Marx's dialectic. He bluntly wrote that in Marxist dialectics, "the remnants of 'logism' inevitably associated with its Hegelian and pre-Hegelian terminology "can be *harmful* in an "organizational",

481 Бухарин, Теория исторического материализма, стр. 75. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

482 Бухарин, Теория исторического материализма, стр. 76.

483 Степанов, Исторический материализм и современное естествознание, 1925 г., стр. 25.

i.e. mechanistic, analysis.

Comrade Bukharin, while repeating Bogdanov's slander of Marxism verbatim and borrowing its entire theory of equilibrium, is silent about the fact that Bogdanov openly calls materialist dialectics "harmful" (!) for the theory of equilibrium.

Instead of understanding the bourgeois-class, reactionary nature of equilibrium theory, Bukharin tries to give it a "Marxist", "dialectical" justification, tries to reconcile it with the revolutionary dialectic of Marxism-Leninism.

The extremely poor understanding of dialectics, beyond which the mechanists in their theory of equilibrium can never rise, is a direct result of the influence of bourgeois ideology. This direct revision of the materialist dialectic served as the theoretical prerequisites for a right-leaning understanding of the issues of the transition period and world revolution.

5.4. Menshevik idealism

5.4.1. Lack of understanding of partisan theory. Denial of the Leninist stage in philosophy

The Marxist-Leninist principle of partisanship in philosophy is the most important principle of materialist dialectics. Marx, Engels, and Lenin were guided in all their activities by it, developing it on the most diverse material of the natural and social sciences.

Lenin always emphasized that "materialism includes ... partisanship, and obligated us to take the point of view of a certain social group directly and openly in any assessment of events"⁴⁸⁴. "Bourgeois theorists and social-fascists try to challenge the scientific character of Marxism-Leninism precisely because of its partisanship, which makes it *a truly scientific*, "thoroughly revolutionary theory". All revisionist groups and trends primarily seek to discredit the principle of partisanship that permeates the theory of Marxism. Ignoring the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of party philosophy is also a characteristic feature of the activities of Menshevik idealists.

The Menshevik idealists ignore the axiom of Marxism, which is that in a class society theory in all its forms and forms is nothing more than a peculiar weapon of the class struggle. It was not by chance that the Menshevik idealists evaded this teaching of Marx-Lenin, since all their theoretical work followed a different line, was conducted on different principles, and expressed an ideology hostile to the proletariat. The Menshevik idealists' disregard of the Marxist-Leninist principle of party philosophy was expressed primarily in the fact that they separated philosophy *from practice* from the fundamental tasks of the proletarian revolution, from the tasks of active struggle for the general line of the party.

In the works of Menshevik idealists, one can find many general declarative statements on the theme that the theory is party-based. But there was absolutely no genuine scientific analysis and justification of this position, much less any partisanship, in the theoretical work. The practice of their activities showed that these declarations served for them only as a cover for an idealistic revision of the materialist dialectic. The social-fascist proteges of the bourgeoisie in the ranks of the working-class movement, powerless to "throw overboard the theory of Marxism," seek to dogmatize it, to emasculate its revolutionary content, and, by detaching it from the class struggle of the proletariat, to transform it into a harmless catechism, into a collection of the most empty abstract categories, and thereby discredit its significance as an effective and most important weapon of the revolutionary struggle. The Menshevik idealists also revised the philosophy of Marxism in the same direction. Unlike the Mechanists with their slogan "throw philosophy overboard", the Menshevik idealists conducted a revision of Marxist philosophy under *the banner of its development*. In fact, instead of developing categories of materialist dialectics based on the material of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions: a materialist reworking of Hegelian philosophy on the

484 Ленин, Экономическое содержание народничества, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. I, стр. 276.

basis of history, science and technology, they uncritically retold *Hegelian* philosophy, completely ignoring the need to comprehend the fundamental, concrete tasks that the party and the country faced in the last period.

Over the years, the general line of the party has been subject to revision by both Trotskyists and right-wing and "left" opportunists. The Party mobilized all its forces to defend Lenin's cause and the ways he outlined for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Menshevik idealists ignored this struggle. Moreover, some of them actively came out with Trotskyist theoretical attitudes: Karev - with his "theory" of one main class in the transition period; Stan, who taught the Komsomol members to test the correctness of the general party line from personal experience, and so on. Instead of being guided by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of party philosophy, putting philosophy at the service of the general party line and actively fighting against deviations from it, the Menshevik idealists themselves played the role of suppliers of methodology for various deviant and counter-revolutionary trends. Separating philosophy from the practice of socialist construction and the class struggle of the proletariat, the Deborin group simultaneously revised almost all the problems of Marxist philosophy.

Deborin's group's disregard for party theory was clearly expressed in the fact that the Menshevik idealists *did not recognize Leninism as a new and higher stage in the development of Marxism*. They denied the Leninist stage in philosophy, they considered Lenin only a practitioner, a guide of Marx's teaching in the revolutionary movement.

Comrade Stalin classically elucidated and developed the basic questions of Leninism, characterized Leninism as the Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, characterized and showed on concrete material the role of Lenin as the most brilliant theorist who developed Marxism comprehensively and raised it to a new, higher level. The Menshevik idealists rejected this role of Lenin. Karev, in the 1924 magazine "PZM", made a characterization of Lenin that differed from the party's guidelines. "Lenin," wrote Karev, "stands entirely on the basis of Marxism, applying it to the present situation — the period of the decay of capitalism. He puts the Marxian theory, cleansed of the vulgarities of the Second International, into action. Leninism is the Marxism of the epoch of the collapse of capitalism, the transition period from capitalism to socialism. This is Marxism in the practice of the proletarian revolution, for which there were not yet sufficient material prerequisites in the Marxist International. Most of all, Lenin would have been surprised if he had been told that he was opening a new era (?) in Marxism⁴⁸⁵." Thus the Menshevik idealists, in spite of the facts, tried to deny Leninism — they fought against the characterization of Leninism as a new, higher stage in the development of the theory and practice of Marxism. By denying the Leninist stage in the development of the theory of Marxism, they thereby revealed their lack of understanding of the main thing in Marxism, its doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the revolutionary "soul" of Marxism — materialist dialectics, characterizing Marxism as a fixed dogma, objectively solidarizing with similar theories of social-fascist theorists.

The epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, with its colossal scope and intensification of the class struggle, the greatest discoveries in all fields of science and technology, the increasing complexity of the old and the emergence of new forms of class struggle, the sharp differentiation and intensification of the class struggle in the various forms of ideology, provided the richest material for the further comprehensive development of the theory of Marxism. Lenin, being at the head of the Bolshevik Party, which in its revolutionary experience has no equal in the world, on the basis of generalizing the practice of the class struggle of the international proletariat and the achievements of world science, comprehensively developed Marxism and raised it to the highest level. The revolutionary essence of Marxism was brilliantly developed in Lenin's writings. Naturally, social-fascist theorists, seeking to undermine the influence of Marxism among the masses, are waging a fierce struggle against Lenin's works, do not recognize Leninism, and characterize Lenin as having "poorly understood" *praktika* Marxism.

485 Карев, О действительном и не действительном изучении Гегеля, статья в «Под знаменем марксизма» № 4 –5 за 1924 г., стр. 241.

The Menshevik idealists in the conditions of the USSR could not openly preach such views. But in unison with the Trotskyists and the rightists, they also characterized Lenin as a "practitioner" who only successfully "applied" Marx's teachings in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. This touching unity of the Menshevik idealists with the right and with the Trotskyists in the assessment of the greatest leader and theorist of the world communist movement once again indicates that in the person of the Menshevik idealists we have peculiar suppliers of methodology for various counter-revolutionary and anti-party groups and trends.

While rejecting Leninism as a new and higher stage in the development of Marxism, the Menshevik idealists quite logically rejected the *Leninist stage in philosophy*. Already after the publication of Lenin's abstracts of philosophy, which are a rich treasury of thoughts and ideas that re-illuminate many of the most important problems of philosophy, Deborin wrote in the preface to the IX Lenin Collection: Vladimir Ilyich intended "apparently to write a special work on materialist dialectics... There is no doubt that if he had succeeded in completing what he had begun, he would have given a serious impetus to the further development of dialectical materialism, raising it to a higher level⁴⁸⁶." The essence of the views of the Menshevik idealists on the question of the Leninist stage in the philosophy of Marxism is summarized here. Deborin denies Lenin's greatest achievements in the further development of materialist dialectics. This is entirely consistent with his assessment of Lenin only as a "practice." Deborin argues that Lenin "could" have given a serious impetus to the development of Marxist philosophy. What kind of Leninist stage in dialectical materialism can we talk about from the standpoint of Menshevik idealists, if, in their opinion, Lenin *could not*, did not even have time *to give a push* for the development of dialectical materialism? Thus, while denying Lenin's role in the development of philosophy, the Menshevik idealists objectively fulfilled the social order of various camps hostile to Marxism, and they joined forces with the theorists of the Second International on a number of issues.

The Menshevik idealists' rejection of the Leninist stage in philosophy is accompanied by a completely uncritical, apologetic attitude towards Plekhanov's works. In the preceding chapters we have already dealt in sufficient detail with Lenin's critique of Plekhanov's philosophical errors. Let us just recall once again that Lenin, in criticizing Plekhanov, emphasized Plekhanov's failure to understand that dialectics is *a theory of knowledge* Marxism, its vulgar interpretation of the laws of dialectics as *the sum of examples*. Lenin noted that Plekhanov was inconsistent in his criticism of Kantianism, that he himself made a number of concessions to agnosticism, and that he was fighting Machism more from a vulgar-materialist standpoint than from a dialectical-materialist one. As is already known, Plekhanov also makes mistakes on such issues as re-evaluating Feuerbach's philosophy, mischaracterizing the process of Marx's philosophical development, re-evaluating and mischaracterizing the role of geographical environment in the development of productive forces, incorrect Feuerbachian understanding of the problem of the unity of subject and object, and the presence of elements of separation of the logical from the historical in questions of the history of philosophy. The existence of such erroneous views indicates the need for critical work on Plekhanov's works, which are — and rightly so — very popular among wide circles of the proletariat of the USSR and foreign countries. It is necessary to purge what is valuable in Plekhanov's works of everything non-Marxist and opportunist, especially since at present these errors (or similar ones) are used by social fascists, and in the conditions of the USSR mechanists and Menshevik idealists pass off these ideas as the last word in the philosophy of Marxism.

The question of the role of Lenin and Plekhanov in the development of philosophy does not accidentally attract the attention of the party and the workers of the philosophical section of the theoretical front. In connection with the development of the Leninist stage in philosophy, the depth of Plekhanov's philosophical errors and their connection with Plekhanov's Menshevik position in the revolutionary movement were revealed with particular force. The struggle against the mechanistic and Menshevik-idealist revision of Marxism has shown firsthand that the errors and

486 Деборин, Предисловие к IX «Ленинскому сборнику», стр. 3, изд. 1-е.

organic vices found in Plekhanov's works are used by them to revise the most important problems of Marxist philosophy. The mechanists, as has been pointed out, continue to defend and further develop Plekhanov's erroneous views, which follow the line of Kantian agnosticism, with a tenacity worthy of better application. On the philosophical side of the theoretical front, Deborin's group also not only did not consider it necessary to criticize Plekhanov's mistakes and methodological failures in matters of philosophy, but also pursued a line of unprincipled *apologetics* for everything Plekhanov wrote on philosophical problems, trying to cover up his mistakes.

Contrary to the precise and brilliant characterization of T. The Menshevik idealists came up with their own theory about Plekhanov as *a theorist who supplemented Lenin-praktika*. In his pamphlet *Lenin as a Thinker*, Deborin wrote: "Both these thinkers (Plekhanov and Lenin. Plekhanov is *Азм.* primarily a theorist, Lenin is primarily a practitioner, a politician, a leader..."⁴⁸⁷ Thus Plekhanov, the leader of Russian Menshevism, was transformed by Deborin's will into Lenin's theoretical mentor.

It is characteristic that, until very recently, the Menshevik idealists tried to defend this completely false, non-Marxist theory by means of various sophisms. Deborin, in the preface to the ninth Lenin Collection, tried to provide a historical basis for this thoroughly false concept of his. "There is a difference between Plekhanov and Lenin," writes Deborin, "which reflects the peculiarities of the historical phases in the development of the revolutionary movement and the class struggle of the proletariat"⁴⁸⁸. "This theory of Deborin is nothing more than an attempt to weaken the necessity of criticizing Plekhanov's mistakes, to reduce the significance of these mistakes and to obscure their connection with Plekhanov's Menshevik line in the revolutionary movement. There is no doubt that Plekhanov, as a Marxist, entered the arena of political struggle several years earlier than Lenin, and his first works were of great importance for the propaganda of Marxism. But all of Lenin's most important basic theoretical works belong to the same period in which the works of Plekhanov, the Marxist, were published. Moreover, Lenin's *Friends of the People* were written somewhat earlier than even Plekhanov's *Monistic View*. The political activities of Plekhanov and Lenin mainly took place during the imperialist stage of the development of capitalism. Methodological failures in Plekhanov's philosophical works and his mistakes in interpreting many problems of philosophy *are connected* with his opportunist, Menshevik, and liberal position in the revolutionary movement. As early as 1908, Lenin emphasized in a letter to Gorky that "Plekhanov is harming this (Marxist-Auth.) philosophy, linking *here* the struggle against factional struggle, but no Russian social-democrat should confuse the present Plekhanov with the old Plekhanov"⁴⁸⁹."

Lenin and Plekhanov are not representatives of different epochs, but representatives of the ideology of *different social classes*. Plekhanov, who wrote brilliant pages in the history of the revolutionary movement in general and of the proletariat in particular in the first decades of his activity, became more and more the exponent of petty-bourgeois ideology in the working-class movement from the beginning of the 900s, and in the period of the war he adopted entirely bourgeois positions. This Menshevik line in the revolutionary movement explains the causes of theoretical errors in its specifically philosophical works as well. Deborin's attempt to treat Lenin and Plekhanov as people of different periods (epochs) in the development of the revolutionary movement is nothing more than a means of belittling and obscuring those major fundamental methodological mistakes of Plekhanov, which Lenin repeatedly criticized, revealing their class and logical background.

It is characteristic that another prominent representative of this group, Karev, tried to "correct" this too crudely formulated attitude of the Menshevik idealists under the fire of unfolding criticism.

487 Деборин, Ленин как мыслитель, изд. 3-е, 1929 г., стр. 26.

488 «Ленинский сборник» IX, стр. 3.

489 Ленин, Письмо к Горькому от 13 февраля 1908 г., Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVIII, стр. 524.

In an article in PZM, he writes that "Plekhanov and Lenin in this respect represented not different epochs in the working-class movement, but *different streams in it*, in Marxism, and different *depths* of its understanding"⁴⁹⁰. Karev, true to his Menshevik-idealist methodology, ignores the simple truth for a Marxist that to explain the difference between Plekhanov, the greatest theoretician of the Second International, and Lenin by depth of understanding means to explain nothing. The difference in depth of understanding itself needs a *class* explanation. No matter how talented an ideologist of the bourgeoisie may personally be at the present time, in the era of decaying capitalism, his creative activity, his ability to penetrate the laws of development are "bound" by his class nature, the conservatism of the class he represents. The inability of the bourgeoisie to look to the future defines, narrows the boundaries and reduces the depth of understanding of the phenomena of social development by its theorists. Ideologists of the classes that are leaving the historical arena, despite all their talents, are not able to give truly profound scientific generalizations and discoveries. This truth of Marxism is confirmed by the entire history of the development of science and philosophy. As Plekhanov became more and more explicit in the position of Menshevism, the depth of his "understanding" of the problems of Marxist philosophy decreased. He strayed more and more thoroughly from the dialectical-materialist positions of Marxism to the positions of vulgar materialism and Kantianism, and during the war period went so far as to openly preach Kant's teaching on the universal laws of law and morality.

The Menshevik idealists ignore the simple truth that the existence of "different streams" in Marxism cannot be discussed without changing the essence of the Marx — Lenin doctrine. Only from the standpoint of Menshevism can we characterize Plekhanov's mistakes and his failure to understand the essence of materialist dialectics on a number of crucial issues as a "stream" that lies "within the limits" of Marxism. This means agreeing with the social-fascist characterization of Marxism as a conglomerate of various trends, streams, and deviations in the treatment of theoretical questions. This is the path taken by the Menshevik idealists, who want to defend their typically revisionist attitude at all costs.

The Menshevik idealists completely ignored *Lenin's criticism* Plekhanov's theoretical errors.

The revisionist groups in the U.S.S.R., the mechanists, and the Menshevik idealists largely agreed on this question. At least the Menshevik idealists, themselves perverting and not understanding Lenin's theory of reflection, could not fight the *mechanistic* revision of the Marxist-Leninist theory of reflection. Contrary to Lenin, they characterized the issues of criticism of the theory of hieroglyphs as not worthy of attention. "There is a theory of hieroglyphs," Deborin said during the discussion, "which is long dead, no one is interested in it, and which Lenin has finally criticized." This thesis of Deborin not only expresses a lack of understanding of the danger that Machist and Kantian revision poses at the present stage, especially in the context of the crisis of capitalism, but also a desire to divert criticism's attention from the Kantian jet that takes place in the works of Deborin's own group. In such articles of Deborin as "Dialectics in Kant", in the works of Asmus, etc., Kant's agnosticism is *obscured*, his philosophy under their pen becomes for the present time almost a dialectical and revolutionary philosophy. This alignment with social-fascist views largely explains the solidarity of the Menshevik idealists with the neo-Kantian revision of Marx's political economy carried out by the Menshevik wrecker Rubin.

5.4.2. Hegelian revision of Materialist Dialectics

Until recently, the Menshevik revision of Marxism in the capitalist countries took place mainly under the slogan of "Kantianizing" Marxist philosophy. Social-fascist theorists, trying to justify their revision, tried to characterize Marxism as a "one-sided" doctrine that needed to be *supplemented* by Kant's theory of knowledge (Max Adler, Forlander, etc.). Emasculating the revolutionary content of Marxism, they pursued the line of "supplementing" it *with Kantianism*,

490 «Под знаменем марксизма» № 6 за 1930 г., стр. 35. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

substituting this reactionary theoretical basis for their counter-revolutionary practice in the ranks of the working-class movement. At the present stage, with the fascization of the bourgeoisie and its increasing offensive against the working class, the bourgeoisie is trying to use the idealistic dialectic of Hegel in a perverse and reactionary form for the philosophical justification of its activity. This new trend of bourgeois thought is also reflected in social fascism (Kautsky, Kunov, Siegfried Mark).

In the USSR, where Marxism is the dominant ideology, taking advantage of the interest shown by the broad masses in Hegel, a group of philosophers led by Deborin revised the philosophy of Marxism under the guise of the need to "supplement" it with Hegelianism. "The fascination with Hegel as a dialectician," writes Karev, "was a perfectly legitimate and necessary reaction to the opportunistic disregard of him by the majority of theorists of the Second International. But at the same time, as the revolutionary Marxists led by Lenin sought *additions to Hegel* (emphasis added). The *Mensheviks* sought in Hegel an antidote to the Marxist theory of the state (Kuhn), while the bourgeois apologists sought a weapon against Marxism at its very foundation."⁴⁹¹ In this thesis of Karev's, which dates back to 1924, the essence of the Menshevik-idealist revision of the philosophy of Marxism by the Deborin group is formulated. Marxism is incomplete, "one-sided," and needs to be supplemented, especially in its philosophical part—that is the attitude of the Menshevik idealists. Therefore, in contrast to the empiricists, the mechanists, who simply throw philosophy "overboard", the Menshevik idealists have taken the line of eliminating the philosophy of Marxism by separating it from the practice of the class struggle, by "supplementing" it with Hegelian philosophy, and ultimately by more subtle means fulfilling the same task of eliminating the philosophy of Marxism as the Mechanists. Karev opposes the essence of Marxism-Leninism, against Lenin's instructions that "Marx's teaching is omnipotent, because it is true, it is complete and harmonious, giving people *a whole* a worldview that is irreconcilable with any superstition, any reaction, or any defense of bourgeois oppression." This teaching does not need any addition from the bourgeois-idealist teachings of the dying capitalist world, just as the philosophy of Marxism does not need any additions, just as "*complete* philosophical materialism, which has given humanity great tools of knowledge, and the working class in particular" (*Lenin*). . The attempt to revise the philosophy of Marxism under the guise of its "supplement" is not new and represents one of the methods of covering up the revisionist activities of various anti-Marxist groups, including Menshevik idealists.

Let us proceed to a concrete consideration of the issues on which the Menshevik idealists revised the philosophy of Marxism, "complementing Hegel". Lenin in 1922 set forth the task of *materialist reworking*. It also points out that the method of Hegel is radically opposed to the method of Marx, since it is thoroughly idealistic, that it cannot be used without materialistic processing, or even more *so combined* with materialism. Other views are held by Menshevik idealists. They see in Hegel's teaching, on the one hand, idealism embodied in the system, and on the other hand, *materialism* expressed in Hegel's method. "According to the definition of Engels and Lenin," writes Karev, "Hegel's philosophy was set on its head by materialism. It was the method that was materialistic in⁴⁹² it." Thus, under the pen of the Menshevik idealists, the method of the classical idealist Hegel is characterized as a materialistic method. The apologetic attitude of the Menshevik idealists towards Hegel's philosophy and its uncritical acceptance are fully expressed in this statement of Karev's.

Leading their line of Hegelianization of Marxism, Menshevik idealists, as a rule, sought to support their revelations with references to Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Meanwhile, the classical Marxists never approached the consideration of Hegel's method in isolation from his entire teaching, from his philosophical system. They always took them together, describing Hegel's philosophy as idealistic in its content, structure, and method. "My dialectical method," Marx wrote, "is not only radically different from Hegel's, but is its direct opposite. For Hegel, the process of thought, which he even transforms into an independent subject under the name of ideas, is the

491 «Под знаменем марксизма» № 1 за 1924 г.

492 Карев, Статья в журнале «Под знаменем марксизма» № 8–9 за 1925 г., стр. 9. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

demiurge (creator) of reality, which is only its external manifestation. For me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing but the material translated and reworked in the human mind⁴⁹³." Marx here emphasizes with exceptional clarity *the antithesis of his method to that of Hegel* .

The Menshevik idealists ignored Engels ' direct, perfectly clear statements that "a method that, according to its own admission (Hegel. - *Auth.*) "from nothing through nothing came to nothing "was ... completely inappropriate", that " the Hegelian method in its *present* form was completely unsuitable. He was essentially idealistic⁴⁹⁴." Engels places this systematic critique of the Hegelian method, Marx's discovery and development of the method of materialist dialectics, on a par with the discovery of the basic materialist view of the world.

The classics of Marxism have always emphasized that the most important task in overcoming Hegelian philosophy, in criticizing it, is the task of *reworking it* its dialectical-idealistic method. Lenin also set the same task for philosophy. Therefore, one cannot speak of any "synthesis" or combination of Hegel's method with materialism without betraying Marxism, just as one cannot speak of the combination or addition of Kantianism to Marxism.

Nevertheless, it is this theory of combining and "synthesizing" the Hegelian method with the materialism of Marx — Lenin that is being developed by Menshevik idealists on various questions of materialist dialectics and the history of philosophy. Dialectical materialism, in their view, "is a synthesis of Hegel's dialectical method with a materialist understanding of nature and history⁴⁹⁵." Following the methodological guidelines of Deborin, his followers argued that dialectical materialism is nothing more than Feuerbach's materialism plus Hegel's method, and so on. This is how the most complex process of the historical genesis and formation of Marxism was presented in the most vulgar form.

While pursuing the theory that dialectical materialism is nothing more than a materialist view of the world plus Hegel's method, the Menshevik idealists passed off this idealistic, eclectic confusion as a materialist reworking of Hegel's philosophy, simultaneously contrasting and tearing apart not only Hegel's method and system, but also the method and worldview of the proletariat, propagating the idea of the possibility of synthesizing the idealist method with a materialistic worldview.

While waging a struggle against the Marxist-Leninist principle of party theory, separating philosophy from the concrete tasks of the class struggle, the Menshevik idealists in their works also gave a theoretical non-Marxist interpretation of *practice and theory* . The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of concrete socio-historical practice of transforming the world by the role of theory as a tool for changing the world, Lenin's doctrine of the unity of theory and practice - based on practice, Lenin's specific instructions that "the point of view of the life of practice should be the first and main point of view of the theory of knowledge", Menshevik idealists, as a rule, is substituted for the Hegelian-Feuerbachian understanding of practice. "The main idea of Hegel in his critique of criticism and of any theory of knowledge boils down to this, "writes Deborin," that *criticism of the theory of knowledge is based on the following principles*: thought, that is, the investigation of its faculties, must go hand in hand with *the activity* of thought. Hegel solves the problem of knowledge in the light of the world-historical practice of mankind. The dualism of subject and object, of cognition and object, is overcome not by *contemplating*, so to speak, these opposites, but as a result of *the struggle* of subject and object, their mutual comparison and comparison in the course of the historical life of mankind⁴⁹⁶." In this way, Deborin interprets Kant's Hegelian critique so broadly that he almost identifies it with Marxist criticism. Deborin does not understand that in this critique

493 Маркс, Капитал, т. I, 1932 г., стр. XXIII. Послесловие ко второму изданию.

494 Маркс, К критике политической экономии. Рецензия Энгельса, стр. 206.

495 Деборин, Дialeктика у Канта, «Архив», т. I, стр. 14.

496 Деборин, Философия и марксизм, 1930 г., стр. 238.

of Kant, Hegel does not go beyond the limits of his idealism, and that consequently there can be no question of any solution of these problems by Hegel, and even in the light of the actual world-historical practice of mankind. And this is for the simple reason that practice in Hegel's understanding is by no means a concrete historical, sensuous practice of humanity, not the practice of revealing the laws of the objective world and its transformation, but is only a "practical idea", a category that fully fits into the Hegelian doctrine of the identity of being and thinking. *Thus, Deborin's statement that Hegel, in his critique of Kant, solves the problems of knowledge in the light of the world-historical practice of mankind, contradicts the facts, and is an additional proof of the completely uncritical understanding of Hegel's views by Menshevik idealists and their identification with Marxist ones.* Deborin's disregard for the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of practice is reflected in Feuerbach's interpretation of the understanding of practice and theory. "All Feuerbach's literary activity," writes Deborin, "...since his break with Hegel, has been a relentless struggle against the 'theoretical', contemplative point of view of the preceding philosophy, and the defense of the point of view of *practical philosophy as well*"⁴⁹⁷ This thesis once again reflects the *eclecticism* of Deborin and his lack of understanding of the essence of the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the problem of practice. In fact, neither Hegel nor Feuerbach reached a true understanding of the essence of the concrete social and historical practice of mankind, being the representatives of the ideology of the bourgeoisie. The former is mainly due to its idealism; the latter is due to the metaphysical character of its materialism and its idealistic views in explaining social phenomena.

Feuerbach's philosophy is a vivid example of a philosophy that sought only to explain the world. "Nature and man," Feuerbach writes, "both constitute something inseparable. Contemplate nature, contemplate man. Here before your eyes you have all the secrets of nature"⁴⁹⁸. In this thesis Feuerbach most clearly formulated the essence of his philosophy and its passive, contemplative character. Feuerbach's weakness lies in his lack of understanding of the revolutionary, transformative role of practice and the role of theory as a tool for changing the world. Through all his works passes the idea that "only the contemplation of things and beings in their objective reality frees a person completely and completely from all prejudices." Feuerbach's philosophy did not go beyond the task of explaining the world, while the task of philosophy, according to Marx, is not only to explain the world, but to change it. Feuerbach, for all the great significance of his philosophy, was and remained a preacher of a purely "theoretical", contemplative point of view, and not a fighter against it, as Deborin tries to present it in spite of the facts.

The Hegelian-Feuerbachian, non-Marxist interpretation of practice and theory by the Menshevik idealists is entirely consistent with their line of *separating theory from practice* socialist construction, the separation of the logical from the historical in explaining the problems of the history of philosophy. The Menshevik idealists ignored Lenin's direct instructions that a revolutionary, truly scientific theory can only be developed *on the basis of practice*, in the most direct and intimate connection with it. They alternated between recognizing theory and practice as equally important (see Luppel's Lenin in Philosophy) and dissolving practice into theory in a Hegelian fashion. Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action; by losing sight of this, "we take out of it its living soul, we undermine its fundamental theoretical foundations-dialectics-the doctrine of a comprehensive and contradictory historical development; we undermine its connection with certain practical tasks of the epoch, which may change with each new turn of history"⁴⁹⁹. This break in the connection of philosophy with the practical tasks of socialist construction was carried out by the Menshevik idealists in the philosophical sector of the theoretical front, turning the elaboration of the theory of materialist dialectics into empty literature, into abstract arguments about the logical

497 Деборин, Людвиг Фейербах, 1923 г., стр. 134.

498 Л. Фейербах, т. I, стр. 77.

499 Ленин, О некоторых особенностях исторического развития марксизма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XV, стр. 71.

order of the arrangement of categories, without advancing its development one iota.

Idealism in the treatment of the major questions of materialist dialectics is by no means an accidental phenomenon in the conception of the Menshevik idealists, but an expression *of the idealistic essence* of the revision carried out by them. That this is so is shown by the nature of their treatment of the main problem of philosophy. In his book *Lenin as a Thinker*, Deborin, first giving the correct definition of matter, concludes by writing: "In a broader sense, matter is the entire infinite concrete totality of 'mediations', i.e., relations and connections⁵⁰⁰." This is a typical idealistic definition, because what characterizes matter is not reflected in it. Matter as an objective reality that exists independently of our consciousness, as a source of our sensations, and so on—all this has for some reason completely disappeared in Deborin's characterization of matter "in the broadest sense". Is this *idealistic interpretation of matter accidental* in the works of Deborin and his group? Far from it. This definition follows from the whole revisionist line of this group and is far from isolated.

Idealism in the interpretation of this fundamental and most important question was particularly strong in the works of Deborin's students, in particular in Hessen's book "Basic Principles of Relativity". In it, Hessen, following the general line of Menshevik idealists, declares that "dialectical materialism regards matter as a synthesis of space and time⁵⁰¹." This characteristic is basically identical with the above Deborin characteristic. In it, too, there are only connections, only forms of the existence of matter, without matter itself. The forms of existence of matter, time and space are identified by Hessen with matter itself. This has nothing to do with the interpretation of matter in the philosophy of Marxism and is a kind of characterization of matter by modern philosophers and idealist physicists.

These views on matter, thanks to the widely spread attitudes of the Deborin group, made themselves felt in various areas of theory, and in philosophy they led to outright idealism, to the assertion that such an attribute of matter as extension is not really an attribute, is not important for the characterization of matter, and so on. In this case, what is left of the matter in the interpretation of the Menshevik idealists and of their oaths of loyalty to Marxist-Leninist philosophy?!

Thus the Menshevik idealists revised *all* the fundamental problems of Marxist philosophy, and thus, under the guise of developing dialectical materialism and criticizing Hegel, they presented idealistic scholasticism of the worst kind.

In the collection of his articles "Dialectics and Natural Science", Deborin, describing the philosophy of Marxism, wrote: "Materialist dialectics, as a universal methodology, must permeate all concrete and empirical sciences, for it is, so to speak, an algebra of sciences *that brings an inner connection to concrete content* »⁵⁰²." In this formulation of the essence of materialist dialectics, Deborin reproduced in full the following characterization of idealist dialectics by Hegel, which he immediately quoted. "Dialectics is, therefore, the living soul in the movement of science: this principle alone introduces necessity and an inner connection into the content of science..."⁵⁰³ Here is a sample of the "materialist reworking" of Hegel's philosophy by the Menshevik idealists! The idealistic definition of dialectics is not an accident, but a kind of system in the work of the Menshevik idealists.

Having described dialectics as a tool *for making connections*, Deborin continues to develop this idealistic concept in other articles. "It is necessary to realize," he writes, "that all scientific knowledge is based *on basic concepts* that have the character of categories. They are as much a part of being as they are of thinking⁵⁰⁴." According to the Marxist-Leninist theory of reflection, concepts

500 Деборин, Ленин как мыслитель, изд. 3-е, 1929 г., стр. 42.

501 Гессен, Основные идеи теории относительности, стр. 69, «Московский рабочий».

502 Деборин, Диалектика и естествознание, 1930 г., стр. 31. Подчёркнуто нами. — *Авт.*

503 Гегель, Соч., т. I стр. 135.

504 Деборин, Философия и марксизм, 1930 г., стр. 259.

are nothing more than *images* in a person's thinking of the laws of the objective world. The categories of logic represent a conclusion from the history of human cognition of the laws of development of nature and society. Marxism connects the development of science and certain philosophical categories with the development of human society and human thinking, because they are the product of human practical activity and the result of man's knowledge of the laws of the world. Deborin, while asserting that concepts are inherent in being and thinking, gives them an ontological meaning, the meaning of some primary entities, and in this interpretation makes a bias towards Hegelianism.

This type of position is very often repeated in the works of Deborin. So he writes: "Each separate area of reality-nature and society-is based on general laws and forms of movement, having them as its foundation, while at the same time resting on specific private *categories* inherent in this particular area"⁵⁰⁵. Here Deborin conducts typical Hegelian installations.

As we have already seen, Hegel, guided by his doctrine of the identity of being and thinking, builds his logic, starting with an empty identity-pure being, which passes into its opposite - "pure nothingness", seeing their unity in becoming, passes to the concept of becoming, existing being — quality — and only then passes to the concept of becoming, existing being-quality. Finally, in the second part of logic, considering the categories of essence, reveals the concepts of identity, difference, opposites, etc. The formation of these *categories* for Hegel is the formation of the objective world. *Hegel identifies the process of cognition with the development of the world.* The self-development of the concept is identical with the self-development of reality. Contradictions in Hegel appear after the concepts of difference and opposition, i.e., in other words, they appear at the next stage of development. From the point of view of materialist dialectics, this does not hold water. Matter-an eternally existing, objective reality-is internally contradictory at *all* stages of its existence and development. There is not and cannot be matter without motion, and the motion of matter is nothing but an ever-present contradiction.

To accept Hegel's scheme for the development of concepts and his treatment of identity, difference, opposition, and contradiction as stages in the development of the world is to accept his doctrine of the identity of being and thinking, and to propagate the purest idealism. This is the idealistic way of interpreting differences, opposites, and contradictions that Deborin takes. "*The opposite*," he writes, "passes further into *contradiction*, which constitutes a new stage in the process of knowledge and *development of the world* »"⁵⁰⁶. Here Deborin characterizes contrast and contradiction as different stages not only in the development of knowledge, but also in the development of the world, uncritically reproducing Hegel's views on this issue. Deborin objectively opposes Marx's teaching about the internal contradictions of matter as the basis of its self-movement, against the teaching that difference and opposition are only forms of expression of the contradictions of the material world. Deborin considers contradiction only as a later product of the development of the objective world; contradiction in his interpretation appears only at the end of development. "When," writes Deborin, "all the necessary stages of development-from simple identity through differences and opposites to exclusive contradiction-are passed, then the epoch of 'resolving contradictions'⁵⁰⁷ begins." *Here Deborin identifies the stages of development of our knowledge of objective laws with the stages of development of the objective world itself.*

A similar type of idealist line is drawn by the Menshevik idealists in their entire treatment of the general *problem of the correlation between the logical and the historical* in scientific knowledge. The classics of Marxism consider the logical as the historical reproduced in thought, cleared of accidents. In *Kapital*, Marx gave a brilliant example of the solution of this cognitive problem. In the

505 Деборин, Дialeктика и естествознание, 1930 г., стр. 27.

506 Деборин, Философия и марксизм, 1930 г., стр. 232. Последнее подчеркнуто нами. — Авт.

507 Деборин, Философия и марксизм, 1930 г., стр. 234.

movement of concepts, he showed the historical process of the development of capitalism, starting from simple commodity economy and ending with expanded capitalism, gave a logical analysis of the forms of exchange, starting from the accidental form and ending with the monetary form, and the course of Marx's logical analysis only reflects the course of the historical development of real social relations expressed by these forms, Marx, Engels, and Lenin never dissolved the historical process of social development in a logical process, nor did they identify them, but always actively fought against the substitution of the historical for the logical.

Meanwhile, in the works of the Menshevik idealists, who readily refer to the classics of Marxism, an all-pervading logic runs like a red thread. Thus, they are characterized by complete oblivion of the class struggle in the study of the historical development of philosophical thought, the desire to present the history of the development of philosophical systems as a purely immanent, logical process of development. To explain the origin and essence of a particular philosophical system — for them, this means analyzing the content of the previous philosophical system from the logical side and, finding in it similar elements with the elements of the subsequent system, presenting them as the causes and conditions that gave rise to the further development of philosophy. In other words, as a rule, they took only the purely logical side, and the concrete historical basis of the development of philosophical systems was completely ignored; the class struggle, the fundamental driving force of historical development in class society, was completely eliminated. At best, as the main reason for the emergence of new philosophical theories, Deborin puts forward "the needs of society or the level of culture", i.e., in solving this question, he also does not go further than Hegel. "Thus," writes Deborin, "two points that define philosophy: the needs of society in a given epoch or the degree of culture form, as it were, the basis on which the philosophical system is built; here we have *a historical* continuity that goes hand in hand with the historical development of various and diverse interests of society. The second point is *logical* continuity, which consists in the fact that philosophical doctrines logically develop from each other and logically determine each⁵⁰⁸ other."

It is no accident, therefore, that the Menshevik idealists in our time have tried to develop materialist dialectics outside of the practice of class struggle and socialist construction, without developing any of the actual problems of materialist dialectics.

5.4.3. Contrasting dialectics with the theory of knowledge and distorting its revolutionary essence

The Menshevik-idealist revision of philosophy in the USSR was carried out in an extremely veiled form, in subtle and complex forms, being mainly an idealistic revision of the Hegelian type. But the Menshevik essence of this revision, its kinship with international Menshevism, has also found expression in *the Kantian* treatment of a number of major questions of materialist dialectics, in addition to the points we have already noted. In particular, Deborin revised along this line such an important question of the philosophy of Marxism as the question of *dialectics as a theory of knowledge*.

Lenin wrote on this occasion that "dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism: this is the "side" of the matter (this is not the "side" of the matter, but *the essence* of the matter) that Plekhanov, let alone other Marxists, did not pay attention⁵⁰⁹ to." To these other "Marxists" we can rightly count the Menshevik idealists of our time. Contrary to Lenin's characterization of materialist dialectics as the theory of knowledge of Marxism, Deborin and his students followed Plekhanov quite uncritically, deepening his mistakes in this matter and contrasting the theory of knowledge with dialectics as supposedly only a "methodology". Deborin writes in his article "Marx and Hegel" that "the significance of dialectics as *a methodology* opposed

508 Деборин, *Философия и марксизм*, 1930 г., стр. 11.

509 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 325.

to the theory of knowledge was fully recognized by the founders of Marxism and its most prominent representatives⁵¹⁰." Deborin argues that the theory of knowledge is no longer needed, that "the theory of knowledge has fulfilled its historical task", thus identifying the theory of knowledge of Marxism with the Kantian theory of knowledge. In this way, Deborin transforms dialectics into a pure, abstract methodology.

Deborin does not understand that materialist dialectics is the truly scientific, thoroughly revolutionary theory of knowledge of Marxism, which represents the unity of the scientific worldview and method. Deborin's reference to the founders of Marxism does not hold water. Marx, Engels, and Lenin in their works never opposed, and could not oppose, the materialist dialectic to the theory of knowledge. Dialectics is the science of the universal laws of the development of nature, society, and thought. The laws of being and thinking are identical in content and different in form. These propositions of Engels provide the key to understanding Lenin's statement that dialectics is the theory of knowledge of Marxism. Methods of cognition, therefore, cannot be established outside the concrete, socio-historical practice of a person, outside the process of his cognitive activity. Dialectics, being the science of the universal laws of the objective world and of the laws of knowledge, is a theory of knowledge.

The social-fascists *oppose* theory of knowledge of Marxism — dialectics. And this is entirely linked to their disregard for the role of practice, their denial of the partisanship of philosophy and their understanding of Marxism as a dogma, and their neo-Kantian "addition" and "correction" of Marxism! Plekhanov's political Menshevism and his insufficiently deep, one-sided understanding of dialectics undoubtedly affected the opposition of dialectics to the theory of knowledge and the gap between them. The Menshevik idealists, in spite of the teachings of Marxism and Lenin's direct instructions, and in spite of Lenin's criticism of Plekhanov specifically on this subject, continued to carry out in the conditions of the USSR the revisionist attitude of Plekhanov that they had restored, *thereby separating theory of knowledge from dialectics*, method from worldview, theory from practice. By denying dialectics the role of the theory of knowledge, the Menshevik idealists thereby bypass the basic question of philosophy about the relationship between being and consciousness and turn dialectics into a kind of "pure" one that does not include questions of worldview, but essentially an idealistic methodology.

Such attempts to *contrast* dialectics and epistemology, or to dissolve epistemology in some abstract methodology, inevitably lead to agnosticism and idealism, to the undermining of the scientific significance of materialist dialectics as the only scientific methodology and theory of knowledge.

Materialist dialectics is essentially a revolutionary science, which is why revisionists of all kinds, seeking to undermine the effectiveness of Marxism, to blunt its revolutionary essence, first of all direct their weapons against the essence, the core of materialist dialectics — the law of the unity of opposites. Some revisionists (Bernstein, etc.) simply reject the study of the contradictions of the real world, calling Marx's dialectic Hegelian, others seek to replace it with a vulgar mechanistic theory of equilibrium, others interpret the basic laws of dialectics in an idealistic, Kantian sense and in this way try to discredit the laws of materialist dialectics, to deprive them of their truly materialistic and scientific revolutionary significance.

The latter is precisely characteristic of the revisionist activity of the Menshevik idealists. In his characterization of the law of the unity of opposites, Deborin essentially follows social-fascist principles. To be guided by the law of the unity of opposites in our cognition means to understand that the basis of development is internal contradictions, that in each phenomenon we must reveal internal, essential contradictions behind external connections, first of all reveal in the phenomenon itself the reasons leading to its self-negation, remember that in each subject there are contradictory tendencies, *the struggle* of which is the main the reason for its development. Lenin, concretizing the law of the unity of opposites, developing it further on the material of the epoch of imperialism and

510 Деборин, Философия и марксизм, 1930 г., стр. 234.

proletarian revolutions, and describing this law, wrote: "The unity (coincidence, identity, equinox) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, and relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and movement⁵¹¹ are absolute." Contrary to this classical characterization of the law by Lenin, the Menshevik idealists give a radically opposite interpretation, describing it not as a law of struggle, not as a law of development, but as a law of "synthesis", *of reconciliation of opposites*. Here, for example, is one of Deborin's typical interpretations of this question. Speaking about Kant's antinomies, Deborin writes: "... Kant opposes the antithesis to the thesis, wanting to prove that the thesis excludes the antithesis and that they therefore cannot be reconciled, cannot be resolved. Positive dialectics, on the other hand, sees in thesis and antithesis not mutually exclusive, but mutually reconciling opposites⁵¹²."

Thus, Deborin contrasts Lenin's formulation of this law, a formulation that expresses as fully and comprehensively as possible the essence of the development of the world, the essence of the class struggle, with his Menshevik-type interpretation of this law. This interpretation of the laws of materialist dialectics, which is characteristic of revisionists in general, is essentially a theoretical expression of their treacherous line in the ranks of the working-class movement.

Comrade Kaganovich, speaking about the law of the unity of opposites, emphasized that "to understand the unity of opposites in reality means not to be afraid of difficulties. This means not being afraid of the contradictions of life that arise in our path, but overcoming them with Bolshevik energy and perseverance⁵¹³." Such an understanding of the law is a truly scientific, Marxist-Leninist understanding of it. Based on this scientific revolutionary understanding of the laws of dialectics, the laws of the development of the class struggle, and guided by them, our party has always pursued the line not of conciliating and obscuring differences of principle, but of opening them up and overcoming them in a revolutionary way. On the contrary, the social-fascists are characterized by a policy of reconciliation, of blunting contradictions, of glossing over differences of principle; they are characterized by a desire to hide differences, to blunt and reconcile them. The Menshevik idealists also followed this path.

5.4.4. Menshevik-Trotskyist understanding of the class struggle. Getting used to Mechanismismedit

Historical materialism as a theory of the class struggle of the proletariat plays a major role in the modern revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, and in the practice of socialist construction in particular. The tasks of working out the problems of historical materialism, of studying new forms of class struggle, and of studying the laws of the transition period are now becoming extremely important. Historical materialism, as the only scientific theory of knowledge and changes in the laws of social development, must be placed at the service of the practice of socialist construction. Without the closest connection with the practice of the class struggle, without generalizing the experience of the proletariat's struggle for socialism, theory cannot develop fruitfully and fulfill the tasks assigned to it in the struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, in the remaking of public consciousness, in the elimination of class remnants in the minds of people. Meanwhile, the group of philosophers headed by Deborin, while separating theory from practice, philosophy from politics, completely *ignored the tasks of working out the issues of historical materialism*, and if they did touch on them, they interpreted them in a Trotskyist or right-opportunist, Menshevik-idealist or mechanistic sense.

In their works, not only is there no attempt to further develop and concretize historical materialism on the basis of the new problems raised by the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the

511 «Ленинский сборник» XII, стр. 324.

512 «Архив Маркса и Энгельса», т. I, стр. 64.

513 Каганович, За большевистское изучение истории партии, Партиздат, 1932 г., стр. 12.

problems that were sufficiently developed by the classics of Marxism were usually characterized by a non-Marxist, Menshevik-idealist characterization. All of Deborin's very few statements on the theory of historical materialism are so *abstract*, in the worst sense of the word, that they have absolutely no value and are often formulated in such a way that the question arises: who is their author—a materialist or an idealist?

Let's take the Deborin class description as an example. He writes that "Marxism considers *the social class* as a reality, as a real fact, on the basis of historical evolution"⁵¹⁴. This characterization is not only general and meaningless, but also clearly misrepresents Marx's real contribution to the development of class problems and the class struggle. In a letter to Weidemeyer dated March 5, 1852, Marx specifically notes that he showed the connection between the existence of classes and certain historical forms of development of material production, and revealed and proved that the class struggle leads to *the dictatorship of the proletariat* and that the latter represents a necessary stage, a transition to *the abolition of classes* in general. In his attempt to "prove" to the mechanists the reality of classes, and in keeping with his Menshevik-idealist methodology, Deborin bypasses the main thing, the main thing in Marxism. In his pamphlet *Lenin as a Thinker*, Deborin, attempting a more concrete characterization of classes and the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat, wrote: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is not at all a paradisiacal "state" in which class contradictions are eliminated. On the contrary, the dictatorship of the proletariat is *a continuation* of the class struggle and even of the civil war on a broader basis, on *an international basis*—an arena where two hostile classes are facing each other armed to the teeth"⁵¹⁵. Here, under the pretext of expounding and developing Lenin's views, Deborin develops a right-opportunist theory of the extinction of the class struggle, a theory of the denial of the class struggle in the USSR and its recognition *only* in the international arena.

This vividly ultra-opportunist characterization of the class struggle is supplemented in the same pamphlet by Kautsky's characterization of the essence of imperialism. "In political terms," writes Deborin, "imperialism means *reaction*, but in economic terms *it means progress* »"⁵¹⁶. Thus, contrary to Lenin's clear characterization of imperialism as the last stage in the development of capitalism, as a stage of decaying capitalism in all respects, Deborin pursues a theory of the economic progress of capitalism, *separating politics from economics in a Kautskian way*, and objectively slipping into positions of solidarity with Kautsky's teaching about imperialism as only the politics of capitalism.

In their attempts to deal with issues relevant to the transition period, the Menshevik idealists proved to be outspoken agents of the theoretical attitudes of Trotskyism and the right-wing deviation that the party had defeated. Contrary to Lenin's teaching about the proletariat and the peasantry as two main classes in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Karev puts forward the thesis of *one main class* in the transition period, in a Trotskyist way denies the role of the peasantry as the second main class, opposing Lenin's teaching that the supreme principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the preservation of the union of working peasants under the leadership of the working class.

Thus the interpretation of the class struggle questions of the Menshevik idealists shows that they and the mechanists represent the ideologies of various petty-bourgeois strata. The Menshevik idealists attributed to themselves the role of almost the only completely consistent fighters against the mechanistic revision of the materialist dialectic. Did they fight the Mechanists? Yes, they conducted it, but they did not conduct it from dialectical-materialist, Marxist positions, or in a partisan way, without carrying out their criticism to the end, without exposing the class essence of mechanismism. Moreover, on a number of issues, the Menshevik idealists even *agreed with the*

⁵¹⁴ Деборин, Дialeктика и естествознание, 1930 г., стр. 246.

⁵¹⁵ Деборин, Ленин как мыслитель, изд. 3-е, 1929 г., стр. 120.

⁵¹⁶ Деборин, Ленин как мыслитель, изд. 3-е, 1929 г., стр. 87.

Mechanists .

For example, one of the first issues on which the struggle against the Mechanists was launched was the question of the latter's rejection of the philosophy of Marxism and its replacement by the latest conclusions of natural science. The Menshevik idealists broke many copies in their struggle with the Mechanists on this question, but in their formal struggle with them, in their essentially idealistic emasculating of the content of materialist dialectics, in their hegelianization of the philosophy of Marxism, they followed the same line as the Mechanists at the other end — the line of eliminating materialist dialectics as a philosophical science. So Deborin wrote that "speculative elements are being replaced more and more by purely scientific ones, and the worldview as a whole is becoming more scientific in nature. Philosophy shows a tendency to merge with science. A considerable part of purely philosophical questions is already absorbed by the positive sciences." Here Deborin openly identifies with the Mechanists, and holds completely erroneous views that have nothing in common with Marxist ones. Deborin, like the mechanists, talks about the destruction of philosophy, about its withering away and replacement by positive sciences, without realizing that the philosophy of Marxism itself has a deeply scientific character and an independent field of study. There can be no question of any merger of the philosophy of Marxism with other sciences, or of any annihilation of this philosophy as a science. Moreover, with the flourishing of the positive sciences, Marxist-Leninist philosophy will be raised even higher in its development, and its role will become even more significant.

At the present time, after the discussion and exposure of the two types of Menshevik revision of the philosophy of Marxism in the USSR, the struggle must continue both against mechanistic revision in philosophy — the main danger on the theoretical front — and against Menshevik idealism. This struggle is an integral part of the elaboration of the Leninist stage in philosophy, the concrete problems of materialist dialectics and historical materialism.

5.4.5. Criticism of the methodology of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism and "left" opportunism

We have already said that in the history of the working-class movement there are two types of perversions of the revolutionary theory and practice of the proletariat. Along with social-reformism, which is openly right-wing opportunism, anarcho-syndicalists and similar revisionists from the "left" have always existed and waged a struggle against Marxism. The representatives of this type of revisionism, while in practice pursuing an opportunist line, in words sought to be "to the left" of the Party of the proletariat, putting forward arch-revolutionary demands and slogans.

A characteristic feature of "left" opportunism is its crackling revolutionary phraseology, which conceals the petty — bourgeois nature of their views. *The theoretical basis of their views and their political practice is idealism, objectivism, abstract dogmatism, and a complete break with dialectics.* The revisionists on the "left" deny the need for flexible tactics, maneuvering, and taking into account all the conditions of the situation on the basis of materialist dialectics. They do not set themselves the task of correctly taking into account all the specific stages of development and difficulties to be overcome. They always act dogmatically, "straightforwardly," one-sidedly, and at their own will. As Lenin wrote in his notes "On the Question of Dialectics" on idealism: "Straightforwardness and one-sidedness, woodiness and ossification, subjectivism and subjective blindness veil & # 224; (these are) the epistemological roots of idealism⁵¹⁷."

This assessment of Lenin is quite applicable to Trotskyists, anarcho-syndicalists, and all sorts of "left" deviators. It reveals the essence of the philosophical foundations of their political views. On the question of "left" views, we find extremely important references in Marx and Engels, since they also had to fight on two fronts. After the Revolution of 1848, the Willich — Schaper minority faction emerged in the German labor movement, which criticized Marx and Engels for their alleged

lack of consistency and "non-revolutionary" approach to the revolutionary movement in Germany.

Dogmatism, idealism, subjectivism, and voluntarism are Marx's philosophical characteristics of this "left" trend. Such are the features and methodological essence of the "left" currents in the working-class movement, not only in the nineteenth century, but also in the twentieth. This characteristic is still relevant. On the contrary, it received even more confirmation of its correctness in the theory and politics of various "left" groups in the post-October period. This anti-Marxist methodology was most clearly expressed in Trotskyism, that variety of Menshevism which in the past stages was disguised by leftist phrases and has now become the vanguard of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

It is fundamentally wrong to attempt to avoid altogether the question of the methodology of Trotskyism, as the Menshevik idealists did, and not to examine and criticize its general theoretical and philosophical foundations. It is also untenable to attempt to reduce the whole matter to "Trotsky's personal moods", which from time to time... "*quite unexpectedly* it often comes into conflict with the main leading core of our party on the most unexpected occasion or on a random issue of no significant significance⁵¹⁸."

In reality, not only Trotsky himself, but also all Trotskyists, have certain methodological attitudes that are characteristic of them in common. Behind Trotsky's seemingly "accidental" and "unexpected" speeches, we must reveal their class basis, their theoretical roots, and their connection with the entire system of views of Trotskyism.

The desire to separate the political practice of Trotskyism from its theoretical foundations, as we have already pointed out, is extremely characteristic of Menshevik idealism, which draws a gap between theory and practice. But Trotsky himself tries to give a "philosophical" justification for such a *break between theory and practice*, because he believes that theoretical activity should proceed independently of party and political practice. For example, in his report on Mendeleev, Trotsky explicitly states that individual scientists may not think at all about the practical results of their research. *The wider, the bolder, the more independent* from the practical need of the day, his thought works, the better⁵¹⁹."

This was said by Soviet scientists. It was Trotsky who urged them not to think about the practical results of their work for socialist construction. It turns out that the less they know about the needs of social construction, the better!

In this separation of theory from practice, science from the party position, in bourgeois *objectivism* Trotsky sees "the essence of Marxism." "It is precisely the essence of Marxism," writes Trotsky, "that it has finally approached society as the subject of objective research, considering human history as a gigantic laboratory diary... It is this objective approach that gives Marxism the unsurpassed power of historical foresight." Objectivism divorced from revolutionary and practical activity—this is what Marxism looks like in Trotsky's image.

Following Plekhanov's statement that "strictly speaking, party science is impossible," Trotsky tried to justify this statement in the future in the interests of the bourgeois reader. "But the reader has the right to demand," he wrote in his work, "that a historical work should represent not *an apology for a political position*, but an internally grounded representation of the real process of the revolution. A historical work *only fully fulfills* its purpose when events unfold on its pages in all their natural compulsion⁵²⁰." Here Trotsky contrasts the *political position* with the "real process", as if the proletariat's implementation of its political position does not in itself represent a real process. While denying in words "treacherous impartiality," Trotsky puts forward instead... "scientific conscientiousness."

Trotsky completely failed to understand the essence of Marxism, its fundamental difference

518 Канатчиков, История одного уклана.

519 Троцкий, Менделеев и марксизм, Гиз, 1925 г., стр. 6. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

520 Троцкий, История русской революции, т. I, изд. «Гранат», 1931 г., стр. 15. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

from bourgeois science, which consists in the consistent application of the principle of partisanship. "Marxism is distinguished from all other socialist theories," Lenin wrote, " by the remarkable combination of complete scientific sobriety in analyzing the objective state of things and the objective course of evolution, with the most decisive recognition of the significance of revolutionary energy, revolutionary creativity, and the revolutionary initiative of the masses⁵²¹."

But Trotsky's "objectivism" is only a disguised cover for his genuine subjectivism, his sophistry, and his game of meaningless phrases. Trotsky repeatedly opposed clear revolutionary slogans with his eclectic slogans covering up his liberal political line. His slogans are a model of *sophistry*, of substituting petty-bourgeois values for revolutionary ones, of opportunistic evasion of *certain values*. the answer to burning political questions. Sometimes, from the outside, his slogans appear to be "dialectical", according to a formula that Plekhanov passed off as completely dialectical: "Neither yes nor no." In fact, this is a complete substitution of sophistry for dialectics. During the peace of Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky uttered the empty phrase "Neither peace nor war"; during the imperialist war, " Neither victories nor defeats." The same Menshevik formula — "neither yes nor no" — found its expression in Trotsky's rejection of Bolshevism and Menshevism in his eclectic attempt to rise above the "extremes", in an effort to create his own "special" trend. In fact, this sophistry of Trotsky's led to political opportunism, to passivity and treachery of the revolutionary proletariat in the decisive moments of the struggle. In connection with Trotsky's negative attitude to the Bolshevik struggle on two fronts — against the Liquidators and Otzovists — Lenin pointed out that Trotsky "actually serves the Liquidators and Otzovists most faithfully, and therefore is the more dangerous evil in the party the more cunning, refined, and phraseological it is concealed⁵²²." "This matchmaker's point of view is the entire 'ideological basis' of Trotsky's conciliationism⁵²³." Unprincipled eclecticism and sophistry, opportunism covered up with loud empty phrases - such was Trotskyism in the past stages.

The formula "neither yes nor no" is an absolute negation of anything, an abstract movement in words, but in fact passive trampling on the spot. This is the "poverty of philosophy" about which Marx, in describing Proudhon, wrote: "Yes turns into *no*, *no* turns into *yes*, *yes* becomes both *yes* and *no*, *no* becomes simultaneously and *not* and *yes*. In this way, opposites are mutually balanced, neutralized, and paralyzed⁵²⁴."

This is precisely the meaning of Trotsky's "philosophy" of negation. This is the philosophy of liberal obscuring and blurring the real contradictions of life and the class struggle, an attempt to avoid sharp corners and avoid a direct answer. Such a "philosophy" leads Trotsky to the same results as Proudhon's. "Despite his greatest efforts to climb to the height of the system of contradictions, M. Proudhon could never rise above the first two steps: the simple thesis and the antithesis, and even here he reached only twice, and once he turned a somersault and fell⁵²⁵." Like Proudhon, Trotsky here developed not a dialectical logic of contradictions, but a *formal logic* abstract negatives.

Subjectivism, sophistry, and formal logic lead Trotsky, when considering any question, from concrete study to *abstract* reasoning from the point of view of "general principles" and therefore to politically incorrect conclusions. In the discussion of trade unions, Lenin says: "When I take up the question of the industrial role of trade unions, I see that Trotsky is fundamentally wrong in saying that he always speaks of this 'in principle', of a 'general principle'. In all of his theses, he speaks

521 Ленин, Против бойкота, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XII, стр. 32.

522 Ленин, Заметки публициста, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIV, стр. 302.

523 Ленин, Заметки публициста, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIV, стр. 303.

524 Маркс, Нищета философии, 1930 г., стр. 102.

525 Маркс, Нищета философии, 1930 г., стр. 102.

from the point of view of a "general principle". The statement is already fundamentally wrong in this⁵²⁶ regard."

On the question of trade unions, Trotsky does not give a concrete analysis of the situation and tasks of trade unions under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, Trotsky could not understand the essence of trade unions, and therefore the role that trade unions should play in the transition period. The abstract approach makes it impossible for Trotsky to correctly understand the character of the Soviet state, the elements of bureaucracy in the latter, the correct correlation between economics and politics, administrative bodies and trade unions.

Trotsky's entire trade union platform, as Lenin defined it, takes "a step back from *business interests*." theses ... that set concrete, practical, vital, vital tasks... to abstract, abstract," empty", theoretically incorrect, intelligently formulated general *theses*, with *the oblivion* of the most businesslike and practical⁵²⁷." "In order to put this question correctly," Lenin wrote, "we must pass from empty abstractions to the concrete, i.e., the given dispute⁵²⁸." From general considerations, from theses on "industrial atmospheres", "industrial dialectics", etc., it was necessary to pass to the study of practical experience of industrial propaganda, the actual work of trade unions as a school of unification, a school of solidarity, a school of management, etc. Trotsky violated this basic rule, the basic requirement of dialectics — the requirement of concreteness "by his tests, with all your approach to the issue." Trotsky's "*whole* approach... his whole direction is wrong," because he goes backwards, "from the living cause to the dead scholasticism of all sorts of "industrial atmospheres"⁵²⁹."

A characteristic feature of Trotskyist idealism is its *voluntarism* (from the word "will"). For Trotskyism, the will is the most important thing, and everything else is subject to it. Marxism-Leninism, as we know, has never denied the role of the individual in history, much less the role and activity of an entire class. On the contrary, he emphasized the necessity and enormous importance of the conscious expression of the will of the working class. But at the same time, Marxism-Leninism considers the basis of this activity of the individual and the class not arbitrariness, but the economic interests of the class, rooted in objective reality. Engels pointed out "that free will means nothing more than making decisions with knowledge." Practical activity, volitional actions and aspirations, politics and tactics of the proletariat must be based on objective necessity. In Trotsky's case, volitional aspirations are not an expression of this class conscious inner necessity, but are imposed on them from the outside. We can trace Trotskyism's "leaps", premature demands, and "idealistic leaps" over the necessary stages of the development of reality in a number of examples: its disregard for the main stages of the revolution in its theory of permanent revolution, its attitude to the Brest Peace, its lack of understanding of the Chinese revolution of 1925-1926, the program of "super-industrialization", the slogan of dekulakization in 1927, and so on.

Idealism is particularly clearly represented in Trotsky's "historical works": 1905, Lessons of October, and The History of the Russian Revolution; in all these works Trotsky develops views entirely in the spirit of Plekhanov's Menshevik historical concept, deducing Russian despotism not from the development of the Russian economy, not from the internal conditions of the development of the class system in Russia. from the external conditions — from the need to protect the country from external attacks. Trotsky and the Mensheviks copied these propositions from the bourgeois-liberal historians Milyukov, Klyuchevsky, and others. It is not without reason that Lenin, as early as 1911, taking into account Trotsky's early works and comparing him with Martov, wrote: "Trotsky's" philosophy of history " is the same. The "sectarian spirit", intellectual *idealism* , and ideological

526 Ленин, О профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 65.

527 Ленин, Ещё раз о профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 127.

528 Ленин, Ещё раз о профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 136.

529 Ленин, Ещё раз о профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 131, 136, 129.

fetishism are brought to the fore."

Trotsky's historical idealism is also reflected in his approach to the essence of the historical process. In *My Life*, Trotsky wrote: "Broadly speaking, the entire historical process is the refraction of the natural through the accidental. If we use the language of biology, we can say that historical regularity is carried out through *the natural selection of accidents* »⁵³⁰." According to Trotsky, the whole historical process is a natural selection of accidents. While the Mechanists deny the objective character of chance, Trotsky, in contrast, turns chance into an absolute law of social development. Here we have a direct identification of randomness with objective regularity, which ignores objective necessity as the basis on which accidents can occur. Here we have a transition to the point of view of bourgeois *empiricism* and *idealism* in the field of history.

Along with the basic idealistic features of Trotsky's views, we find in them a considerable dose of *mechanismism*. Although Trotsky himself points out that the "liberal-Manchester attempts" to mechanically transfer Darwinism to sociology led only to childish analogies, and believes that "there is no need to dwell on these vulgarities," he nevertheless contradicts himself and falls into the arms of bourgeois naturalism and social Darwinism. Trotsky declares that Darwinism is a prerequisite for Marxism, and that he is deeply convinced that "in the broad materialist and dialectical sense, Marxism is an application of Darwinism to human society"⁵³¹.

In his report on Mendeleev, Trotsky also stated that "we live in an era of screening and selection"⁵³².

In the same report on Mendeleev, we find in Trotsky a number of other mechanistic interpretations, in particular the notorious theory of reducing higher forms of motion of matter to lower forms. "Psychology," he says, "is reduced to physiology in the last analysis, just as the latter is reduced to chemistry, physics, and mechanics"⁵³³. "Chemistry reduces the essence of chemical processes to the mechanical and physical properties of particles"⁵³⁴.

Consequently, the essence of certain complex processes, according to Trotsky, can be revealed only by reducing this higher to the simple, to the primary. For example, the phenomena of consciousness — "the soul is a complex system of conditioned reflexes, entirely rooted in the primary reflexes of physiology, which in turn passes its roots through the mighty layer of chemistry into the subsoil of physics and mechanics"⁵³⁵.

Эту теорию Trotsky is inclined to extend this theory of the reducibility of all phenomena to mechanics to society. "The same can be said about sociology. To explain social phenomena, there is no need to involve any eternal or otherworldly principles. Society is as much a product of the development of primordial matter as the Earth's crust or the amoeba. Thus, from the most complex phenomena of social ideology, scientific thought uses its diamond drilling methods to reach matter, its constituent elements, and particles with their physical and mechanical properties"⁵³⁶.

Consequently, Trotsky applies to society his universal "law" of the reducibility of all the most complex phenomena to the simplest ones. Instead of studying social phenomena in all their uniqueness, Trotsky suggests studying the physiological and mechanical properties of the simplest

530 Троцкий, *Моя жизнь*, т. II, стр. 234.

531 Троцкий, *Поколение Октября*, стр. 56.

532 Троцкий, Д. И. Менделеев и марксизм, Соч., т. XXI, стр. 268.

533 Троцкий, Д. И. Менделеев и марксизм, Соч., т. XXI, стр. 273.

534 Троцкий, Д. И. Менделеев и марксизм, Соч., т. XXI, стр. 274.

535 Троцкий, Д. И. Менделеев и марксизм, Соч., т. XXI, стр. 275.

536 Троцкий, Д. И. Менделеев и марксизм, Соч., т. XXI, стр. 275.

elements, approaching social life and the class struggle in the same way as a physiologist approaches an amoeba. Instead of dialectical materialism, we have here mechanics of the most vulgar variety, the most vulgar metaphysics, flat evolutionism and eclecticism.

Trotsky slavishly grasps at every bourgeois fashionable trend in the field of science and declares it to be a materialist, even a materialist-dialectical trend. Thus the reflexology of Academician Pavlov, who in his experimental works gave valuable data confirming materialism, but in his general attitudes admits a number of mechanistic errors-this reflexology is recognized by Trotsky as the only scientific psychology that follows "entirely... the path of dialectical materialism"⁵³⁷.

We find the same thing in Trotsky's assessment of Freudianism. Freudianism is recommended by Trotsky as "a working hypothesis that can and undoubtedly does provide conclusions and conjectures along the lines of materialistic psychology"⁵³⁸. It is the same story with the characterization of Mendeleev's philosophical views. Mendeleev's position in the theory of knowledge is clearly idealistic, namely agnostic, Humean-Kantian-he denies the possibility of knowing the essence of things. If, according to Lenin, agnosticism contradicts and is incompatible with dialectical materialism⁵³⁹, then, according to Trotsky, agnosticism is only "verbal concessions" that do not affect the essence of views. And Mendeleev "in terms of his methods and highest achievements is nothing more than a dialectical materialist"⁵⁴⁰. Trotsky could not give a correct analysis of the views of this or that scientist with the position of dialectical materialism, since in his philosophical views he himself had and has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.

The same peculiar combination of idealism and mechanismism can be found in the analysis of the views of other Trotskyist theorists-Preobrazhensky, Voronsky, etc. Preobrazhensky's elements of mechanismism were particularly pronounced in the "New Economy", while Voronsky's critical and literary works were clearly idealistic in nature.

The same methodological guidelines are characteristic of the "half-Trotskyists of the Zinoviev-Kamenev group". Here, too, we find a combination of subjectivism — for example, in the question of the "dictatorship of the party," in their portrayal of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the dictatorship of the party over the working class - with abstract dogmatism and mechanismismthe mechanistic transfer of the relations of capitalism to Soviet conditions and the treatment of NEP as "state capitalism," *этсххолостический подход*. new facts of life, the inability to properly understand and apply Marxism-Leninism and its materialist dialectic correctly.

These methodological peculiarities of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist opposition were revealed by vol. Stalin at the seventh Plenum of the ECCI, when he characterized Zinoviev's understanding of "revisionism." "According to Zinoviev, it follows that any improvement, any refinement of the old formulas or individual propositions of Marx or Engels, and even more so their replacement by other formulas corresponding to the new conditions, is revisionism. Why, one wonders? Isn't Marxism a science, and isn't science developing by enriching itself with new experience and improving old formulas?... If, for example, Marx said in the middle of the last century that with *an ascending line* for the development of capitalism, the victory of socialism within national borders is impossible, and Lenin in the 15th century XX century said that with *the descending line* with the development of capitalism, and with a dying capitalism, such a victory is possible, it follows that Lenin has fallen into revisionism in relation to Marx... According to Zinoviev, it follows... that any improvement on certain propositions and formulas of certain classics of Marxism is revisionism"⁵⁴¹.

537 Троцкий, Культура и социализм, т. XXI, стр. 430.

538 Троцкий, Культура и социализм, т. XXI, стр. 430.

539 Ленин, Замечания на книгу Бухарина «Экономика переходного периода».

540 Троцкий, Д. И. Менделеев и марксизм, Соч., т. XXI, стр. 17.

541 Сталин, Об оппозиции, стр. 507–510.

A common methodological attitude unites the Trotskyists of the Soviet Union with various Trotskyist and semi-Trotskyist groups in Germany and in other countries (Korsch, Bordiga, etc.).

Trotskyism also shares a number of methodological features with all types of "left" opportunism. "Left" opportunism and "left" bends at the present stage of socialist construction, with "administration" and "jumping over" the immediate concrete tasks, such as opposing the expansion of Soviet trade, advocating the death of the Soviets in areas of complete collectivization, the death of the monetary system, the death of the school, etc., with their bureaucratic and administrative tasks, mechanistic "plans" — they also sin with subjectivism, abstractness, etc.

The combination of subjectivism and voluntarism with mechanistic fatalism led the "left" opportunists and Trotskyists to unexpected *flights* from one extreme to the other - from the policy of administrative suppression to cries for "democracy", from plans for "super-industrialization" to the camp of opponents of genuine industrialization.

It should be noted, however, that despite the peculiar combination in the philosophical foundations of Trotskyism and "left" opportunism of a subjective-idealistic understanding with a mechanistic-fatalistic one, the main thing that characterizes their philosophical essence is *a subjective — idealistic basis*. This is the well-known methodological divide between "left" and right opportunism. The philosophy of "left" opportunism reflects the social existence of the mostly ruined urban petty bourgeoisie of the USSR and expresses their political aspirations and interests. Their political expression is *petty-bourgeois radicalism, petty-bourgeois revolutionism* with an opportunistic nature and an external revolutionary phraseology.

As we have already seen, Menshevik idealism is linked to Trotskyism by its common social roots, by a whole series of general idealistic propositions, and finally by political practice itself *меньшевистствующий идеализм*. A number of representatives of Menshevik idealism at one time fought against the party, being in the ranks of the Trotskyist opposition (Karev, Stan, Gonikman, etc.). At a certain historical stage in the development of Trotskyism and its existence as a faction of communism, Menshevik idealism provided Trotskyism with its main methodological weapon, acting as the philosophical vehicle of Trotskyist ideas. Menshevik idealism has played and continues to play the same role in relation to "left" opportunism. It is not surprising that the Menshevik idealists did not engage in criticism of the methodology of Trotskyism. If they tried to "criticize" Trotskyism from this point of view, at best they found elements of mechanismism in it, i.e., they could not reveal the most idealistic essence of the theoretical and philosophical foundations of Trotskyism.

Chapter 6. Basic questions of the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism

6.1. Lenin in the Struggle against international opportunism and Revisionism in the field of philosophy

The decision of the Central Committee of our Party of January 25, 1931, on the journal "PZM", which summed up the results of the philosophical discussion, set before the philosophical section of the theoretical front the most important task of actually working out Lenin's philosophical legacy, the task of widely propagating the questions of the Leninist stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism.

The question of the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism is *the central problem* of the entire struggle against Menshevik idealism and the mechanists, and the main point that determines the path of all our further theoretical work in the field of dialectical and historical materialism.

Whether it is possible and necessary to speak at all of Leninism in philosophy, whether it is

possible at all to speak of a new and higher stage in the development of Marx — Engels' dialectical materialism. Does not this formulation of the question represent the opposition of Lenin to Marx and Engels, and does not this lead to an underestimation of what Marx and Engels have given in the development of philosophy? It is precisely on these questions that we have exceptional perversions of Marxism. Riazanov, this traitor and traitor to the party, denied the very legitimacy of raising this question. All this is not surprising, if we recall how Riazanov once wrote about Leninism. It is to him that the famous words belong: "I am not a Bolshevik, I am not a Menshevik or a Leninist. I am only a Marxist, and as a Marxist, I am a communist."

Riazanov's views on the question of Leninism in philosophy were by no means isolated. Conversely. These views were a common thread in the works of Deborin, Karev, and others.

However, they were not alone in this issue. These views on the question of Leninism in philosophy are held by such "theorists" as Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Preobrazhensky; such views were developed by Bukharin in his time.

In the collection "Militant Materialist", book 2, for 1925, Preobrazhensky's article "Lenin and Marx as theorists" was published, which raises the question of Lenin's theoretical inheritance. In this article, Preobrazhensky develops the following mechanistic scheme: he distinguishes various elements in Marxism that "have different degrees of durability". First, those elements that should remain intact, second, those that should be developed and supplemented, and third, those that should be replaced by new constructions. And so, from the point of view of this scheme of his, Preobrazhensky comes to the conclusion (and this is his main idea) that the methodology of Marxism, dialectical materialism — this is precisely the element of Marx's teaching that does not tolerate any development. He writes: "As for the general philosophical method, Lenin took it entirely from Marx, defended it against the attacks of his opponents, and applied it brilliantly (together with the method of historical materialism) to the concrete philosophical work Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, etc. a defense of the understanding of the method of Marx and Engels that he considered correct and "genuinely correct"⁵⁴²." Further, continuing to develop these ideas, Preobrazhensky found that the unity of the method of dialectical materialism is *the identity of the theoretical foundations of Marx's and Lenin's views*.

Let us now turn to Bukharin. In his pamphlet Lenin as a Marxist, Comrade Bukharin also raises the question of dialectical materialism in Lenin's works. He approaches this problem in the following way: he distinguishes two things in Marxism: first, the sum of ideas, propositions, theoretical views, etc., and second, *the method used in Marxism*. Marxism, its methodology, with the help of which this sum of ideas, views, and theoretical propositions is extracted, with the help of which *проанализирована* certain historical epoch is analyzed, and so on.

And in this regard, he writes: "But if by Marxism we do not mean the sum of ideas, as Marx had it, but the instrument, the methodology, which is inherent in Marxism, then it goes without saying that Leninism is not something that modifies or revises the methodology of Marx's teaching. On the contrary, in this sense Leninism is a complete *return* to the Marxism that was formulated by Marx and Engels⁵⁴³ themselves."

Thus, from Comrade Bukharin's point of view, Leninism in its methodology is a complete return, and *only a return*, to the Marxism formulated by Marx and Engels themselves. In this respect, there is no *further development*, no further deepening and concretization of Marx's teaching. Thus we see that on this question we have a touching unity of views among Riazanov, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Preobrazhensky, Bukharin, Deborin, Karev, etc.

In contrast to all the incorrect settings in this question, we have the installation and solution of this problem, data from t. Stalin in 1924 in his "Fundamentals of Leninism". He wrote on the question that interests us: "What is given in Lenin's method was basically already present in Marx's teaching, which, in Marx's words, is 'essentially critical and revolutionary'. It is precisely this

542 «Воинствующий материалист», кн. 2, 1925 г., стр. 44.

543 Бухарин, Сборник «Атака», стр. 255.

critical and revolutionary spirit that permeates Lenin's method from beginning to end. But it would be wrong to think that Lenin's method is a simple restoration of what Marx gave. In fact, Lenin's method is not only a restoration, but also *a concretization and further development* of Marx's critical and revolutionary method, his materialist dialectic⁵⁴⁴."

Here we present the only correct statement and solution of the question of Leninism in philosophy. Lenin's work on dialectical materialism, and his brilliant application of materialist dialectics, represent not only a return (after all the perversions and deviations from dialectical materialism that we had in the epoch of the Second International) *to dialectical materialism. Leninism in philosophy represents not only a return, but also a further development and concretization of dialectical materialism.* Leninism in philosophy represents a new and higher stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism.

It should be clear and understandable to all that such a statement of the question cannot in any way imply any "opposition" between Leninism and Marxism, or any misunderstanding or underestimation of the legacy of Marx and Engels. On the contrary, if we are truly true to the spirit of Marxism, not to its letter, if we correctly understand the relationship between method and worldview, between theory and practice, if we understand that Marxism is not a frozen dogma, but a living, developing teaching, then only the answer given by T. V. Tolstoy is possible. Stalin on the question of the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism. The formulation of the question of the method of dialectical materialism given by Preobrazhensky and Bukharin, whose views proceed from the fact that in the field of the content of Marxism, the richness of its ideas, there can be a major advance, but in the field of the methodology of Marxism there can be no progress or deepening, is based on a complete misunderstanding of the relationship between the method of Marxism and It is based on a lack of understanding, if we put the question more broadly, of the relationship between theory and practice, on a lack of understanding of the method of dialectical materialism itself. In fact, how can there be a significant new content in the very development of Marxism, such a significant content as Lenin's works on imperialism, on the state and revolution, on the Soviet form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc., etc. — without developing, concretizing, and deepening *the very method* of materialist dialectics? The new epoch, and precisely such a rich epoch as the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, gives new forms of communication, new laws, new types of relations, extremely complex forms of class relations, various forms of class struggle, the gigantic development of technology and the natural sciences, the peculiar contradictions of this development, and so on.

All this can be understood (and not only described) only on the basis of deepening and concretizing the Marxist methodology itself. Since dialectical materialism is a scientific methodology, its deepening and concretization cannot but be based on the totality of knowledge of the sciences of its time. And it is precisely in all these respects that Lenin is brilliant and great.

As is well known, Comrade Stalin, in his letter "On Certain Questions of the History of Bolshevism," emphasized the enormous international importance of the theory and practice of Bolshevism. This letter is a brilliant continuation and development of the basic tenets of his Voprosy Leninizma on the struggle of Bolshevism against opportunism. Just as in Voprosy Leninizma, Comrade Stalin carries out one of the most important theses outlined by Lenin in his preparatory works for the well-known book The State and the Revolution with remarkable depth and consistency. Lenin makes an extremely important remark there. He says: "The Bolsheviks are not an 'accident'; they grew out of the struggle against the opportunism of 1894-1914."⁵⁴⁵ Both in Comrade Stalin's Voprosy Leninizma and in his last letter on the history of Bolshevism, all these problems are posed and elaborated precisely in the spirit of Lenin's principle of the irreconcilable struggle of Bolshevism against opportunism in all its forms and forms.

It is clear that when we raise the question of the new contribution that Lenin made to the

544 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 16. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

545 Ленин, Марксизм о государстве, 1931 г., стр. 62.

development of dialectical materialism, we cannot help starting from these most important propositions. It is clear that the philosophy of Marxism cannot be considered *without or outside the whole history of Bolshevism*, without or outside the whole history of the struggle of Bolshevism against opportunism, out of which Bolshevism grew.

On the other hand, it is clear that it is impossible to give a true scientific history of Bolshevism without examining and studying *Lenin's theoretical struggle*. This is exactly what T.'s letter calls for. Of Stalin. Starting from this basic position, we will be able to correctly approach the formulation and solution of questions related to the understanding and illumination of Lenin's philosophical legacy, the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism.

Comrade Stalin gave the classical *definition of Leninism as Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions*. In order to understand the essence of the theoretical questions and problems that inevitably had to arise and have arisen in connection with the practice of the class struggle during this new historical period, it is necessary to recall some of the main features that characterize it.

As T. points out Stalin, this new historical epoch is defined by three main points: 1) an extreme intensification of the struggle between the working class and the capitalists, 2) an extreme intensification of the struggle between the imperialist Powers for the redivision of the world, for colonies, for markets and raw materials, 3) fundamental contradictions and an intensification of the struggle between the oppressing and oppressed nations. All these contradictions are an expression of the fact that the productive forces cannot develop further within the framework of the relations of production created by capitalism at this stage, that this is the last stage in the development of capitalism, that this is the eve of the proletarian revolution. This new epoch is characterized by an extreme intensification of the class struggle, new forms of its manifestation, and extreme complexity.

This is a period of extremely fierce struggle in the field of ideology. This is a crisis of the whole system, a crisis of bourgeois ideology, bourgeois science, etc.

In the context of this new historical stage, the proletariat and its party have faced new tasks — the task of directly overthrowing capitalism. In the same new historical period, the whole bourgeois essence of the policy of the Second International was revealed. In *Voprosy Leninizma*, Comrade Stalin describes the entire work of the Second International. Only if we understand the full depth of this characteristic can we understand how Bolshevism grew up on the basis of the struggle against opportunism in the Second International. Tov. Stalin writes: "I said earlier that between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, lies a whole strip of opportunism of the Second International. In the interests of accuracy, I must add that we are not talking here about the formal domination of opportunism, but only about its actual domination. Formally, the Second International was headed by "orthodox" Marxists, while Kautsky and others were "Orthodox". In fact, however, the main work of the Second International was carried out along the line of opportunism. The opportunists adapted themselves to the bourgeoisie by virtue of their opportunistic, petty — bourgeois nature-the "Orthodox" in turn adapted themselves to the opportunists in the interests of "preserving unity" with the opportunists, in the interests of "peace and the party." The result was the domination of opportunism, for the chain between the policy of the bourgeoisie and the policy of the "Orthodox" turned out to be closed⁵⁴⁶."

Here we give an extremely profound characterization of the main line of work of the Second International as *an opportunist line*. Tov. Stalin also shows the role and significance of *centrism* in the Second International, the role and significance of various forms of opportunism. It shows how the chain between the policy of the bourgeoisie and the policy of the Second International turned out to be closed. Then t. Stalin also points out a number of characteristic features of the work of the Second International: the predominance of eclecticism, sophistry, instead of revolutionary theory, which is closely linked to the living practice of the revolutionary struggle, and the presence of

546 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 11.

fragments of Marxism, which, when separated from the practice of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, turned into emasculated dogmas.

Comrade Stalin points out that instead of the revolutionary struggle, flabby philistinism, politicking, etc. flourished in the era of the Second International. In connection with all this, the proletariat and its real ideologues were faced with the task of forging and creating truly militant, truly revolutionary parties. It was necessary to make a complete revision of everything that had been created during the period of relatively peaceful "organic" development of capitalism, during the period of the Second International's rule. It was necessary to clear the Augean stables of theory and practice of the Second International. And this part of the general examination of the theoretical and practical platform of the Second International fell to the lot of Leninism.

Clearly, this is an indication of T. Stalin, where he gives a historical analysis of the conditions and outlines the historical tasks that have fallen to the lot of Leninism, refers not to any one aspect of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, *but to all the components of Marxism*—to its economic, political, and philosophical side.

Lenin not only restored the revolutionary Marxist doctrine, purging it of the opportunism of the Second International, but also developed it further in relation to the new conditions, to the conditions of imperialism, to the conditions of the new forms of class struggle. Lenin gave a further concretization of all aspects of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

It is necessary to examine the essence of the philosophical "positions" of the Second International, to find out how the closing of the chain between the policy of the bourgeoisie and the policy of the Second International affected the *философская* latter's philosophical views, in order to show on this basis the full role and significance that *Lenin's struggle against philosophical opportunism in all its manifestations* had.

Eclecticism, sophistry, and the isolation of theory from practice, from the revolutionary struggle, are characteristic of the whole set of views of the most prominent theorists of the Second International, including their philosophical views, their philosophical "line".

This "line" is defined mainly by the following points:: 1) the complete separation of theory from practice, 2) the separation of economics and politics, and 3) the separation of the economic and historical theory of Marxism, its component parts, from its philosophical basis. Hence the need arises for the most prominent theorists of the Second International to find some "new" theoretical and cognitive foundation for the economic and historical theory of Marxism. It is clear that when one breaks away from the historical and economic theory of Marxism *отрывается*. If Marxism is based on its philosophical basis, then we must put some other philosophical foundation under Marxism. Among the most prominent "pillars" of the Second International, we just have a cross-section of the most thoroughly bourgeois philosophical points of view. In this respect, the representatives of the Second International are completely trailing behind the bourgeoisie.

Finally, a characteristic feature of the general picture of their philosophical views is the rejection of materialist dialectics in one form or another by the most prominent theorists of the Second International. At one time, this was clearly expressed in the statement put forward by the "famous" Bernstein that dialectics is nothing more than a trap on the path to true knowledge, that dialectics must be abandoned. Other representatives of the Second International, hidden opportunists, centrists, etc., expressed essentially the same thing, but only in a more subtle, veiled form.

Such, in general terms, is the characteristic of the philosophical "line" (if one can even use the word line here at all) of the Second International. As for the theoretical and cognitive foundations that the representatives of the Second International brought under Marxism in connection with the elimination of Marxist philosophical foundations, the latter are characterized by approximately the following trends: the official stream in essence is neo — *Kantianism*, then *Machism*, then neo-Hegelianism, which has recently been developing *неогегельянство*. It is well known that the Second International put forward quite prominent representatives of the neo-Kantian trend, who linked Kant and Marx in various ways in matters of philosophy, ethics, etc. We find among them such "theorists" as Bernstein, Max Adler, Forlander, Kautsky, Hilferding, etc.

The Machist current (Friedrich Adler, Otto Bauer, etc.) is also strong, and finally the neo-Hegelian current that has been developing in the ranks of social democracy in recent years. One of the most prominent exponents of it at present is the Breslau Professor Siegfried Mark. An extremely curious process is taking place in which the chain between the politics, theory, and ideology of the bourgeoisie and the politics, theory, and ideology of the Second International is being closed. In recent years, bourgeois philosophy has increasingly turned towards Hegel, trying to modernize and adapt him in its own way. The fascizing bourgeois philosophy puts neo-Hegelianism at its service. This process, which is taking place in the ranks of bourgeois philosophers, immediately finds its response in the ranks of social fascism. Social-fascist theorists, following the lead of the bourgeoisie, try to pass from neo-Kantianism to Hegelianism, try to link their philosophical views with neo-Hegelianism.

Let us now proceed to give a more detailed account of the attitude of the theorists of the Second International towards these philosophical schools of the bourgeoisie. Let us first consider Kautsky's position in relation to *neo-Kantianism*.

Lenin, in his famous article "Marxism and Revisionism," described neo-Kantianism developing in the ranks of social-democracy in the following way: "In the field of philosophy," he wrote, "revisionism was at the tail end of bourgeois professorial 'science.'" The professors went "back to Kant" - and revisionism trailed after the neo-Kantians; the professors repeated thousands of times the priest's vulgarities against philosophical materialism - and the revisionists, smiling condescendingly, muttered (word for word, according to the last handbook) that materialism had long been "refuted"; the professors treated Hegel like a "dead dog", and while they themselves preached an idealism that was only a thousand times more petty and vulgar than Hegel's, they shrugged their shoulders contemptuously about dialectics, and the revisionists followed them into the swamp of philosophical vulgarization of science, replacing "cunning" (and revolutionary) dialectics with "simple" (and calm) "evolution"; the professors worked out their official duties, a salary, adapting both their idealistic and "critical" systems to the prevailing medieval "philosophy" (i.e., to theology) and the revisionists moved closer to them, trying to make religion a "private matter" not in relation to the modern state, but in relation to the party of the advanced class. What real class significance such "amendments" to Marx had is not necessary to say — the matter is self-evident⁵⁴⁷."

This scathing criticism, directed against revisionists like Bernstein, against Konrad Schmidt, against Struve, and others, had a direct bearing on both the centrists and Kautsky, who essentially lost ground to Bernstein on these issues. The neo-Kantian revision of Marxism exposed by Lenin, shown from its social roots, the theory preached by the social-democratic "philosophers", was essentially no different from the idealistic reaction of the bourgeois neo-Kantians.

Previously, professors, fulfilling honestly the social order of the bourgeoisie, were dragged "back to Kant". Now, fulfilling the social order of the capitalists, they are trying to adapt the Hegelian doctrine of the state, even the Hegelian dialectic, to the needs of the blackshirts, to justify the terrorist domination of the bourgeoisie. In the past, the social-democratic "theorists", trailing in the wake of these bourgeois professors, "linked" Marx with Kant. Now the modern social-fascists, trailing in the wake of reactionary scientists, are preaching neo-Hegelian views and trying to "combine" them in some way with Marx.

Kautsky's position on the question of the attitude towards the neo-Kantian revision of Marxism expresses very well in general the attitude towards philosophical problems that prevailed in the ranks of social-democracy. In his correspondence with Plekhanov, when the latter made a very sharp criticism of Bernstein, Kautsky wrote: "In any case, I must openly state that neo-Kantianism is the least of my worries. I have never been very good at philosophy, and although I take the point of view of dialectical materialism, I still think that the economic historical point of view of Marx and Engels is at least compatible with neo-Kantianism; after all, Darwinism is just as

547 Ленин, Марксизм и ревизионизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XII, стр. 184–185.

well compatible with Buchner's materialism as with Haeckel's monism and Lange's Kantianism. If Bernstein had only faded in that direction, I wouldn't have bothered in the least."

Kautsky, as you can see, is not at all disconcerted by the combination of Kant and Marx, by the separation of the philosophical foundations of Marxism from the economic and historical theory of Marxism. It is true that he declares that he stands entirely on the point of view of dialectical materialism, but this declaration is actually replaced by a complete surrender of his positions. It must be said that Kautsky holds the same point of view in his latest work, *The Materialist Understanding of History*, which is a theoretical generalization of the entire opportunist practice of social — democracy. In this two-volume volume, Kautsky expresses himself on the question of the correlation between the various aspects of Marxism. It says:

"Recognition of a materialist understanding of history should not be a precondition for membership in a social democratic party. This party must leave it to everyone who wants to take part in the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat, in the struggle against all oppression and exploitation, to justify this desire theoretically as best they can — materialistically, Kantian, Christian, or otherwise."

In essence, this point of view allows complete freedom to combine Marxism with religion, with Kant, Mach, etc. Kautsky's general position on the question of attitude to neo-Kantianism, expressed by him in 1898 in correspondence with Plekhanov, found its theoretical expression here. Whether we take his treatment of questions of the theory of knowledge, the thing — in-itself, or problems of ethics, we can feel the author's neo-Kantian point of view everywhere.

Let us pass on to the question of Kautsky's general attitude to *Machism*. During the 1908-1910 philosophical discussion with Bogdanovism, one of the workers, Bendianidze, asked Kautsky to comment on the question of Machism. Kautsky wrote back to him: "You ask me," he wrote, "whether Mach is a Marxist. This depends on what is meant by Marxism. I consider Marxism not as a philosophical doctrine, but as an empirical science, as a special understanding of society. It is true that this view is incompatible with idealistic philosophy, but it does not contradict Mach's theory of knowledge. I personally do not see a significant difference between the views of Mach and Dietzgen. Marx is very close to Dietzgen" (1909).

This answer is extremely characteristic not only in its macho-opportunist nature, but it also determines Kautsky's understanding of Marxism and his opportunist attitude towards Machism.

Kautsky, therefore, does not regard Marxism as a philosophical doctrine, but only as an empirical science. Secondly, Marxism is only a doctrine of society. And third, Marxism is incompatible with the idealistic revision of Marxism, but at the same time it does not contradict Mach's theory of knowledge, which is, after all, idealism. Such is Kautsky's "dialectic". Such is the obscene caricature of Marxism that the "venerable" Kautsky drew for the worker Bendianidze. This little passage in Kautsky's reply perfectly characterizes his views. It fully confirms the general characterization of the positions of the Second International given above.

This is Kautsky's attitude to Machism, which was developed in the West, and here in the person of Bogdanovism, etc. But if we take Kautsky's last work, *The Materialist Conception of History*, we can say the same about neo — Hegelianism. Kautsky goes to great lengths to prove that Marxism can be compatible with neo-Hegelianism, and so on. The general process of fascization of social-democracy is expressed quite clearly in the field of philosophy as well. *This is the philosophical "line" of this shameless eclectic, this hardened sophist, who conciliates and connects everything and continues to pass off such a "mess" as Marxism.*

It is necessary to dwell a little on the characterization of the philosophical positions of the *left social-Democrats* — Mehring and R. Luxemburg, as well as the leader of Russian Menshevism, Plekhanov, in order to clearly understand what the Second International gave in the field of philosophy, in order to understand the full significance of the struggle against opportunism that Lenin carried out.

Mehring wrote quite a lot of articles on philosophical issues, and paid quite a lot of attention to philosophical problems. A number of articles by Mehring devoted directly to the criticism of a particular literary work contain valuable, accurate characteristics from the point of view of

dialectical materialism. But still, in general, Mering does not go beyond the positions described above. First of all, dialectical materialism is not for Mehring a coherent worldview and method of Marxism. He believes that in the field of nature it is possible to establish the point of view *of the mechanical* materialism and that it is precisely this kind of materialism that is combined with historical materialism. This view runs like a red thread through all of Mehring's works. In a number of his articles, he wrote that the Neo-Kantians do not attempt the existence of Marxism at all, but only want to "elevate" or "supplement" it; that they do not find any "fundamental mistakes in historical materialism; that Mach did for natural science what Marx did for the social sciences"; that "Mach does not want to be a philosopher at all... he is confident enough in himself to confine himself to the sphere in which he feels scientifically masterful. In this respect, Mach completely agrees with Marx, who completely excluded philosophy and saw the spiritual progress of mankind only in practical work in the field of history and natural science⁵⁴⁸." These are some of Mehring's statements in a number of his philosophical articles.

On the question of mechanical materialism and historical materialism, Mehring wrote: "Historical materialism includes the natural-scientific, but the natural-scientific does not include the historical⁵⁴⁹."

"In the field of natural science, mechanical materialism is a principle of scientific research, just as historical materialism is in the field of social sciences. To say that Marx and Engels, who rejected the right of mechanical materialism to the sphere of history, would also deny it its right to the sphere of natural science, would be to send these people out of the realm of scientific thought into the realm of superstition, which is dominated by the devils of the Australian Negroes, the philosophy of the unconscious, and the "psychism" of the neo-Lamarckists⁵⁵⁰."

Mehring is not an idealist and does not combine Marx with Kant, Marx with Mach. However, he is not, as we see, a consistent dialectical materialist; on the contrary, in his worldview, in his views on nature, Mehring adheres to mechanical materialism.

What are the philosophical positions *of R. Luxemburg* ? It is quite clear that it is not a representative of consistent, i.e., dialectical materialism. In the economic works of R. Luxemburg, in her "theory of the automatic collapse of capitalism", in raising the question of the relationship between internal and external contradictions, we find a detailed *mechanistic* concept applied to the analysis of capitalism.

Lenin's assessment of Luxemburg's views on the national question is also well known. Touching on the philosophical side of the question, Lenin shows how R. Luxemburg *substitutes sophistry* and completely abstract propositions for dialectics. Lenin especially castigates her for not understanding the concrete historical approach to the national question. In the question of spontaneity and consciousness, R. Luxemburg combines idealistic moments with individual moments of mechanismism, but she does not have a consistent dialectical materialism in her theoretical statements and in her application to this or that political concrete-practical question.

As we can see, the philosophical positions of the left social-Democrats and the radical left in the Second International did not differ significantly from the theoretical and philosophical views of the revisionists and centrists.

6.2. Lenin and Plekhanov

A special place among the theorists of the Second International is undoubtedly occupied by Plekhanov. The question of Lenin and Plekhanov was one of the most important questions of the entire philosophical discussion, one of the most important questions of the struggle against

548 Мering, На страже марксизма, 1927 г., стр. 136.

549 Мering, На страже марксизма, 1927 г., стр. 31.

550 Мering, На страже марксизма, 1927 г., стр. 94.

Menshevik idealism and mechanismism. *In his philosophical views, Plekhanov undoubtedly represents the best among the theorists of the Second International.* Undoubtedly, along with the internal organic unity that exists between Plekhanov's political opportunism and his philosophical deviations from Marx — Engels, he has a certain contradiction, namely, that in his literary works, despite all his deviations from the consistent point of view of dialectical materialism, he nevertheless defended it better than all the other theorists of the Second International. materialism distinguished itself from the subjective idealism and positivism of the Narodniks and from the open Bernsteinist revisionism, waged a struggle against Machism and Bogdanovism, and at the same time transformed dialectics into sophistry and scholasticism. The difficulty lies in the fact that Plekhanov is, as Lenin pointed out in his statements and characterization of Plekhanov, a figure who, from the point of view of Marxist philosophy, gave a decisive rebuff to open revisionists like Bernstein, Konrad Schmidt, Russian Machists, and God-seekers.

A truly *historical* approach consists in identifying the truly objective place and significance that Plekhanov occupies in the development of the working-class movement. A truly historical assessment consists in paying tribute to the role played by Plekhanov, while at the same time revealing all the errors that exist in his philosophical views. It is necessary to give a Bolshevik assessment of the role and significance of the struggle that Lenin waged with Plekhanov on all major philosophical problems. One extremely important remark must first be made in order to show that on the question of the attitude towards Plekhanov there are many similarities between Debodin and Axelrod. Despite all the struggle that Debodin and Axelrod waged between themselves on the basic question, on the question of Lenin and Plekhanov, on the question of Lenin's philosophical legacy, their views have much in common, and it is extremely important to analyze and show this commonality here. For example, in the journal *Under the Banner of Marxism*, a letter from Axelrod-Orthodox and Deutsch was published without notes, probably as some official material about Plekhanov, under the heading "G. V. Plekhanov did not cease to be a Marxist."

The content of this letter is as follows:

"In No. 110/1519 of *Izvestia* of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, as well as in other press organs, there is an appeal of the Executive Committee of the Comintern "To the workers of all countries", in which, among other things, in the first paragraph it is printed: "Still *deceased* Plekhanov, *when he was a Marxist*", etc. We consider the words we have underlined incorrect and offensive both to the memory of the founder of the Marxist movement in Russia, and personally to us, his friends and associates. We find it all the more necessary to protest against this insinuation because it is thrown out by an entire institution, moreover, in its appeal "to the workers of all countries." The latter, not knowing exactly the views of the late Plekhanov and relying on the statement of such an authoritative body as the Executive Committee of the Comintern, will undoubtedly believe that the founder of Marxism in Russia later betrayed him, which of course is absolutely wrong. We, who are close to Plekhanov, know what his views were up to his death, and we affirm that to the grave he remained faithful to the views of the founders of scientific socialism, which he had learned in his youth and had consistently preached for forty years.

P.S. We ask all the organs that published the appeal of the Executive Committee of the Comintern to reprint our present letter."

For the "Committee for Perpetuating the Memory of G. V. Plekhanov"

Lyubov Axelrod-Orthodox, Lev Deitch, May 20, 1922, Moscow.

Here is a direct Menshevik sally, a direct Menshevik appeal against the appeal of the Comintern, which Axelrod accuses of insinuations, etc., and this was published in due time in the pages of *Under the Banner of Marxism*. This is an extremely characteristic fact, which must be understood in order to understand the importance of the struggle with Debodinism, as well as with the Mechanists, around the problem of "Lenin and Plekhanov".

In essence, both Debodin and Axelrod defended and maintained this point of view for a number of years before and during the last philosophical discussion, and did not reject it in

substance even after the discussion.

It makes no sense to dwell on Deborin's already sufficiently exposed formulation of the question of Plekhanov as a theorist who complements Lenin as a practitioner. You can take another setup — Karev's "disciple". In his "Instead of an article for the fifth anniversary of the magazine", he wrote the following:

"In our time, attempts are repeatedly made to oppose Plekhanov to Lenin or Lenin to Plekhanov. Attempts are useless. Everyone knows Plekhanov's political mistakes. It is well known that in the twilight of his days during the war and in 1917, many of the political errors of a mind as consistent as Plekhanov's also developed into theoretical errors. Even before the war, Plekhanov had several inaccurate formulations and poorly placed accents in the field of theory: the well-known history of hieroglyphs and the concept of experience, Marx's lack of emphasis on the inclusion of the theory of knowledge in dialectics, the omission of classes in the scheme of the social whole, which prepared Plekhanov's mistakes in the History of Russian Social Thought, and so on. *private ones* mistakes cannot eliminate the general point that Lenin repeatedly emphasized — Plekhanov's philosophical works are still the best that has been written on these topics in the world literature of Marxism⁵⁵¹."

Here Karev expounded a whole concept in Plekhanov's understanding. There is not a grain of Bolshevism in this concept. Here, every line is a gross mistake. The general meaning of these mistakes: an apologetic attitude to *everything* Plekhanov, to Plekhanov the Menshevik, to Plekhanov the author of the History of Russian Social Thought, etc., etc. *надо* to oppose Plekhanov-Menshevik' that Lenin's theory of reflection *is necessary* to oppose Plekhanov's hieroglyphic theory, etc., etc.

Karev believes that "the loss of classes in the scheme of the social whole" is an "unfortunate emphasis"! This passage is a bright spotlight that reveals and illuminates the whole Menshevik, if not simply liberal, essence of the views of Karev and the entire Deborin group.

This passage perfectly reveals the anti-Marxist essence of Menshevik idealism.

Here are the attitudes of the *Deborin group* on the question of the relationship between Lenin and Plekhanov.

Let us turn to Zinoviev. In his book "Leninism" there is a special chapter "Leninism and dialectics". This chapter, being a vivid example of "quote-based " Marxism, shows how much T. V. Lenin is interested in Marxism. Zinoviev did not understand either Leninism or dialectics, as he perverts the true Leninist dialectic, its revolutionary and effective character. Zinoviev completely failed to understand the partisanship of the philosophy so profoundly and fully developed by Lenin. Not understanding this aspect of the matter, Zinoviev slips into the Struvist objectivist interpretation of materialist dialectics. Here is how he perverts the essence of Lenin's views: "Lenin was able to be a most active, passionate," rabid " (Lenin's favorite word) participant in events and at the same time was able to immediately, as if stepping aside, completely objectively observe, evaluate and generalize these same events with philosophical calm, with the criterion of Marxist dialectics, with the objectivity of a natural scientist⁵⁵²." Continuing to develop this attitude, if I may say so, Zinoviev tries to prove by a number of examples how "in the midst of actual-political argumentation, Lenin" suddenly "turns to dialectics⁵⁵³."

Such "characteristics" of Lenin should be called nothing more than a complete perversion of the essence of the matter. Zinoviev quite outwardly and mechanically imagines the connection between theory and practice, between "frenzied, passionate" activity in political events and Lenin's supposedly "objective", "philosophically calm" observation of them, between "actual-political argumentation" and argumentation from the point of view of materialist dialectics. Zinoviev

551 «Под знаменем марксизма» № 12 за 1926 г., стр. 25.

552 Зиновьев, Ленинизм, 1926 г., стр. 342.

553 Зиновьев, Ленинизм, 1926 г., стр. 355.

completely fails to understand that the strength of Lenin, as the greatest dialectical materialist who developed the teachings of Marxism in the new historical epoch, lies in the fact that he gives examples of the revolutionary unity of theory and practice, of scientific analysis with deep partisanship. Zinoviev does not understand that in Lenin we have an organic inner unity of revolutionary theory and revolutionary politics, that every Leninist political article is a model of materialist dialectics, and that every line of Lenin's on dialectical questions is thoroughly saturated with politics.

It is clear that by perverting the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of theory and practice in a Menshevik way, Zinoviev is completely misinterpreting the question of Lenin and Plekhanov. In essence, he puts this question in the spirit of Menshevik idealism, or rather, he is one of the authors of this position. Here is what he writes about Plekhanov and Lenin: "As far as purely philosophical problems are concerned, Plekhanov understands dialectics as well as Lenin. As an educator, as a writer, as a propagandist, as a popularizer of Marx's philosophical views, Plekhanov is strong. Plekhanov gives us a brilliant academic exposition of the dialectical method. But to reduce all these questions from the academic sky to the sinful earth, to apply dialectics to the revolutionary struggle, to the movement of the masses, to social development, to the emancipatory struggle of the working class — in this sphere Plekhanov proved utterly powerless. *And Lenin was a real giant in this area* »⁵⁵⁴." Isn't Zinoviev here a co-author of Deborin's famous Menshevik thesis that "Plekhanov is a theorist, and Lenin is a practitioner"? Didn't Zinoviev break with theory and practice here? Zinoviev obscures the fact that even in the general understanding of materialist dialectics we have in Plekhanov, despite his "brilliant" exposition, a number of gross errors of principle, and a certain system of deviations from dialectical materialism. Zinoviev completely glosses over the fact that Plekhanov's political opportunism could not fail to find its expression in his theoretical views on the philosophy of Marxism, just as, conversely, his deviations from dialectical materialism could not fail to influence his political views. Zinoviev, like Karev, like Deborin, does not understand that there is not only a certain contradiction between Plekhanov's philosophical views and his Menshevism, but also an internal *connection* what Lenin repeatedly revealed in his works.

What is the real historical place of Plekhanov, and how should the question of the relation between Lenin and Plekhanov be raised in the development of the philosophy of Marxism? Undoubtedly, Plekhanov, who was at the head of the Emancipation of Labor group, is one of the representatives of Marxism in Russia. We know what Lenin said about this. Undoubtedly, much of what Plekhanov wrote on dialectical materialism was of great positive significance for the strengthening and development of Marxist ideas in Russia. Plekhanov's works were and still are of considerable value in the fight against philosophical revisionism. While accepting these *historical achievements of Plekhanov*, we must not forget the struggle waged by Lenin against Plekhanov's perversions of the materialist dialectic, against Plekhanov's Menshevik scholasticism, sophistry, and vulgarization of Marxist philosophy, especially in its application to political and strategic-tactical questions. We must know from the history of the entire revolutionary movement in Russia and in the West over the past four decades, and from the history of our party's struggle, that Lenin is the only consistent successor of Marxism in the entire international working-class movement who raised Marxism in all its constituent parts, including the theory of dialectics, to a new level. There were repeated attempts to portray Plekhanov as an intermediate link between Marx-Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, and attempts to portray Lenin as a disciple of Plekhanov (Deborin et al.). This blatant falsification of historical facts in favor of Menshevism must be rebuffed. It is also necessary to give a decisive rebuff to the assertions that Plekhanov gives "brilliant pages" in the theoretical and academic exposition of Marxism, that Plekhanov has no flaws in this respect, and that only in practice has he proved to be a non-dialectician. This is a fundamentally wrong point of view.

Since, however, the Marxism of the Second International represents a step backward, a

554 Зиновьев, Ленинизм, 1926 г., стр. 346. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

departure from orthodox Marxism, and since Plekhanov, in the totality of his works, basically does not go beyond the Marxism of this epoch, *we must also consider his own philosophical works as a series of deviations from consistent Marxism* .

It is erroneous to think that in Plekhanov's philosophy we have only a series of isolated, random erroneous formulations. From the point of view of Lenin's understanding of the problems of Marxist philosophy, Plekhanov makes a lot of individual mistakes. The task of understanding these errors, of overcoming them critically, is to search for and reveal *the inner logic* of these errors, as well as the organic connection that exists between them and Plekhanov's political, mainly Menshevik line.

In assessing the totality of Plekhanov's theoretical works, it is necessary first of all to note that the "basic tradition and dogma of the Second International" — *the gap between theory and practice, the gap between theoretical writings about dialectical materialism and the inability to apply it* — *was very clearly expressed* by him . One has only to recall the Leninist characteristics of this Plekhanovian "dialectic" ("dogmatics", "most harmful sophistry", "perversion", "mockery of the spirit of Marxism" , etc., etc.) in order to understand what a strong gap exists in Plekhanov, as described above.

If we take Plekhanov's actual philosophical works and analyze the totality of errors that he has and that are criticized by Lenin, then in general we can outline approximately four rods around which these errors are concentrated:

1) misunderstanding "dialectics as a theory of knowledge", misunderstanding materialistic dialectics as a philosophical science, reducing dialectics to the sum of examples;

2) commitment to formalism and logistics;

3) significant elements of agnosticism and Kantianism;

4) a significant influence of vulgar, contemplative materialism.

Lenin's struggle against Plekhanov's opportunism and his perversions of dialectics has been going on throughout the history of our party. We will here give only a few facts from this struggle, while noting a characteristic feature: the struggle waged by Lenin against Plekhanov on political questions constantly touches on the cardinal problems of materialist dialectics.

Let us point out here the Leninist critique of Plekhanov in connection with his commitment to formalism and logistics. We are referring to Lenin's remarks on Plekhanov's draft party program. Lenin, in his remarks on Plekhanov's "second project," wrote the following:

"(1) According to the way in which the most important section relating to the characterization of capitalism is formulated, this draft does not give the program of the proletariat *fighting* against very real manifestations of very definite capitalism, but the program of an economic *textbook* devoted to capitalism in general.

2) In particular, the program is not suitable for playing *Russian* of the proletariat, because the evolution of Russian capitalism, the contradictions and social calamities engendered by Russian capitalism, are almost completely bypassed and obscured by the same system of characterizing capitalism in general....

We can get away with the fact that capitalism" in its developed form " differs *in general* with such characteristics — and in Russia capitalism is "becoming predominant" -*it means* evading the concrete accusation and declaration of war, which is most important for a practically struggling party⁵⁵⁵."

These profound remarks of Lenin's throw a clear light on the whole difference between Lenin's materialist dialectic and Plekhanov's formalism, and its logistics in dealing with major questions.

Lenin demands a concrete analysis of concrete capitalism in Russia and outlines concrete tasks for the party and the proletariat; Plekhanov demands a general characterization of capitalism, abstractness, and deduction of the "properties" of Russian capitalism from the definition of the

concept of capitalism in general. This "system of characterizing capitalism in general" is extremely characteristic, as Lenin notes, of the entire program. Instead of a concrete analysis based on dialectical materialism, in Plekhanov we have a deduction from concepts, a logical definition of concepts. But this is a characteristic feature of formalism and logistics.

In July 1907, in the preface to the second edition of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Lenin returned to the same characteristic of Plekhanov's methodology, but on different issues. He wrote: "A concrete analysis of the situation and interests of different classes should serve to determine the exact meaning of this truth in its application to a particular question. The reverse mode of reasoning, which is often found among right-wing social-Democrats with Plekhanov at their head — that is, the desire to seek answers to concrete questions in the simple logical development of the general truth about the fundamental character of our revolution — is a vulgarization of Marxism and a complete mockery of dialectical materialism⁵⁵⁶."

Lenin's struggle with Plekhanov's theoretical and tactical views, especially during the revolution of 1905-1906, was of great importance for the victory of Bolshevik strategy and tactics in the working-class movement and its implementation in the revolution. Along with its direct political content, this struggle provides exceptionally rich material for studying and clarifying Lenin's philosophical positions as opposed to Plekhanov's. It should be noted that Plekhanov conducts all his "argumentation" on tactical questions ostensibly from the point of view of dialectical materialism. All the time he criticizes Lenin for "a complete misunderstanding of dialectical materialism" and for deviating from it. In his article "Something about 'Economism'" and the "Economists," he charges the Bolsheviks with insouciance about theory. "At the economist-praktika," he wrote, "theory was not generally found in advance. But the current practitioner has a 'political' connotation (i.e., the Bolsheviks. - *Auth.*) is also not God knows how attached to the theory. If it comes to the truth, then we will say that our current 'political' practitioners are as carefree about theory as the 'economic' practitioners of the recent past⁵⁵⁷ were."

With a zeal worthy of better application, Plekhanov repeats the same slander against Lenin countless times. Accusing Lenin of lacking dialectic, he even states a "fourth period" in the working-class movement. He's writing: "And that is why the 'liquidation of the fourth period' of our movement, which is characterized by the influence of Leninist metaphysics, just as its 'third period' is characterized by the influence of 'economism', will have to consist, among other things, in finally rising to the theoretical point of view of this group (i.e., the Emancipation of Labour group). Even the very nearsighted will soon see this."

Plekhanov does not stop at these vile attacks against Lenin; he deepens them by spreading slander, later supported at that time by Deborin and other Mensheviks, about Machist philosophy, which is supposedly the official philosophy of Bolshevism. This is what he wrote in his "Letters on Tactics and Tactlessness."

"When I say that we pay lip service to Marx and his dialectics, I do not, of course, mean the theorists of our present Blanquism. In the field of philosophy, these people do not even pay lip service to Marx. They act as its 'critics'; for them, standing on the point of view of empiriomonism, dialectics is a 'long-surpassed stage'⁵⁵⁸."

This was written by Plekhanov in the spring of 1906.

Plekhanov's accusations of idealism against Lenin and the Bolsheviks are repeated countless times. So he writes: "The tactics advocated by our 'Bolsheviks' bear clear traces of petty-bourgeois idealism and petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionism⁵⁵⁹." He goes on to write: "...Lenin lowers the

556 Ленин, Развитие капитализма в России, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. III, стр. 12.

557 Плеханов, т. XIII, стр. 17.

558 Плеханов, т. XV, стр. 125. Примечание.

559 Плеханов, т. XV, стр. 62. Примечание.

level of revolutionary thought... he introduces a utopian element into our views... Blankism or Marxism — that is the question we are deciding today. Lenin himself admitted that his agrarian project is closely linked to his idea of seizing power⁵⁶⁰." In his Letters on Tactics and Tactlessness, he addresses the Bolsheviks as follows: "You are precisely dogmatists who have lost all capacity for practice. You take your own will as the main revolutionary engine, and when we point out real relations to you, you cry out about our imaginary opportunism. You think that a revolutionary who wants to take these real relations into account "has nothing to do". Your faction is exactly like the Willich-Schaper faction, and yet this faction was only a German version of blankism, which adopted Marx's terminology and some fragments of his ideas that it had not digested at all... Being idealists in tactics, you naturally apply the idealistic criterion to the assessment of all other parties; you try to find a way out of it. determine their more or less *good will* »⁵⁶¹." "Your discussion of the critique of weapons ' is *nothing more than a simple transfer to the field of tactical reasoning of the Duhring theory of violence, which Friedrich Engels once so bitterly ridiculed* »⁵⁶².

In the article we have already quoted — "The Working Class and the Social-Democratic Intelligentsia" — Plekhanov accuses Lenin of being both narodniks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Bauerists. So he writes: "In Lenin's view, we see not *Marxism* , but — I apologize for the ugly — sounding word-*Bauerism* , a new edition of the theory of *heroes and crowds*, corrected and supplemented in accordance with the market requirements of the most recent times⁵⁶³."

Such is the bouquet of lies and slanders against Lenin, which Plekhanov puts forward in the course of the struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks for carrying out revolutionary tactics in the 1905 revolution, for carrying out slogans of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, for exposing the opportunism of the Mensheviks and their khvostism to the Cadet liberal bourgeoisie.

It could be shown that Plekhanov has been fighting Lenin for almost the entire history of the party, with the exception of those periods when he himself showed fluctuations in the direction of Bolshevism. Here it is only necessary to quote Plekhanov's assessment of Lenin's April theses of 1917, which are the greatest document of international socialism, the clearest example of the method of materialist dialectics, and the most profound concrete analysis of the situation of the class struggle and the correlation of class forces in the February Revolution. How does Plekhanov assess these theses? He wrote: "I compare him (i.e. Lenin. - *Author*) theses with speeches of abnormal heroes of the named great artists (Plekhanov means Chekhov and Gogol. - *Ed.*) and in some ways enjoy them. And it seems that these theses were written precisely in the context in which Avksenty Ivanovich Poprishin sketched one of his pages. This situation is characterized by the following note: "I don't remember the number. There wasn't a month either. "The devil knows what it is"" We will see that it is precisely under such circumstances, i.e., with complete distraction from the circumstances of time and place, that Lenin's theses were written. This means that the Unity reporter was absolutely right when he called Lenin's speech " delusional."⁵⁶⁴.

This is the vicious, frenzied insinuation to which Plekhanov goes in his struggle against Bolshevism during the war and in the period after the February Revolution. Plekhanov "criticizes" Bolshevism, dwelling on the philosophical and methodological side of the question, distorting and falsifying its views in every possible way.

Exposing and overcoming Plekhanov's mistakes in the field of philosophy means overcoming

560 Плеханов, т. XV, стр. 72.

561 Плеханов, т. XV, стр. 108–109.

562 Плеханов, т. XV, стр. 115.

563 Плеханов, т. XIII, стр. 133.

564 Плеханов, О тезисах Ленина и о том, почему бред бывает подчас интересен, Сб. «год на родине», Париж.

Menshevism in such an important theoretical field as the philosophy of Marxism. It is precisely along this line that the struggle against Menshevik idealism was, and still is, of great party significance.

6.3. Lenin's Struggle against philosophical Opportunism in the history of our Party

Let us pass on to the question of the falsification of the history of Lenin's philosophical struggle against opportunism, which we find in the works of representatives of Mechanismism and Menshevik idealism. It is necessary to note a number of characteristic features of the approach of Menshevik idealism to Lenin's philosophical struggle against opportunism. First of all, and this is closely connected with the general concept of Menshevik idealism, the Deborinists are characterized *by the separation of Lenin's "purely philosophical works" from all his other works* . Such works of Lenin's as "What are the Friends of the People", "The Development of Capitalism in Russia", etc., completely fell out of the field of attention of these philosophers when approaching the path of Lenin's philosophical development, since these works are not "purely philosophical works". The second characteristic feature of Menshevik idealism's approach to Lenin's philosophical struggle is the well — known theory that *"Lenin is a disciple of Plekhanov"* and therefore his philosophical works have no independent significance, but are significant insofar as they complement Plekhanov's views. The third characteristic feature of their approach to Lenin's struggle against philosophical opportunism is *the denial of the international significance of Lenin's works against neo-Kantianism, against Machism, and the denial of the international significance of Lenin's struggle for materialist dialectics*. Finally, the fourth point is the strenuous promotion of Plekhanov's Menshevik *idea of the organic connection that supposedly exists between Bolshevism and Machism* . Here are four important points that are a common thread in a whole series of articles, materials, and works written by representatives of Menshevik idealism. Whether we take Deborin's book "Lenin as a Thinker", Luppel's "Lenin and Philosophy", Karev's works and articles — all these points are more or less expanded in them.

Let us recall first of all what Deborin wrote in his article "The Philosophy of Mach and the Russian Revolution" as early as 1908, as a Menshevik, concerning the alleged connection between the philosophy of Machism and Bolshevism as a political movement.

"The stamp of subjectivism, of voluntarism, "he says there," lies on the whole tactics of so — called Bolshevism, of which Machism is the philosophical expression. Machism is a worldview as a philosophy of subjectivism and individualism, it forms, in combination with Nietzschean immoralism, which justifies "evil", exploitation, etc., an ideological fog that covers the practical aspirations of the bourgeoisie. Bolshevik philosophers and" ideologists " do not go beyond the limits of the petty-bourgeois outlook. Bolshevik strategists and tacticians, with their romantic revolutionism and petty-bourgeois radicalism, put into practice the theoretical principles of philosophical nihilism, which is based on the denial of objective truth and the recognition of the right of each individual to determine the character of what is allowed and what is not allowed, true and false, good and evil, just and unjust . Our flywheel-like Marxists are conscious Bolsheviks who understand the practice and tactics of the latter. Bolshevik practitioners and tactics are unconscious Machists and idealists. Objectively Machism thus represents on Russian soil the ideology of the revolutionary, radical stratum of the bourgeoisie, and within these limits marks a progressive phenomenon. In relation to Marxism, the worldview of the proletariat, Machism plays a reactionary role. The impotence and political backwardness of the petty bourgeoisie compel it to seek temporary allies among other classes of the population. The most reliable revolutionary and consistent ally is the proletariat. But in order to" win over "the latter for the purposes of at least" the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, "one must resort to Marxist phraseology, which makes it possible to cover up the petty-bourgeois"essence." After all, our Social Revolutionaries are 'also Marxists'."

Special comments on this Menshevik slander of Bolshevism are hardly necessary. It is

important to note that such views are reflected in a highly veiled form even in the work "Lenin as a thinker", written by Deborin in 1924, published until 1928 without any corrections.

I must say that in this matter we can state that there was a touching unity between the then Deborin and Axelrod-Orthodox. Axelrod-Orthodox has a whole series of malicious Menshevik articles on philosophical questions.

Here is what she wrote, for example, in the article "Two currents".

"If the connection between philosophy and social trends is mostly hidden, if it has to be discovered only by analyzing the internal content of a given social trend, then the connection between Bolshevism and Machism is also striking from a vulgar empirical point of view, or, to use the term of empirical critics, from a purely descriptive point of view. Indeed, most Bolshevik theorists profess an empirio-critical doctrine. Philosophy for these theorists is not a serious subject, but a method of thinking, which also determines the methods of their practical activity. It is clear, therefore, that their theoretical and practical activities also influenced and continue to influence this circle of social-Democrats, who have nothing to do with philosophy directly⁵⁶⁵."

Later in the same article, she continues to portray in the most slanderous manner "the psychology and logic of Bolshevism," as she puts it, in an effort to prove the kinship and identity of Bolshevism with Machism.

Plekhanov's thesis about the kinship of Bolshevism with Machism, so diligently developed and propagated by Deborin and Axelrod, was exposed by Lenin. In his work *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, Lenin wrote:

"Plekhanov, in his remarks against Machism, was not so much concerned with refuting Mach as with inflicting factional damage on Bolshevism. For this petty and scanty use of fundamental theoretical differences, he has already been rightly punished — with two books by the Menshevik Machists⁵⁶⁶."

Let us now proceed to the work of T. Luppola "Lenin and Philosophy".

In it, we find:

"In his book, he did not develop the principles of dialectical materialism in a positive form, but expounded them in the form of a negative critique of the philosophical revisionists of Marxism. The polemical task determined the method and character of constructing Lenin's book. For each of the main propositions of the revisionists, he finds their roots in the idealistic philosophical literature of the West and, thus revealing their idealistic, anti-Marxist character, briefly contrasts materialist theses, drawing them not only from Marx and Engels, but also from such materialists as Diderot, Feuerbach, Joseph Dietzgen, Plekhanov⁵⁶⁷."

Here is an example of falsification of Lenin's philosophical path. It is particularly strange to read such lines about Lenin's book, written in 1925-1926 and published in 1929, after the remarkable and profound formulation of the question given in the works of T. V. Lenin. Stalin in 1924

In exposing this falsification, it must be said that Lenin, from the very first of his works, gives us examples of the effective understanding of Marxism that was discussed at the beginning. Lenin from the very first of his works *connects philosophy with politics*, gives examples of partisanship of philosophy. When he criticizes the economic and political views of the Narodniks, he does not stop there, but also gives a detailed critique of their philosophical and sociological views. Let us compare at least two works: "On the Development of the Monistic View" by Plekhanov and "What are the 'friends of the People'" by Lenin, and we will immediately see the enormous difference that exists between Lenin and Plekhanov, between Lenin's and Plekhanov's understanding of Marxism.

565 Сборник «На рубеже» 1909 г., в котором участвовали Ф. Дан, А. Деборин, Д. Кольцов, В. Львов, Л. Маслов, Мартынов, Неведомский, Л. Ортодокс, А. Потресов.

566 Ленин, *Материализм и эмпириокритицизм*, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 290. Примечание.

567 Луппол, *Ленин и философия*, стр. 21–22.

What does Plekhanov give in his book? It is well known that this book of Plekhanov's is one of his best books on the philosophy of Marxism, and that a number of generations of Marxists grew up on it. It is clear to us that this book must be studied, that without it one cannot become a true Marxist, a true communist, but one must not study it in the Deborin way. It must be studied critically, finding out Plekhanov's mistakes and where Lenin is superior to Plekhanov. In Plekhanov we find an extremely *academic exposition of Marxism*, Marxist philosophy, and the historical preparation of Marxism. We already have in this book significant elements of mechanismism, errors on the question of the role of the geographical environment; a "geographical bias", a lack of understanding of the relationship between nature and society. In Plekhanov's work, the question of the role and significance of the theory of class struggle in Marxism, in the materialist understanding of history, is quite insufficiently formulated and developed. In Lenin's work, however, we are confronted from the very beginning with party militancy in the struggle against the Narodniks. Lenin establishes a link between the philosophical, sociological, economic, and political views of the Narodniks. If we take Lenin's analysis of handicraft in the domestic system of production, if we take the concrete character of the Narodniks' criticism, which extends from criticism of the general philosophical and sociological views of the Narodniks to questions about the community, about handicraft industries, if we compare all the theoretical wealth that Lenin gives, and remember that it is in this work that he focuses the most important problem of historical If the problem of materialism is a question of socio — economic formation, then we will see what a difference there is between these works of Lenin and Plekhanov. Finally, it must be said that Lenin is essentially *the first and independently*, and not in the way that Deborin and Luppel draw it, gives in Russia a detailed exposition of the Marxist worldview in the struggle against the subjective sociology of the narodniks. Plekhanov wrote his book *in the autumn of 1894*, and Lenin wrote his Friends of the People in *April 1894*. Moreover, he wrote independently, regardless of the work that Plekhanov was doing. Comparing these works and showing how much higher Lenin's work is, we can say that Lenin *was the first in Russia to give in this book, in the struggle against the Narodniks, with subjective sociology, a detailed exposition of dialectical materialism.*

Lenin was also the first and most consistent leader in the struggle against neo-Kantianism. As early as the end of 1894, Lenin read a report in the St. Petersburg circle of social-Democrats on the reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature, which he published in a revised form, as a book directed simultaneously on two fronts-against Struve and against the Narodniks. We are referring to Lenin's work "The Economic Content of Narodism and its Criticism in Mr. Struve's Book", written at the end of 1894 and published in 1895.

This work provides an exceptional example of the irreconcilability of theoretical polemics, a model of the struggle on two fronts. In it, Lenin also criticizes Struve's philosophical views, and in a number of passages and remarks criticizes the neo-Kantian revision of Marxism outlined by Struve. *The concreteness of criticism* is characteristic of Lenin's works in general. Further in the works against Bulgakov on the theory of realization, etc. Lenin throws out a whole series of remarks directed against neo-Kantians. At that time, however, Plekhanov did not oppose either the Bernstein revision or Struve. Much later, in a letter to Potresov dated September 2, 1898, Lenin pointed out that Plekhanov still did not speak out strongly against neo-Kantianism, leaving Struve and Bulgakov to debate the main questions of this philosophy, as if it had become an integral part of Marxist philosophy.

The first version of Plekhanov's article "On the Economic Factor" published in PZM sheds a bright light on Plekhanov's interpretation of a number of philosophical questions, in particular, it characterizes his attitude to the neo-Kantian revisionism of Struve, Bulgakov, Berdyaev, etc. at the end of the XIX century, after the well-known Leninist criticism of Struve. Plekhanov writes in this version of the article: "The philosophical views of the 'students' who gravitate towards German 'critical' philosophy are not similar to the philosophical views of the authors of Capital. They know this very well and do not consider themselves to follow his philosophy. But this does not prevent them from recognizing the validity of his economic and philosophical-historical theory... They are his students to the same extent as those who share not only his economic and philosophical-

historical views, but also his philosophical views. A neo-Kantian who recognizes the validity of the economic and philosophical-historical theory of the author of *Capital*, *within these limits* he may be as faithful and consistent a disciple of this famous thinker as any of the modern materialists, i.e., those who follow the author of *Capital* also in philosophy.

But is it possible to share the philosophical and historical views of a writer without at the same time sharing his philosophical views? This question cannot be answered absolutely, Sa depend, as the French say. But as for the neo-Kantians, it must be said in the affirmative that they can, without changing their philosophical point of view, recognize the validity of Marx's economic and philosophical-historical views⁵⁶⁸."

This version of the article was written by Plekhanov at the end of 1897 or at the beginning of 1898. Here, for a number of tactical reasons, Plekhanov goes as far as theoretically defending revisionism, allowing *for the possibility of combining Marxism with neo-Kantianism* .

As a matter of fact, in these lines there is no difference in the formulation of this question between him and Kautsky, who wrote exactly the same thing to Plekhanov in a letter dated May 22, 1898.

In contrast to this position, Lenin, from the very beginning of his literary activity, from his first major work "What are the "friends of the people" and how they fight against the Social Democrats", takes a clear, consistent, revolutionary position, defending the solidity and integrity of Marxist teaching, categorically opposing any attempts or even hints at the possibility of combining Marxism with some "fashionable" philosophical theory. Lenin is essentially the first in the international arena to criticize the Russian neo-Kantians, with a concrete critique and analysis of their economic views, and so on. This is how the situation is in reality, and this reality completely contradicts what Deborin wrote.

It must further be said that Lenin is essentially also *the initiator of the struggle against Machism* , and this again is completely perverted in Deborin's book *Lenin as a Thinker*. Deborin portrays the case as if the "Plekhanov school", which included Plekhanov, Axelrod and himself, Deborin, had come out to fight Machism, and Lenin had just joined them and written his "Materialism and Empirio-criticism".

Lenin was the first initiator of the struggle against Machism. In 1904, at Lenin's insistence, Axelrod wrote an article against Bogdanovism. Around 1901, after reading Bogdanov's book "A Historical View of Nature" and seeing that it was an idealistic revision of Marxism, Lenin insisted that Plekhanov and Axelrod criticize Bogdanov, since he himself was then directly involved in party affairs. At the same time, Axelrod wrote her own article, and she herself indicated that she was criticizing Bogdanov at Lenin's insistence.

The Deborinists, like the Mechanists, completely glossed over the international significance of Lenin's struggle against Machism. Meanwhile, Lenin himself wrote that this "philosophical dispute" was of international importance, that dialectical materialism had to "cope" with new discoveries in the field of natural science, that Plekhanov did not raise this question at all, ignored the questions of natural science.

Here are a number of points that should be specially developed theoretically in order to show the role and significance of Lenin's struggle against opportunism in the field of philosophy, in order to show the consistency and intransigence with which Vladimir Ilyich waged this struggle throughout the entire history of the party.

It is not necessary to dwell too much on the significance that questions *of the struggle against neo-Hegelianism now have* . "Materialism and Empirio-criticism", Lenin's works on Hegel, his article "On the Significance of militant Materialism" provide a detailed theory of materialist dialectics, a deep assessment of the role and significance of Hegel in the preparation of Marxism, and a great weapon for a truly critical approach to Hegel, for exposing his idealism. In the international struggle of Bolshevism against fascism, social-fascism, and the struggle against the

fascization of science, which leads to the fascists trying to portray almost every major bourgeois thinker as the founder and father of fascism, such as Hegel, Goethe, Spinoza, etc., the defense of the foundations of dialectical materialism is of particular importance. Lenin's teaching and his philosophical works represent the sharpest weapon in the struggle against modern neo-Hegelianism, a weapon with which fascism and social-fascism can be dealt the most severe blows in the field of theory, as if they were twins.

6.4. Lenin and the further development of Materialist dialectics

Let us now turn to the question of what new developments Lenin introduced into the development of dialectical materialism.

The starting point for understanding the Leninist stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism, for understanding what Lenin brought new to the development of Marxism as a whole, is the classical characterization of Leninism given by Vol. By Stalin. We must proceed from the fact that the main thing in Leninism is the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

When developing certain aspects of Marxist-Leninist theory, we must proceed from the fact that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is a coherent, integral, consistent doctrine, that the three components of Marxism are not mechanically glued together parts, of which one can be accepted and the other half accepted, one can not be realized, and the other can be several years later. We must proceed from the fact that Marxism is a consistent, coherent, monolithic teaching, from which nothing can be torn out, so as not to distort or trivialize it... We must also understand that *the main thing in Leninism*, namely, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has determined and is determining the tasks and direction of work, the development of certain aspects of Leninism as Marxism of the new epoch. We must proceed from this in order to understand the new elements that Lenin introduced into this or that component part of Marxism. However, incorrect conclusions are sometimes drawn from these indisputable propositions, which essentially imply *a liquidationist point of view in relation to the philosophy of Marxism*. We have in mind vulgar and simplistic statements of something like this order: starting from the correct idea that the main thing in Leninism is the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, they believe that we should not look for anything new introduced by Lenin in Marxist philosophy, except what is given to them in the theory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is believed that the essence of the Leninist stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism is that Lenin developed the philosophy of Marxism as a theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In other words, they are trying to dissolve all the components of Leninism, including Leninist philosophy, in the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. To adopt this point of view is to adopt a liquidationist point of view in relation to the philosophy of Marxism, which, under the guise of phrases about the dictatorship of the proletariat, is essentially engaged in destroying the philosophy of Marxism. Lenin developed the philosophy of Marxism as the fundamental theoretical foundation of Marxism throughout the entire historical struggle of the party, in indissoluble connection with the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, in indissoluble connection with the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the doctrine of the party, etc. *своеобразное* and the new things that Lenin brings to one side or another of Marxism.

We must start from thoughts that are exceptional in their depth, developed by T. S. Tolstoy. Stalin in his conversation with the first American workers' delegation on September 9, 1927. He said:

"I think that Lenin did not add any 'new principles' to Marxism, just as Lenin did not abolish any of the 'old' principles of Marxism. Lenin was and remains the most faithful and consistent disciple of Marx and Engels, relying entirely on the principles of Marxism. But Lenin was not only an executor of the Marx — Engels doctrine. He was at the same time a follower of the teachings of Marx and Engels. What does it mean? This means that he developed further the teachings of Marx-Engels in relation to the new conditions of development, in relation to the new phase of capitalism, in relation to imperialism. This means that by developing Marx's teaching further in the new

conditions of the class struggle, Lenin has added to the general treasury of Marxism something new in comparison with what was given by Marx and Engels, in comparison with what could have been given in the period of pre-imperialist capitalism, and this new one, introduced by Lenin into the treasury of Marxism, is based entirely on and entirely on the principles given by Marx and Engels. It is in this sense that we speak of Leninism as Marxism in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions⁵⁶⁹."

There is not a single question of Marxist philosophy, there is not a single problem of materialist dialectics, of historical materialism, which Lenin did not develop and concretize in accordance with the conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat in the new historical epoch. It is clear that in matters of dialectical materialism *Lenin does not abolish any of the "old principles" of Marxist philosophy and does not add any "new principles"* .

Lenin's greatness as a theorist of the proletariat, as a man who analyzed and revealed the laws of the new historical epoch, the epoch of imperialism and the proletarian revolution, consists in the fact that, starting from the principles of Marxism, without changing any of them or introducing new principles, *he developed all the components of Marxism in relation to the conditions and tasks of the class revolution. the struggle of the proletariat* .

If we go on to describe the conditions, the peculiarity of the new epoch, and the tasks that the working class faced in the development of problems in the philosophy of Marxism, we should note the following:

First, *the dominance of idealism among broad circles of intellectuals and bourgeois scientists* . In this respect, there is a big difference between the era of pre-monopoly capitalism and the era of monopoly domination. The political peculiarity of imperialism, as Lenin repeatedly notes, is *"reaction along the whole line"* . This reaction is clearly reflected in science and philosophy all along the line. With the entry of capitalism into a new phase, the turn of broad circles of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia towards idealism, mysticism, and clericism intensified. Broad scientific circles have increasingly turned away from materialism. In this respect, the fate of Haeckel's book "The World's Riddles" and the idealistic bacchanalia and pandemonium that arose in the bourgeois press in connection with its publication are extremely characteristic.

Secondly, *there is a deep crisis in physics and the whole of natural science, which was greatly developed already at the beginning of the XX century* . All science, especially physics, has undergone a tremendous development, which has led to a change in the basic old ideas about the structure of matter, about space and time, about matter and motion, about the principle of causality, etc. The discovery of the electron, quantum processes, etc. created a whole revolution in the old ideas. On this basis, many bourgeois scientists began to draw reactionary idealistic conclusions. Lenin points to the development of "physical idealism, " "physiological idealism, "and so on. Lenin emphasizes that here "we have before us a certain international ideological trend that does not depend on any one philosophical system, but follows from certain general reasons that lie outside of philosophy⁵⁷⁰."

Lenin emphasizes that *"the essence of the crisis of modern physics consists in breaking the old laws and basic principles, in rejecting objective reality outside of consciousness, i.e., replacing materialism with idealism and agnosticism. "Matter has disappeared" - this is how one can express the main and typical difficulty that created this crisis in relation to many particular issues⁵⁷¹."*

Third, *the specialization of all bourgeois philosophy on all kinds of epistemological questions, on all kinds of epistemological subtleties, with the aim of providing a philosophical justification for the turn to popery in broad circles of the intelligentsia, under this crisis of bourgeois science* .

The widespread development of neo-Kantian idealism, the "mathematical justification" of

569 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 263.

570 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 247.

571 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 211.

modern natural science, the flourishing of empirio-critical literature, immanent intuitionists, phenomenologists, etc., who invent thousands of epistemological subtleties and details in order to refute the hated materialism for the thousandth time-this is the picture of philosophical development at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Fourthly, *the reflection of all this idealistic reaction among the socialist parties and the development of philosophical revisionism, opportunism, beginning with the neo-Kantian revision of Marxist philosophy and ending with Bogdanov's empiriomonism*. The cries about the lack of a "cognitive-theoretical" foundation in Marxism, about the need to put a "new epistemological foundation" under Marxism, about the need for Marxism to take into account the latest "achievements" of philosophy in the field of the theory of knowledge, the writings that materialism has long been outdated — are becoming widespread. "The ever — more subtle falsification of Marxism, the ever — more subtle falsification of anti-materialist doctrines under Marxism-this is what characterizes modern revisionism both in political economy, in questions of tactics, and in philosophy in general, both in epistemology and in sociology⁵⁷²," Lenin wrote.

Finally, and fifthly — *the need on the part of the representatives of Marxist philosophy to give their own answer to the questions raised in connection with the revolution in natural science*; the need to "cope" with the latest discoveries; the need to break down, from the point of view of dialectical materialism, all the latest tricks and subtleties in the field of bourgeois, professorial philosophy, relying on all the actual achievements of science. Finally, the need to give the most decisive rebuff to this anti-materialist reaction in the workers' parties. That is why Lenin was so insistent on the necessity of considering the struggle against idealistic philosophy in the light of the actual scientific discoveries of the new era, and why Lenin wrote:

"The connection of the new physics, or rather of a certain school in the new physics, with Machism and other varieties of modern idealistic philosophy is beyond the slightest doubt. To dissect Machism and ignore this connection — as Plekhanov does-is to mock the spirit of dialectical materialism, i.e., to sacrifice Engels' method for the sake of one or another letter in Engels⁵⁷³."

All this historical situation, these conditions, the needs and tasks of the class struggle of the proletariat on the front of philosophy and natural science required further development *of the theory of knowledge* — dialectical materialism, required further development of materialist dialectics. In this situation, it was impossible to confine ourselves to defending general basic propositions, but it was necessary to give a detailed theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism, which would answer all the questions of the revolution of natural science, and would be based on a thorough study and generalization of the latest stage in the development of science and, above all, social development. Lenin points out that the "revision "of the" form "of Engels' materialism, the revision of his natural-philosophical propositions, not only does not involve anything" revisionist" in the established sense of the word, but, on the contrary, must necessarily be called Marxism⁵⁷⁴."

In *The Fundamentals of Leninism*, Comrade Stalin wrote:

"None other than Lenin undertook the most serious task of generalizing, in materialist philosophy, the most important thing that science has given in the period from Engels to Lenin, and of comprehensively criticizing the anti-materialist trends among Marxists. Engels said that "materialism has to assume a new form with each new great discovery." It is well known that this task was fulfilled for its time by none other than Lenin in his remarkable book "Materialism and Empirio-criticism"⁵⁷⁵.

Lenin was responsible for the further theoretical substantiation and development of the

572 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 270.

573 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 206.

574 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 206.

575 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 17.

materialist theory of knowledge. It was Lenin who, in accordance with the need of the new epoch, paid special attention to the theory of knowledge of *dialectical materialism*, developing in this respect the teachings of Marx and Engels. This explains why Lenin treated the questions of Marxist philosophy so profoundly, understanding materialist dialectics as the philosophical science of Marxism, and giving a very deep understanding of the unity of dialectics and the theory of knowledge. In all these problems, Lenin does not introduce "new principles" into Marxist philosophy and does not abolish any old ones, but proceeds from the principles of Marx — Engels.

The next point that must be noted when we speak of the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism is that it is none other *than Lenin* of all the Marxists of the modern era, *he has given the most complete and detailed critique of the latest anti-materialist trends*, which we still have to fight to this day. The latest forms of Hegelianism, Kantianism, neo — Kantianism, Machism, subjective idealism, Bogdanovism, and finally physical idealism—all this was mercilessly criticized and exposed by Lenin. Lenin's criticism and exposure of these anti-materialist, anti-dialectical tendencies are the most powerful, for this is not a criticism of them from the standpoint of vulgar materialism, as even Plekhanov sometimes strayed to do. In his critique of these doctrines, Lenin dialectically combines logical criticism with a historical-class approach, considering the connection of these trends with the state of modern natural science.

Another important issue on which we can and should note the new and peculiar one associated with the name of Lenin is the question of *the relation of Marxism to Hegel*. In general, it must be said that the question of Marx's relation to Hegel and the Hegelian dialectic is of great theoretical importance. The whole galaxy of revisionists, beginning with Bernstein, Kunov, Kautsky and ending with our Mechanists and Comrade Bukharin, who do not understand the revolutionary materialist dialectic, deny it or distort it, proceeds essentially from the position that the works of Marx and Engels bear the stain of Hegelian idealism. Even Comrade Bukharin, in his book "The Theory of Historical Materialism" in the chapter "Towards a statement of the problem of historical materialism" — albeit in a rather veiled form — believes that Marx is infected to one degree or another with Hegelianism. This is due to Bukharin's mechanistic conception, to his lack of understanding of the actual relationship that exists between Marxism and Hegel. In Lenin's work on this question we have, first of all, a restoration, a return to a correct understanding of this problem, after all the perversions in this question in the epoch of the Second International. If, however, we were to limit ourselves to this, we would not fully express the essence of Lenin's solution of this problem. Lenin has not only a return, but also a further development and concretization of this problem — since Lenin has a fully developed concept of a consistently and systematically developed theory of dialectical materialism. Lenin's concretization and further development of Marx — Engels' teaching on this question consists in the fact that he (for example, in his philosophical notebooks) provides brilliant examples of *the materialist reworking of Hegel's dialectic* in all the most important basic categories.

The next most important question that needs to be addressed is the question of *the theory of reflection* in Lenin's works. In general, it must be said that the questions of dialectics as a theory of knowledge, the law of the unity of opposites as the core of dialectics, and the theory of reflection are not at all separate and isolated questions. These are all the most important problems of the theory of materialist dialectics, brilliantly developed by Lenin. These are questions that are organically connected to each other. None of them can be understood without the others. Separate the materialist theory of reflection from Lenin's formulation of the question that "dialectics is the theory of knowledge", and nothing remains of this proposition, or rather of its Leninist content. And can dialectics as a theory of knowledge, as a theory of reflection, be understood without the law of unity of opposites as the core of dialectics? Are not Lenin's doctrine of the unity of theory and practice, and Lenin's principle of partisanship in philosophy and science, components of this unified concept? Only by understanding this can we focus on each of these aspects separately.

The theory of reflection is of exceptional importance for the most consistent justification of materialism. It is no accident that it is precisely on this point that the notorious enemy of dialectical materialism, the social fascist Max Adler, concentrates his attack on Leninism.

In his work, which bears the title "textbook of the materialist understanding of history" and which is as far from materialism as heaven is from earth, which is a work specifically directed against Lenin, a slanderous, malicious, anti-Bolshevik document from beginning to end, Max Adler devotes two chapters specifically to the analysis of Lenin's theory of reflection in order to refute this theory, a theory that is really the banner of a genuine materialist point of view.

Here is what Max Adler writes about Lenin's theory of reflection: "Lenin is very fond, as we already know, of calling critical idealism 'old junk'. This is not exactly a polite word, but it should be fully applicable to what Lenin, in his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, repeatedly calls the materialist theory of knowledge. This is, in fact, nothing more than old junk, the so — called and actually long buried under the noise and laughter of critical philosophy — *the theory of reflection ...*"

Let's see what conclusions Adler himself draws after the "burial under noise and laughter" of the reflection theory. He develops a typically idealistic theory based on the conclusions of "modern natural science" about the "disappearance of matter", a "theory" *really buried by Lenin* in "Materialism and empirio-criticism". "Modern natural science," says Adler, "does not need not only God 'as a hypothesis, but also 'Matter', and the great English physicist Pearson could rightly exclaim: 'Matter has disappeared.'" It is unlikely that any comments will be required here...

The theory of reflection in Lenin's sense takes *the whole process of cognition*, from sensation to concept, and considers it historically. And whoever restricts this theory of reflection separates the theory of reflection from practice, from the whole historical path of knowledge; he certainly does not understand Lenin, he certainly cannot understand what Lenin has brought to the understanding of these questions.

The next question that should be considered in the exposition of Lenin's stage is the question *of the law of unity of opposites*.

We often find the opinion that Lenin is the only one who understands this law as the core of dialectics. This is of course an incorrect opinion. One has only to point to Marx's analysis of the dual character of labor in *Capital*, the process of exchange, the process of creating surplus value, the transformation of money into capital, and the crises in *Capital* to understand that this law runs like a red thread throughout *Capital*, and that it forms the real core of dialectics in the works of Marx and Engels. Everyone is familiar with Engels' statements on this subject in *Anti-Duhring* and in *L. A. Schulz. Feuerbach*". It is well known that this law was developed in the works of Marx and Engels as the central question of materialist dialectics. However, it should not be inferred from this that Lenin does not introduce anything new or develop Marxism into this question. Lenin does not introduce new principles to the solution of this question, but Lenin develops the materialist dialectic further.

In order to understand what is the essence of this new thing, what Lenin brings to the understanding of the law of the unity of opposites, it is necessary first of all to understand why this law, as the most important law of the development of the objective world and as the law of knowledge, has acquired special significance in the new historical epoch. If we take *Imperialism, the State and Revolution*, these major works of Lenin, which analyze the relationship between the state and revolution, the problems of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the analysis of the new epoch, we will see that they are constructed from the point of view of applying all categories of materialist dialectics to these phenomena. But the law of the unity of opposites is of particular importance for understanding all this Lenin's analysis of the new epoch and its fundamental problems. Lenin points out that the problem of the contradictions of capitalism in the monopolistic stage of its development is the crowning task of criticism of imperialism. Lenin writes:: "The questions of whether a reformist change in the foundations of imperialism is possible, whether to move forward to further aggravation and deepening of the contradictions generated by it, or back to blunting them, are the fundamental questions of criticism of imperialism. Since the political features of imperialism are reaction along the whole line and the strengthening of national oppression in connection with the oppression of the financial oligarchy and the elimination of free competition, petty-bourgeois-democratic opposition to imperialism appears in almost all the imperialist countries

of the early twentieth century. And the break with Marxism on the part of Kautsky and the broad international trend of Kautskyism consists precisely in the fact that Kautsky not only failed to take care, failed to oppose himself to this petty-bourgeois, reformist, and fundamentally reactionary opposition, but, on the contrary, merged with it practically⁵⁷⁶."

It is clear that the question of how to understand the theory of contradictions, how to apply the laws of materialist dialectics to the analysis of imperialism, is the fundamental question of the critique of imperialism. Along this line there is a watershed between Bolshevism and opportunism of every order. Along this line there is a watershed between the genuine revolutionary understanding of materialist dialectics and those who tried to reduce materialist dialectics to a theory of blunting contradictions. Lenin points out: "Kautsky's theoretical critique of imperialism has nothing in common with Marxism, and therefore is only suitable as an approach to the preaching of peace and unity with opportunists and social-chauvinists, because this critique bypasses and obscures precisely the most profound and fundamental contradictions of imperialism: the contradiction between monopolies and the free competition that exists alongside them, between monopolies and free competition, the gigantic "operations" (and gigantic profits) of finance capital and "fair" trade on the free market, between cartels and trusts on the one hand, and non-cartelized industry on the other, etc⁵⁷⁷."

Opportunists of all sorts who deviate from Marx's dialectic also cover up the fundamental contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie, the contradictions between imperialist states, the contradictions between colonial imperialist countries, etc., etc. All these questions are *fundamental questions of analysis and criticism of imperialism*. It is now clear that in this epoch the question of the law of the unity of opposites could not fail to become extremely acute.

Naturally, this question should have received further theoretical development from Lenin. In his remarks and preparatory works for "Imperialism," Lenin repeatedly notes in the margins the importance of precisely the theoretical, i.e. philosophical, elaboration of the law of the unity of opposites.

If we take Lenin's work "The State and the Revolution", then there is no doubt that the main line along which this work is constructed is to clarify the development of the Marxist point of view on the state as a product of the irreconcilability of the class struggle, as opposed to the social — democratic teachings on the state as a product of class reconciliation. Thus, here, too, the main question of methodological order is the question of the unity of opposites.

Lenin develops and concretizes the question of the correlation between the moments *of unity* and *the struggle* of opposites. Let us recall Lenin's well-known thesis concerning the absoluteness of struggle and the relativity of unity, identity, and coincidence of contradictions.

Lenin emphasizes the need for a concrete analysis of contradictions and various *types* of contradictions. Indeed, in the epoch of imperialism, we have contradictions in their extreme expression between the working class and the capitalists, between the imperialist States, between the mother countries and the colonial countries. These are all different types of contradictions. We must also point out the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry: the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry in the epoch before the victory of the proletarian revolution, the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry in the epoch of the proletarian revolution. Finally, we have an exceptionally ingenious formulation of the question of the correlation between the proletarian and bourgeois-democratic revolutions, when the solution of the problems of the bourgeois-democratic revolution becomes a by-product of the proletarian revolution, etc. The totality of these problems that have arisen in the field of social science, in the field of the scientific justification of the proletarian policy, has undoubtedly been the basis for further theoretical development of the question of materialist dialectics and the law of the unity of

576 Ленин, Империализм как высшая стадия капитализма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIX, стр. 160–161.

577 Ленин, Империализм как высшая стадия капитализма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIX, стр. 166.

opposites, for its concretization, for elucidating the various types of opposites, and so on.

Further developing materialist dialectics as a philosophical science, Lenin did not confine himself to developing the law of the unity of opposites as the core of dialectics. He gave a further theoretical development of all the other categories of materialist dialectics, their connection with each other and with the law of unity of opposites. When we discussed the laws of materialist dialectics earlier, we saw how these questions were developed by Lenin on the basis of the practice of the revolutionary struggle of the epoch of imperialism and the proletarian revolution, and on the basis of his study of the state of modern natural science.

Finally, the question of *the partisanship of philosophy and science*.

The doctrine of partisanship in philosophy and science in general is a crucial link in Lenin's development of dialectical materialism. It is absolutely no accident that it was Lenin who gave such a brilliant further development of this most important question and in precisely this direction. The new era, the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, is an era of gigantic class clashes, powerful proletarian uprisings, an era of unprecedented intensification of the class struggle. The class struggle becomes exceptionally acute in this epoch, the main classes of capitalist society are fully armed in the historical arena, and this struggle rises to a new level in comparison with the period of industrial capitalism. In this era, political parties are developing very much. It is not only the proletariat that is forging its own Communist party in every country, thereby strengthening to a very large extent its consciousness, its unity and organization. The bourgeoisie is also actively forging its own parties. Taking into account the lessons of the proletarian revolution in Russia, taking into account the experience of the first round of proletarian revolutions in the West — the bourgeoisie is organizing intensively, strengthening its parties, creating powerful and disciplined, militarily built party organizations, such as the fascist party in Italy and Germany. The antagonism of capitalism finds its profound expression not only in the field of politics and economics, but this sharp antagonism is also reflected in all areas of science, in the ideological field. And here the class differentiation is very clear.

In his article "The Socialist Party and Non-party Revolutionism" in December 1905, Lenin gave excellent characteristics of partisanship and non-partisanship. Thus he writes: "Strict partisanship is the companion and result of a highly developed class struggle. Conversely, in the interests of an open and broad class struggle, it is necessary to develop strict partisanship⁵⁷⁸."

He goes on to say: "The most complete, complete and well-formed expression of the political struggle of classes is the struggle of parties. Non-partisanship is indifference to the struggle of parties. But this indifference is not equal to neutrality, to abstaining from the struggle, for in the class struggle there can be no neutrals, and in capitalist society one cannot "abstain" from participating in the exchange of products or of labour-power. And exchange inevitably creates an economic struggle, and after it a political struggle. Indifference in the struggle is not, therefore, in fact a withdrawal from the struggle, a refraining from it, or a neutrality. Indifference is the tacit support of the one who is strong, the one who dominates⁵⁷⁹."

In order to avoid any ambiguity in the sense that Lenin's propositions relate not only to political questions proper, but also to the ideological struggle, we will quote one passage from the same article by Lenin. He goes on to write: "Non-partisanship is a bourgeois idea. *Partisanship is a socialist idea*. This proposition is generally applicable to the whole of bourgeois society. Of course, one must be able to apply this general truth to particular questions and special cases⁵⁸⁰."

These passages articulate the problem of partisanship with remarkable clarity. It is true that the application of these principles, these truths to the field of ideology, to the field of science,

578 Ленин, Социалистическая партия и беспартийная революционность, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. VIII, стр. 412.

579 Ленин, Социалистическая партия и беспартийная революционность, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. VIII, стр. 415.

580 Ленин, Социалистическая партия и беспартийная революционность, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. VIII, стр. 416. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

requires taking into account the peculiarity, the specificity of the subject, the special character of this field, the special forms in which the struggle is expressed here. However, there is no doubt that these propositions reveal much for us to understand Lenin's principle of partisanship in philosophy and science.

From what has been said, it becomes quite clear why the theoretical development of Marxist propositions about the party character of science and philosophy is proceeding in this direction in connection with and in accordance with the new epoch. Between Lenin's quoted lines written in 1905, the brilliant pages on the partisanship of philosophy and the struggle of parties in science in *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* in 1908, Lenin's notes on philosophy in the ninth and twelfth Lenin Collections in 1914, and finally Lenin's article *On the Significance of Militant Materialism*, there is a deep inner connection, a link that gives us the opportunity to fully clarify the essence of his teaching about the partisanship of philosophy.

Lenin's development of the principle of party science consists in the fact that he showed all *the limitations of objectivism*, which falls into the apologetics of the ruling classes, and all the limitations of *subjectivism*, which transforms social science into a series of edifications of petty-bourgeois morality. He showed all the limitations of objectivism, which welcomes the spontaneous course of the historical process and does not understand the active, effective role of the revolutionary class in changing reality, as well as all *the limitations of subjectivism*, which reduces the historical process to the actions of an abstract, far-fetched person, who is also endowed with reactionary morality and "modern moral ideas".

Lenin showed that the partisanship of dialectical materialism does not consist in the synthesis (in the sense of reconciliation) of subjectivism and objectivism, as Debordin presented in his book *Lenin as a Thinker*. Lenin showed that the point of view of dialectical materialism is *the highest point* of view, which overcomes and removes both objectivism and subjectivism; it overcomes objectivism because it starts from the active, effective position of the revolutionary class — the proletariat, which changes the world; it overcomes subjectivism because it firmly adheres to the objective reality of non-objective facts.

The partisanship of philosophy is the most important link, the central point, which is characteristic of the Leninist approach to the problems of philosophical theory. This is due to the fact that none other than Lenin gave the most profound theoretical and practical solution of the question of the correlation between theory and practice, tested on the facts of the new epoch after Marx and Engels. It was Lenin who tirelessly emphasized in his writings, in contrast to the theory and practice of the Second International, in contrast to Plekhanov, the position of the founders of materialism that "our theory is not a dogma, but a guide for revolutionary action." Lenin's teaching about the partisanship of philosophy and theory in general has deep internal roots with the entire concept of Leninism as a whole. It is connected with the fact that it is precisely Leninism that has given and continues to give examples of the unity of revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice. The doctrine of partisanship, as if in focus, collects and reflects a number of the most important aspects of Marxism-Leninism. This doctrine expresses most fully, most consistently, and most concretely for our epoch, Marx's thesis that philosophers should not only explain the world, but change it. Lenin's doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy, the solution of the question of subjectivism and objectivism, of theory and practice, is an excellent development and concretization of Marx's first thesis on Feuerbach.

The essence of Lenin's development of the principle of partisanship in philosophy and science can be summarized in the following five points:

First of all. Lenin's doctrine of the partisanship of science and philosophy is the best expression of the tasks of the proletariat in the field of science and philosophy, when all bourgeois science is going through the most severe internal crisis and disintegration, when "non-partisanship in philosophy is only a contemptibly disguised lackeyism before idealism and fideism"⁵⁸¹. Lenin's

581 Ленин, Материализм и эмпириокритицизм, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XIII, стр. 290.

doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy is the best scientific exposure of the class and party character of bourgeois philosophy and theory, as well as of all such social-fascist theories, in an era of acute class struggle.

Secondly. The principle of partisanship of theory means the most complete and detailed interpretation of the Marxist thesis about the effectiveness of our theory. According to the teachings of Leninism, the most advanced, most active, and most effective part of the working class is its party. Therefore, anyone who really and consistently wants to pursue the point of view of the class character of science must extend this understanding to the understanding of the partisanship of science.

Third. Lenin's doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy provides the most complete and detailed solution of the question of theory and practice, of the primacy of practice. Lenin's solution of this question provides an example of the struggle both with the idealistic interpretation of this problem, when theoretical activity is considered primacy, and with the creeping empirical point of view, which eliminates the role and significance of theory in general and theoretical work in particular. Lenin, in all his writings, emphasized the enormous importance of revolutionary theory. Recognizing that without a revolutionary theory there is not and cannot be a revolutionary working-class movement, Lenin at the same time wrote: "By emphasizing the necessity, importance, and enormity of the theoretical work of the Social-Democrats, I do not at all mean that this work should be put first before *practical* work, much less that the second work should be postponed until the first is completed. This is what only fans of the "subjective method in sociology" or followers of utopian socialism would conclude⁵⁸²." The doctrine of the partisanship of materialism expresses precisely the depth of Lenin's solution of the question of theory and practice.

Fourth. The principle of partisanship of philosophy and science provides a classical solution to the most important question of the relationship between philosophy, science and politics. We have seen above what absurdities bourgeois science heaps up on this question, and how social-democratic theorists do their best to break all ties between politics and science. In the meantime, Lenin has given a great deal of new information on this question. It is worth recalling the discussion about trade unions and Comrade Bukharin's accusation against Lenin at that time that his approach was too "political". It was then about the relationship between economics and politics. How did Lenin respond? He wrote: "Politics is a concentrated expression of economics," I repeated in my speech, for I had already heard this absolutely unacceptable reproach for my "political" approach, which is incongruous in the mouth of a Marxist. *Politics cannot fail to take precedence over economics. To think otherwise is to forget the alphabet of Marxism* »⁵⁸³."

Here Lenin's understanding of Marxism and its dialectic, its concrete approach, are most deeply affected. He goes on to explain: "For the question stands (and in Marxist terms it can 2) only in this way: without a correct political approach to the matter, this class will not maintain its dominance, and therefore it won't be able to solve its own production problem »⁵⁸⁴ either."

Lenin here explains in what sense he *puts the political approach in the foreground* . Although economics ultimately decides, however, without a correct political approach, without a correct political line, the proletariat cannot be assured of its victory, and after its victory, the solution of its economic problems. It may seem that Lenin has given here a statement of the question that concerns only economics and politics. That's not so. These statements of Lenin have a much broader meaning, and in particular they are extremely important for understanding our approach to the problems of theory. And here, in matters of theory and theoretical struggle, *the political approach cannot fail to take precedence* . During the struggle against Menshevik idealism, some of its

582 Ленин, Что такое «друзья народа» и как они воюют против социал-демократов?, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. I, стр. 197–198.

583 Ленин, Ещё раз о профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 126.

584 Ленин, Ещё раз о профсоюзах, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVI, стр. 126.

representatives zealously defended the primacy and primacy of philosophy over politics, on the grounds that philosophy is a universal methodology, completely failing to understand the point of view of our party on this question.

Fifth. The doctrine of partisanship in philosophy notes as its most important moment the active struggle for the general line of the party.

Even in his struggle with Struve, as we have seen, Lenin wrote that "materialism includes, so to speak, partisanship, obliging any assessment of events to take the point of view of a certain social group directly and openly⁵⁸⁵." Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, when the Communist Party of the proletariat is the one and only party of the proletariat, when hostile, class — based ideological processes are reflected within the party in the form of various deviations from the general party line, *taking a definite point of view directly and openly can only mean one thing: actively defending and fighting for the general party line*. In connection with all this, to concretize Lenin's position for the present epoch, we can say this: dialectical materialism, in the struggle against all kinds of open or disguised opportunism, includes partisanship, i.e., it obliges us to fight directly and openly, actively and consistently for the general line of the party. The representatives of Menshevik idealism, while trying to define the partisanship of philosophy, gave an extremely abstract, extremely academic, non-partisan definition of the partisanship of philosophy, which allegedly boils down to the fact that the philosophical section of the theoretical front must search for the "methodological" keys of each epoch. The anti-partisanship of this definition consists in the fact that the Deborin group "forgot" that the only leading *theoretical and practical* center in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the party and its Central Committee. The most important feature of Bolshevism and the Bolshevik Party is that the leading staff is not only the political and organizational center of the revolutionary movement, but also its ideological and theoretical center. The peculiarity of Bolshevism, as opposed to the parties of the Second International, lies precisely in the fact that it forges a leadership of the Communist Party that is a genuine theoretical synthesis of theory and practice, theory and politics, theory and organization, theory and tactics. Precisely because the leading staff of Leninism provides such a synthesis, it is the center of truly *creative Marxism*.

6.5. Tov. Stalin and the Materialist dialectic

The further development of Marxist-Leninist theory in all its constituent parts, including the philosophy of Marxism, is associated with the name of Comrade Lenin. Of Stalin. In all his practical work, in all his theoretical works, vol. Stalin embodied all the experience of the world struggle of the proletariat, all the rich content of the Marxist-Leninist theory. Stalin develops and concretizes the teachings of Leninism decisively in all areas. Special attention is paid in all his works by T. Stalin devotes himself to the problem of the unity of theory and practice, to the question of the militant *creative* character of Marxist teaching.

The militant character of Marxist-Leninist theory, the development of Marxist teaching as a revolutionary and critical weapon for changing the world, *and the unity of theory and practice*—all this is further developed in the works of T. V. Lenin. Of Stalin. It was he who waged an enormous struggle against all sorts of dogmatic and scholastic perversions of Marx's dialectic. In the struggle against voluntarism, against Trotsky's eclecticism, against Zinoviev's "quote Marxism," against Bukharin's scholasticism, against the theory of equilibrium, and against Menshevik idealism — in the struggle against these theories, vol. Stalin raises the development of our combat theory to a new level.

With particular force exposes T. *The dogmatism* of international Menshevism and social-fascism, and their emasculation of any revolutionary content from Marxism.

As early as at the Sixth Party Congress, vol. Stalin, objecting to Preobrazhensky's statements

585 Ленин, Экономическое содержание народничества, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. I, стр. 288.

about the impossibility of the victory of socialism in your country, pointed out:

"It is possible that Russia will be the country paving the way for socialism... We must reject the outdated notion that only Europe can show us the way. *There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the ground of the latter* »⁵⁸⁶."

The whole subsequent struggle with Trotskyism, with the Zinoviev-Kamenev variety of it, shows with what ingenious sagacity the theory was applied. Stalin's materialist dialectic on the most important question, the question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country. Drawing a line of principle between dogmatic "Marxism" and genuine Marxism is the leitmotif of a whole series of further speeches by T. V. Lenin. Stalin, in which he deals with these problems. Especially you should pay attention to the article by T. Stalin, dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Lenin's birth, published in Pravda in April 1920. There's T. Stalin wrote:

"There are two groups of Marxists. Both of them work under the banner of Marxism and consider themselves "genuinely" Marxist. And yet they are far from identical. Moreover, there is a whole gulf between them, because their methods of work are diametrically opposed.

The first group is usually limited to the external recognition of Marxism, its solemn proclamation. Unable or unwilling to grasp the essence of Marxism, unable or unwilling to put it into practice, it turns the living and revolutionary propositions of Marxism into dead formulas that say nothing. It bases its activities not on experience, not on taking into account practical work, but on quotations from Marx. It draws its instructions and directives not from the analysis of living reality, but from analogies and historical parallels. The discrepancy between words and deeds is the main disease of this group...

The second group, on the contrary, shifts the center of gravity of the question from the external recognition of Marxism to its implementation, *to its implementation. Outlining the ways and means of implementing Marxism that correspond to the situation, and changing these ways and means when the situation changes* — *this is what this group mainly focuses on* ... Marx's words are quite appropriate to this group, because Marxists cannot stop at explaining the world, but must go further in order to explain the world. to change it. The name of this group is Bolshevism, communism⁵⁸⁷." Do you need a clearer, more precise description of the work of T. himself? Stalin? The speech at the conference of Marxist agrarian workers, where the task of eliminating the kulaks as a class was set, the speech at the meeting of economic managers — six historical conditions, recent speeches on collective farm issues, etc — - all these are examples of" putting into practice "the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, all these are examples of" outlining ways and means of implementing Marxism that correspond to the situation changes in these ways and means as the environment changes."

T. returns many times. Stalin on the question of *the effective character of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine* on the struggle against all and sundry opportunistic perversions. Here is another place:

"What is Marxism? Marxism is a science. Can Marxism survive and develop as a science if it is not enriched by the new experience of the class struggle of the proletariat, if it does not digest this experience from *the point of view of Marxism, from the point of view of the proletariat?* the Marxist method? Clearly, it can't.

Is it not clear, then, that Marxism requires the improvement and enrichment of old formulas, taking into account new experience, while *preserving the old ones?* Zinoviev does the opposite, preserving the letter and substituting the letter of certain propositions of Marxism for the point of view of Marxism and its method.

What can there be in common between real Marxism and the substitution of the letter of certain formulas for the basic line of Marxism and quotations from certain propositions of Marxism?"⁵⁸⁸.

586 Сб. «На путях к Октябрю», 1925 г., стр. 138. Подчёркнуто нами. — Авт.

587 Сталин, О Ленине, Партиздат, 1932 г., стр. 5–6.

588 Сталин, Об оппозиции, стр. 510.

This characterization of the Marxist method, of materialist dialectics as a science that must be constantly enriched by new experience of the class struggle of the proletariat, which must theoretically generalize and digest this experience, is very important for understanding the essence of Marxist theory. Thus, we see that the fundamental tenet of all the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin is the creative character of the mighty Marxist teaching, the unity of revolutionary theory and practice, and the materialist dialectic, which is the greatest instrument for understanding and changing the world.

And precisely because T. Stalin gives us an example of such an effective understanding and application of Marxism, and that is why he also gives us examples of further theoretical development of questions of materialist dialectics. In fact, it is only necessary to recall the speeches of T. Stalin on the question of the link, on the subjective and objective factors of historical development, on the categories of possibility and reality, and his critique of the theory of equilibrium and the theory of self-flow, in order to make it clear what a profound theoretical development of the questions of materialist dialectics he gives us. Exactly T. In the true spirit of Lenin's testament "On the Significance of Militant Materialism", Stalin develops this dialectic from all sides, using "those models of dialectics in the field of economic and political relations of which recent history, especially the modern imperialist war and revolution, provide unusually many⁵⁸⁹ examples."

Dialectics is the soul of Marxism, says Comrade Lenin. Stalin. At the XVI Party Congress, vol. Stalin characterized Lenin's formulation of the question of the right of nations to self-determination, up to and including secession, as follows: "this' contradictory ' formula reflects the vital truth of Marx's dialectic, which enables the Bolsheviks to take the most impregnable fortresses in the field of the national question⁵⁹⁰." Further criticizing opportunism, he said: "Whoever does not understand this dialectic of historical processes is lost to Marxism. The trouble with our deviators is that they do not understand and do not want to understand Marx's dialectic⁵⁹¹."

Let us give here two or three examples of the dialectic of T. Stalin, who gave and continues to give the Bolsheviks the opportunity to take the most impregnable fortresses. Let us take the analysis of the nature of collective farms given by vol. Stalin in his speech at the conference of agrarian Marxists. Defining the type of collective farm economy as one of the forms of socialist economy. Stalin approaches this definition from the point of view of analyzing the relations of people in the production process, i.e., from the point of view of the only consistent Marxist criterion for determining the social nature of the economy. And from this only correct point of view: "Does not the collective farm represent the socialization of the main instruments of production on land belonging to the same state? What grounds are there for asserting that collective farms as a type of economy do not represent one of the forms of socialist economy?"⁵⁹² Having established the socialist nature of collective farms as a type of economy, Comrade Stalin proceeds to analyze the internal contradictions of the collective farm, which distinguish it from the consistently socialist type of economy and enterprises. The analysis of elements of class struggle in collective farms is particularly interesting. He's writing: "The mistake of our" left-wing " phrasemongers is that they do not see this difference. What does class struggle *mean outside* the collective farms, *before* the formation of collective farms? This means fighting the kulak, *which owns* the tools and means of production and *enslaves* the poor with these tools and means of production. This struggle is a life-and-death struggle. And what does class struggle *on the basis of* collective farms mean? This means,

589 Ленин, О значении воинствующего материализма, Соч., изд. 3-е, т. XXVII, стр. 187.

590 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 566.

591 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 567.

592 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 454.

first of all, that the kulak is broken and deprived of the tools and means of production... This means, finally, that we are dealing with a struggle between members of the collective farms, some of whom have not yet freed themselves from the individualistic and kulak survivals and are trying to use certain inequalities in the collective farms to their advantage, while others want to expel these survivals and this inequality from the collective⁵⁹³ farms."

We thus see that T. Stalin reveals *the qualitative* difference that exists between the class struggle in the countryside outside the collective farm and the elements of the class struggle in the collective farm. It is only by mastering perfectly the method of materialist dialectics, the method of truly concrete analysis of complex concrete reality, and only by being able to apply in a Leninist way the most important laws of dialectics, the laws of quality, quantity, measure, and the law of the unity of opposites, that such a clear analysis of the social nature of collective farms can be made. It is one thing to have contradictions in the countryside *outside the collective farms* on a qualitatively different basis; it is another thing to have existing contradictions in the collective farms on a different qualitative basis, in a different type of economy. It is one thing to fight the kulak, the owner of the tools and means of production, a life — and-death struggle; it is another thing to fight the kulak, individualistic remnants on the basis of collective farms. The first type of contradiction is one thing, the second type of contradiction is another.

All works by T. Stalin's ideas represent an inexhaustible number of such examples of materialist dialectics. We will only mention the following question here — the question of national and socialist culture. Everyone knows Stalin's analysis of the character and slogans of national culture under the rule of the bourgeoisie and under the dictatorship of the proletariat. These are the two types of resolution of the unity of form and content that living reality gives us, and which have been so expertly revealed. By Stalin. That's what T. said. Stalin at the XVI Party Congress: "What is national culture under the rule of the national bourgeoisie? *Bourgeois* in its content and form it is a national culture, which aims to poison the masses with the poison of nationalism and strengthen the rule of the bourgeoisie. What is national culture under the dictatorship of the proletariat? *The Socialist Party* It is a national culture in its content and form, with the aim of educating the masses in the spirit of internationalism and strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. How can these two fundamentally different phenomena be confused without breaking with Marxism⁵⁹⁴?"

The main thing in the approach T. Stalin's approach to the analysis of these phenomena is the difference between the class structure and the class nature of a twofold type of rule — the rule of the national bourgeoisie and the rule of the socialist proletariat, its dictatorship. Extremely characteristic in this analysis is the materialistic primacy of content in the dialectical unity of form and content. Stalin does not recognize once and for all this unity of form and content; he analyzes the historical, class background of this unity. The application of developmental theory to the question of culture is extremely characteristic. Let us quote this classic passage from the work of T. Of Stalin. He wrote: "It may seem strange that we, who are supporters *слияния* of the future merging of national cultures into one common culture (both in form and content) with one common language, are at the same time supporters *of the flourishing* of national cultures at the present moment, during the dictatorship of the proletariat. But there's nothing strange about it. It is necessary to allow national cultures to develop and unfold, revealing all their potentials in order to create conditions for merging them into one common culture with one common language. The flourishing of national in form and socialist in content cultures under the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country *in order to* merge them into one common socialist (both in form and in content) culture with one common language, when the proletariat will prevail all over the world and socialism will enter into everyday life—this is precisely the dialectic of Lenin's formulation of the question of socialism. national culture"⁵⁹⁵.

593 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 455.

594 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 565.

595 Сталин, Вопросы ленинизма, изд. 9-е., стр. 566.

Here are vivid examples of materialist dialectic. Anyone who thinks that we have only one use here would be deeply mistaken *применение* dialectics, not its development, not the development of the theory of materialist dialectics. We must understand that *the actual creative application of the method of materialist dialectics is at the same time its actual theoretical development*. In this case, the example of the unity of form and content shows what theoretical richness we get here. In addition to the two types of unity of form and content, the theory of development applied to the national question provides a new type of unity of opposites: a culture of communist society that is unified both in form and content.

We have given here two examples of the application and development of materialist dialectics in order to show how the party, etc. Stalin, following Lenin's directives and instructions, develops from all sides a materialist dialectic, without which Marxism is, in Lenin's words, not a fighter, but a fighter. In the light of a creative understanding of Marxism, an effective understanding of dialectical materialism, the scholastic character of the development of dialectics, which was "conducted" by Menshevik idealism in isolation from the practice of socialist construction, becomes quite clear.

Our party attaches exceptional importance to revolutionary theory, without which revolutionary practice is unthinkable. Materialist dialectic is the revolutionary soul of Marxism-Leninism.

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